Does a testator have to sign his or her own Will to be valid? A little used provision of the Succession Law Reform Act permits a Will to be signed by some other person (an “amanuensis”) in testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction.
Our managing partner, Suzana Popovic-Montag, wrote several on this very topic.
With the logistical issues associated with execution of wills by video-conference, it may be that this manner of execution may become more widely used.
If this is to be done using presence by video conference, we have come up with some suggestions in our Hull e-State Planner Blog. (click here)
Note that the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 does not specifically permit execution by an amanuensis for Powers of Attorney.
We continue in unchartered waters and we welcome any suggestions or comments.
The Victorians consigned themselves to more subtlety in their works of entertainment than we at present do. To all appearances, theirs was decidedly not an age capable of enjoying rap music and HBO comedies. The spiciest themes in their art, therefore, would include marriage intrigues, duels, financial scandals – or, as we see in George Eliot’s Middlemarch – controversial wills and eccentric testators.
The wills and estates subplot in Middlemarch is comprised of all the ingredients that you may see in a modern legal drama: a rich and erratic miser (Mr. Featherstone) manipulating his relatives with implied promises of future bequests; the idle protégée (Fred Vincy) who accumulates debts with the idea that the testator will bail him out; concern over the testator’s attachment to his young caregiver (Mary Garth); a train of impoverished relatives ill-concealing their greedy expectations; and much discussion on why “blood” was deserving and why “strangers” were not.
It is remarkable how little has changed in a century or so with respect to wills and estates. Then, as now, a Mr. Featherstone who promises a bequest, receives consideration, and then goes back on his word, may be found to have broken a binding contract – as occurred in Legeas v. Trusts & Guarantee Co. Likewise, a ruling of unjust enrichment (Moore v. Sweet) or specific performance (Folsetter v. Yorkshire & Canadian Trust Co.) could be made against him/his estate.
Still relevant today are the challenges of undue influence and incapacity. In the story, the scheming relatives are alarmed at Mr. Featherstone’s connection to Ms. Garth. She, all too aware of an undue influence allegation, refuses her patron’s money and ignores him when he orders her, while on his deathbed, to destroy his wills. In return, he throws his cane at her, which is perhaps evidence of incapacity.
Much as we may laugh at the relatives in Middlemarch who repeatedly visit Mr. Featherstone to remind him of his obligations to his “own flesh and blood”, our own law continues to ascribe significance to bloodlines. The Succession Law Reform Act defines “child” based upon conception, and the statute’s intestacy provisions speak of “issue” and the “nearest degree” of kindred. As many an adopted child and step-child knows, with respect to estates law, blood still matters.
There are some marked differences between Eliot’s England and modern Canada. Whereas Fred Vincy was loaned money in part because the creditors knew he was favoured by Mr. Featherstone, we now have businesses openly and explicitly offering advances to those who “have an inheritance coming”. Although we still use the Banks v. Goodfellow test for evaluating capacity, there have been some innovations, such as capacity assessments done after death and more nuanced, neuroscientific understandings of capacity. Lastly, if Mr. Featherstone had died in Ontario in 2020, he could not take as much comfort in tantalizing relatives and then crushing their hopes, for we have dependency support laws whereby testators must provide “adequate provision” for their “dependents”. Perhaps the creation of such laws was influenced, in part, by the ghoulish conduct of such Victorian literary characters.
Thank you for reading. Enjoy the rest of your day!
Suzana Popovic-Montag and Devin McMurtry.
Today I wanted to discuss a basic, but important concept when it comes to Wills: revocation. There are a number of ways in which a Will can be revoked, and it is crucial that everyone with a Will, or who will make a Will in the future, understands what those methods are, and the requirements that must be met in order to successfully revoke a Will. An incomplete understanding of revocation can lead to unintended consequences if a testator mistakenly believes either that a prior Will has been revoked, or that a prior Will that he or she believed to have been revoked, remained valid and operative.
According to section 15 of the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26,
15 A will or part of a will is revoked only by,
(a) marriage, subject to section 16;
(b) another will made in accordance with the provisions of this Part;
(c) a writing,
(i) declaring an intention to revoke, and
(ii) made in accordance with the provisions of this Part governing making of a will; or
(d) burning, tearing or otherwise destroying it by the testator or by some person in his or her presence and by his or her direction with the intention of revoking it.
