Tag: Substitute Decisions Act
It is often said that an Attorney for Property can do anything on behalf of the grantor’s behalf except make a will. This is on account of section 7(2) of the Substitute Decisions Act (the “SDA“), which provides:
“The continuing power of attorney may authorize the person named as attorney to do on the grantor’s behalf anything in respect of property that the grantor could do if capable, except make a will.” [emphasis added]
Although at first glance it would appear that the potential tasks that an Attorney for Property could complete on behalf of a grantor are almost absolute, with the Attorney for Property being able to do anything on behalf of the grantor except sign a new will, in reality the tasks that an Attorney for Property may complete relative to the grantor’s estate planning is more restrictive than this would suggest at first glance. This is because the definition of “will” in the SDA is defined as being the same as that contained in the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“), with the SLRA in turn defining “will” as including not only typical testamentary documents such as a Last Will and Testament or Codicil, but also “any other testamentary disposition“. As a result, the stipulation that an Attorney for Property can do anything on behalf of the grantor “except make a will” would include not only a restriction on the Attorney for Property’s ability to sign a new Last Will and Testament or Codicil on behalf of the grantor, but also a restriction on the Attorney for Property’s ability to make “any other testamentary disposition” on behalf of the grantor.
It is fairly common for individuals such as spouses to own real property as joint-tenants with the right of survivorship. When one joint-owner dies ownership of the property automatically passes to the surviving joint-owner by right of survivorship, with no portion of the property forming part of the deceased joint-owner’s estate. Although such an ownership structure may make sense when the property is originally purchased, it is not uncommon for circumstances to arise after the property was registered (i.e. a divorce or separation) which may make one of the joint-owners no longer want the property to carry the right of survivorship. Should such circumstances arise, one of the joint-owners will often “sever” title to the property so that the property is now held as tenants-in-common without the right of survivorship, making efforts to attempt to ensure that at least 50% of the property would form part of their estate should they predecease the other joint-owner.
Although severing title to a property is fairly straight forward while the owner is still capable, circumstances could become more complicated should the owner become incapable as questions may emerge regarding whether their Attorney for Property has the authority to sever title to the property on behalf of the grantor, or whether such an action is a “testamentary disposition” and therefor barred by section 7(2) of the SDA.
The issue of whether an Attorney for Property severing title to a property is a “testamentary disposition” was in part dealt with by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Champion v. Guibord, 2007 ONCA 161, where the court states:
“The appellants argue that the severing of the joint tenancies here constituted a change in testamentary designation or disposition and is therefore prohibited by s. 31(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act because it is the making of a will.
While we are inclined to the view that the severance of a joint tenancy is not a testamentary disposition, we need not decide that question in this case. Even if it were, we see no error in the disposition made by the application judge, because of s. 35.1(3)(a) of the Substitute Decisions Act.” [emphasis added]
Although the Court of Appeal does not conclusively settle the issue in Champion v. Guibord, the court appears to strongly suggest that they are of the position that an Attorney for Property severing a joint-tenancy is not a “testamentary disposition” within the confines of the SDA.
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This blog was written in collaboration with, and with thanks to Yasmin Vinograd of Merovitz Potechin LLP .
In some cases, an incapable person residing outside of Canada has assets in Canada. Can a guardian appointed outside of Canada have access to the incapable’s Canadian assets? By extension, would a Guardianship Order made outside of Canada be recognized in Ontario?
In Ontario, this scenario is dealt with in the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 (“SDA”). Section 86 of the SDA provides a mechanism by which orders made by a court outside of Ontario to appoint a guardian of property or of the person may be recognized or “resealed” in Ontario. Subsections of s. 86 specify that:
s.86(1): a foreign order is “an order made by a court outside Ontario that appoints, for a person who is sixteen years of age or older, a person having duties comparable to those of a guardian of property or guardian of the person.”
s.86(2): “Any person may apply to the court for an order resealing a foreign order that was made in a province or territory of Canada or in a prescribed jurisdiction.”
s.86(3): an applicant seeking to have the court reseal the foreign order is required to file a copy of the foreign order, along with a certificate signed by registrar, clerk or other officer of the foreign court stating that the order is unrevoked and is of full effect.
