Tag: litigation guardian
Under the Limitations Act, 2002, most actions are subject to a two-year limitation period. However, the limitation period does not run during any time in which the person with the claim is incapable of commencing a proceeding AND not represented by a litigation guardian in relation to the claim. A person is presumed to be capable unless the contrary is proved.
What happens when a claim is commenced, but not all defendants are named? This issue arose in the recent decision of Wood v. David Mitchell et al., 2020 ONSC 4903 (CanLII). There, the plaintiff suffered a stroke. He sued a number of defendants in relation to his medical care. One doctor was referred to in the Statement of Claim, but not named as a party. Three years after the claim was started, the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as the plaintiff’s litigation guardian. The PGT moved to add the doctor as a defendant. The doctor moved to strike the claim on the basis of the passage of the limitation period. The plaintiff resisted, taking the position that the plaintiff did not have capacity when the claim was commenced, and did not have a litigation guardian.
The doctor raised two main points. Firstly, the doctor sought information about communications between the plaintiff and his initial lawyers going to his capacity at the time. Secondly, the doctor argued that the plaintiff was represented initially by a “de facto” litigation guardian, a Mr. McQueen.
The decision addressed these issues from the perspective of a motion to compel answers to questions and further production. The plaintiff had refused to answer questions about his and Mr. McQueen’s communications with his initial lawyers and to produce the lawyers’ file on the basis of relevance and privilege.
At first instance, the Master disallowed the questions. On appeal, the court ordered that the lawyers’ files as they relate to the plaintiff’s capacity and to Mr. McQueen’s dealings with the lawyers must be produced, even if privileged.
The court held that on the first issue, as the plaintiff put his capacity in issue, information that his lawyers had about his capacity was to be produced. The court stated that the “elephant in the room” was “what were the plaintiff’s initial lawyers thinking” when they commenced the claim? Did they believe that the plaintiff had capacity? If so, what was that belief based on?
On the second issue, the court referred to the Court of Appeal decision of Azzeh (Litigation Guardian of) v. Legendre, 2017 ONCA 385 for the proposition that a de facto litigation guardian could recommence the running of the limitation period. In Azzeh, the court held that a person could be considered litigation guardian, even if not formally appointed, if they held themselves out as litigation guardian. In Wood, the court held that the definition of “litigation guardian” might even by broader.
As can be seen, the issues that arise in litigation where the capacity of a party may be in issue can be complex. The courts must walk a fine line of ensuring that the right to sue is not taken away from an incapable person, while ensuring that the rights of third parties, including the right to the protection of limitation periods, are safeguarded.
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I have previously blogged about the need to have any settlement which affects the interests of a party under a “legal disability”, whether on account of them being a minor or otherwise, to be approved by the court in accordance with rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the settlement is binding upon the party under a disability. Although rule 7.08 is clear what materials need to be included in any Motion to approve a settlement, with affidavits being required both from the incapable person’s litigation guardian as well as the litigation guardian’s lawyer outlining why they believe the settlement should be approved, what is less clear is the actual procedure by which such a Motion is brought before the court.
There has been some debate recently about whether in Toronto a Motion to approve a settlement should be brought in writing or if they should be brought before a Judge in person. The apparent confusion appears to be caused by what appear to be competing instructions that are contained in the practice direction for the Toronto Region as well as the practice direction for the Estates List, with one appearing to tell you to bring the Motion in writing and the other appearing to tell you to do the opposite.
The general practice direction for the Toronto Region provides the following regarding an approval Motion under rule 7.08:
“A motion under Rule 7.08 must be brought in accordance with the Best Practice’s Guidelines and Checklist for rule 7.08 matters.”
The Best Practice’s Guidelines and Checklist in turn provides:
“Rule 7.08 requires the approval of a judge for any proposed settlement on behalf of a party under a disability. This is done by way of a motion made in writing or if no action has been commenced, then the approval of a judge is obtained by way of an application. In Toronto, Rule 7 motions and applications are to be filed as in-writing motions through the civil intake office, in the motions department.” [emphasis added]
The checklist appears clear that if you are bringing a motion to approve a settlement in Toronto that it is to be done in writing. As a result, if your matter is subject to the general Toronto practice direction, it would appear fairly clear that your approval Motion must be brought in writing.
