Tag: Trust

14 Jul

Possible Changes to the CRA’s Voluntary Disclosure Program

Rebecca Rauws Estate & Trust Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

We have previously blogged about the CRA’s Voluntary Disclosure Program and how it can, for instance, be useful for estate trustees should they encounter a situation where the deceased whose estate they are administering failed to meet their tax obligations. Essentially, the program gives a taxpayer a second chance to come forward voluntarily and change a tax return that was previously filed, or to file a return that should have been filed, and to request relief from prosecution or penalties as a result of any erroneous or incomplete filings.

However, as discussed in a recent article in the Financial Post, the CRA has proposed some changes to the Voluntary Disclosure Program. The draft “Information Circular – IC00-1R6-Voluntary Disclosures Program” prepared by the CRA for discussion purposes can be found here. The key proposed changes would narrow the eligibility for the Voluntary Disclosure Program, and impose additional conditions on taxpayers who are applying. The proposed changes also include less generous relief in certain circumstances, such as cases of major non-compliance.

As discussed in a PwC Tax Insights publication, another proposed change creates two tracks into which the CRA can assign a taxpayer upon application to the Voluntary Disclosure Program—either the “general program” or the “limited program”. The general program is intended for inadvertent and minor non-compliance, while the limited program is intended for major non-compliance. The general program involves mostly minor changes, including a limitation on interest relief. Major non-compliance, which will fall into the limited program, includes, for example, active efforts to avoid detection, multiple years of non-compliance, a sophisticated taxpayer, or disclosure being made after an official CRA statement regarding its intended focus of compliance or following CRA correspondence or campaigns. If an application is assigned to the limited program, the relief available to the taxpayer will no longer include interest relief or relief from penalties other than gross negligence penalties. The determination of which track an application will be assigned to will be made on a case-by-case basis.

Previously, there were four conditions that had to be met in order to be considered as a valid disclosure. The proposal would add a fifth condition, requiring payment of the estimated tax owing along with the application. The changes described above are only a few of the proposed changes, and all such changes can be found in the Information Circular.

The CRA will be accepting comments with respect to the changes proposed in the draft Information Circular – IC00-1R6 – Voluntary Disclosures Program until August 8, 2017. Any changes to the program would come into effect as of January 1, 2018.

Thanks for reading,

Rebecca Rauws

 

Other blog posts that may be of interest:

13 Jul

Vanier v Vanier: Power of Attorney Disputes, Undue Influence, and Losing Sight of a Donor’s Best Interests

Rebecca Rauws Power of Attorney Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Often in power of attorney litigation,  relationship issues between past or present attorneys may take centre stage, with the unfortunate consequence that the best interests of the donor of the power of attorney may get lost amid suspicions and accusations being thrown back and forth. This can often arise in situations where siblings are involved in a dispute regarding power of attorney for a parent, and, in fact, was the situation in the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Vanier v Vanier, 2017 ONCA 561.

Background

At issue was the power of attorney for property of Rita, whose husband had predeceased her, leaving her his entire estate. She had three adult children: twin sons, Pierre and Raymond, and a daughter, Patricia. There was a power of attorney for property executed in 2011 naming Patricia. Unfortunately, Patricia allegedly took advantage of her role as Rita’s power of attorney for property, leading to litigation and a settlement. As a result, Rita executed a power of attorney for property in 2013 naming Pierre and Raymond, jointly and severally, as her attorneys for property (the “2013 POA”).

However, Pierre and Raymond became suspicious of each other, steps taken by each of them as Rita’s attorneys for property, and their relationship broke down. Issues arose in relation to Rita’s ability to access her money; in particular, Raymond had failed to cooperate in relation to unfreezing some corporate assets that had been frozen as part of the litigation with Patricia, and instructed Rita’s lawyer not to release settlement funds received from Patricia to Rita. Consequently Rita could not access funds to pay for basic living expenses, including rent at her retirement home. As a result, Pierre suggested that Rita take certain steps to facilitate access to her funds, including executing a power of attorney for property naming Pierre as her sole attorney for property, which Rita did in 2015 (the “2015 POA”).

Litigation and Appeal

Raymond brought an application seeking Pierre’s removal as attorney for property and a declaration that the 2015 POA was void. He also brought a motion seeking interim relief. The decision on the motion was appealed by Raymond, leading to this decision from the Court of Appeal. The Court considered 5 issues on appeal, but I will address only 1 of them for the purposes of this blog, being whether the motion judge erred in applying the wrong test for undue influence.

