Tag: Succession Planning
Cherished, memories, generational, and cozy, are just some of the words that evoke the magnificence that is the family cottage. It is this magnificence that leads many families to want to hold on to the family cottage as part of their estate plan. This is not always easy though, and the family cottage is often the centrerpiece of an estate dispute. As such, careful planning is key.
Those that want the cottage to stay in the family should consider a co-ownership agreement. The purpose of these types of agreements are to set out the governance of the cottage to ensure it is maintained and disputes are resolved.
Some of the key terms to consider in a co-ownership agreement include:
- how basic expenses will be covered, including hydro, telephone, maintenance, and property taxes;
- how extraordinary expenses, including capital expenses, are to be paid;
- when payments are to be made and to whom;
- which family members are allowed to occupy the cottage, and when;
- are guests permitted;
- should there be a management committee charged with making certain decisions;
- what mechanisms should be used to resolve disputes;
- the procedure for the sale or transfer by a co-owner; and
- what happens upon the death of a co-owner.
If the Kardashians can teach us anything about estate planning (and you know that given the title, there had to be a Kardashian reference), it is that family dynamics are in flux. New relationships emerge, siblings develop different values and beliefs, and sometimes, problems arise. A good co-ownership agreement is not cookie-cutter, but a carefully crafted document reflecting the uniqueness of each family member that can evolve over time.
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At the recent Six-Minute Estates Lawyer, several areas of interest were discussed. One that served as a helpful reminder to me was the presentation on the estate administration tax-avoidance strategy of using primary and secondary wills. Many tips are contained in the paper presented by Kathleen Robichaud. Here are eight of them:
- Checklist – develop a thorough intake process and form, so you can ensure a detailed meeting with your client takes place that will give you the information needed to make recommendations best suited to your client’s needs;
- Revocation clause – ensure each will has one that takes the other will into account, so each will won’t revoke the other;
- Estate trustee – using the same estate trustee (and same alternate) for both wills may reduce the risk of drafting errors and usually simplifies the administration (although for a second will regarding outside Ontario assets, it is ideal to have the estate trustee and assets both in the same jurisdiction);
- Debts and Taxes – it is of particular importance to delineate how debts are to be paid in both wills, especially if you have difference beneficiaries and/or estate trustees in each of the wills;
- Know which assets require probate – sounds trite, but when in doubt only include assets in the secondary will that you are certain do not require probate (e.g. real property (subject to exceptions), bank accounts with large balances, RRSPs left to the estate, shares of publicly traded companies, an interest in a privately held partnership and investment accounts generally require probate);
- Define the assets carefully – otherwise you may have a partial intestacy that could defeat the testator’s wishes;
- Out of jurisdiction assets – when dealing with out of jurisdiction assets, consider that a second, third or even fourth will may be appropriate for varying reasons (e.g. because of difference succession rules or difference taxation rules); and
- Beneficiaries – listing the correct beneficiaries for the right assets, and matching the right set of beneficiaries with the corresponding will, can avoid drafting errors that may otherwise result in both wills having to be probated and/or rectification orders being needed.
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As an estates litigator for the past 25 years, there isn’t much I haven’t seen when it comes to will drafting issues and errors. I’ve made a living out of picking up the pieces and sorting out the conflicts that result from errors and ambiguities in the estate documentation process.
While it’s great for my business, clients pay a high price for those errors and ambiguities in the form of legal fees, bequests lost, and family harmony dashed to bits among other things.
A will may be one of the most common documents in our legal world, but there is nothing off-the-shelf about it, and complexities abound. You’ve likely experienced it your own practice – drafting a will “right” isn’t always easy.
Is there a better way to draft one – so that the proper checks are made, the proper questions asked, and the proper wording applied?
You bet. The Hull e-State Planner is an interactive Will Planning App designed specifically for Canadian lawyers. It takes a visual approach to will planning, one that’s easy for you to use and easy for your client to understand and verify that their wishes have been properly captured.
You can find out more about it here. https://e-stateplanner.com/about/
Or, to see the Hull e-State Planner in action, take a few minutes to watch how the App takes you through the drafting process. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wyZWyM9gktQ
Even better, try it yourself, with a 30-day, 100% money back guarantee. You’ll find it a small price to pay for a better way to draft your clients’ wills.