Ontario has a strict compliance regime, meaning that the statutory requirements for actions such as executing and revoking a Will must be followed carefully, and that the courts do not have the discretion to declare a document valid that does not do so. Accordingly, if an attempted revocation of a Will does not strictly comply with the statute, it may not be valid.
For instance, one method of revoking a Will is by a writing declaring an intention to revoke and made in accordance with the requirements of the making of a Will. This means that, even if the document revoking the prior Will is not itself a Will, it must nonetheless comply with those requirements, whether it be a formal Will witnessed by two people, or a holograph Will. A testator who does not seek legal advice on revoking his or her Will may mistakenly believe that, for example, a typewritten signed statement would validly revoke a Will, when, in fact, it would not.
Destroying a Will, another method of revocation, must also be done in a particular way to satisfy the requirements of the Succession Law Reform Act. As discussed in Probate Practice (5th ed.), the two elements of destruction and intention to revoke must both be present. The destruction itself must also be done either by the testator personally, or by someone else in the testator’s presence and by his or her direction. Therefore, even if the testator directs another person to destroy his or her Will, if the testator is not present at the time of such destruction, it will be insufficient to revoke the Will in question.
Additionally, the requisite capacity to revoke a Will is the same as that required to execute a Will in the first place.
While this blog only briefly touches upon a few specific issues that may arise in relation to revoking Wills, it is clear that without a proper understanding of how to validly revoke a Will, a testator can easily stray offside of the statute, resulting in a potentially invalid revocation. As with the execution of a Will, revocation can also have significant effects on a testator’s testamentary dispositions, and it is important to seek advice from a trusted legal professional prior to taking any steps that may lead to unintended, and unfortunate, consequences.
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I recently came across the decision in Campbell v Campbell, 2017 ONSC 2139. This is a recent decision with respect to two motions brought within an application for the interpretation of the last will and testament (the “Will”) of the late Howard Campbell (the “Deceased”). While the decision focuses on the various procedural matters at issue in the motions rather than the interpretation question at issue in the application, the decision also provides a brief summary of the facts which raised an interesting question for me regarding the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
The interpretation concerns the Deceased’s Will, which contains three seemingly incompatible bequests, as follows:
- Paragraph 3(b) of the Will directs the estate trustee “to pay my debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and to transfer the residue of my estate to my wife, if she survives me for a period of thirty days, for her own use absolutely”;
- Paragraph 3(c) of the Deceased’s Will directs the estate trustee “to deliver to my wife, for her use and enjoyment for life, all articles of personal domestic and household use or ornament belonging to me at the time of my death…and on her death, to divide all such articles among my children…”; and
- Paragraph 3(d) of the Will directs the estate trustee “to divide the residue of my estate equally between my wife (if she survives me for a period of thirty days) and my children, Kim, Howard, Rory, Cherie, Gina, Casey and Patrick, if then alive…”.
There appear to be four possible interpretations of the Deceased’s Will based on the above clauses:
- One hundred percent of the estate is left to the Deceased’s wife;
- The Deceased’s wife is given a life interest in personal property, which is later to be divided amongst the Deceased’s children;
- Fifty percent of the Deceased’s estate is to be left to his wife, and the other fifty percent is to be divided amongst the Deceased’s children; or
- The Deceased’s wife and the Deceased’s children are each to receive one-seventh of the estate.
In interpreting wills, Courts must first look to the language of the will to ascertain whether the testator’s intention can be discerned from the will itself. If the Court is unable to determine the testator’s intention from the will alone, it may then consider the surrounding circumstances known to the testator at the time that he or she made his or her will.
The surrounding circumstances that may be considered include only indirect extrinsic evidence, and not direct extrinsic evidence. Indirect extrinsic evidence consists of such circumstances as the character and occupation of the testator, the amount, extent and condition of his property, the number, identity, and general relationship to the testator of the immediate family and other relatives, the persons who comprised his circle of friends, and any other natural objects of his bounty. Direct extrinsic evidence would include, for example, instructions given by the testator to his solicitor in respect of the preparation of his will, or direct evidence from other third parties about the testator’s intentions.
