Tag: joint tenancy

13 Aug

Severing a Joint Tenancy – A Loosening of the “Course of Dealing” Rule?

Natalia R. Angelini Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Support After Death, Trustees, Uncategorized, Wills Tags: 0 Comments

There are three ways in which a joint tenancy may be severed (Hansen Estate v. Hansen):

  1. Unilaterally acting on one’s own share (e.g. selling or encumbering it).
  2. A mutual agreement between the co-owners.
  3. Any course of dealing sufficient to intimate that the interests of all were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common.

In Marley v. Salga, the Court addressed the third manner in which to sever joint title – by course of dealing. In this case, there were competing applications brought by Ms. Marley, the deceased’s widow, on the one hand, seeking sole legal and beneficial ownership of the matrimonial home, and by the deceased’s children from a prior marriage, on the other hand, seeking an order that the estate is entitled to a half interest in the property as a tenant-in-common.

The Court declared that the estate was entitled to a half-interest in the property as a tenant in common. The evidence considered to determine the issue included a deathbed conversation between deceased and Ms. Marley, in which Ms. Marley acknowledged the deceased’s wish to divide the property 50:50 between his children and Ms. Marley. The Court seemed to place great weight on this evidence, finding that the deceased and Ms. Marley “were in agreement as to how the property should be handled on his death.” One commentator criticizes the Court for accepting that Ms. Marley was prepared to compromise her property rights “…on the basis of soothing words spoken to her husband on his deathbed without fully understanding her rights, without the benefit of any advice as to the consequences that would result to her and without any compensation or consideration for the loss of those rights.”

Another consideration for the Court was the language of the deceased’s Will, which allows Ms. Marley to occupy the deceased’s half of the property on certain terms, purports to terminate her rights in certain circumstances, and provides for the sale of the property. The Will’s language assisted in swaying the Court, as the Court treated it as a piece of evidence used to discern if there was a common intention, and it inferred that the provision in the Will was known to Ms. Marley. This rationale has been the subject of debate as (i) a testamentary disposition cannot sever a  joint tenancy and should not be relied upon as evidence of a mutual intent, and (ii) there does not seem to have been evidence of both spouses taking steps showing a mutual treatment of their co-ownership as a tenancy in common.

If appealed, we may get some helpful clarification on this important issue.

Thanks for reading,

Natalia Angelini

08 Apr

Can an Attorney for Property sever a joint-tenancy in real property?

Stuart Clark Power of Attorney Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

It is often said that an Attorney for Property can do anything on behalf of the grantor’s behalf except make a will. This is on account of section 7(2) of the Substitute Decisions Act (the “SDA“), which provides:

The continuing power of attorney may authorize the person named as attorney to do on the grantor’s behalf anything in respect of property that the grantor could do if capable, except make a will.” [emphasis added]

Although at first glance it would appear that the potential tasks that an Attorney for Property could complete on behalf of a grantor are almost absolute, with the Attorney for Property being able to do anything on behalf of the grantor except sign a new will, in reality the tasks that an Attorney for Property may complete relative to the grantor’s estate planning is more restrictive than this would suggest at first glance. This is because the definition of “will” in the SDA is defined as being the same as that contained in the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“), with the SLRA in turn defining “will” as including not only typical testamentary documents such as a Last Will and Testament or Codicil, but also “any other testamentary disposition“. As a result, the stipulation that an Attorney for Property can do anything on behalf of the grantor “except make a will” would include not only a restriction on the Attorney for Property’s ability to sign a new Last Will and Testament or Codicil on behalf of the grantor, but also a restriction on the Attorney for Property’s ability to make “any other testamentary disposition” on behalf of the grantor.

It is fairly common for individuals such as spouses to own real property as joint-tenants with the right of survivorship. When one joint-owner dies ownership of the property automatically passes to the surviving joint-owner by right of survivorship, with no portion of the property forming part of the deceased joint-owner’s estate. Although such an ownership structure may make sense when the property is originally purchased, it is not uncommon for circumstances to arise after the property was registered (i.e. a divorce or separation) which may make one of the joint-owners no longer want the property to carry the right of survivorship. Should such circumstances arise, one of the joint-owners will often “sever” title to the property so that the property is now held as tenants-in-common without the right of survivorship, making efforts to attempt to ensure that at least 50% of the property would form part of their estate should they predecease the other joint-owner.