Proper Test for Undue Influence

Raymond argued that the proper test to be used was not the test for testamentary undue influence, but rather the test for inter vivos equitable undue influence, which would shift the onus of proving undue influence from Raymond, to Pierre, who would have to prove that Rita signed the 2015 POA willingly and without undue influence.

The Court of Appeal found that the application of the inter vivos test had not been argued before the motion judge, was a new issue raised on appeal, and, based on the general rule, the Appeal Court could not consider it. Moreover, there was no need for the Court to consider whether to grant leave to allow a new argument in this regard, as in any event, the inter vivos equitable undue influence test had no application on the facts.

In order to shift the burden of proof from the complainant (in this situation Raymond, arguing on behalf of Rita) to the other party (in this case, Pierre), two prerequisites must be met:

  1. The complainant reposed trust and confidence in the other party; and
  2. The transaction is not readily explicable by the parties’ relationship; the transaction is “immoderate and irrational”.

Pierre conceded that Rita did repose trust and confidence in him. However, the Court found that Rita’s decision to execute the 2015 POA was not “immoderate or irrational”. The Court noted that while the decision was emotionally difficult for Rita, it was totally rational. She knew that she was having issues accessing funds needed to pay her basic expenses. She also knew that some of Raymond’s actions had led to her inability to access those funds.  The Court also found that the 2015 POA conferred little, if any, benefit on Pierre. Lastly, even if the inter vivos test applied, the Appeal Court held that the record did not support a finding of undue influence.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal commented that it endorsed the words of the motion judge who had expressed the view that Raymond and Pierre had “lost sight of the fact that it is Rita’s best interests that must be served here, not their own pride, suspicions, authority or desires”, stating also that it hoped that in light of this decision, Rita’s sons would honour her wishes and end the litigation.

Thanks for reading,

Rebecca Rauws

 

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11 Apr

Hull on Estates #514 – Intersections in Trust and Family Law

76admin Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Podcasts, PODCASTS / TRANSCRIBED, Show Notes, Show Notes, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

This week on Hull on Estates, Ian Hull discusses the various areas of interplay between trust law and family law.

 Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.
04 Apr

Hull on Estates #513 – Drafting Protection of Trustees

76admin Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Podcasts, PODCASTS / TRANSCRIBED, Show Notes, Show Notes, Trustees, Wills Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

This week on Hull on Estates, Natalia Angelini and Stuart Clark discuss options that may be available to help protect a trustee when drafting a Will or Trust.

 Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.
16 Feb

The Donald J. Trust

Noah Weisberg Beneficiary Designations, Executors and Trustees, In the News, Trustees Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

The media cannot get enough of President Donald Trump.  Regardless of whether you turn on the television, or pick up a newspaper, there seem to be endless articles about the policies and the decisions he has made.  As this is an estates blog, I thought it would be interesting to discuss the recent commentary regarding the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust (the “Trust”).

Before his election, the then President-elect Donald Trump was questioned as to whether he intended to place his assets in a blind trust.

What is a blind trust? In order to answer this, I refer to a prior Hull & Hull blog which states that, “a blind trust can be thought of as an individual relinquishing control over their assets, and providing them to a trustee to manage them on their behalf. The trustee has complete discretion over how to invest the individual’s assets, with the beneficiary being provided with no information regarding how the investments are being held, and the beneficiary having no say in how the funds are managed. As the beneficiary has no idea what their funds are invested in, the theory is that they would not be inclined to enact government policy which would favour their own investments, and that they would be able to avoid a conflict of interest”.

Documents recently made available to the public provide insight into the terms of the Trust.  For instance, the assets of the Trust include liquid assets (from the sale of investments), as well as his physical and intellectual properties.  The Trustees of the Trust are the President’s eldest son, Donald Trump Jr., and Allen Weisselberg, the Trump Organisation’s chief financial officer.  Apparently, the President has the ability to revoke the trustees’ authority (I presume by saying, ‘you’re fired’) at any time. Moreover, according to the New York Times, the President will continue to receive reports on any profits/losses.

Of course, there are two views as to whether these Trust terms constitute a blind trust.  While some pundits suggest that the Trust satisfactorily distances the President from his assets, others suggest that the President has not gone far enough to absolve himself of potential conflicts of interest and is therefore not a blind trust.

Find this topic interesting?  Please consider these related Hull & Hull LLP Blogs & Podcasts:

Noah Weisberg

17 Jan

Can you be adopted into a Trust?