The effect of these provisions is that a guardianship order made by a foreign court will be recognized and enforceable in Ontario.
Sounds easy enough, doesn’t it? Unfortunately, it is not.
I had previously blogged about the possibility of resealing guardianship orders made in other provinces and territories. The issue arises when trying to reseal a guardianship order made outside of Canada. The problem is that Ontario has yet to prescribe any other country as a “prescribed jurisdiction” for the purpose of section 86(2). This begs the question: can the court reseal a foreign guardianship in the absence of the list of prescribed jurisdictions?
When faced with this exact issue in Cariello v Perrella, 2013 ONSC 7605, the court refused to apply section 86 to reseal a guardianship order made in Italy. Justice Mesbur stated:
It seems to me that unless and until Ontario creates a list of “prescribed jurisdictions” there is simply no legislative basis on which I can apply s. 86. This is not a case where the statute inadvertently fails to deal with an issue. Here, the province has simply failed to take the regulatory steps necessary to create a list of prescribed jurisdictions to which s.86 would apply. I have no idea of the province’s intentions in that regard. I fail to see how I can simply assume Ontario would designate Italy as a prescribed jurisdiction when it finally creates a list of prescribed jurisdictions under the SDA. I have no basis to conclude that Ontario has any intention of having s.86 apply to any jurisdiction other than another Canadian province or territory. Section 86 cannot apply.
In light of the Cariello decision, it appears that section 86 and the mechanism it provides cannot be used to reseal an order made by a jurisdiction outside of Canada. What, then, is a guardian to do if the incapable has assets in Canada that need to be accessed?
There are two ways in which this could be addressed.
The first is to bring an application to have the guardianship order recognized as a non-monetary order, pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions of Morguard Investments v De Savoye,  3 SCR 1077 (SCC), Beals v Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, and Pro Swing Inc v ELTA Golf Inc, 2006 SCC 52. As of now, there is no decision that applied the SCC’s test of real and substantial connection in the context of a guardianship order. It remains to be seen whether an Ontario court would be open to recognizing a guardianship order on that basis and what the Public Guardian and Trustee’s position will be on such an application.
The second option is to commence a new guardianship application in Ontario. The evidence of incapacity in the foreign jurisdiction may be useful in such an application, but it would probably need to be updated to reflect the current status of the incapable and to demonstrate his or her incapacity. The “new” guardianship application will need to conform to Ontario’s requirements under the SDA, including the filing of a Management and/or Guardianship Plan(s), service on required persons, and naming of specific respondents in the notice of application.
Being a Power of Attorney for Property can often be a difficult and thankless job. It is not unforeseeable that, after originally accepting the job, circumstances may arise which leads the Attorney for Property to want to resign. But how do you go about actually resigning as Attorney for Property? Is it enough to simply stop acting as Attorney for Property, or to loudly scream “I quit!” to those that have caused you the frustration, or are additional steps required for the resignation to become effective?
The resignation process for an Attorney for Property is governed by section 11(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, which provides:
“An attorney under a continuing power of attorney may resign but, if the attorney has acted under the power of attorney, the resignation is not effective until the attorney delivers a copy of the resignation to,
(a) the grantor;
(b) any other attorneys under the power of attorney;
(c) the person named by the power of attorney as a substitute for the attorney who is resigning, if the power of attorney provides for the substitution of another person; and
(d) unless the power of attorney provides otherwise, the grantor’s spouse or partner and the relatives of the grantor who are known to the attorney and reside in Ontario, if,
(i) the attorney is of the opinion that the grantor is incapable of managing property, and
(ii) the power of attorney does not provide for the substitution of another person or the substitute is not able and willing to act.”
As a result of section 11(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, if an Attorney for Property wishes to resign from their position they must put such resignation in writing, which must then be delivered to the certain individuals, including the grantor, any other Attorneys for Property named in the document, as well as the grantor’s spouse and next-of-kin if the grantor is incapable and the Power of Attorney does not provide for a substitute Attorney for Property or the substitute is not willing or able to act. Once the resignation has been received by all of such individuals, the resignation is effective, and the individual is no longer the grantor’s Attorney for Property.