Although severing title to a property is fairly straight forward while the owner is still capable, circumstances could become more complicated should the owner become incapable as questions may emerge regarding whether their Attorney for Property has the authority to sever title to the property on behalf of the grantor, or whether such an action is a “testamentary disposition” and therefor barred by section 7(2) of the SDA.

The issue of whether an Attorney for Property severing title to a property is a “testamentary disposition” was in part dealt with by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Champion v. Guibord, 2007 ONCA 161, where the court states:

The appellants argue that the severing of the joint tenancies here constituted a change in testamentary designation or disposition and is therefore prohibited by s. 31(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act because it is the making of a will.

While we are inclined to the view that the severance of a joint tenancy is not a testamentary disposition, we need not decide that question in this case. Even if it were, we see no error in the disposition made by the application judge, because of s. 35.1(3)(a) of the Substitute Decisions Act.” [emphasis added]

Although the Court of Appeal does not conclusively settle the issue in Champion v. Guibord, the court appears to strongly suggest that they are of the position that an Attorney for Property severing a joint-tenancy is not a “testamentary disposition” within the confines of the SDA.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

13 Dec

Testing the waters of Section 72(1)(d) of the Succession Law Reform Act

Hull & Hull LLP Joint Accounts, Support After Death Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Many of our readers will be aware that on an application for dependant’s support under Part V of Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act, certain property that may not be considered an asset of the deceased’s estate can be “clawed back” into the estate for the purposes of considering and funding an award of dependant’s support.  Subsection 72(1)(d) provides that “a disposition of property made by a deceased whereby property is held at the date of his or her death by the deceased and another as joint tenants” shall be deemed to be part of the estate.

Whether jointly-held property is caught by s.72(1)(d) depends on whether there was a “disposition” into that joint tenancy.  When a property is initially purchased by a deceased person and another in joint tenancy and remains as such at the time of death, it can not be said that there was a disposition into joint tenancy: s. 72(1)(d) would not appear to apply.

However, when the ownership arrangement of a property is more intricate, whether or not jointly-held property will be deemed to be an asset of the estate within the context of a dependant’s support application becomes less clear.

Consider the following scenario:

  • At first instance, title to a property is taken as follows:
    • 50% held solely by A; and
    • 50% held jointly by A and B, who are common law spouses.
  • Years later, A conveys the 50% held by her alone to herself and her common law spouse jointly.
  • Therefore, immediately preceding A’s death, 100% of the property is held in joint tenancy by A and B.

Now, after A’s death, A’s minor children assert a dependant’s support claim. Does section 72(1)(d) apply, such that the property can be made available to fund a payment of dependant’s support?

The decision in Modopoulos v Breen Estate, [1996] O.J. No. 2738 interpreted section 72(1)(d) of the Succession Law Reform Act to mean that, only if the property was owned solely by the deceased and later transferred into joint tenancy prior to death, would there be a “disposition” into joint tenancy.

In the unique set of circumstances described above, it could be argued that A never solely owned the property and, therefore, the later disposition is not captured by section 72(1)(d).  However, another perspective is that the 50% interest held initially by A as a tenant in common (with A and B jointly as to the other 50%) would have formed part of her estate if the subsequent disposition to B as a joint tenant did not take place. This interpretation strongly supports that section 72(1)(d) of the Succession Law Reform Act would in fact apply to make the 50% interest in the property available in satisfaction of a dependant’s support claim.  Certainly such an argument is consistent with the remedial intent of the legislation.

To our knowledge, there has yet to be a decision in Ontario that addresses whether section 72 would apply to a disposition out of a tenancy in common and into a joint tenancy, such as that featured in our hypothetical example.  It will be interesting to see how a court would interpret similar transactions if encountered in the future.

Thank you for reading.

David Morgan Smith and Nick Esterbauer

 

Other blog entries that you may enjoy reading:

 

16 Oct

The Risks of Joint Tenancy

Rebecca Rauws Estate & Trust, Joint Accounts, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Although there are certainly some benefits that may result from making ownership of a property or other asset joint with another individual (e.g. avoiding payment of estate administration tax in relation to that property upon the death of one of the joint owners), there can also be risks associated with jointly-held property.