Stuart Clark Estate & Trust Tags: , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

When one thinks of a “trust fund baby“, images of a lavish lifestyle supported by family wealth probably come to mind. But with the images likely comes the sad realization that such a lifestyle will not be enjoyed be you; either you are born into such wealth or you are not. But is this necessarily true? Could you be adopted into a trust, and with it adopt the lifestyle of a trust fund baby? If a trust has been set up which provides that the beneficiaries of the trust are to be the issue (i.e. children) of a specific individual, if such an individual legally adopts you, would you become a beneficiary of the trust?

In Ontario, the legal status of adopted children is governed by the Child and Family Services Act (the “CFSA“). Section 158(2) of the CFSA provides that, for the purposes of the law, upon an adoption order being granted the adopted child becomes the child of the adoptive parent and ceases to be the child of the person who was his or her parent before the adoption order was granted.

With respect to the question of whether an adopted child gains status under any will or trust, section 158(4) of the CFSA provides:

“In any will or other document made at any time before or after the 1st day of November, 1985, and whether the maker of the will or document is alive on that day or not, a reference to a person or group or class of persons described in terms of relationship by blood or marriage to another person shall be deemed to refer to or include, as the case may be, a person who comes within the description as a result of an adoption, unless the contrary is expressed.” [emphasis added]

Simply put, so long as the will or trust deed does not specifically preclude adopted children from becoming included as part of any class of persons described by relationship by blood or marriage, an adopted child would be treated no differently than a biological child in determining who forms part of such a class. As a result, presuming that the trust in question does not bar adopted children from becoming beneficiaries, should the wealthy individual contemplated in the hypothetical above legally adopt you, you would become a beneficiary of the trust.

Your dreams of living as a trust fund baby may not be over yet. Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

Saskatchewan’s New Adoption Regulations

Adult Adoptions

The All Families are Equal Act is Passed!

29 Nov

Hull on Estates #495: Revisiting Mutual Wills

Hull & Hull LLP Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Joint Accounts, Podcasts, PODCASTS / TRANSCRIBED, Show Notes, Show Notes Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

 This week on Hull on Estates, Ian Hull and Lisa Haseley discuss the Mutual Wills Doctrine. Link to Paul Trudelle’s paper: Mutual Wills A Review http://bit.ly/2fs2l5P

Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.

Click here for more information on Ian M. Hull.

Click here for more information on Lisa Haseley.

10 Nov

Trusts – Disclosure Obligations to Beneficiaries of Corporate Documentation

Stuart Clark Estate & Trust Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

The composition of assets held by a trust can be complex. In situations wherein a significant amount of wealth is held in a trust, the trust can often be composed of various corporate entities (whether numbered companies or otherwise), which in turn can often hold interests in other corporations. The administration of such corporate entities can have wide ranging implications, with the trusts perhaps only owning a portion of any shares in the overall structure. But what right, if any, does a beneficiary of the trust have to view the backing corporate documentation for such corporations? Does a beneficiary of a trust have an automatic right to view all backing corporate documentation, or do the trustees have the authority to refuse the request in certain circumstances?

Although there is little jurisprudence in Canada on the subject, the English case of Butt v. Kelson, [1952] Ch. 197, has been cited as a leading authority. In Butt v. Kelson, Justice Romer provides the following commentary in confirming that beneficiaries of a trust have certain rights to compel the release of backing corporate documentation:

Release of backing corporate documentation
“In Butt v. Kelson, Justice Romer provides the following commentary in confirming that beneficiaries of a trust have certain rights to compel the release of backing corporate documentation”

“What I think is the true way of looking at the matter is that which was presented to this court by Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas, that is that the beneficiaries are entitled to be treated as though they were the registered shareholders in respect of trust shares, with the advantages and disadvantages (for example, restrictions imposed by the articles) which are involved in that position, and that they can compel the trustee directors if necessary to use their votes as the beneficiaries, or as the court, if the beneficiaries themselves are not in agreement, think proper, even to the extent of altering the articles of association if the trust shares carry votes sufficient for that purpose… I would propose, accordingly, that the declaration which has been made be discharged, but that there should be inserted into the order liberty to [the beneficiary] to apply in these proceedings in relation to any document which he may hereafter desire to see and of which [the trustees] decline to give him inspection. [emphasis added]

Justice Romer’s commentary suggests that at minimum a beneficiary of a trust is entitled to the same disclosure rights regarding any corporation owned by the trust as if the beneficiary were the shareholder of the shares which the trust owns. Whether such disclosure rights go beyond that of a shareholder, and whether the beneficiary can compel the release of any documentation available only to the directors, will need to be determined on a case by case basis, with Justice Romer suggesting that it may even be possible in circumstances where the trust is the majority shareholder for the beneficiaries to compel the trustees (as shareholders) to alter the articles of incorporation to provide for the release of certain documentation which otherwise may not have been available to them. Whether the beneficiaries would be entitled to receive such documentation would need to be determined by the court on a case by case basis.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