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As an estate planner and a lawyer, it is important to remember that when creating an estate plan, familial relations may turn negative. It becomes crucial for estate planners to ensure that their instructions are complete, in order to protect themselves in the case of a family fight.
Often, in the process of a married couple jointly retaining a lawyer to prepare their wills, “mirror wills” are prepared. Mirror wills typically provide for all estate assets to pass to the surviving spouse.
An issue arises in the case of a lawyer who prepares mirror wills and one of the spouses decides to make a change, adversely affecting the other spouse. What are the lawyer’s ethical obligations?
Pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3-1 states that a lawyer has an ethical obligation to hold in confidence all information concerning their clients, and Rule 3.4-1 creates an ethical obligation to avoid conflicts of interest.
It is important, therefore, that when acting for a married couple, the lawyer outlines his or her ethical obligations, and specifically, if applicable, outlines that they are acting in a joint retainer. Rule 3.4-5 outlines the ethical obligations of a lawyer in the case of a joint retainer:
Before a lawyer acts in a matter or transaction for more than one client, the lawyer shall advise each of the clients that:
(a) the lawyer has been asked to act for both or all of them;
(b) no information received in connection with the matter from one client can be treated as confidential so far as any of the others are concerned; and
(c) if a conflict develops that cannot be resolved, the lawyer cannot continue to act for both or all of them and may have to withdraw completely.
While outlining the joint retainer rules to a client, it is important that the lawyer considers what they would do in the case of one of the spouses asking the lawyer to alter a mirror will. While the lawyer could refuse to draft a new will, the requesting spouse may be able to find another lawyer to do the will, and the lawyer will still have the issue of whether or not to tell the disadvantaged spouse. This may give rise to a conflict of interest.
The second Commentary to Rule 3.4-5 specifically contemplates and guides the lawyer acting for a married couple as to what should happen in this scenario. Simply put, any subsequent communication to change the will by one of the spouses would be “treated as a request for a new retainer and not as part of the joint retainer.” The lawyer would therefore have a duty to decline the new retainer unless the other spouse consented to the change.
The critical issue is that this possibility must be conveyed to the spouses at the outset of the joint retainer.
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A testamentary document may be set aside if it is not accurately representative of a testator’s intentions, for reasons such as an innocent mistake on behalf of the testator or solicitor, or the fraud of another.
In the British Columbia Supreme Court case of Johnson v Pelkey (1997) 36 BCLR (3d) 40, the Court stated that “any will that does not express the real or true ‘intention’ of the testator will be set aside, even if the testator had testamentary capacity, and was not subject to undue influence.”
Additionally, in Coleman v Coleman Estate, 2008 NSSC 396 (CanLii), the Nova Scotia Supreme Court observed that even if testamentary capacity is found to exist, it is possible that a testator did not properly know or appreciate the contents of their will due to an innocent mistake or by the fraud of another. As established in Vout v Hay,  2 SCR 876, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the propounder of a will must demonstrate “that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will.”
When drafting a will, there is a duty on the solicitor drafting the testamentary document to make necessary inquiries. This duty is required so that the solicitor can demonstrate, based on discussions with the testator, that the testator fully appreciated what he or she was doing when they made the will.
In Johnson v Pelkey, the British Columbia Supreme Court found that there were differences between the solicitor’s notes and what appeared in the executed will, there were errors in the will, a property lot was left out of the will entirely, and an intended gift was missing. The solicitor testified these omissions were his mistakes or that his instructions may have been changed between receiving them and the execution. It was reported that upon the solicitor’s review of the will with the testator, the testator did not notice any of the omissions, errors and ambiguities.
When considering whether the testator had the knowledge of his or her testamentary document as well as approval of the contents of his or her will, based on mistake, are matters of fact to be determined based on all of the evidence of the case.
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As societal norms are continuously changing and evolving, there has been a change in attitudes toward the relationship between adopted children and their biological parents. Today, society encourages adopted children and their birth parents to re-establish a relationship. For example, we have previously blogged on a change of the law in Saskatchewan, which provides for an adult adopted child to reconnect with their birth parents.
