Tag: spouse

29 Oct

Can there be a “break” in a common law relationship?

Stuart Clark Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

As anyone who has ever watched the show Friends can attest, “breaks” can happen in any relationship. For those attempting to claim common law spousal status however, what impact, if any, do such “breaks” have upon the length of time that the couple has to be together? Do you have to re-set the clock of the relationship after every “break”, or can the “breaks” be ignored?

Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act incorporates the definition of “spouse” from section 29 of the Family Law Act. Section 29 of the Family Law Act in turn defines “spouse” as including “two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years“. This definition is often what is being referred to when someone says that a relationship is “common law”, with significant corresponding legal rights potentially being given to the two individuals if they are found to be “spouses”.

As the word “continuously” is included in the definition, one would be forgiven for thinking that there cannot be any “breaks” in the relationship, and that you must have a continuous three year period of “cohabitation” for two people to be considered spouses. As we will see below however, this may not necessarily be the case.

I have previously blogged about the factors that the court may look to in determining whether two people are “cohabitating”, with the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H. having confirmed that you look to the factors listed in Molodowich v. Penttinen to determine whether to individuals are “cohabitating” to the extent that their relationship becomes spousal. For the purpose of this blog however, the interesting question which follows is whether a couple who otherwise meets enough of the factors from Molodowich to be considered to be “cohabitating”, but had a “break” in their relationship during the three year period, could still be considered “spouses”.

In Boothe v. Gore, [1996] O.J. No. 4376, the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) provides the following commentary regarding the effect of a “break” on a relationship:

The law in Ontario recognizes that a man and a woman are considered to have continuously cohabitated, despite that while living together, there might have been separations for varying periods of time before reconciling. Cohabitation does not terminate until either party regards it as being at an end, and, demonstrate convincingly that this is the party’s intent. A brief cooling off period does not convincingly show a settled state of mind that cohabitation has terminated…

The effects of temporary separations depends on the intention of the parties. When one party leaves the other and provides an objective basis to believe that they do not intend to resume cohabitation and the separation lasts for a meaningful period of time, the period of cohabitation could well have been interrupted.” [emphasis added]

As Boothe v. Gore suggests, a “break” in a relationship should not necessarily preclude a finding that two persons are common law spouses. Rather, the court is to attempt to ascertain the intentions of the parties at the time of the “break”, with the spousal status only coming to a close if either of the parties regards the relationship as being “at an end“, or the period of separation lasts for a “meaningful period of time“.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

27 Aug

Predatory Marriages: A Growing Concern in Ontario

Kira Domratchev Capacity, Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, Guardianship, Litigation, Power of Attorney, Wills Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

We sometimes hear about an elderly person marrying a much younger person. What we often do not consider, however, is the possibility that such a marriage is entered into by a “predatory” spouse in order to take advantage of an elderly victim with the ultimate goal of assuming control of his or her finances.

The “predator” is often a caregiver or a family friend or neighbour. In most cases, it is a person who uses a position of trust to cause an elderly victim to change a Will, a power of attorney, an insurance policy designation or other documents. It is also not uncommon for inter vivos transfers to be made while the senior is alive.

According to Ontario law, the act of marriage grants the new spouse certain property rights, specifically with respect to the matrimonial home and spousal support. The most significant effect of a marriage, however, is the fact that the Succession Law Reform Act, revokes any Will executed prior to the marriage. To make matters worse, predatory marriages often occur in private such that the senior’s family members are not aware that he or she has married.

The evidentiary burden imposed upon the elderly victim’s adult family members to prove that a marriage should be declared void as it is a marriage of a “predatory” nature is significant.

Why is it so tough to show that a marriage is void?

Capacity is a fluid concept. It means that a person could have capacity for one task and no capacity for another, as capacity is time and situation specific. Capacity to enter into a marriage, is the lowest threshold of capacity. As such, a person can be entirely capable to enter into a marriage but may be incapable of managing his or her own financial affairs.

In addition, a person likely does not just lose capacity in a day; it is a gradual process such that there is a “grey zone” between having capacity and having no capacity at all. It is in that “grey zone” that a predator will take advantage because a person may start forgetting things but is otherwise capable for all intents and purposes.

Because of that, many are of the opinion that Ontario laws make seniors an easy target for “predatory marriages”. Will there be a change in the law coming our way, in light of the growing phenomenon of such marriages? Only time will tell.