As discussed in the decision of Rondel v Robinson Estate, 2011 ONCA 493, an exception to the general rule that direct extrinsic evidence is not admissible is in circumstances where there is an “equivocation” in the will, meaning that the words of the will in question apply equally well to two or more persons or things. Equivocation should not be equated with either ambiguity or mere difficulty of interpretation
One of our recent blog posts discusses a case where extrinsic evidence was not permissible. In that case, the court found that the language of the will in question was not equivocal, and accordingly, extrinsic evidence was not admitted. However, in the facts described above, it appears that the Deceased’s Will may provide an example of a situation where there is an equivocation, given that there seem to be four alternative interpretations.
As further discussed in the Rondel v Robinson decision, when direct extrinsic evidence, such as third party evidence of a testator’s intentions are admitted, this can give rise to reliability and credibility issues. Accordingly, it is important that the admissibility of direct extrinsic evidence be restricted, and permitted only when the rules of interpretation and construction are insufficient to interpret equivocal language.
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A testamentary document may be set aside if it is not accurately representative of a testator’s intentions, for reasons such as an innocent mistake on behalf of the testator or solicitor, or the fraud of another.
In the British Columbia Supreme Court case of Johnson v Pelkey (1997) 36 BCLR (3d) 40, the Court stated that “any will that does not express the real or true ‘intention’ of the testator will be set aside, even if the testator had testamentary capacity, and was not subject to undue influence.”
Additionally, in Coleman v Coleman Estate, 2008 NSSC 396 (CanLii), the Nova Scotia Supreme Court observed that even if testamentary capacity is found to exist, it is possible that a testator did not properly know or appreciate the contents of their will due to an innocent mistake or by the fraud of another. As established in Vout v Hay,  2 SCR 876, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the propounder of a will must demonstrate “that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will.”
When drafting a will, there is a duty on the solicitor drafting the testamentary document to make necessary inquiries. This duty is required so that the solicitor can demonstrate, based on discussions with the testator, that the testator fully appreciated what he or she was doing when they made the will.
In Johnson v Pelkey, the British Columbia Supreme Court found that there were differences between the solicitor’s notes and what appeared in the executed will, there were errors in the will, a property lot was left out of the will entirely, and an intended gift was missing. The solicitor testified these omissions were his mistakes or that his instructions may have been changed between receiving them and the execution. It was reported that upon the solicitor’s review of the will with the testator, the testator did not notice any of the omissions, errors and ambiguities.
When considering whether the testator had the knowledge of his or her testamentary document as well as approval of the contents of his or her will, based on mistake, are matters of fact to be determined based on all of the evidence of the case.
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In a recent case, Ilott v. The Blue Corss & Ors,  UKSC 17 (15 March 2017), the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has affirmed that a testator has testamentary freedom to disinherit his or her child.
As outlined in a recent National Post article, the Court rejected a daughter’s proceeding to set aside her late mother’s will, which left the majority of the mother’s estate to several animal charities. In the will, the mother also directed the executors of her estate to resist any efforts her daughter may make to challenge the will.
The disappointed daughter exercised her rights pursuant to the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the “1975 Act”), which allows certain individuals such as spouses and children to make a claim for reasonable financial provision from an estate.
Unlike Part V of Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act, the 1975 Act does not require the deceased testator to have provided his or her dependant with support or to have been under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death. Rather, the 1975 Act requires the surviving child to prove that the deceased’s will did not include reasonable financial provision for his or her child in light of the child’s own financial resources and needs.
Interestingly, the daughter appealed the District Judge’s award of £50,000.00 to her and the Court of Appeal’s decision awarding her £143,000.00 to buy the house she lived in and an additional £20,000.00. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision and restored the District Judge’s decision on the basis that the District Judge’s decision struck an appropriate balance between the mother’s testamentary wishes and the daughter’s claim for reasonable financial provision from the estate. In doing so, the Supreme Court upheld the long standing principal that people remain at liberty to dispose of their assets and property subject to provisions of the 1975 Act.
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As many people are aware, the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 (the “SLRA”) governs the formalities with which Wills, both formal and holograph, must be executed. The SLRA also governs the necessary formalities for making alterations to a Will after it has been executed. Section 18 states as follows:
18. (1) Subject to subsection (2), unless an alteration that is made in a will after the will has been made is made in accordance with the provisions of this Part governing making of the will, the alteration has no effect except to invalidate words or the effect of the will that it renders no longer apparent.
