Tag: Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act
Most people know that if a person dies without a Will, the laws of intestacy govern the division of his or her estate. Specifically, it is Part II of the Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S.26 (the “SLRA“) that is titled “Intestate Succession” that comes into play.
The question of who inherits where there is no Will is easily answered in some of the following scenarios:
- Where there is a surviving spouse (limited to married spouses, by the way), said spouse is entitled to the entirety of the property of the deceased (section 45(1));
- Where there is a surviving spouse and one child, spouse receives a preferential share of the estate of the deceased (i.e. $200,000.00 as of today) and if anything is left over, it is divided equally between spouse and child (section 46(1));
- Where there is a surviving spouse and two or more children, the spouse is entitled to a preferential share of the estate of the deceased and 1/3 of what is left over. The remainder is then divided between the issue of the deceased (section 46(2)).
The SLRA further addresses how the division of assets is to take place where the only surviving relatives are parents, brothers and sisters and nieces and nephews (in respective order of preference). If the deceased has no surviving parents, brother/sisters or nieces/nephews, the next of kin provision (section 47(6)) applies.
Despite the fact that the SLRA attempts to bring clarity to the division of one’s intestate estate, it appears that certain situations may arise that would lead to confusion, absent case law that would provide some guidance.
In Farmer Estate v Karabin Estate, an executor of a niece who predeceased the deceased commenced an application in respect of her alleged share in the estate of the deceased. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the SLRA is confined to nieces or nephews who do not predecease the deceased and does not extend to more remote issue. The Court of Appeal relied on section 47(4) of the SLRA which is worded as follows:
“Where a person dies intestate in respect of property and there is no surviving spouses, issue or parent, the property shall be distributed among the surviving brothers and sisters of the intestate equally, and if any brother or sister predeceases the intestate, the share of the deceased brother or sister shall be distributed among his or her children equally.” [emphasis added]
In interpreting this provision, the Court relied on the definitions of “child” and “issue” as defined in the SLRA, namely the definition of “child” includes a child conceived before and born alive after the parent’s death and the definition of “issue” includes a descendant conceived before and alive after the person’s death.
In another matter, Kiehn v Murdoch, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that grandnieces and grandnephews are excluded from sharing in the estate of a deceased by operation of section 47(4).
Unfortunately in the circumstances where a particular scenario arises that has not been clearly addressed by the SLRA and subsequent case law, an application for directions may need to be commenced to receive some clarity from the Court as to how a particular intestate estate is to be divided.
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Testamentary freedom is a core tenet of estate planning in Ontario. In general, testators are at liberty to set up their estate plan to include or exclude whomever they wish. Where part or all of a testator’s estate plan fails as a result of an intestacy, Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA”) steps in to provide the parties who will benefit as a result. Occasionally, the principles of testamentary freedom and intention and the laws of intestacy intersect in peculiar ways. This intersection came to a head in the Eissmann v Kunz (2018 ONSC 3650) decision.
In Kunz, the testator, Siegfried Kunz, died leaving no fewer than four testamentary documents purporting to be wills, briefly summarized as follows:
- A will drawn in 1967, which divided Mr. Kunz’s estate between his wife and their daughter, Petra;
- A will drawn in 1982 in Mr. Kunz’s handwriting, which stated that the “beneficiary after [his] death is Petra”;
- A will drawn in 2000, again in Mr. Kunz’s handwriting, which purported to modify the 1967 will and listed a number of specific legacies to various beneficiaries. Mr. Kunz appears to have later written over the original bequests to increase the amount of each. Petra was once again listed as the sole residuary beneficiary; and
- A will drawn in 2009, also in Mr. Kunz’s handwriting, which provided that Petra would “not receive a single Euro of out [the] Estate.” In the margin of the 2009 will, Mr. Kunz expressly indicated that the 2009 will was to be an “amendment” to the 2000 will.
The Court was first tasked with determining which will was to govern. The Court concluded that the 2000 will was a valid holograph will, though noted that the subsequent handwritten amendments were of no force and effect as they did not comply with the formal requirements for valid alterations under the SLRA. The Court concluded that the 2009 will operated instead as a codicil to the 2000 will as it did not dispose of any property on its face and, therefore, could not function as a standalone will.