For more information regarding this growing concern and the manner in which this issue has been treated by the courts, please see a paper by Kimberly Whaley of WEL Partners on Predatory Marriages.

Thanks for reading.

Kira Domratchev

09 Apr

The Support Claim as a Remedy for the Disappointed Spouse

Kira Domratchev Support After Death, Wills Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Occasionally, a person finds themselves in a situation in which, following their spouse’s death, they were either not adequately provided for under their spouse’s Will or were not provided for at all.

Especially in situations where the deceased fully supported his or her spouse, one viable option is for the surviving spouse to assert a claim for support under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c. S. 26 (the “SLRA”).

A surviving spouse, either married or common-law as defined in the SLRA fits into the definition of a “dependant” and is thus entitled to support from the deceased spouse’s estate.  The question for the Court is whether the deceased made adequate provision for his/her surviving spouse and, if not, what ought to be the quantum of support.

Under the SLRA, a “dependant” includes not just married spouses, but also either of two persons who,

  • were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated or declared a nullity; or
  • are not married to each other and have cohabited,
    • continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
    • in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child.

It is important to keep in mind that such a claim under the SLRA must be brought within six months of obtaining probate, unless the Court allows for an extension of time. Probate is another term for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will that is usually obtained by the Estate Trustee for proper administration of the Estate.

The Court may consider various factors in assessing the nature, amount and duration of support, including the eighteen factors listed under section 62(1) of the SLRA some of which are:

  • The Dependant’s current assets and means;
  • The Dependant’s capacity to contribute to their own support;
  • The Dependant’s age and physical and mental health;
  • The Dependant’s needs – with regard to accustomed standard of living;
  • Any agreement between the Dependant and the deceased spouse; and
  • The proximity and the duration of the Dependant’s relationship with the deceased spouse.

If a claim for dependant’s relief is successful, the Court has broad discretion and can make a variety of orders for support, including but not limited to:

  • A monthly or annual payment, for an indefinite or limited period of time or until the occurrence of a specific event;
  • A lump sum payment;
  • The transfer of specified property, either absolutely, for life, or a specified number of years; or
  • The possession or use of any specified property for life or for such period as the Court considers appropriate.

In any event, if a person believes that they may have a good case for a Dependant’s Support Claim under the SLRA, it is important to consult with a lawyer as soon as possible so as to file the claim within the allotted limitation period and discuss any other options.

Thanks for reading.

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

Dependant’s Support – Do common law spouses have to live in the same residence?

Dependant Support and Pre-Retirement Death Benefits

Can Divorced Spouses No Longer Be Dependants?

 

31 Oct

Hull on Estates #532 – Do common law spouses need to live together?

76admin Common Law Spouses, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Podcasts, PODCASTS / TRANSCRIBED, Show Notes, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

This week on Hull on Estates, Ian M. Hull and Stuart Clark discuss the recent case of Stajduhar v. Wolfe, 2017 ONSC 4954, and whether two individuals need to live together to be considered spouses within the confines of Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.

Click here for more information on Ian M. Hull.

Click here for more information on Stuart Clark.

26 Oct

Dependant’s Support – Do common law spouses have to live in the same residence?

Stuart Clark Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Paul Trudelle recently blogged about the Stajduhar v. Wolfe decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, wherein the court was faced with the question of whether two individuals who did not live together in the same residence could meet the definition of “spouse” for the purposes of seeking support after death pursuant to Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“). In ultimately concluding in such a decision that the two individuals did not meet the definition of “spouse”, such that the surviving individual could not seek support after death, much emphasis was placed on the fact that the two individuals did not “live” in the same residence. In coming to such a decision, the court stated:

In conclusion, I find that Branislava has failed to prove that she was a dependent spouse as defined by s. 57 of the SLRA at the time of Jeffrey’s death.  The evidence satisfies me that the couple never lived together and thus did not cohabit for any period of time.” [emphasis added]

But is such a finding in keeping with the previous case law on the subject? Do two individuals need to live in the same residence to be considered “spouses” within Part V of the SLRA?

The definition of “spouse” within Part V of the SLRA includes two people who have “cohabited” continuously for a period of not less than three years. “Cohabit” is in turn defined as “to live together in a conjugal relationship, whether within or outside marriage“. When read together, to meet the “common law” definition of spouse in Part V of the SLRA two people must live together in a conjugal relationship continuously for a period of not less than three years.

