In Ontario, a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property or a Power of Attorney for Personal Care must be signed by two witnesses. As our readers also know, as a result of COVID-19, witnessing and execution requirements for Powers of Attorney in Ontario have been relaxed to facilitate access to incapacity planning during the pandemic. These provisions have recently been extended to November 21, 2020. Provided that one witness to a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property or Power of Attorney for Personal Care is a licensee under Ontario’s Law Society Act, the document may be witnessed using audiovisual communication technology and signed in counterpart. The document does not otherwise need to be witnessed by a lawyer (although, where a lawyer has assisted in the preparation of Powers of Attorney, it will often be most practical for the lawyer and one of his or her staff to witness the client’s execution of the document).
Especially in light of social distancing measures, it is important to keep in mind the restrictions on who can witness incapacity planning documents. In Ontario, neither a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property nor a Power of Attorney for Personal Care can be witnessed by:
- the attorney or the attorney’s spouse;
- the grantor’s spouse;
- a child of the grantor;
- a person whose property/personal care is under guardianship; or
- an individual of less than eighteen years old.
If the lawyer him or herself is being appointed under the document, which is not an uncommon practice, the involvement of a second lawyer or a paralegal in the virtual execution and witnessing of the document(s) may be necessary.
In the Yukon, the witnessing requirements for Powers of Attorney are somewhat different. As it currently stands, in order for a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property (there referred to as an Enduring Power of Attorney) to be effective, a Certificate of Legal Advice must be provided by a lawyer. As a result, the lawyer typically witnesses the Power of Attorney, which is not otherwise valid. While only one witness is required, the lawyer providing the Certificate cannot be the attorney or the attorney’s spouse.
A recent article from Canadian Lawyer reviews proposed changes to Yukon’s Enduring Power of Attorney Act. One of the key amendments is the replacement of the requirement that a lawyer be involved in witnessing the execution of Continuing Powers of Attorney for Property with the option of the witnessing of such documents by two other individuals. Similar to the requirements in Ontario, a witness must be an adult and cannot be the spouse of the donor, the attorney, or the spouse of the attorney.
If approved, the recent Yukon Bill will eliminate the necessity that a lawyer be involved in the witnessing of Powers of Attorney to increase access to incapacity planning throughout the territory.
Thank you for reading.
Canada’s population is rapidly aging. With baby boomers constituting just over one quarter of our population, the percentage of elders in our society is rising at an alarming rate. In 2014, the percentage of seniors north of 65 was 15.6 percent of the population. By 2030 – in the next decade – seniors will make up 23 percent of the Canadian population. With this change in demographics, elder abuse (and financial exploitation in particular) has become somewhat of an epidemic.
Financial exploitation commonly occurs when an attorney for property abuses his/her power afforded by the Power of Attorney (“POA”) document. Executing a POA is a vital component of every estate plan. When properly drafted and with the appropriate understanding of rights, duties and obligations, a POA has the effect of protecting individuals and their heirs against future incapacity. When drafted improperly and without a clear recognition of duties and responsibilities, the consequences can be grave.
Toronto resident, Christine Fisher (“Fisher”), is all too familiar with the devastating impact that POA abuse can have on an individual’s financial situation. In 2016, Fisher was 94 and living independently in her own apartment despite suffering from the beginning stages of Dementia. Fisher ultimately executed a POA appointing an old colleague, Theresa Gardiner (“Gardiner”), as her attorney for property. In her role as attorney, Gardiner immediately moved Fisher from her apartment to a seniors’ residence – a decision that was not viewed favourably by Fisher’s family and long-time friend, Nancy Lewis (“Lewis”). In the coming months, Lewis discovered that Gardiner had been abusing the power granted to her under the POA by misappropriating Fisher’s funds. By breaching her fiduciary duty, Gardiner exacerbated Fisher’s financial situation and improved her own. In an attempt to justify her misconduct, Gardiner told CBC News that Fisher had gifted her the money. In July of 2019, Gardiner was charged with several counts of theft. Most of these charges were withdrawn by the Crown in November of 2019.