The interplay between the 2000 will and the 2009 codicil is such that a conflict arose with respect to the disposition of the residue of Mr. Kunz’s estate. The 2000 will names Petra as the sole residuary beneficiary. The 2009 will revokes Petra’s interest entirely. The 2009 codicil therefore created a partial intestacy with respect to the residue of Mr. Kunz’s estate, and the Court looked to the SLRA to determine who would inherit.
The hierarchy of beneficiaries on an intestacy is set out in Part II of the SLRA. Mr. Kunz died leaving no surviving spouse, and so the next intestate beneficiaries were to be his children, that is, Petra. In an ironic twist of fate, the Court concluded that Petra was solely entitled to all of the residue of Mr. Kunz’s estate, notwithstanding that he had intended to expressly disinherit her under the 2009 codicil. The Court declined to give effect to Mr. Kunz’s apparent intention to exclude Petra.
Simple estate planning steps, such as the appointment of an alternate beneficiary under the 2009 will, could have prevented this great irony. Ensure the effects of your testamentary dispositions are properly understood by taking time to review your will with a lawyer.
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When is it Appropriate to Extend the Time Granted in Favour of Equalization under the Family Law Act?
Applications for an extension of time (beyond six months from date of death) to elect under the Family Law Act (“FLA”) are regularly brought before the Court. Decisions with respect to that are often dealt with by way of short endorsements.
Justice Dunphy, in Aquilina v Aquilina, 2018 ONSC 3607, a recent court decision, made some interesting comments regarding applications for an extension of time in such circumstances.
The Deceased passed away in December, 2017, leaving the Applicant (his wife) and their three adult children. The Applicant was primarily a homemaker and as such, her level of information regarding the family financial affairs was imprecise. The Estate was not a simple one to administer, in part due to a number of business interests the Deceased had in the family’s native country, Malta, held through various corporations, real estate holdings and an active business.
At the time of the hearing, the Estate did not have an administrator. It was determined that the Deceased did not leave a Will.
The Applicant in this matter had two options – making a claim under the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”) or the FLA.
Under the SLRA, in the event of an intestacy, the beneficiaries of the Deceased’s estate are the Applicant and their three adult children. Under s. 46(2) of the SLRA, where there is no Will and there is more than one child of the Deceased, the surviving spouse is entitled to 1/3 of the Estate plus the “preferential share” prescribed by s. 45 of the SLRA.
In contrast, s. 5(2) of the FLA provides that the surviving spouse will receive 1/2 of the difference between the value of the net family property of each of the spouses where the Deceased had the higher of the two amounts.
The Applicant has a period of six months from the date of death to make the election as per s. 6(10) of the FLA. Absent an election, the surviving spouse takes under the SLRA.
Criteria for Extension
The Applicant requested that the court: (i) extend the time to make an election until two years from the date of the application; (ii) extend the time for the deemed election to the same date; and (iii) extend the time during which distributions from the Estate are suspended until the same date.
In making a finding, the Court must consider:
- Whether there are apparent grounds for relief;
- Whether delay, if any, was incurred in good faith; and
- Whether anyone will be substantially prejudiced by the delay.
It is important to note, that the surviving spouse does not have to have precise and accurate information but that he or she must have sufficient information to make an informed choice. Justice Dunphy noted that extensions are intended to be the exception and not the rule.
Analysis and Decision
Justice Dunphy held that it was going to take a period of time – very likely a year or more – to be able to gather the facts necessary to understand the value of this Estate and the Applicant’s intersecting interests within (meaning the consequences flowing from her different roles as a shareholder, widow and spouse). Therefore, Justice Dunphy held that there are some grounds for relief in the circumstances of this case.
In considering whether there was any delay that was not incurred in good faith, though Justice Dunphy noted that the Application was brought very close to the six month anniversary of the Deceased’s date of death, he placed weight on the fact that the death was “sudden, unexpected and shocking” and the relative complexity of the Estate. He held that the delay was incurred in good faith.
Justice Dunphy found that there would be no substantial prejudice in this case if an election was granted because the only other beneficiaries of the Estate are the three adult children of the Deceased and the Applicant, who confirmed that they did not oppose the motion. He did balance against that finding, however, the inherent prejudice in having all or a substantial portion of the Estate frozen. In making this consideration, Justice Dunphy found that any prejudice in this matter was slight.