As the words “live together” are contained in the definition of spouse, when read in its literal sense it would appear self-evident that two individuals must “live together” in the same residence to be considered common law spouses. Importantly however, this is not how the court has historically interpreted the subject.

Prior to Stajduhar v. Wolfe, the leading authority on what was meant by two individuals “living together in a conjugal relationship” was the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision of M. v. H. In M. v. H., the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that in determining whether two individuals lived together in a conjugal relationship you are to look to the factors established by paragraph 16 of Molodowich v. Penttinen, which include:

  • Did the parties live under the same roof?
  • What were the sleeping arrangements?
  • Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?
  • Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?
  • What was the attitude and conduct of the community towards each of them and as a couple?

The Supreme Court of Canada was clear in M. v. H. that the factors established by Molodowich can be present in varying degrees, and that not all categories must be met for two individuals to be considered spouses. When the Ontario Court of Appeal in Stephen v. Stawecki applied the factors employed by M. v. H. specifically to the question of whether two individuals must live in the same residence to be considered spouses, the court concluded that they did not, and that living arrangements are only one of many factors to consider. In coming to such a conclusion, the Court of Appeal states:

We agree with the respondent that the jurisprudence interprets “live together in a conjugal relationship” as a unitary concept, and that the specific arrangements made for shelter are properly treated as only one of several factors in assessing whether or not the parties are cohabiting.  The fact that one party continues to maintain a separate residence does not preclude a finding that the parties are living together in a conjugal relationship.” [emphasis added]

The recent Stajduhar v. Wolfe decision notably does not contain any reference to Stephen v. Stawecki, nor to the Supreme Court of Canada’s previous consideration of the issue in M. v. H., such that it is not clear whether such cases were considered by the court before determining that the two individuals were not “spouses”. As a result, it is not clear whether M. v. H. and Stephen v. Stawecki will continue to be the leading authorities on the issue, such that Stajduhar v. Wolfe is an outlier decision, or whether Stajduhar v. Wolfe represents a new line of thinking for the court on whether two individuals must live in the same residence to be considered spouses.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

07 Sep

Update: Can divorced spouses be dependants?

Stuart Clark Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Back in February 2017 I blogged about how, as a result of a recent change in the definition of “spouse” within the confines of Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA”), divorced spouses could arguably no longer qualify as a “spouse” of the deceased individual for the purposes of dependant’s support. As a divorced spouse would be unlikely to be included amongst any other class of individual who could qualify as a “dependant” of the deceased, the effect of such a change was to potentially deprive divorced spouses from the ability to seek support from their deceased ex-spouse’s estate following death.

The issue centered on the removal of language from the definition of “spouse” within Part V of the SLRA. The definition of spouse previously included language which provided that a “spouse” included two people who “were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated or declared a nullity”. The revised definition provided that “spouse” under Part V of the SLRA had the same meaning as section 29 of the Family Law Act. As section 29 of the Family Law Act did not include similar language to the definition of spouse including two people who “were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated or declared a nullity”, but rather simply provided that “spouse” was defined as including two people who were married to each other or who are not married to each other but cohabitated continuously for a period of not less than three years (i.e. common law spouses), the argument was that divorced spouses could no longer be “spouses” for the purposes of Part V of the SLRA.

Much debate ensued in the profession following such a change in definition about what impact, if any, it would have upon a divorced spouse’s ability to seek support after death. Such debate now appears to be moot, as the Ontario legislature appears to have acknowledged the confusion caused by the change in definition, and has again changed the definition of “spouse” within the confines of Part V of the SLRA with the passage of the Stronger, Healthier Ontario Act (Budget Measures), 2017, S.O. 2017, C.8 (the “Stronger, Healthier Ontario Act”).

