Tag: interlocutory order
In June of this year, the Divisional Court of Ontario clarified that Section 10(1) of the Estates Act did not supersede the Courts of Justice Act where leave is required in order to appeal an interlocutory order.
In Luck v. Hudson Re: Estate of Albert Luck, the court however did grant leave, in order to immediately dismiss an appeal that raised issues not heard by the judge in the court of first instance and revealed ulterior concerns.
Steven Luck is the son of the late Albert Luck. Albert owned a house jointly with his wife Marylou Hudson. The relationship between Steven and Albert had deteriorated during Albert’s life and litigation ensued. Albert sued his son, who in turn filed a counterclaim- skidoos and cottage upgrades were all under dispute. Then Albert died, and the Will challenge began.
The motion judge, Justice Salmers, held that money from the sale of the house of Albert and Marylou be paid into court to the credit of the estate of Albert and to be paid out and distributed pursuant to the terms of the Will.
Subsection 10(1) of the Estates Act says that a party to a proceeding under that statute “may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order, determination or judgment if the value of the property affected” exceeds $200. Steven did not seek leave to appeal the interlocutory order and instead relied on 10(1) saying that he had an appeal as of right.
Since only this brief decision is reported, we do not know the underlying dispute which gave rise to Salmers, J’s interlocutory injunction, but the panel made two issues clear:
1: Leave is required to hear an appeal of interlocutory injunction
2: An appeal is not the appropriate venue to raise new issues, or air grievances.
The Courts of Justice Act is clear in section 133 that no appeal lies without leave from an order made on consent, or where the appeal is only to costs. The test for granting leave to appeal from an interlocutory order is an onerous one. If the panel feels the decision was well reasoned and the issues raised are not of general importance (Bell ExpressVu Ltd v Morgan (2008) O.J. No. 4758) leave will not be granted.
In this case, the court determined that Steven was seeking not only to appeal the injunction but that, “at its root the true purpose of that motion was to raise concerns as to the validity of the Will.” While Steven made no objection to the appointment of Trustees or to the Will in first instance, the court went on to say:
“What has become apparent is that Steven Luck wants to contest the Will in order to overturn the distribution of the funds held in court. He wishes those funds to remain available as security for the enforcement of a counterclaim he has made in response to an action commenced by his father (prior to his death) against Steven Luck.”
The court determined that Steven was actually seeking a Mareva injunction: A freezing of the estate assets, as security, in advance of any judgement made, potentially, in his favour.
The court found Steven had not met any of the prerequisites for such an order, and in fact, may have been barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, as previously determined by Justice Salmers.
In the end, as quickly as leave was granted, the appeal was dismissed. And Steven, now on the hook for a $25,000 cost award, was no better off.
A valuable caution to those considering the appeal route.
Thanks for reading!
Suzana Popovic-Montag and Daniel Enright