Based on the facts, Justice Dunphy held that more time would be required to consider the rights of the Applicant, as the surviving spouse, under the SLRA as compared to the FLA. As such, he granted the Applicant all the relief sought, but reduced it to one year from the date of the Application instead of the two years that the Applicant was seeking.
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Occasionally, a person finds themselves in a situation in which, following their spouse’s death, they were either not adequately provided for under their spouse’s Will or were not provided for at all.
Especially in situations where the deceased fully supported his or her spouse, one viable option is for the surviving spouse to assert a claim for support under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c. S. 26 (the “SLRA”).
A surviving spouse, either married or common-law as defined in the SLRA fits into the definition of a “dependant” and is thus entitled to support from the deceased spouse’s estate. The question for the Court is whether the deceased made adequate provision for his/her surviving spouse and, if not, what ought to be the quantum of support.
Under the SLRA, a “dependant” includes not just married spouses, but also either of two persons who,
- were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated or declared a nullity; or
- are not married to each other and have cohabited,
- continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
- in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child.
It is important to keep in mind that such a claim under the SLRA must be brought within six months of obtaining probate, unless the Court allows for an extension of time. Probate is another term for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will that is usually obtained by the Estate Trustee for proper administration of the Estate.
The Court may consider various factors in assessing the nature, amount and duration of support, including the eighteen factors listed under section 62(1) of the SLRA some of which are:
- The Dependant’s current assets and means;
- The Dependant’s capacity to contribute to their own support;
- The Dependant’s age and physical and mental health;
- The Dependant’s needs – with regard to accustomed standard of living;
- Any agreement between the Dependant and the deceased spouse; and
- The proximity and the duration of the Dependant’s relationship with the deceased spouse.
If a claim for dependant’s relief is successful, the Court has broad discretion and can make a variety of orders for support, including but not limited to:
- A monthly or annual payment, for an indefinite or limited period of time or until the occurrence of a specific event;
- A lump sum payment;
- The transfer of specified property, either absolutely, for life, or a specified number of years; or
- The possession or use of any specified property for life or for such period as the Court considers appropriate.
In any event, if a person believes that they may have a good case for a Dependant’s Support Claim under the SLRA, it is important to consult with a lawyer as soon as possible so as to file the claim within the allotted limitation period and discuss any other options.
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It is not uncommon to encounter situations where an individual dies without a will, having never been married, widowed, separated or divorced and without children. It can, however, be uncommon to come across situations where an individual dies under these circumstance but also leaves behind no known close relatives or next of kin. When this occurs, the question that immediately arises is: who will inherit the deceased person’s estate?
In Ontario, the distribution of the estate of an unmarried, childless person who has died without a will is governed by Part II of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “Act”). The Act provides a statutory scheme that sets out classes of individuals who will inherit on such a persons’ intestacy. The order of entitlement is as follows:
- Nieces and Nephews; and finally,
- Next of Kin.
When none of the above individuals can be identified or located, section 47(7) of the Act states that the property of the deceased person becomes the property of the Crown, and the Escheats Act, 2015 applies.
Depending on the circumstances, individuals without a family may wish to consider if there is a charitable organization or community activity that they belong to that they would prefer to benefit from their estate under a will. In the alterative they may wish to take proactive steps to locate their distant relatives during their lifetime.
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This week on Hull on Estates, Paul Trudelle and Umair Abdul Qadir discuss limitation periods for dependant’s support claims, seeking leave to extend the limitation period under the Succession Law Reform Act and the recent Ontario Superior Court Justice decision in Weigand v Weigand Estate, 2016 ONSC 6201 (http://bit.ly/2dBTomV).
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Last week we discussed the doctrine of republication, which makes an older valid will operate as if it had been executed on the (later) date of republication. A codicil that refers to a prior unrevoked will is the most common example of republication.
Republication must not be confused with revival of a revoked will, which requires clear evidence of an intention to make valid a previously revoked will. (We have written before about revocation of a will, which can be effected by marriage (depending on the will), making a new will, a proper written revocation, and destruction of the will with an intention to revoke.)