In accordance with “Schedule 29” of the Stronger, Healthier Ontario Act, the definition of “spouse” as contained in Part V of the SLRA now reads as follows:

“Spouse” has the same meaning as in section 29 of the Family Law Act and in addition includes either of two persons who were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated by divorce.” [emphasis added]

The revised definition of “spouse” leaves no doubt that divorced spouses can qualify as a dependant of their deceased ex-spouse within the meaning of Part V of the SLRA. Interestingly, while the revised definition of “spouse” clearly includes divorced spouses, it does not contain a reference to those individuals whose marriage was “declared a nullity” as the previous definition of spouse contained. As a result, it is still questionable whether those individuals whose marriage was declared a nullity could be considered a “spouse” within the confines of Part V of the SLRA, and whether they could bring an Application for support as a dependant of their ex-spouse’s estate following death.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related topics:

Can Divorced Spouses no longer be Dependants?

Cohabitation and Marriage

Dependant Support Claims, Limitation Periods and the Vesting of Real Property

23 Feb

Hull on Estates #507 – Divorced Spouses and Dependant’s Relief Claims

76admin Archived BLOG POSTS - Hull on Estates, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Podcasts, PODCASTS / TRANSCRIBED, Show Notes, Show Notes Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

This week on Hull on Estates, Paul Trudelle and Umair Abdul Qadir discuss recent amendments to the definition of “spouse” under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, and the implications for former and divorced spouses. For more on this topic, read our associate Stuart Clark’s recent blog post on the amendments.

 Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.

Click here for more information on Umair Abdul Qadir.

06 Feb

Can Divorced Spouses no longer be Dependants?

Stuart Clark Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

A recent amendment to the definition of “spouse” within the confines of Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“) has likely made it such that divorced spouses may no longer bring an Application for support as a dependant of their deceased ex-spouse’s estate. This is in stark contrast to the previous definition of “spouse” in Part V of the SLRA, which allowed divorced spouses to bring an Application for support.

Section 57 of the SLRA defines a “dependant” as including a “spouse” of the deceased to whom the deceased was providing support, or was under  a legal obligation to provide support, immediately before his or her death. As an ex-spouse of the deceased would not qualify amongst any other class of individuals who may be a “dependant” of the deceased (not being a parent, child, brother or sister), the effect of removing them from the definition of “spouse” is to preclude them from being able to qualify as a “dependant” of the deceased.

The old definition of “spouse” within Part V of the SLRA was as follows:

‘spouse’ means a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1) and in addition includes either of two persons who,
     (a)        were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated or declared a nullity; or
     (b)        are not married to each other and have cohabitated,
          (1) continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
          (2) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child” [emphasis added]

From the bolded section above, it is clear that divorced spouses previously qualified as a “spouse” of the deceased for the purposes of determining dependants. If the deceased was providing support, or was under a legal obligation to provide support, to their ex-spouse immediately prior to their death, and they did not make adequate provision for them from their estate, the court could make an order providing for their support under section 58(1) of the SLRA. This is likely now no longer the case.

The definition of “spouse” in Part V of the SLRA was recently amended by section 71 of the All Families Are Equal Act, which came into effect on December 5, 2016. The new definition of “spouse” in Part V of the SLRA is as follows:

” ‘spouse’ has the same meaning as in section 29 of the Family Law Act”

Section 29 of the Family Law Act (the “FLA“) defines “spouse” as follows:

” ‘spouse’ means a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabitated
     (a)        continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
     (b)        in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the parents of a child as set out in section 4 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.”

Section 1(1) of the FLA further defines spouse as follows:

” ‘spouse’ means either of two persons who,
     (a)        are married to each other, or
     (b)        have together entered into a marriage that is voidable or void, in good faith on the part of a person relying on this clause to assert any right.”

The definition of “spouse” in section 29 of the FLA, and section 1(1) of the FLA by extension, notably does not include any reference to divorced spouses being included amongst the class of individuals who could be considered “spouses”. As the definition of “spouse” in Part V of the SLRA now mirrors that of section 29 of the FLA, it appears that divorced spouses can no longer qualify as “spouses” under Part V of the SLRA, such that they may no longer qualify as a “dependant” of the deceased. As only a “dependant” may bring an Application for support, the effect of the change is that ex-spouses may likely no longer bring an Application for support under Part V of the SLRA.