13 Sep

Application for Directions – Trustee Act

Stuart Clark Trustees Tags: , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Being a trustee of a trust can be perilous, with trustees facing potential personal liability should they make the wrong decision. As a safeguard against such potential liability, when issues arise in the administration of a trust, trustees may consider commencing an Application for the opinion, advice or direction of the court in accordance with the Trustee Act. Section 60(1) of the Trustee Act provides:

“A trustee, guardian or personal representative may, without the institution of an action, apply to the Superior Court of Justice for the opinion, advice or direction of the court on any question respecting the management or administration of the trust property or the asserts of a ward or a testator or intestate.”

Should the court accept such an Application, and provide the trustees with directions regarding the issue, the trustees are insulated from liability as it relates to the beneficiaries regarding such an issue so long as they act in accordance with the directions of the court. This is made clear by section 60(2) of the Trustee Act, which provides:

As per the Trustee Act, draft an Application for Directions to safeguard a trustee from potential liability.
“As a safeguard against such potential liability, when issues arise in the administration of a trust, trustees may consider commencing an Application for the opinion, advice or direction of the court in accordance with the Trustee Act.”

“The trustee, guardian or personal representative acting upon the opinion, advice or direction given shall be deemed, so far as regards that person’s responsibility, to have discharged that person’s duty as such trustee, guardian or personal representative, in the subject-matter of the application, unless that person has been guilty of some fraud, wilful concealment or misrepresentation in obtaining such opinion, advice or direction.”

Notably, while section 60(1) of the Trustee Act allows trustees to direct a specific issue for the “opinion, advice or direction” of the court, the court has been clear that on such an Application the court will not exercise discretionary decisions on behalf of the trustees. Such a point was recently made clear by Justice Broad in Keller v. Wilson, where at paragraph 25 the court states:

“The fact that trustees are expressly permitted by the Trustee Act to apply for the opinion advice or direction of the Court does not authorize the court to exercise discretionary powers on behalf of trustees, thereby shifting responsibility from the trustees, on whom the settlor of the trust placed such responsibility, to the court. This is so even though subsection 60(2) of the Trustee Act provides a specific indemnification to trustees who act upon the opinion, advice or direction of the court.” [emphasis added]

Cases like Keller v. Wilson make it clear that on an Application for opinion, advice, or direction, the court will not exercise discretionary decisions on behalf of the trustee, with their jurisdiction to provide directions being limited to questions of a “legal” nature relating to the discharging of the trustees’ duties. To this effect, the court’s direction can be thought of the court advising whether the trustee “can” not “should” do a particular action. While the court will advise whether the trustee has the legal authority to do a particular action, they will not make such a discretionary decision on behalf of the trustee.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

04 Jul

Valuing Intangibles Assets

Ian Hull Executors and Trustees, General Interest, In the News Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

I recently came across an interesting New York Estate Planning Blog, which attempts to address the valuation of intangible property in relation to the payment of estate administration tax.

Although it is rather straightforward that estate trustees are required to value assets of a deceased person, and pay taxes on those assets, the issue posed by the blog is, whether intangible assets are included in the payment of estate administration taxes, and if so, how a valuation is reached.

G96BHG75X8In Ontario, intangible property is deemed to be owned by the deceased at the time of death, and is therefore included in the calculation of estate administration tax.  This has been made clear by the Ministry of Finance.

Valuing intangible property appears to be less clear though.  Apparently, in the USA, disputes have arisen between estate trustees and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), over the valuation of intangible assets, and to the amount of estate administration tax paid.

This dispute seems to be highlighted by the valuation of publicity rights.  For example, the estate trustees of Michael Jackson’s estate have valued his estate at $2,105.00, whereas the IRS has attributed a value of $1.125 billion – therefore alleging that an additional $702 million is owned in estate administration tax (based on taxes and penalties).  According to the LA Times, most of the dispute is over the price attributable to the King of Pop’s image, and his interest in a Trust which includes the ownership of Beatles songs, including Yesterday, Get Back, and Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band.

While most Ontario residents will not be burdened with valuing publicity rights, it is nonetheless important to consider the inclusion of assets, including intangible assets, in calculating estate administration tax, and that a proper valuation is obtained.  Otherwise, in reviewing the payment of estate administration tax paid, the CRA may not ‘Let it Be’.

Ian M. Hull

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