Section 19(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act provides that a revoked will can be revived by: (a) another duly executed will, (b) a codicil that shows an intention to revive, or (c) re-execution of the will with the required formalities. Re-execution also requires intention, so merely signing a revoked will does not revive it.
If there is a codicil that refers to a validly revoked will, the court will look to see whether there is evidence of intention to revive. If a codicil is ambiguous, the court will consider extrinsic evidence of whether the testator had an intention to revive the will. Whether or not extrinsic evidence is admitted, the court will place itself “in the position of the testator” and consider the codicil in light of “surrounding circumstances.” In this way, the court will try to find the testator’s true intentions from the codicil (Hale v Tokelove (1850), 2 Rob Ecc 318 at 325).
Intention to revive can be a significant issue if a testator does not know that his or her will was revoked in the first place. A properly executed codicil that would republish a valid will might not be sufficient to revive a revoked will. For example, a testator might not be aware that his or her marriage revoked their previous will. If that testator makes a codicil referring to the earlier will, without understanding that the will was revoked by operation of law, then the codicil may not show the necessary intention to revive the will. If the testator dies without making a new will, his or her estate will pass on either full or partial intestacy, despite having made a will.
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Republication of a valid will makes the will operate as if it were created on the date of republication. Generally speaking, a codicil republishes the will to which it refers, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the codicil. For example, a codicil, duly executed on September 14, 2016, to an earlier will would republish the will, making it operate as if the will were executed on September 14, 2016. This is true whether or not the codicil is annexed to the will. A testamentary document that is not called a codicil and that does not make reference to a specific earlier will does not republish the will.
The Wills Act, 1837 provided that a republished will is deemed to have been made at the time of the republication. The Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA) does not make any reference to republication, to either confirm or abolish the doctrine. Thus, the SLRA has a neutral effect on the doctrine, and it continues to operate
in Ontario law.
The concept of republication was more important before the Wills Act, 1837 was enacted, when it was a rule of law that real property acquired after the date of the execution of a will could not be devised by that will. The Wills Act, 1837 changed the law so that a will speaks from the date of death in respect to the property of the testator.
Republication can still be useful in estate planning. For example, republication can be used to incorporate by reference a document or memorandum into the will that was not in existence when the will was first executed (Lady Truro, Re (1866), [1865-69] LR 1 P &D 201). Republication might also be significant in construing the meaning of certain provisions of a will, particularly descriptions.
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Today on Hull on Estates, Noah Weisberg and David Morgan Smith discuss the recent English Court of Appeal decision of Ilott and Mitson which considers both estrangement and testamentary wishes in the context of dependant support and its application under Part V of the (Ontario) Succession Law Reform Act.
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Section 72(1) of Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act allows a court to deem various assets that may normally fall outside of a deceased’s estate, to be part of the estate for the purposes of satisfying a dependant support claim. This usually includes “any amount payable under a policy of insurance effected on the life of the deceased and owned by him or her”. However, as demonstrated in Madore-Ogilvie (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ogilvie Estate  E.G. No. 4654 (Div. Ct.), this provision will not normally capture insurance policies owned jointly by the deceased and a third party.
In Ogilvie Estate, the deceased was the father of six children (three of them minors) by five different women. Dependant support claims were made on behalf of two of the minor children. It was agreed that the deceased had failed to provide adequately for his minor children.
The issue before the court was whether a joint life insurance policy, issued to both the deceased and his spouse, could be included as part of the deceased’s estate under section 72(1) of the SLRA. The deceased and his spouse were both the owners and beneficiaries of the policy, which provided that the survivor of the two would receive the face amount of the policy on the death of the other. It was undisputed that the spouse had made the majority of the payments under the policy.
The applications judge held that the policy could be included as part of the estate. On appeal, a majority of the Divisional Court reversed this decision. The majority held that a jointly owned policy cannot be included as part of an estate merely because the deceased is one of the owners of the policy. The Court recognized that s. 72 of the SLRA was designed to counter the intentional depletion of an estate at the expense of dependants. However, there are transactions that “would be considered the normal personal commerce of an individual” and not necessarily undertaken to disenfranchise a dependant. In the case at hand, the majority ultimately decided that the contractual rights of the spouse to the joint policy trumped the needs of the deceased’s dependants.
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