In Ontario, the legal status of adopted children is governed by the Child and Family Services Act (the “CFSA”). Section 158(2) of the CFSA provides that, upon an adoption order being granted, the adopted child becomes the (legal) child of the adoptive parent and ceases to be the child of the person who was his or her parent before the adoption order was granted. Pursuant to this statute, once a child is adopted, they are not entitled to their birth parent’s estate unless specifically provided for in the birth parent’s will.
Furthermore, in Ontario, there are no direct provisions governing a testator’s wishes in distributing their property. There is no requirement that all children must be treated equally, or that an individual must leave a part of their estate to their children through a testamentary document. Statutory protection does exist, for dependants, however, under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.
In contrast, the law in British Columbia provides that the Court has discretion to vary a will to remedy disinheritance of a child. Pursuant to s. 60 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act (“WESA”), a parent must make adequate provision for their children, and if the court does not find a testamentary division among the children to be equitable, the court can intervene.
A recent case out of British Columbia considered a novel argument: does the receipt of a benefit under a birth parent’s will entitle an adopted child to argue for a greater share of the estate under section 60 of the WESA?
In the Boer v Mikaloff, 2017 BCSC 21, Mr. Boer was legally adopted as a baby to an adoptive family. He became reunited with his birth mother around the age of thirty, and in his birth mother’s last will and testament, he received a portion of her estate. Mr. Boer challenged his birth mother’s last will and testament in court, arguing that pursuant to s. 60 of the WESA, he was not given an equitable share of his mother’s estate compared to his mother’s other children.
The court held that Mr. Boer was not entitled to an equitable share, as he was not legally considered to be his birth mother’s child. The court held that section 3(2)(a) of the WESA does not allow an adopted child to manipulate a bequest by the child’s pre-adopted parent into a s. 60 claim and applied the case of Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Canada, 2005 SCC 54, to uphold that the text, context and purpose of the statute in this regard was clear.
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With the aging population, there are increasing numbers of individuals who may require a caregiver. And that caregiver is not always privately employed, or a direct family member or a spouse.
Currently, the socio-economic situation of such unpaid caregivers has been documented as “financial hardship” due to the void created upon the terminated relationship A recent article published by Canadian Family Law Quarterly suggests a two-pronged statutory remedy be put in place in order to: (i) provide legal recognition of such relationships, and (ii) compensate sacrifices of the unpaid/altruistic caregiver.
Who Should Compensate Unpaid Caregivers?
An important consideration in the contemplation of providing support to unpaid caregivers is whether the state or the individual accepting care should have the onus of providing financial support. In the case of Egan v Canada,  2 SCR 513, Justice Sopinka ruled in favour of individual responsibility and stated “the government was not required to be proactive in recognizing new social relationships [and that]… it is not realistic for the court to assume that there are unlimited funds to address the needs of it all.”
On the other hand, Nicholas Bala in an article published in the Queens Law Journal states: “an adult who shares a home and provides care for another economically dependent adult should be entitled to the same level of state assistance (or tax relief) [as paid caregivers] whether the dependent is a spouse, parent, sibling, uncle or friend.”
Currently, aside from equitable and statutory remedies (not available to all and not certain), the only private law safeguard put in place to protect unpaid caregivers is through wills and estate planning. To protect an unpaid caregiver through a will or estate plan would require forethought by the recipient of the care. The plan would need to be instituted at a point when the individual had capacity, and was able to properly execute a will or testamentary document.
In the case of unpaid caregiving, the care provider who is a family member may be a beneficiary of an existing estate plan (outside of any caregiving obligations). Entitlement to an enhanced benefit would be a fair way to compensate for unpaid care to the testator.
Another recourse for an unpaid caregiver is to apply for dependant’s relief pursuant to section 58(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”).
Section 58(1) provides that:
Where a deceased, whether testate or intestate, has not made adequate provision for the proper support of his dependants or any of them, the court, on application, may order that such provision as it considers adequate be made out of the estate of the deceased for the proper support of the dependants or any of them
In the case of Cummings v Cummings, 2004 CanLII 9339 (ON CA), the Court of Appeal acknowledged that “caregiving may give rise to both legal and moral obligations to provide support.” Therefore, if an unpaid caregiver can establish themselves as a dependant of the deceased individual who was receiving their care, it is possible they may get some recourse under the SLRA.