Although the general Toronto practice direction appears clear that approval Motions are to be brought in writing, many, if not most, estates matters in Toronto are adjudicated on the specialized Estates List. The general Toronto practice direction notes that it does not apply to matters on the Estates List unless it is specifically mentioned, stating:
“This Practice Direction does not apply to motions or applications heard on the Commercial and Bankruptcy Lists, Estates List, or under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, unless specifically mentioned.” [emphasis added]
There appears to be no reference in the general Toronto practice direction that the “in writing” rule for approval Motions is to apply to matters on the Estates List. As a result, it would appear that such a rule does not apply to matters on the Estates List, and that we are to revert to any direction provided in the Estates List practice direction regarding approval Motions.
The Estates List practice direction provides the following regarding how approval motions are to be brought before the court:
“Where the settlement of a proceeding on the Estates List requires court approval, the motion for approval of the settlement and the application for the appointment of a guardian of property should be brought before a judge on the Estates List.” [emphasis added]
There is no reference in the Estates List practice direction to the approval motion having to be brought in writing, with the practice direction simply stating that it has to be brought “before a judge”. Although a technical reading of such a direction may suggest that a matter could be brought “before a judge” in writing, in the absence of any specific bar to bringing the approval Motion before a Judge in person, and as Judges often have questions about a settlement before granting their approval, it would appear that absent any additional direction from the court that approval motions on the Estates List can (and probably should) still be brought before a Judge in person.
The result of all of this appears to suggest that if you are seeking the approval of a settlement in Toronto and your matter is on the general civil list that you have to bring the approval motion in writing. If you matter is on the Estates List however it would appear likely that you can continue to bring your approval Motions in person before a Judge. Matters in jurisdictions outside of Toronto should consult with your local practice direction for any direction regarding how they may want you to bring any approval Motions.
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In March of last year, I blogged on the decision in Hunt v Worrod which dealt with predatory marriages and an individual’s capacity to marry. There have been several developments in that case since then, most recently in a Court of Appeal decision released in June, concerning the issue of costs.
The facts of the case are set out in greater detail in my earlier blog, but a quick refresher may nonetheless be helpful. The application was commenced by the applicant, by his two litigation guardians, largely for the purposes of challenging the validity of his marriage to the respondent and its effect on her property rights as a spouse of the applicant. The respondent had been granted a legal aid certificate by Legal Aid Ontario (“LAO”), which funded her legal fees through trial. Importantly, LAO was not retained as counsel by the respondent. Rather, the respondent retained private counsel whose fees were funded by LAO.
The applicant was ultimately successful at trial and sought an order for costs against the respondent personally, the respondent’s counsel personally, and LAO. In his decision on costs, Justice Koke ordered the respondent was to pay the applicant’s costs on a full indemnity basis. However, he equally noted that, as a result of her limited means and tenuous financial position, it was unlikely that the respondent would be able to pay any amount of that costs award.
The trial judge then turned his mind to the request for costs payable by LAO. In reviewing the circumstances of LAO’s involvement in the case, the trial judge held that it had failed to carry out its mandate by continuing to fund the respondent’s fees notwithstanding the lack of merit. The trial judge ordered LAO to pay one-half of the amount of the costs award made against the respondent.
LAO appealed the costs award and was successful. In its reasons, the Court of Appeal plainly stated that the decision to award costs against LAO could not stand, as it had been made on a misapprehension of LAO’s role in the matter. While the trial judge had held that LAO purportedly failed to monitor the litigation that it had continued to fund, resulting in an abuse of process, the Court of Appeal took a markedly different view.
Notably, the Court of Appeal identified that LAO’s role was strictly limited to providing funding for the respondent to retain separate counsel in accordance with its statutory mandate. LAO itself did not act for the respondent, nor was it a party to the initial application.
Had LAO been a party to the litigation, the Court of Appeal held that they would properly have been exposed to a potential costs award, subject to the discretion of the trial judge. However, in the absence of evidence of any bad faith on the part of LAO in continuing to fund the litigation, the Court of Appeal held that a costs award against LAO was not appropriate in the circumstances.
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Where an incapable person is named as a party in a legal proceeding, the appointment of a representative is necessary to ensure that the person’s interests are adequately represented in the litigation.
Litigation Guardians in Civil Proceedings
Rule 7.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that, unless the Court orders or a statute provides otherwise, a litigation guardian shall commence, continue or defend a proceeding on behalf of a “party under disability.” The Rules define “disability” to include a person who is mentally incapable within the meaning of sections 6 or 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.
Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides additional guidance regarding litigation guardians in civil proceedings, including the powers and duties of a litigation guardian.
But what about parties who are under an incapacity and who are named as parties in a family law proceeding in Ontario?