While section 34(4) of the FLA contemplates that any previous order providing for the support of an ex-spouse would bind the deceased spouse’s estate unless the order provides otherwise, the inability for ex-spouses to proceed under Part V of the SLRA could have a significant impact in the context of insolvent estates. Under section 72 of the SLRA, assets which pass outside of the estate, including life insurance policies and/or joint-assets which pass by right of survivorship, can be made available to satisfy an order for support. The FLA does not appear to have an equivalent provision, such that any support order may likely only be paid for out of the estate. As a result, to the extent that there are insufficient assets in the estate to satisfy any outstanding support order, or to the extent that such an order has not yet been made, the divorced spouse may be out of luck. While previously the divorced spouse could have brought a claim under Part V of the SLRA, and seek the payment of any support order from assets such as life insurance policies and/or joint-property under section 72 of the SLRA, this option appears to no longer be available to them.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

Other blog posts you might enjoy:

The All Families are Equal Act is Passed

New Financial Disclosure Requirements Under the Family Law Rules

The Case for Financial Support of Non-Conjugal Caregivers

23 Feb

Hull on Estates #455 – Kuchta v. The Queen and Tax Liabilities of Surviving Spouses

Hull & Hull LLP Archived BLOG POSTS - Hull on Estates, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Podcasts, PODCASTS / TRANSCRIBED, Show Notes, Show Notes Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

This week on Hull on Estates, Noah Weisberg and Nick Esterbauer discuss a recent decision of the Tax Court of Canada that addresses the use of property transferred to spouses to satisfy tax liabilities pursuant to the Income Tax Act.  A copy of the Kuchta v. The Queen decision is available here: http://bit.ly/1QcncGi

Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.

Click here for more information on Noah Weisberg.

Click here for more information on Nick Esterbauer.

22 Feb

Kuchta v The Queen – Meaning of Spouse and Tax Liability

Ian Hull Beneficiary Designations, Estate Planning Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

In Kuchta v The Queen, 2015 TCC 289, the Tax Court of Canada had occasion to consider some interesting issues with respect to the meaning of “spouse” in the Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (the “ITA”) and a spouse’s joint and several liability for a deceased spouse’s tax liabilities on death.

Ms. Kuchta was married to Mr. Juba (the “Deceased”) at the time of his death in 2007. Ms. Kuchta was the designated beneficiary of two of the Deceased’s RRSPs, and she accordingly received $305,657.00 upon the Deceased’s death. The Deceased was assessed by the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) and found to owe $55,592.00 in respect of his 2006 taxation year. After the Deceased’s Estate failed to pay that amount, the Minister assessed Ms. Kuchta for the amount owing, pursuant to s. 160(1) of the ITA. This section provides that where a person has transferred property to their spouse, the transferee and transferor are jointly and severally liable to pay the transferor’s tax.

Ms. Kuchta’s position was that, three of the four requirements of s. 160(1) were met, but that the last requirement had not been met. Ms. Kuchta stated that she was not the Deceased’s spouse at the time of transfer of the RRSPs, as it occurred immediately after the Deceased’s death, at which point their marriage had ended. The Court, therefore, had to consider (a) when should the relationship between Ms. Kuchta and the Deceased be determined; and (b) does the word ‘spouse’ in s. 160(1) include a person who was, immediately before a tax debtor’s death, his or her spouse?

With respect to issue (a), if the relationship is determined at the time that Ms. Kuchta was designated as beneficiary of the RRSP, they would have been married, whereas if the relationship were determined at the time of transfer, they would not have been married. The Court easily concluded that the relationship should be determined at the time of transfer. It then had to determine whether the word “spouse” in s. 160(1) is sufficiently broad to include Ms. Kuchta at the time of transfer. That is, whether it included widows and widowers.

The Court undertook a “textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the word ‘spouse’ in subsection 160(1).” After a lengthy and thorough analysis, the Court concluded that the word ‘spouse’ must have been intended to include widows and widowers. It found that Parliament used both the legal and colloquial meanings of the term in the ITA, which differ from each other, thus presenting conflicting interpretations and ambiguity. However, the purposive analysis was found to point to an interpretation that includes widows and widowers.

Ultimately, therefore, Ms. Kuchta was found jointly and severally liable for the Deceased’s unpaid taxes, as a result of the beneficiary designation of the Deceased’s RRSPs. It will be interesting to see how this case applies going forward, and we should keep in mind that the Minister may be able to collect on unpaid taxes from the beneficiary of a Deceased’s RRSP.

Thanks for reading.

Ian Hull

SUBSCRIBE TO OUR BLOG

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.
 

CONNECT WITH US

CATEGORIES

ARCHIVES

TWITTER WIDGET