In Watson v. Lopes, 2025 ONSC 5934, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice revisited the boundaries of a testator’s moral obligation to a long-term common-law spouse under the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”).
Kenneth Watson and Suzanne Crawford lived together as common-law partners for 26 years until Ms. Crawford’s death in 2021. At 71, Mr. Watson was retired and claimed he relied entirely on Ms. Crawford for shelter and financial support. In her 2018 will, Ms. Crawford allowed him to live rent-free in her home in Ajax for one year after her death but left the residue of her estate to her only child, Kerri-Ann Lopes, the Respondent.
Following Ms. Crawford’s death, Ms. Lopes, as estate trustee, sold the Ajax residence that she and her mother had owned as joint tenants, realizing net proceeds of over $740,000. Mr. Watson applied under Part V of the SLRA for dependant’s support, arguing that Ms. Crawford had failed to make adequate provision for him in her will, and seeking the full value of the estate.
The Parties’ Positions
Mr. Watson asserted that he was financially dependent on Ms. Crawford, relying on her inheritance and her home for shelter during retirement. He also claimed a beneficial interest in the Ajax property, arguing that his contributions toward mortgage payments and improvements entitled him to an ownership interest.
Ms. Lopes conceded that Mr. Watson met the definition of “spouse” and “dependant” under the SLRA but maintained that her mother’s will provided adequate support. She argued that he had sufficient assets of his own, including proceeds from a cottage sale and potential ownership of a British Columbia property. She further denied that the Ajax residence formed part of the estate, as it passed to her by right of survivorship.
The Court’s Analysis
The Court agreed that Mr. Watson qualified as a dependant but found that he failed to prove he was financially dependent on Ms. Crawford at the time of her death. His evidence of the deceased’s $300,000 inheritance that allegedly funded their lifestyle was uncorroborated and inconsistent. The court also found no proof that he contributed financially to the Ajax home.
The court also scrutinized Mr. Watson’s credibility regarding his assets. The evidence suggested he may have had an ownership interest in a property in British Columbia, contradicting his claim of financial hardship. The judge concluded that he was capable of providing for his own shelter and had not fully disclosed his assets.
Despite rejecting his legal and equitable claims, the court turned to the issue of moral obligation. Citing Cummings v. Cummings and Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, the court emphasized that “adequate provision” under the SLRA extends beyond financial necessity—it encompasses society’s expectation that a “judicious person” would provide reasonably for a long-term partner. Over their 26-year relationship, Mr. Watson had supported Ms. Crawford, cared for her during illness, and contributed to household maintenance.
While Ms. Crawford’s will allowed Mr. Watson to stay in the home for a year, the court found that this fell short of fulfilling her moral obligation towards him. The court concluded that “a judicious person in the circumstances” would have provided more generous support to a partner of such longstanding emotional and practical significance.
Accordingly, the court ordered a lump-sum payment of $50,000 to Mr. Watson as dependant’s support, payable from the estate. Though modest compared to his claim for the full estate, in the end, the court struck a careful balance between fairness and testamentary freedom by acknowledging moral obligation without undermining a testator’s intentions.
Thank you for reading!