Unfortunately, the story of Christine Fisher is not an anomaly. It is a reflection of society’s tendency to overlook and ignore vulnerable elders. Given the substantial risks associated with appointing an inappropriate attorney, lawyers should remain vigilant to possibilities of incapacity, fraud and undue influence prior to creating a POA for a client. Recognizing the warning signs is the first step to protecting this vulnerable population.
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Suzana Popovic-Montag & Tori Joseph
Under the Limitations Act, 2002, most actions are subject to a two-year limitation period. However, the limitation period does not run during any time in which the person with the claim is incapable of commencing a proceeding AND not represented by a litigation guardian in relation to the claim. A person is presumed to be capable unless the contrary is proved.
What happens when a claim is commenced, but not all defendants are named? This issue arose in the recent decision of Wood v. David Mitchell et al., 2020 ONSC 4903 (CanLII). There, the plaintiff suffered a stroke. He sued a number of defendants in relation to his medical care. One doctor was referred to in the Statement of Claim, but not named as a party. Three years after the claim was started, the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as the plaintiff’s litigation guardian. The PGT moved to add the doctor as a defendant. The doctor moved to strike the claim on the basis of the passage of the limitation period. The plaintiff resisted, taking the position that the plaintiff did not have capacity when the claim was commenced, and did not have a litigation guardian.
The doctor raised two main points. Firstly, the doctor sought information about communications between the plaintiff and his initial lawyers going to his capacity at the time. Secondly, the doctor argued that the plaintiff was represented initially by a “de facto” litigation guardian, a Mr. McQueen.
The decision addressed these issues from the perspective of a motion to compel answers to questions and further production. The plaintiff had refused to answer questions about his and Mr. McQueen’s communications with his initial lawyers and to produce the lawyers’ file on the basis of relevance and privilege.
At first instance, the Master disallowed the questions. On appeal, the court ordered that the lawyers’ files as they relate to the plaintiff’s capacity and to Mr. McQueen’s dealings with the lawyers must be produced, even if privileged.
The court held that on the first issue, as the plaintiff put his capacity in issue, information that his lawyers had about his capacity was to be produced. The court stated that the “elephant in the room” was “what were the plaintiff’s initial lawyers thinking” when they commenced the claim? Did they believe that the plaintiff had capacity? If so, what was that belief based on?
On the second issue, the court referred to the Court of Appeal decision of Azzeh (Litigation Guardian of) v. Legendre, 2017 ONCA 385 for the proposition that a de facto litigation guardian could recommence the running of the limitation period. In Azzeh, the court held that a person could be considered litigation guardian, even if not formally appointed, if they held themselves out as litigation guardian. In Wood, the court held that the definition of “litigation guardian” might even by broader.
As can be seen, the issues that arise in litigation where the capacity of a party may be in issue can be complex. The courts must walk a fine line of ensuring that the right to sue is not taken away from an incapable person, while ensuring that the rights of third parties, including the right to the protection of limitation periods, are safeguarded.
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The job of being an attorney for personal care for an incapable person is not an easy one. The attorney often has to make difficult decisions regarding an incapable person’s medical care and treatment, personal care, food, clothing, and shelter. A particularly difficult decision that can arise in the case of older adults is the decision of whether an older incapable person should be placed in a retirement or long-term care home.
I recently came across a decision that considered a personal care attorney’s decision to move his mother, Ann, into a long-term care facility. As set out in Corbet v Corbet, 2020 ONSC 4157, prior to the move, Ann had been living with her personal care attorney’s son (Ann’s grandson), and his spouse. The personal care attorney lived in the USA. The grandson and spouse were the defendants to an action brought by the personal care attorney, and the defendants had brought the motion that was dealt with in the decision. The motion sought an order that Ann return to live with the defendants.