In the recent British Columbia Supreme Court decision in Gully v Gully, 2018 BCSC 1590, a mother added her son as a joint tenant on real property that she owned (the “House”). Her decision to do so was based on estate planning advice that she had received. The mother did not tell her son that she had added him as a joint tenant, and the son did not contribute to the House in any way, either before or after it was transferred into joint tenancy. Contemporaneously with the registration of title to the House in joint tenancy, the mother also executed a last will and testament specifically setting out that in naming her son as a joint owner, she intended that the asset would belong to him upon her death.

A couple of years after the mother had added the son as a joint tenant on her House, the son and his software company consented to judgment in favour of a creditor in the amount of $800,000.00. At the time he consented to judgment, the son was still not aware that he was a joint owner of his mother’s House. The creditor subsequently registered a certificate of judgment on the son’s undivided half interest in the House.

The mother brought an application seeking a declaration that the son held his interest in the House on a resulting trust in her favour. The court stated that the proper evidence of a transferor’s intention is at the time of the transfer, because a transferor can change his or her mind subsequent to the transfer, but may not retract a gift once it has been made. In this case the court concluded that the mother did intend to gift an interest in the House to her son at the time the joint tenancy was registered on title, and that the son did not hold his interest on a resulting trust in favour of the mother.

Further, the court stated that even if it had found that the mother had not intended to gift the House to the son, the fact that the joint tenancy was registered on title to the House meant that the creditor could rely on title to enforce its judgment against the son’s interest in the House. Although the issue of whether or not a resulting trust arises in the circumstances may be relevant  as between family members or beneficiaries of an estate, it is not applicable in the case of a third party creditor claiming against a registered interest in land. As a side note, the creditor in this case did advise the court that it did not intend to execute the judgment against the House while the mother was still living there.

Before making any changes to ownership of an asset, it is crucial to obtain comprehensive advice as to all of the possible consequences of doing so—both positive and negative. Communication regarding joint tenancy is also important. This will help ensure that all parties are aware of the assets in which they may have an interest and the nature of any such interest, so they are in a position to manage their affairs accordingly.

Thanks for reading,

Rebecca Rauws

 

Other blog posts that you may find interesting:

04 Jul

Severing Joint Tenancy: Pitfalls to Guard Against

David M Smith Beneficiary Designations, Common Law Spouses, Estate Planning Tags: , , , 0 Comments

Joint tenancy is a great way for parties to hold property when there is a common desire to pass the property by right of survivorship to the surviving joint owner.  However, when the relationship between the parties fails, proactive steps must be taken to sever the joint tenancy to ensure that the title-holding reflects the new reality of the dissolved relationship. Case law is littered with examples of spouses who did not take such steps.

MacNeil Estate v. Bower, a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, is a good example of how litigation can ensue when arrangements don’t fully keep pace with the reality of a failed relationship.  In this case, Robert and Mark began a conjugal relationship began in 1995 and the relationship progressed such that Robert designated Mark as beneficiary of his RRSP and group life insurance in 2007.  In 2008, Robert and Mark purchased a property as joint tenants, notwithstanding that Robert contributed the entire down payment approximating about 20% of the value of the property. In 2010, the relationship between the two ended and Robert entered into a new relationship.  Thereafter, Robert became seriously ill and began to arrange his affairs such that he changed his beneficiary designations and sought legal advice to draft an agreement changing title to the townhouse to tenancy in common.

Litigation ensued because the Agreement was not finalized and executed before Robert died.  Mark claimed right of survivorship as title was still held in joint tenancy.  Robert’s Estate Trustee argued that the joint tenancy had in fact been severed regardless of the incomplete status of the Agreement.

Severing joint tenancy requires one of: (i) a unilateral act affecting title, (ii) a mutual agreement between the co-owners to sever the joint tenancy, or (iii) any course of dealing sufficient to clearly demonstrate or intimate that all owners’ interests were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common.  In MacNeil, the Court found that both the second and third types of severance were realized.

Thanks for reading,

David Morgan Smith

08 Feb

Can Delivery of a Gift Precede Intention?