“Special Parties” Under the Family Law Rules
In Ontario, the Family Law Rules apply to family law cases in the Superior Court of Justice’s Family Court, the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Court of Justice. The Family Law Rules provide guidance on the appointment of representatives for incapable persons in family law matters.
Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules defines a “special party” as a party who is a child or who is or appears to be mentally incapable for the purposes of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 in respect of an issue in the proceeding.
Pursuant to Rule 4(2), the Court may authorize a person to represent a special party if the person is appropriate for the task and willing to act as representative. If there is no appropriate person willing to act, the Court may authorize the Children’s Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee to act as the representative.
Mancino v Killoran – More Than One Potential Representative
A recent decision illustrates the conflicts that may arise when more than one person believes that they are the most appropriate person to act as an incapable person’s representative in a family law proceeding.
In Mancino v Killoran, 2017 ONSC 4515, the Applicant asserted a claim for spousal support and for an interest in a property against the Respondent (“Michael”). Michael had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s, and was a resident at a long-term care home. Michael’s sister (“Colleen”) and his son (“Allan”) both sought to represent Michael’s interests in the litigation, and filed affidavits in support of their positions.
Justice Gareau considered Michael’s power of attorneys and testamentary documents, which were executed at a time when Michael was still capable. Allan was named as Michael’s attorney for property and co-attorney for personal care. Allan was also named as the sole Estate Trustee of Michael’s Estate.
Justice Gareau held that “[t]he fact that Michael…, at a time when he had capacity, placed Allan… in a position of trust over his personal property and the administration of his estate indicates that he had confidence in Allan…to represent his best interests.” Michael’s sister Colleen was not named in any of Michael’s testamentary documents, which Justice Gareau found to be a “powerful and persuasive fact.”
The Court concluded that there was nothing in the evidence that would persuade the Court to depart from Michael’s express wishes regarding the management of his property. In the result, Allan was appointed to represent Michael as a special party in the family law litigation.
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Umair Abdul Qadir
“Disability” is defined in Rule 1.03(1) to mean a person who is (a) a minor, (b) mentally incapable within the meaning of section 6 or section 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, whether that person has a guardian or not, or (c) an Absentee within the meaning of the Absentee Act.
The procedure and requirements for the appointment of a Litigation Guardian are different for plaintiffs/applicants and defendants/respondents.
The initial appointment of a Litigation Guardian for a plaintiff or applicant occurs without a court order upon the filing of an affidavit with the court setting out the information outlined in Rule 7.02(2).
Where the party under a disability is a defendant or respondent to a proceeding, Rule 7.03(1) states that a Litigation Guardian must be appointed by motion to the court unless the exceptions set out in Rule 7.03 (2), (2.1) or (3) apply. These exceptions include the prior appointment of a Guardian or a valid Attorney for Property with express powers to act as Litigation Guardian, or where the Office of the Children’s Lawyer is representing a minor’s interest in an estate or trust. Where there is no appointed guardian or attorney under a power of attorney, any person not under a disability may act as a Litigation Guardian. Where there is no person willing to act as Litigation Guardian, the Public Guardian and Trustee may be appointed.
Litigation Guardians are necessary to protect parties under disability, but also to protect opposing parties and court procedures.
A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Huang v. Braga, 2016 ONSC 6306, considers the appointment of a litigation guardian for a defendant or respondent in circumstances of mental incapacity.
In that case, the defendant had retained five different counsel over 13 years. She had fired her counsel, rejected a large settlement and insisted on proceeding to trial. A capacity assessment was ordered and she was found to be incapable of acting for herself in the action, but capable of managing her property. On review of the totality of the circumstances, Archibald J. found the defendant to be a party under a disability and issued Judgment appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee to act as litigation guardian.
Archibald J. refers to the decision in C.C. v. Children’s Aids Society of Toronto,  OJ No. 5613, which establishes the following test for whether a Litigation Guardian is required:
- The person must appear to be mentally incapable with respect to an issue in the case; and
- As a result of being mentally incapable, the person requires legal representation to be appointed by the Court.
In addition, Archibald J. states that the cause of incapacity must stem from a source of mental incapacity such as mental illness, dementia, developmental delay or physical injury and not from some other reason such as lack of sophistication, education or cultural differences.