It should of course be noted that resigning as Attorney for Property would not release the individual of any liability for their historic administration of the grantor’s property. To do so, the resigning Attorney for Property would likely have to commence an Application to Pass Accounts regarding their management of the grantor’s property, or seek a release from the grantor if the grantor was still capable. This, however, is a topic for a further blog on a different day.
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When concerns are raised about the conduct of an Attorney for Property, those raising the concerns often seek an Order compelling the Attorney for Property to commence an Application to Pass Accounts pursuant to section 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act. Should such an Application to Pass Accounts be commenced, the objecting party will often make allegations against the Attorney for Property that the incapable person and/or estate has suffered damages as a result of the Attorney for Property’s conduct, often seeking monetary damages against the Attorney for Property in relation to such objections.
An interesting question was recently posed to me in the context of such an Application to Pass Accounts for an Attorney for Property. Can the objecting party pursue damages against the Attorney for Property within the actual Application to Pass Accounts itself, or do they need to commence a separate claim against the Attorney for Property for the recovery of such damages?
The ability to pursue damages against an Estate Trustee within the Application to Pass Accounts process is well established by statute, with section 49(3) of the Estates Act providing:
“The judge, on passing any accounts under this section, has power to inquire into any complaint or claim by any person interested in the taking of the accounts of misconduct, neglect, or default on the part of the executor, administrator or trustee occasioning financial loss to the estate or trust fund, and the judge, on proof of such claim, may order the executor, administrator or trustee, to pay such sum by way of damages or otherwise as the judge considers proper and just to the estate or trust fund, but any order made under this subsection is subject to appeal.” [emphasis added]
Section 49(3) of the Estates Act makes it clear that a separate claim against an Estate Trustee is not necessary to pursue damages for breach of trust when an Application to Pass Accounts has been commenced, and that the Judge may order damages against the Estate Trustee within the actual Application to Pass Accounts itself. Perhaps importantly however, the Estates Act appears to suggest that section 49 only applies to a passing of accounts for an “executor, administrator or trustee under a will“, making no reference to an Attorney for Property. Sections 42(7) and 42(8) of the Substitute Decisions Act also set out the “powers of the court” in an Application to Pass Accounts for an Attorney for Property, with such provisions notably containing no reference to the ability to order damages against the Attorney for Property for any wrongdoing.
As there appears to be no statutory equivalent to section 49(3) of the Estates Act which specifically contemplates that it applies to Attorneys for Property, and the ability to pursue damages within the Application to Pass Accounts itself in other circumstances appears to be derived from statute, the question of whether there is a “legislative gap” as it relates to the ability to pursue damages against an Attorney for Property within an Application to Pass Accounts can at least appear to be raised. If such a “legislative gap” does exist, would this mean that a separate claim would have to be commenced by the objector to pursue such damages even when an Application to Pass Accounts was currently before the court?
When I have raised the question to other estate practitioners, some have suggested that while there may be no statutory authority to order such damages against the Attorney for Property within the Application to Pass Accounts, the court may have inherent jurisdiction to order such damages by way of a “surcharge order” in the Application to Pass Accounts. Some have also suggested that as section 42(6) of the Substitute Decisions Act contemplates that the procedure to be utilized on passing an Attorney’s accounts is to be the same as that as an executor’s accounts, that this should be read as evidence to show that section 49(3) of the Estates Act would apply to the passing of an Attorney for Property’s accounts. In response to this, I would suggest that it is at least questionable if section 49(3) of the Estates Act is “procedural” in nature, and, even if it is found to be procedural, whether the “powers of the court” provisions of sections 42(7) and 42(8) of the Substitute Decisions Act, which notably does not include the power to award damages against the Attorney for Property for wrongdoing, would trump section 49(3) of the Estates Act in any event.
I am aware of no decision which specifically addresses the issue of whether there is a “legislative gap” when it comes to whether damages can be sought against an Attorney for Property within the Application to Pass Accounts itself. While the issue may simply be academic at this time, it is not unforeseeable that someone could attempt to argue that an objector cannot seek damages against the Attorney for Property within the Application to Pass Accounts itself, and that a separate claim is required. If such an argument is successfully raised, and the length of time between the alleged wrong and the separate claim being commenced was such that the limitation period may have expired, it is not unforeseeable that the Attorney for Property may attempt to argue that the separate claim must now be dismissed as a result of the expiry of the limitation period.