Suzana Popovic-Montag Estate Planning Tags: , , , 0 Comments

In the recent decision of McKendry v McKendry, the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered the elements of a valid inter vivos transfer of property, particularly the timing of intention to make a gift. The central issue in the case was whether a written deed of gift under seal was necessary to complete a gift where legal title had previously been transferred into joint ownership.

Facts

Mary, a widow, had several adult children. In 2006, Mary’s son, John, moved into her house. He lived with her until her death in 2012. In 2008, Mary transferred legal title to the house to joint tenancy with John. At the time of the 2008 transfer, Mary did not intend to make a gift of the beneficial interest in the house to John; rather, she intended for John to hold the beneficial interest of the house in trust for her estate to be allocated among him and his siblings according to her will.

In 2010, Mary changed her mind in respect to the disposition of the house. Instead of a trust, she decided to leave the property to John outright as surviving joint tenant. She told her lawyer she understood the house would be John’s absolutely on her death and that he was not obligated to share it with his siblings. About a month later, Mary met with her lawyer to sign a new will. It included a provision stating:

I […] confirm that I wish to cancel any trust agreements or other documents imposing an obligation on my son to share the property I own at [the house] with my other children.  I want my home to be my son’s property on my death absolutely – no strings attached.  I have made this decision after much consideration and I fully understand that this gives my son the majority of my assets.  My house constitutes the majority of my assets.

After Mary’s death, three of her daughters commenced two actions against John: one seeking a declaration that he held the house in trust for the estate and the other seeking a variation of Mary’s will.

Trial Decision

The Trial Judge found that Mary did not intend to make a gift of the beneficial interest in the house to John when she transferred legal title to him in 2008. The Judge further found that Mary’s intention changed in 2010, when she decided to make a gift of the house to John. She held the transfer, made in 2008 “is not sufficient to perfect a gift of the survivorship interest in [the house] to John, because (as I have found) Mary did not intend at that time to make such a gift to John.” Further, when Mary did form the intention to make a gift of the house to John, Mary made no further steps to perfect the gift. In the absence of a written deed of gift under seal, the Judge held there was no legally binding gift.

BCCA Decision

The Court of Appeal overturned the trial decision. The Court reviewed the requirements for a valid inter vivos gift: “the donor must have intended to make a gift and must have delivered the subject matter to the donee. The intention of the donor at the time of the transfer is the governing consideration. In addition, the donor must have done everything necessary, according to the nature of the property, to transfer it to the donee and render the settlement legally binding on him or her.”

The court held that in 2008, Mary transferred only legal title to John (as joint tenant) and retained the entire beneficial interest for herself and her estate. In 2010, however, Mary renounced her beneficial interest in the right of survivorship in John’s favour. “In doing so, she clearly intended to make an immediate inter vivos gift of that incident of the joint tenancy to John.” Because she had already transferred legal title to John, she did everything necessary in 2010 to perfect the gift of the beneficial interest, bearing in mind the nature of the interest. The legal title would not have been affected by a deed of gift under seal, given her clear written intention. Mary’s intention was recorded in writing and no other act of delivery was required.

Thank you for reading.

Suzana Popovic-Montag

Other articles you might enjoy:

The Validity of an Inter Vivos Gift

The Many Uses of Inter Vivos Trusts

More on Rebutting The Presumption of Resulting Trust

08 Nov

Does Jointly Owned Property Pass to the Surviving Spouse?

Stuart Clark Estate Planning, Wills Tags: , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Many people are aware of the presumption which was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pecore v. Pecore that assets which are held jointly between the deceased and certain individuals (including their adult children) are presumed to be held by the surviving joint owner on a resulting trust for the deceased owner’s estate unless they can rebut the presumption and show evidence that the deceased intended them to receive the property by right of survivorship. While the application of such a presumption is clear when the property is owned jointly between a parent and an adult child, what about when the property is owned jointly between two married spouses? Does a similar presumption to that in Pecore apply, such that the surviving spouse is forced to show that the deceased spouse intended them to receive the asset upon their death, failing which it is presumed to form part of the deceased spouse’s estate?

When will jointly held property pass to the surviving spouse?
“As a result of section 14 of the Family Law Act, property which is held jointly between two married spouses is presumed to pass to the surviving spouse by right of survivorship.”