(2) An alteration that is made in a will after the will has been made is validly made when the signature of the testator and subscription of witnesses to the signature of the testator to the alteration, or, in the case of a will that was made under section 5 or 6, the signature of the testator, are or is made,
(a) in the margin or in some other part of the will opposite or near to the alteration; or
(b) at the end of or opposite to a memorandum referring to the alteration and written in some part of the will.
The rules for alterations essentially parallel the rules for execution of the Will itself. If the original Will was a formally executed Will, any alterations also require the signature of the testator along with attestation by two witnesses, while an alteration to a holograph Will, need only include the testator’s signature. Section 18 also includes an exception if the alteration renders the words “no longer apparent”. Case law has held that this term means that the words have been completely obliterated such that they can no longer be read using natural means.
With respect to alterations to holograph Wills, it can often be difficult to determine when an alteration was made, as the entire document consists of the testator’s handwriting. For example, if a holograph Will contains a clause that reads as follows:
To my daughter Mary Jane, I leave my pearl necklace.
There are a number of possible scenarios whereby this clause may have come to be, as follows:
- The testator inadvertently wrote “Mary” when they meant to write “Jane” and immediately corrected it;
- The testator initially wanted to leave the necklace to Mary, but upon further consideration, and prior to execution of the Will, decided to leave it to Jane instead. At that point they crossed out “Mary”, wrote “Jane”, and subsequently signed the holograph Will; or
- The testator fully wrote out and signed the holograph will and later decided to change the bequest to Jane.
While the first two scenarios would theoretically be valid as the revisions were made prior to execution, the third would not be valid as it does not include the testator’s signature, and accordingly does not comply with the requirements in s. 18 of the SLRA. However, the issue in this situation is that the testator will most likely not be around to assist with the interpretation when it becomes necessary to determine whether Mary or Jane are entitled to the necklace. Even if one of the first two scenarios is true, there is no way to tell when the alteration was made. Based on the SLRA, the alteration would likely be found invalid, and Mary would be entitled to the necklace.
Unfortunately, in Ontario, strict compliance with the provisions of the SLRA does not leave much flexibility for the Court to uphold what it views as the testator’s true intention, unless the Will, or alteration to the Will, has been executed according to the rules in the SLRA. There are many arguments in favour of, and against maintaining the strict compliance regime, and you can read more about the issue in our previous blog here.
This can be problematic, as many testators who make holograph Wills are doing so without the assistance or advice of a lawyer. Accordingly, they are likely not familiar with the formalities required for alterations, leading to circumstances that can easily result in an interpretation of the holograph Will that may not necessarily be as the testator intended.
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A recent case arising from British Columbia addresses whether a deceased parent is able to disinherit their child as a result of their sexual orientation.
As outlined in the recent National Post article, found here, a daughter has commenced a claim against her father’s estate on the basis that she was left out of the Will because she is in a lesbian relationship. Specifically, the father’s Will leaves the entirety of his estate to his other children, and nothing to the disappointed daughter.
The disappointed daughter alleges that her parents never accepted her sexual orientation and isolated themselves with her and her long-time partner. For example, the parents did not attend their daughter’s wedding. Apparently, this is the basis for the disinheritance.
Interestingly, this is not the first time the BC Courts have been required to address sexual orientation in Wills. In the 2006 BCSC decision of Peden v Peden, Justice Groves struck down a Will where a deceased father failed to approve of his son’s homosexuality on the basis that, “…homosexuality is not a factor in today’s society justifying a judicious parent disinheriting or limiting benefits to his child”.
Although, the laws in BC and Ontario are different with respect to the requirement of a testator to make adequate provision for spouses and children, given the recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in BMO v Spence, it will be interesting to follow the applicability of sexual orientation to challenging an Ontario Will.
Listen to Developments in Will Changes.
This week on Hull on Estates, Ian and Suzana discuss developments in will changes. They reference cases from Key Developments in Estates and Trusts Law in Ontario ed. 2008.
Listen to Alter Ego Trusts.
This week on Hull on Estates, Natalia and Chris discuss what Alter Ego Trusts are and the pros and cons of using Alter Ego Trusts.