The Corbet decision discussed the powers and duties of an attorney for property, as governed by the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30 (the “SDA”). Section 66 of the SDA provides that a personal care attorney must exercise his or her powers and duties diligently and in good faith. If the attorney knows of prior wishes or instructions of an incapable person, they shall make their decision in accordance with those prior wishes or instructions. If the attorney does not know of a prior wish or instruction, or if it is impossible to make the decision in accordance with the wish or instruction, the attorney shall make the decision in the incapable person’s best interests. Although making a determination of what is in the incapable person’s best interests can be difficult, the SDA does set out the factors that the attorney must consider, as follows:
- the values and beliefs that the guardian knows the person held when capable and believes the person would still act on if capable;
- the person’s current wishes, if they can be ascertained; and
- the following factors:
- (i) Whether the guardian’s decision is likely to,
- improve the quality of the person’s life,
- prevent the quality of the person’s life from deteriorating, or
- reduce the extent to which, or the rate at which, the quality of the person’s life is likely to deteriorate.
- (ii) Whether the benefit the person is expected to obtain from the decision outweighs the risk of harm to the person from an alternative decision.
- (i) Whether the guardian’s decision is likely to,
Ultimately, the court determined that it was not prepared to grant the order sought by the defendants. Some of the factors that were determinative included the following:
- Ann had entrusted her only son as her attorney for personal care.
- The court should not attempt to micromanage an attorney’s day-to-day handling of an incapable person’s affairs unless there is clear evidence the attorney is not acting in good faith.
- Before making the decision to move Ann to the long-term care facility, the attorney consulted with Ann’s family doctor, and had a comprehensive assessment of the defendants’ home done by the LHIN case manager.
- Although Ann had expressed that she wanted to “go home”, the court found that Ann perceived her home as the home she had shared with her late husband, and not the defendants’ home.
- There was no evidence that the personal care attorney failed to consider the best interests criteria as set out above.
- There were allegations that the defendants had mistreated or neglected Ann, and that they had misused or misappropriated her money. As a result, it remained to be determined whether they were “supportive family members” with whom the attorney has a duty to consult under the SDA.
Attorneys for personal care would be well-advised to carefully consider their decisions, in light of the guidelines set out in the SDA, and to document their considerations in making decisions on behalf of an incapable person.
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These other blog posts may also be of interest:
Earlier this week, Ian Hull and I spoke at Osgoode Professional Development’s program on Powers of Attorney and Guardianship: Non-Contentious and Contentious Matters.
During the program, in addition to discussing new execution options for wills and powers of attorney, the panel shared its thoughts on a number of considerations relevant to the preparation of powers of attorney during the pandemic, including some of the following:
- It may now be impractical to permit for decisions regarding personal care or property to be made only jointly by two or more attorneys acting together where the attorneys selected are not members of the same household.
- In light of ongoing travel restrictions, it may be increasingly important that the selected attorney(s) for property and/or personal care are local.
- It may be more difficult to access multiple medical professionals (or a specified medical professional) to confirm incapacity during a healthcare crisis. The provision regarding the circumstances in which a power of attorney is to become effective should accommodate potentially limited access to a specified physician or more medical professionals than necessary.
- It may be more important than ever to ensure that the original power of attorney documents (and/or copies) are physically accessible to the named attorney(s).
- The current circumstances present a unique opportunity to assist clients in updating outdated plans and ensuring that powers of attorney are put into place for those who do not have them already.
Even outside of the context of a pandemic, considering practical issues like those set out above when creating or updating an incapacity plan is a worthwhile exercise and may expose potential problems with the plan before it is finalized.
Thank you for reading.
Other blog entries that may be of interest:
We often encounter situations where the administration of an estate is complicated by the fact that the deceased was married multiple times, and there is a clash between children from a prior relationship and a subsequent spouse (and/or his or her children). Sometimes, a couple will be closer with one set of children, which may lead to disputes following both of their deaths. Estate of Ronald Alfred Craymer v Hayward et al, 2019 ONSC 4600, was one such case, in which Joan and Ronald had been closer for much of their 32-year marriage with Joan’s children from a prior marriage. After Joan and Ronald died in 2016 and 2017, respectively, a dispute arose between their adult children.