Archibald J. states that in determining whether a person “appears to be mentally incapable” the following factors should be considered:
(a) The person’s ability to know or understand the minimum choices or decisions required and to make them;
(b) An appreciation of the consequences and effects of his or her choices or decisions;
(c) An appreciation of the nature of the proceedings;
(d) The person’s inability to choose and keep counsel;
(e) The person’s inability to represent him or herself;
(f) The person’s inability to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant issues; and,
(g) The person’s mistaken beliefs regarding the law or court procedures.
Traditionally the Court has accepted the following types of evidence in support of same:
- medical or psychological evidence as to capacity (including, a capacity assessment, report or doctors certificate);
- evidence from persons who know the litigant well;
- appearance and demeanour of the litigant;
- testimony of the litigant; and,
- opinion of the litigant’s own counsel.
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It is typically the case that a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property and/or Personal Care that is granted while the grantor is capable will survive for the life of the grantor, unless there is compelling evidence of misconduct or neglect. However, this was not the case in Corewyn v McCulloch, 2015 ONSC 6039. In this case, Justice Sweeny appointed the daughter of an incapable woman as guardian, despite the fact that there was a valid Continuing Power of Attorney in favour of the incapable woman’s husband and no evidence of misconduct or neglect.
Ena and her husband Bill had been married for over 32 years. Ena executed a Continuing Power of Attorney in favour of her husband in February 1999, and in 2007 Ena was diagnosed with Alzheimer Dementia and became incapable of managing her property and personal care. Although Bill was Ena’s Attorney for Property and Personal Care, he was not very involved in health and personal care decisions for Ena. Instead, Ena’s daughter Donna made many of the personal care decision on behalf of Ena with some consultation with Bill. Donna also provided Bill will personal care assistance.
Issues began to arise after Ena broke her hip and required additional care. After Ena broke her hip, Donna arranged for her to be moved to a new care facility where her personal care needs could better be meet. Donna also arranged for a personal support worker (“PSW”) to assist her mother on a daily basis for approximately 25 hours per week.
At the same time Bill executed Powers of Attorney in favour of Donna but soon became suspicious of Donna’s motive. He consulted with a lawyer and his daughter, Sara and made the decision to revoke the Powers of Attorney in favour of Donna and granted new Powers of Attorney to Sara.
In her capacity for Attorney of Property for Bill, Sara made the decision to reduce Ena’s personal support worker visits to two hours per day. This caused Donna to become concerned about her mother’s care and the decisions that Bill and Sara where making on Ena’s behalf.
On March 28, 2015 Donna and Sara made an agreement that resulted in Ena and Bill dividing their assets 50/50. Following this agreement, Bill withdrew $75,000 from a joint account held with Ena. Donna then took her mother to the bank to withdraw the remaining $19,000. Donna then commenced a guardianship application to be granted the legal authority to make personal care and financial decisions on behalf of her mother.
In accordance with sections 22(3) and 55(2) Substitute Decisions Act (“SDA”), Justice Sweeny was satisfied that Ena was incapable of making decisions regarding her property and personal care that such decisions could not be met by any alternative course of action.
In dealing with the issue of whether Bill’s Powers of Attorney should be terminated, Justice Sweeny acknowledged that to do so required clear evidence of misconduct or neglect, which was simply not present in this case. Nonetheless, Justice Sweeney cited case law that suggests that the courts may substitute a decision maker where a valid Power of Attorney no longer served the best interest of the incapable person.
In granting Donna’s application for guardianship, Justice Sweeny stated that in considering the best interest of Ena “the court must take into consideration the changing nature of a person’s needs and always focus on what is in the best interests of the person at the particular time the appointment is sought to be made…”
In considering the factors set out in section 24(5) of the SDA, Justice Sweeny held that Ena’s appointed had not only appointed Donna as her substitute Attorney for Property and Personal care but that Donna had acted as de facto Attorney Ena for numerous years with Bill’s knowledge. Further, she had always acted in Ena’s best interest. In light of these facts and sufficient evidence that Bill had not taken an active role in making decisions on Ena’s behalf, Justice Sweeny found it to be in the best interest of Ena to appoint Donna as guardian of the person for Ena.
This cases now suggests that the best interest an incapable person may be an additional factor to be considered when the court is asked to terminate a valid continuing power of attorney. Accordingly, solicitors should be mindful of this consideration when acting for an Attorney for Property or an Applicant in a Guardianship Application.
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Today on Hull on Estates, Paul Trudelle and Noah Weisberg discuss the role of a litigation guardian and the circumstances in which one may need, or need to remove, a litigation guardian. Should you have any questions, please email us at firstname.lastname@example.org or leave a comment on our blog page.