The common law presumption that joint assets are held on a resulting trust for the benefit of the deceased owner’s estate has been altered in Ontario as it relates to married spouses by the Family Law Act. Section 14 of the Family Law Act provides:

“The rule of law applying a presumption of a resulting trust shall be applied in questions of the ownership of property between spouses, as if they were not marries, except that,

(a) the fact that property is held in the name of spouses as joint tenants is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the spouses are intended to own the property as joint tenants; and

(b) money on deposit in the name of both spouses shall be deemed to be in the name of the spouses as joint tenants for the purposes of clause (a).”

As a result of section 14 of the Family Law Act, property which is held jointly between two married spouses is presumed to pass to the surviving spouse by right of survivorship. That being said, it is a rebuttable presumption, such that if there is evidence that the deceased spouse did not intend the property to pass to the surviving spouse upon death, the deceased spouse’s estate could seek a declaration that the asset in question is held on a resulting trust for the benefit of the deceased spouse’s estate. Section 14 of the Family Law Act effectively reverses the presumption as described in Pecore in the case of married spouses, whereby property held jointly between two married spouses is presumed to pass to the surviving spouse by right of survivorship unless there is evidence to the contrary such that the presumption can be rebutted.

Notably, section 14 of the Family Law Act only reverses the presumption as it relates to married spouses. As a result, an argument could be raised that in circumstances where common law spouses own property jointly, that the standard presumption as confirmed by Pecore would apply, such that the surviving common law spouse is presumed to hold the asset on a resulting trust for the benefit of the deceased spouse’s estate unless they can show evidence to rebut the presumption.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

09 Aug

Severance of a Joint Tenancy by Course of Dealing

Laura Betts Estate Planning, Executors and Trustees, Litigation Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

Whether a property is held as a joint tenancy or as a tenancy in common can have a significant impact on the overall value of an estate.

Where a property is held as a joint tenancy, and one of the owners dies, his or her interest passes to the surviving owner by right of survivorship.

Where a property is held as tenants in common, the deceased owner’s share of the property passes to his or her beneficiaries pursuant to the terms of his or her Will or, where the deceased dies without a Will, in accordance with the laws governing an intestacy in Ontario.

The severance of a joint tenancy can often become a disputed issue in context of estate litigation.

A joint tenancy can be severed and converted to a tenancy in common in one of three ways:

  1. one owner unilaterally acting on his or her own share, such as selling, transferring or encumbering it;
  2. a mutual agreement between the co-owners; or
  3. any course of dealing sufficient to suggest that the interests of the joint tenants were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common.

Severance by course of dealing can occur without the knowledge of the registered joint owners and is particularly relevant in the context of property held by spouses who had separated, or were in the process of separating, prior to death.

JO8UW3FDNJThe legal test for severance by course of conduct is set out in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Hansen Estate v. Hansen, 2012 ONCA 112 at para 7 as “whether the parties indented to mutually treat their interest in the property as constituting a tenancy in common.” It operates so as to prevent a party from asserting a right of survivorship where doing so would not do justice between the parties.

The test does not require proof of an explicit intention or communication regarding severance of a joint tenancy, rather the party asserting severance must prove that the owners by their conduct treated their respective interest in the property as no longer being held jointly.

The cases in which severance by course of conduct has been successfully upheld generally involve couples who have taken formal steps to separate their interests. For example, where one spouse has moved out of the property, both spouses have retained lawyers in connection with their separation, a valuation of the property has been sought and/or one spouse has made an offer to purchase the other spouse’s share of the property.

However, each case will turn on its own facts. In Jurevicius v. Jurevicius, 2011 ONSC 696,  the Court found that the mere fact of separation was insufficient to establish severance, and in, Gorecki Estate v. Gorecki, 2015 ONCA 845, the Court found that while the relationship between the parties was falling apart, it had not yet reached a point at which they formed a mutual intention to treat their interests in the property as a tenancy in common.

Thank you for reading.