It nonetheless bears repeating that the case for law reform relates to the person who does not meet the definition of dependant: the non-direct family member, non-conjugal caregiver who altruistically provides caregiving at significant personal sacrifice and is not named in the Will on the termination (i.e. death) of the caregiving relationship.
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A successful application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) is an uncommon occurrence. It is therefore of considerable interest to the estates bar that leave to appeal from a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (“BCCA”) has been granted in the case of Cowper-Smith v. Morgan.
The case touches on important aspects of both undue influence and proprietary estoppel. It was in respect of the BCCA’s decision finding against the availability of proprietary estoppel as a remedy that leave was granted and we will all eagerly await the pronouncement of the SCC in due course. While the issue of proprietary estoppel in the case will be the subject of next week’s blog, the analysis of the BCCA as it relates to undue influence makes for interesting reading.
Elizabeth Cowper-Smith had three children, a daughter, Gloria, and two sons, Max and Nathan.
2001 – Upon obtaining legal advice, Elizabeth transferred her home and investments into joint tenancy with Gloria and executed a Declaration of Trust providing for Gloria to receive the assets “absolutely” upon her death. This transfer left her estate devoid of any significant assets.
2002 – Notwithstanding the Declaration of Trust, Elizabeth executed a Will leaving 1/3 of her estate to each of her children.
2007 – Gloria asked Max to return home from England in order to care for Elizabeth. Gloria offered Max the right to purchase a 1/3 interest in the home as an incentive.
Gloria reassured her brothers that the property transfer into joint tenancy with her was done simply to help manage the mother’s affairs. Upon Elizabeth’s death, however, Gloria said the transferred assets were hers.
British Columbia Superior Court Decision (2015 BCSC 1170)
Max and Nathan brought an action against Gloria alleging that Gloria exerted undue influence on Elizabeth. Max also sought a declaration that, on the basis of proprietary estoppel, he was entitled to purchase Gloria’s 1/3 interest in the house. At trial, the judge found that Gloria’s true intentions were located in her 2002 will.
British Columbia Court of Appeal Decision (2016 BCCA 200)
Gloria submitted on appeal that independent legal advice provided to Elizabeth was adequate to rebut the undue influence.
The appeal was allowed in part. The legal advice given to Elizabeth was inadequate to rebut the presumption of undue influence; however, Max did not acquire a right to purchase Gloria’s 1/3 share by promissory estoppel (again, the SCC has granted leave to appeal this latter finding).
Issue 1: Undue Influence
The trial judge, upheld by the BCCA, ruled in favour of Max and Nathan, and set held that the property was impressed with a trust for the benefit of the estate: the presumption of Gloria’s undue influence was not rebutted. This is an interesting finding, as Elizabeth obtained her own legal advice prior to executing the transfers to Gloria. Independent legal advice can be used to rebut presumptions of undue influence, if the independent legal advice qualifies as “informed advice”.
In applying Geffen v Goodman Estate,  2 SCR 353, the trial judge found a potential for domination inherent in the relationship between Gloria and Elizabeth, that gave rise to the presumption of undue influence.
The test for Gloria to rebut the presumption of undue influence was established in Geffen:
- An “examination of the nature of the transaction[s]”;
- A finding of whether the donor entered into the transactions as a result of her “own full free and informed thought”; and
- A “meticulous examination of the facts.”
The BCCA agreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that, based on this test, Gloria was not able to rebut the presumption of undue influence. Despite the fact that Elizabeth went to two lawyers, the court found that Gloria and her husband had advised the lawyers that Max and Nathan were trying to take Elizabeth’s property. Moreover, Gloria was present at some of the meetings with the lawyers. Lastly, the lawyers relied on the false information from Gloria and failed to adequately provide “informed advice” and otherwise probe for the existence of undue influence.
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With the unfortunate increase in fake news stories circulating the internet, one particular fabricated story nonetheless raises important estate planning considerations.
True: Mr. Antonino Fernandez died in August 2016. Mr. Fernandez was the owner of Corona beer, and chairman of Grupo Modelo, which also exports Modelo, and other Mexican beers. Mr. Fernandez was a philanthropist who set up establishments to encourage rural development in his birth area, as well as charitable foundations in both Mexico and Spain to ensure employment opportunities for disabled individuals.