Thank you for reading.
On Monday’s blog, I discussed the mechanisms available to Ontario courts under the Declarations of Death Act to deal with the estate of a deceased person who “returns from the dead.” In today’s blog, I thought it might be useful to look at similar provisions under Ontario’s Absentees Act and to distinguish between the purpose of each Act as well as the authorities of the court thereunder.
The most obvious distinction is evident in the titles of each Act. The Declarations of Death Act, unsurprisingly, concerns individuals that have been declared deceased by the courts. In contrast, and perhaps even more unsurprisingly, the Absentees Act deals with “absentees.”
An absentee is defined under section 1 of the Absentees Act as a person, ordinarily resident in Ontario, who “has disappeared, whose whereabouts is unknown, and as to whom there is no knowledge as to whether he or she is alive or dead.” Similar to the analogous provision in the Declarations of Death Act, section 2 of the Absentees Act allows the Superior Court of Justice to declare a person to be an absentee if a “due and satisfactory inquiry has been made.”
The difference in finality of an order declaring an individual to be deceased rather than merely an absentee is also reflected in the authority given to the courts in dealing with an individual’s property under each Act. Once an individual is declared deceased, that individual’s property is subject to distribution in accordance with any testamentary documents that he or she may have left, such as a will. Without going into significant detail, the property rights of the testator as well as those of any beneficiaries will be substantially impacted as a result of a declaration of death. The courts will be reluctant to trigger these rights absent a conclusive determination of death.
As a result of the foregoing, the Absentees Act gives no authority to the courts to order distributions of property pursuant to a testamentary document. In effect, the authority of the courts over the property of an absentee is severely limited, at least until he or she is declared as such in accordance with the Declarations of Death Act, or unless evidence of his or her death is produced.
Rather than create circumstances that may trigger distributions of an absentee’s property, the Absentees Act may require an individual to instead ensure its upkeep while the absentee is, well, absent. Section 4 of the Absentees Act allows a court to make an order to ensure the “custody, due care and management” of an absentee’s property by a committee, if needed.
This appointee would essentially function as a caretaker of the absentee’s property. The committee has all of the powers and duties of a guardian of property under the Substitute Decisions Act, including the authority to expend the absentee’s own funds for the purposes of determining whether he or she is alive or dead.
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As is often the case, a person who is concerned about a fiduciary’s management of property may wish to compel an accounting. However, it is important to remember that a person’s ability to compel such an accounting may vary depending on whether an accounting is being sought from an estate trustee of a deceased’s estate or, in the alternative, from an attorney for property during the lifetime of an incapable grantor.
The legal framework in Ontario
In Ontario, pursuant to section 50 of the Estates Act, an executor or administrator shall not be required to account by the Court “…unless at the instance or on behalf of some person interested in such property or of a creditor of the deceased….” Further, Rule 74.15(1)(h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides for any person who appears to have a financial interest in an estate to move for an order for assistance requiring an estate trustee to pass his or her accounts.
Conversely, the right to compel an accounting from an attorney for property or guardian of property is set out under section 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act. Pursuant to section 42, in addition to the attorney, the guardian and the incapable person, the following persons may apply for the fiduciary’s accounts to be passed:
- The grantor’s or incapable persons’ guardian of the person or attorney for personal care;
- A dependant of the grantor or incapable person;
- The Public Guardian and Trustee;
- The Children’s Lawyer;
- A judgment creditor of the grantor or incapable person; and
- Any other person, with leave of the Court.
This is an important distinction to keep in mind: although a person with a financial interest in the estate may be able to compel an accounting from an estate trustee, such a financial interest on the death of an incapable grantor may not in and of itself be sufficient to compel an accounting from an attorney for property during the lifetime of the incapable.
What is the criteria for obtaining the leave of the Court?
The recent decision of the Honourable Justice LeMay in Groh v Steele, 2017 ONSC 3625, is an important reminder of the high threshold for obtaining the leave of the Court to compel an accounting from an attorney for property under section 42.