While Ronald’s will named his own children as beneficiaries of his estate, his Continuing Power of Attorney or Property (like Joan’s), named Joan’s daughter as alternate attorney for property, should his spouse be unable to act. Joan had acted as Ronald’s attorney for property from 2006, during which he had suffered a stroke, until her death. In 2011, Joan had transferred the couple’s matrimonial home, previously held jointly, to herself alone. During this period, however, there had been no request by Ronald’s children for an accounting. Joan’s daughter had subsequently acted as Ronald’s attorney for property and as estate trustee for Joan’s estate over the period of approximately eight months between the deaths of Joan and Ronald.
Ronald’s children sought a passing of accounts with respect to the management of their father’s property by Jane and her daughter and, specifically, challenged the change in title to the matrimonial home. The Court referred to Wall v Shaw, 2018 ONCA 929, in stating that there is no limitation period to compel an accounting. Accordingly, it considered the only bar to this relief to be laches and acquiescence. Justice C.F. de Sa commented that the there was nothing improper in the manner in which the plaintiff had sought the accounting and, furthermore, that the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances. The Court permitted the claim regarding the matrimonial home to continue, but nevertheless declined to order a passing of accounts:
…[O]rdering the passing of accounts is discretionary. And in my view, to require an accounting at this point would result in a clear injustice as between the parties.
[Joan’s daughter,] Linda, as Estate Trustee, is hardly in a position to account for Joan’s spending while she was alive. Yet, to require a passing of accounts at this point would subject every line of Joan’s spending (as Attorney for Property) to the court’s scrutiny. Moreover, as the Estate Trustee, the Defendant would be liable to account for any unexplained expenditures.
Indeed, it is unclear that the spending was spurious given the nature of the relationship between Joan and Ronald. Joan would have been spending the money as his wife as much as his Attorney for Property. The failure to keep detailed accounts is hardly suspicious given the circumstances here.
…In the circumstances, I will not order a passing of accounts.
This decision is interesting in that it clearly considers the practicality of a passing of accounts and the inability of the deceased attorney’s estate trustee to properly account in the absence of relevant records in determining that it would be unjust to order a passing of accounts, despite there being no other apparent legal reason not to do so.
Thank you for reading.
Other blog entries that may be of interest:
The Court of Appeal of British Columbia (the “BCCA”) recently dealt with an appeal from an Order of the British Columbia Supreme Court which declined to exercise jurisdiction by staying a petition for guardianship of an incapable person. This Order also included various terms relating to the person’s care and property.
This appeal dealt with the guardianship of Ms. Dingwall, the mother of both the Appellant and the Respondent.
At all material times, Ms. Dingwall and the Appellant lived in Alberta and the Respondent resided in British Columbia. Between 2010 and 2014, Ms. Dingwall resided for various periods in both Alberta and British Columbia. At the time of this appeal, Ms. Dingwall lived in a care home in British Columbia. She suffered from advanced dementia.
The Alberta Proceedings
On February 5, 2015, the Appellant sought an Order from the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench appointing him as Ms. Dingwall’s guardian and trustee. The Respondent opposed this Order and in September, 2015 filed an Application to move the proceedings to British Columbia. This Application was never heard and the matter continued to be heard in Alberta.
On July 7, 2016, the Court granted the Order sought by the Appellant which appointed him as Ms. Dingwall’s guardian and provided him with the authority to make decisions with respect to Ms. Dingwall’s health care, the carrying on of any legal proceeding not related primarily to Ms. Dingwall’s financial matters and Ms. Dingwall’s personal and real property in Alberta.