False: In his will, Mr. Fernandez left every resident in his birth village, Cerezales del Condado in Spain, 2.5 million dollars.
A recent news hoax about the late Mr. Fernandez leaving a generous gift to each of the residents in his birth village raises the question whether such a testamentary disposition would have been valid.
Who Would Get a Distribution?
According to the fabricated story, Mr. Fernandez gave each resident of his village 2.5 million dollars upon his death pursuant to a clause in his testamentary document that apparently stated “for the benefit of the village`s inhabitants“. His village had 77 residents.
In Mr. Fernandez’s purported will, he left his fortune to his 13 siblings and extended family. Each villager did not directly get a distribution. If the disposition to the villagers did exist, would the siblings be obligated to distribute the estate based on the foregoing provision?
Would the Will Be Void for Uncertainty?
While each villager would have been informed that they were to receive a distribution from Mr. Fernandez, due to the drafting of the will, it is unclear if they would have received a distribution.
To prevent the villagers from recovering their distribution, the siblings would want to argue that the term in the will benefiting the villagers was void for uncertainty. As such a will would be ambiguous, the parties may need to look to a Judge to help interpret the will.
Pursuant to the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Burke  OJ No 706, the judge must study the whole contents of the will, and after full consideration of all the provisions and language used therein, try to find what the intention was in the mind of the testator. When an opinion has been formed as to the intention of the testator, the court should strive to give effect to it.
As established in Montreal Trust Co. v Sinclair (1958 CarswellMan 39) “one of the commonest forms of uncertainty in this respect is where the gift provides for selection from a number of persons or bodies and does not state who is to make the selection or how it is to be made.“ In the false case of Mr. Fernandez, it may be argued that while he left a gift to the inhabitants of his village in his will, he did not specifically state how a villager was to be defined.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada in Brewer v McCauley  SCR 645 established that “a testator must, by the terms of his will, himself dispose of the property with which the will proposes to deal. He may not depute that duty to his executors or trustees“ In this case, the siblings of Mr. Fernandez could also attempt to argue that Mr. Fernandez left an unclear condition on the gift to them, and that leaving the distribution of the gift to the villagers to his siblings was an improper delegation of testamentary authority.
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Testamentary capacity is most commonly an issue when a testator prepares a new will later in life, against a form of progressive dementia, whether it became apparent before or after the creation of the will.
The Main Question to be Considered
In cases regarding progressive dementia, the question is whether the mental deterioration has deprived the testator of his or her testamentary capacity. If the testator has been deprived of their capacity, it is likely (but by no means certain) that the will they signed will be invalid. Pursuant to the case of Johnson v Huchkewich (2010 ONSC 6002), a diagnosis of dementia is not tantamount to a lack of testamentary capacity.
Requirements for Capacity
As established in Banks v Goodfellow [(1870), [1861-73] All ER Rep 47], “the standard of capacity in cases of impaired mental power, is…the capacity on the part of the testator to comprehend the extent of the property to be disposed of, and the nature of the claims of those he is excluding.” In applying the test for testamentary capacity, it is important to ensure that the testator was capable of appreciating the terms of the will, but also the circumstances surrounding the making of the will. The testator must be able to recall and comprehend circumstances beyond a range of familiar topics. As defined in Leger v Poirier (1944 CarswellNB 11), the individual must be able to have a “disposing mind and memory”, which is able to “comprehend, of its own initiative and volition, the essential elements of will-making, property, objects, just claims to consideration, revocation of existing dispositions, and the like.”
Therefore, in a case where an individual has progressive dementia and is attempting to make a testamentary document, the lawyer has an obligation to ascertain if the individual can appreciate the circumstances as a whole. The ability for the testator to rationally respond to questions is not enough to determine that the individual has full capacity.
Furthermore, it bears repeating that a testator who is incapable to manage his or her affairs due to progressive dementia, does not necessarily lack testamentary capacity. As established in the case of Cranford’s Will, Re, (1978 CarswellNfld 23), “in determining the testamentary capacity of an aged person it is necessary to be careful not to substitute suspicion for proof so as to render it impossible for old people to make wills…”
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