In Groh, the Applicant, Ernest, sought a capacity assessment of his mother Gabriella under the Substitute Decisions Act. Ernest also sought an order for the suspension of Gabriella’s attorneys for property ability to act and an order for the attorneys for property to pass their accounts. Ernest’s Application was opposed by Gabriella and her attorneys for property.
On the issue of Ernest’s request that the attorneys pass their accounts, Justice LeMay reviewed section 42 of the SDA and concluded that “it is clear that the only circumstances in which Ernest could ask for a passing of accounts is if he can obtain leave of the Court.”
Justice LeMay went on to make the following statement regarding the circumstances in which leave should be granted by the Court:
In my view, such leave should be granted sparingly. The passing of accounts is a detailed review of the financial affairs of the grantor. As such, it is something that is intrusive, and will reveal private financial information about the grantor. In order to obtain leave, the party applying would have to establish both that he or she had some interest (at least indirectly) in the affairs of the grantor, and that there was at least some evidence that the Attorneys were not properly conducting the affairs of the donor. The Court should also consider the role that the Attorneys are playing in the Grantor’s affairs.
After reviewing the facts before the Court, Justice LeMay concluded that a formal passing of accounts should not be ordered, and Ernest’s Application was dismissed.
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Umair Abdul Qadir
Last week, the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO) released its Final Report on Legal Capacity, Decision-making and Guardianship. The Final Report is the result of work conducted by a LCO Advisory Group since early 2013.
In the Final Report, the LCO outlines the strengths and attributes of Ontario’s capacity and guardianship regime, as well as areas of concern. Some key areas of concern the LCO identifies include:
- The system is confusing and lacks coordination;
- There is a lack of clarity and consistency in the law for capacity assessments;
- Legal tools are not responsive enough for the range of needs of those directly affected;
- Individuals, families, and service providers are not receiving enough support;
- The current oversight and monitoring mechanisms for substitute decision makers are insufficient;
- The dispute resolution mechanisms under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 (SDA) are inaccessible to many.
The Final Report includes recommendations for reforms to law, policy and practice. These recommendations relate to (1) improving access to the law, (2) promoting understanding of the law by those directly affected, (3) strengthening protection of rights under the Health Care Consent Act, (4) reducing inappropriate intervention, (5) increasing accountability and transparency, and (6) enabling greater choice of substitute decision makers.
The Final Report makes 58 recommendations on the statutory regime for legal capacity, decision-making, and guardianship, including proposed reforms to the SDA, the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and the Mental Health Act. Some of the Final Report’s key recommendations on the law of substitute decision-making include:
- Improved access to capacity assessments under the SDA;
- A standard-form “Statement of Commitment” required to be signed by persons accepting an appointment as an attorney;
- The delivery of “Notices of Attorney Acting” at the first time the attorney acts, delivered to the grantor, the spouse, any previous attorney and any monitor appointed, as well as for any other persons identified in the Power of Attorney;
- The option to name a “monitor”, who would have statutory powers to visit and communicate with the grantor and powers to review accounts and records kept by the attorney;
- Development of time-limited or reviewable guardianship orders;
- Development of limited property guardianships, in parallel with existing limited personal care guardianships;
- Further research and consultation be conducted towards establishing a dedicated licensing and regulatory system for professional substitute decision-makers;
- Further research and consultation be conducted towards allowing community agencies to provide substitute decision-making for day-to-day decisions;
- Clarification of the duty of health practitioners to provide information to substitute decision-makers upon a finding of incapacity; and
- Empowering adjudicators under the SDA to order substitute decision-makers to obtain education on specific aspects of his or her duties.
The Final Report suggests short, medium, and long-term plans for implementing the LCO’s recommendations. You can find a copy of the full report at the LCO website.
Thank you for reading.
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Section 31 of the Substitute Decisions Act (“SDA”) states that an attorney for property “has power to do on the incapable person’s behalf anything in respect of property that the person could do if capable, except make a will.” An attorney for property also has the power to make gifts and loans to the grantor’s family and friends, as well as charitable gifts (SDA s37(3)).
