Tag: Moore v Sweet
It is nearly a new year. It is during this time that we reflect on the past year, make goals for the upcoming year, and come across all sorts of ‘best of’ and ‘most popular’ rankings.
As such, I herewith present the most popular estate and trust cases from 2018, as decided solely by me (and without regard to any actual data):
- Moore v Sweet – the Supreme Court of Canada provided clarification regarding the juristic reason competent of the test for unjust enrichment, as well as confirmed the circumstances in which a constructive trust remedy is appropriate in the context of unjust enrichment.
- Re Milne Estate & Re Panda – In Re Milne (currently under appeal), the Superior Court of Justice found that multiple Wills were invalid where so-called ‘allocation clauses’ (also referred to as basket clauses) in the Wills provided the Estate Trustees with the discretion to determine which estate assets fell under which Will. Conversely, in Re Panda, the Superior Court of Justice declined to follow Re Milne and probated the Will notwithstanding the presence of an allocation clause. The Superior Court of Justice also addressed the roles of the court as either the ‘court of probate’ or ‘court of construction’ and whether a Will is a trust that is subject to the three certainties.
- Wall v Shaw – the Court of Appeal (sitting as the Divisional Court) held that there is no limitation period to objecting to accounts in an Application to Pass Accounts. The Court reasoned that a notice of objection does not commence a ‘proceeding’ for the purposes of section 4 of the Limitations Act.
- Seguin v Pearson – the Ontario Court of Appeal reiterated the different tests for undue influence that apply in the inter vivos and the testamentary context.
- Valard Construction Ltd. v. Bird Construction Co. – the Supreme Court of Canada found that a trustee had a fiduciary duty to disclose the terms of a trust (here, it was a bond) to the beneficiary, notwithstanding the fact that the express terms of the trust did not stipulate this requirement.
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The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Moore v Sweet provided meaningful clarification on the Canadian law of unjust enrichment and, in particular, the juristic reason analysis.
As it made a finding of unjust enrichment, it was not necessary for the Court to consider the second issue before it, being whether, in the absence of unjust enrichment, a constructive trust could nevertheless be imposed in the circumstances on the basis of “good conscience”.
In 1997, the Supreme Court released its decision in Soulos v Korkontzilas. That case considered situations that may give rise to a constructive trust remedy. In referring to the categories in which a constructive trust may be appropriate, which were noted to historically include where it was otherwise required by good conscience, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) stated as follows:
I conclude that in Canada, under the broad umbrella of good conscience, constructive trusts are recognized both for wrongful acts like fraud and breach of duty of loyalty, as well as to remedy unjust enrichment and corresponding deprivation…Within these two broad categories, there is room for the law of constructive trust to develop and for greater precision to be attained, as time and experience may dictate.
Since 1997, Soulos and the above excerpt have been interpreted inconsistently by scholars and courts of appeal throughout Canada. Some consider Soulos to restrict the availability of constructive trust remedies to only situations where there has been a finding of unjust enrichment or wrongful conduct, while others favour a more liberal interpretation.
The appellant in Moore v Sweet sought, in the alternative to a remedy on the basis of unjust enrichment, a remedial constructive trust with respect to the proceeds of the life insurance policy on the basis of good conscience. In choosing not to address this issue, Justice Côté (writing for the Majority) stated as follows:
This disposition of the appeal renders it unnecessary to determine whether this Court’s decision in Soulos should be interpreted as precluding the availability of a remedial constructive trust beyond cases involving unjust enrichment or wrongful acts like breach of fiduciary duty. Similarly, the extent to which this Court’s decision in Soulos may have incorporated the “traditional English institutional trusts” into the remedial constructive trust framework is beyond the scope of this appeal. While recognizing that these remain open questions, I am of the view that they are best left for another day.
It will be interesting to see if and when the Supreme Court ultimately chooses to determine “the open questions” regarding the availability of the remedial constructive trust. Until then, it appears that some debate regarding the circumstances in which it may be imposed will remain.
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