Laura Betts

30 Sep

The High Cost of Probate

Suzana Popovic-Montag Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, Wills Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Many third parties such as banking institutions and the Land Registry Office require probate as proof of authority to act as estate trustee. Unfortunately, the process of probate brings with it the widely unpopular Estate Administration Tax which is calculated on the value of the assets of the estate. As a result, estate planning methods that seek to remove assets from an estate and transfer them directly to a beneficiary are becoming increasingly popular. These include the transfers of title of real property into joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, adding joint account holders to bank accounts, designating beneficiaries in insurance policies, lifetime gifting and the use of multiple wills.

The challenge that some of these techniques brings is that when used in a way that does not ensure an equal distribution of assets among beneficiaries or when the intentions of the testator are later brought into question, they all too often become land mines associated with an increased likelihood of estate litigation.

The question becomes: what is probate and the resulting Estate Administration Tax really costing us? When avoiding probate at all costs begins to encourage risky behaviours that would not have otherwise been taken, we need to start to consider whether certain safeguards need to be implemented.

In looking to the rest of Canada, we can see in both Alberta and Quebec two alternative models. In Alberta, the probate process has created an upper limit or maximum fee that can be payable. This is currently set at $400.00 for estates of $250,000.00 or more. In this way, the incentive to attempt to distribute assets outside of the will has been largely removed.

In Quebec, they have gone even a step further. There is a flat fee for the probate of any estate, regardless of its value, which is currently set at $105.00. However, if the testator has obtained a notarial will, there is no fee at all as notarial wills are not subject to probate. The will is immediately valid upon the death of the testator and is in and of itself valid proof of the authority of the liquidator (i.e. estate trustee) to act.

Aside from the removal of incentives, there are other precautionary measures that can be taken. For instance, public legal education on the effects of lifetime transfers, joint accounts and joint tenancy could be beneficial. These estate planning tools can be effectively and safely used provided that the testator and any joint tenants or account holders have an accurate understanding of the consequences that can arise as a result of these types of transfers.

Furthermore, obtaining proper and independent legal advice beforehand is always recommended. The law with respect to joint assets is still evolving and can give rise to complex issues that can have significant ramifications for the testator, estate and the beneficiaries.

Thank you for reading.

Suzana Popovic-Montag

 

21 Sep

Joint Tenancy, Survivorship, and Adverse Possession

Ian Hull Estate & Trust, General Interest Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Post Estate (Trustee of) v Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 5252 (available on Westlaw) considered a rather unusual set of facts with respect to joint tenancy and an interesting application of the equitable remedy of adverse possession.

Edward and Heather had been common law spouses several decades ago. They purchased a home together (the “home”) in 1980, as joint tenants. Three years later, Edward and Heather ended their relationship, and Heather moved out of the home they had bought together. Edward lived in the home ever since, until his death in December 2014. Heather has not been heard from since 1983.

When Edward died last year, his Estate ran into a roadblock with the home. Edward’s family had understood that the home was in Edward’s name alone, but were surprised to find that Heather and Edward still owned the home together as joint tenants. Under the law of joint tenancy, when one of the joint owners dies, the asset passes to the surviving joint tenant, by right of survivorship. Theoretically, therefore, the home should have become Heather’s property.

The wrinkle in this case was that, despite “strenuous efforts”, Heather could not be found. Edward’s Estate Trustee then brought an Application for an Order vesting title in the home in the Estate. The issue considered by the Honourable Justice MacDougall was thus, whether one joint tenant can acquire full title to property by way of adverse possession. In order to establish title by possession, Justice MacDougall stated that a party must show three things:

  • i. Actual possession for the statutory period by him/herself and those through whom s/he claims;
  • ii. That such possession was with the intention of excluding from possession the owner or person entitled to possession; and
  • iii. Discontinuance of possession for the statutory period by the owners and all others, if any, entitled to possession.

With respect to the first and third requirements, Edward had actual possession of the home by himself for 32 years, which is well beyond the 10 year statutory period required. With respect to the second requirement, the court found that, although Edward did not have a “clear and direct intention” to exclude Heather, the court can still infer a presumed intention to exclude and consequently find in favour of adverse possession. In this case, Justice MacDougall was able to infer such presumed intention due to the facts that Edward believed he had full ownership of the house, he paid all the expenses for the house for 32 years, and made mortgage payments and renewed the mortgage without Heather’s signature or agreement.

Thanks for reading.

Ian Hull

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