There are strict limits, however, to how generous an attorney may be. The SDA includes guiding principles with respect to making gifts: the attorney cannot deplete the grantor’s property to the extent that there may not be enough to satisfy the needs of the grantor him or herself, during the grantor’s lifetime. The gifts or loans must also only be made if the attorney has a reason to believe, based on any expression the grantor might have made while capable, that the grantor would have made these gifts or loans if capable. Charitable gifts have further restrictions.
In addition to the prohibition against making a will, an attorney for property has an obligation to find and read the grantor’s will (SDA s33.1). Unless necessary to perform one’s duties to the incapable person, the attorney must not dispose of property subject to a specific testamentary gift, although this prohibition does not apply to a testamentary gift of money (SDA s35.1). The court highlighted the importance of the will in Weinstein v. Weinstein (Litigation Guardian of), stating obiter that s 33.1 of the SDA is “indicative of the importance the legislators attach, appropriately, to the will of an incapable person, in view of the permanent character of the will if the incapable person does not regain capacity.” Taken together, these provisions can be read to support the proposition that an attorney does not have the authority to dispose of assets in a way that undermines the grantor’s estates plan.
The case law on the subject of an attorney’s ability to make gifts is limited. Moreover, the cases largely deal with relatively small gifts. While not directly related to the issue of gifts made by an attorney on behalf of a grantor, the court in Banton v Banton held that it is improper for an attorney to deprive the grantor of his or her testamentary freedom by making inter vivos transfers. The attorneys in this case made a large transfer to a trust to protect the grantor from a predatory marriage, which is both allowed and an appropriate action for an attorney to take. However, the secondary beneficiaries of the trust were the grantor’s children, which the court held functioned as a will substitute, which is an inappropriate use of the power of attorney.
In summary, gifting must be done carefully and in a manner that would survive judicial scrutiny. An attorney should not make gifts if they represent so large a proportion of the estate that the attorney has substituted the testamentary intentions of the grantor with their own discretion. An attorney should also not make any gifts if the grantor was not in the habit of making gifts to friends and family or had expressed a contrary intention while capable.
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This week on Hull on Estates, Paul Trudelle and Noah Weisberg discuss the recent Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision of Keller v. Wilson, 2015 ONSC 6962, pertaining to applications for directions by Attorneys and passing of Attorney accounts pursuant to the Substitute Decisions Act.
Should you have any questions, please email us at email@example.com or leave a comment on our blog.
The Substitute Decisions Act directs that, when a person who does not reside in Ontario is appointed as a guardian of property, that person must provide security, as approved by the Court, for the value of the property to be administered. However, the Court also has discretion to waive the requirement that security be provided by a non-resident guardian of property. Under what circumstances the Court will exercise its discretion to waive the requirement to post security when appointing a non-resident guardian of property is unclear within the legislation and little guidance is provided by the sparse case law that deals with this issue.
In a paper presented by Dermot Moore of the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (the “PGT“) at this year’s Six-Minute Estates Lawyer, Mr. Moore outlined the policy of the PGT on recommending security when a non-resident guardian of property is being appointed. The PGT will typically recommend that security be required in the following circumstances:
- If the proposed guardian is not a parent or spouse of the incapable person and the value of property is greater than $100,000.00;
- If the proposed guardian is a parent or spouse, the incapable person does not own real property, and the value of the property is greater than $250,000.00; and
- If the proposed guardian is a parent or spouse, the incapable person owns real property, and the value of the property is greater than $500,000.00.
It may be worth noting that in a jurisdiction such as Toronto, where property values are so high, a guardianship application by a non-resident of Ontario in respect of the average person who own real property will result in a recommendation by the PGT that security be posted.
In his paper, Mr. Moore notes that it is not infrequent for the Court to dispense with the requirement that security be provided if there is some argument in support of waiving the requirement. One of the few decisions in which the issue of security in the appointment of non-resident guardians has been considered is Salzman v. Salzman, 2011 ONSC 3555, 2011 CarswellOnt 15786. In this case, a resident of Quebec was appointed as guardian of property for his mother and was not required to post security upon his appointment. In dispensing with the requirement to post security, Justice Hoy made note of the proposed guardian’s close relationship with his incapable mother, his historical assistance in managing her affairs, and the consent of his siblings, the only other beneficiaries of his mother’s estate, to the non-resident’s appointment and the dispensing of the requirement to post security.
Thank you for reading.