The British Columbia Proceedings
A few weeks prior to the Alberta hearing, the Respondent filed a petition with the Supreme Court of British Columbia seeking a declaration that Ms. Dingwall was incapable of managing herself or her affairs due to mental infirmity and an Order appointing her as committee of Ms. Dingwall’s person and Estate. The Appellant opposed the Respondent’s petition by arguing that the Supreme Court of British Columbia lacked jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of British Columbia asserted jurisdiction because Ms. Dingwall was at the time of the decision, ordinarily resident in British Columbia and because there was a “real and substantial” connection to British Columbia. The Court found that, in this case, both Alberta and British Columbia had jurisdiction.
Despite British Columbia having jurisdiction in this case, the Court found that the Alberta forum was nonetheless more appropriate and cited the following factors in favour of its decision:
- The similarity of the proceedings;
- Alberta having issued a final order; and
- The Respondent having attorned to Alberta’s jurisdiction by opposing the Appellant’s petition.
As a result, the Court stayed the Respondent’s petition but also made several Orders respecting Ms. Dingwall’s care and property. The parties’ costs on a “solicitor client basis” were to be payable by Ms. Dingwall’s Estate.
The Appellant appealed the following Orders made by the Court, other than the stay of the Respondent’s proceedings:
- issuing an Order on the matter after declining to exercise jurisdiction respecting it;
- finding the Court had territorial competence over the matter; and
- awarding solicitor-client costs payable from Ms. Dingwall’s Estate.
The BCCA Decision
The BCCA allowed the appeal and found that the lower Court erred in making Orders concerning the very matter over which it had declined to exercise jurisdiction. The Court noted that a decision to decline jurisdiction over a particular matter renders a judge incapable of deciding issues or making orders as to the substance of that matter.
As a result, the Court set aside the Orders respecting Ms. Dingwall’s care and property. In light of that finding, the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to deal with the issue of whether British Columbia had territorial competence over this matter, given that the lower Court declined to exercise jurisdiction, in any event.
The Court of Appeal found that the Appellant was entitled to special costs payable by Ms. Dingwall’s Estate and that the Respondent was not entitled to costs.
The full decision can be found here: Pellerin v. Dingwall, 2018 BCCA 110
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The applicability of limitation periods to estates, trusts, and capacity matters is crucial for litigators to consider. In a recent decision of the Superior Court of Justice, the Court was asked to consider the application of the limitation period in Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”) to a claim that was advanced by the Public Guardian and Trustee (the “PGT”) as the litigation guardian of an incapable support claimant.
Shaw v. Barber, 2017 ONSC 2155, is an important precedent for the proposition that limitation periods do not run against the incapable person from the day that the PGT becomes his/her statutory guardian of property. By operation of section 16(5) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, the PGT automatically becomes an incapable person’s statutory guardian of property the moment they receive a certificate of incapacity from the assessor. In Shaw v. Barber, the dependant support claimant, Lois Shaw, was assessed and found to be incapable of managing property on February 16, 2015 and a copy of the certificate was sent to the PGT on or about February 25, 2015.
Prior to the assessment, Ms. Shaw lived with Frank Cyril Barber on the date of his death, although they were not married. Mr. Barber died in August, 2014, leaving a Will which named his son as the sole Estate Trustee and beneficiary of his Estate. A Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will was issued to Mr. Barber’s son on February 5, 2015. Pursuant to section 61(1) of the SLRA, an application for dependant support may not be made six months after the grant of probate, subject to the Court’s discretion in section 61(2) to allow claims against the undistributed portion of an estate. Without considering the Court’s discretion in section 61(2) of the Act, Justice McNamara found that Ms. Shaw’s claim for dependant support was not statute barred despite the fact that it was issued, one year after six months from probate, on August 5, 2016.
In his reasoning, Justice McNamara considered the tolling provision applicable to incapable persons while he/she is not represented by a litigation guardian in section 7 of the Limitations Act, 2002 (which applies to the section 61 of the SLRA). The turning point then becomes whether a guardian of property is automatically a litigation guardian in relation to the claim at issue since a guardian has the power to do anything the incapable person may do except make a will. In this case, there was an affidavit from PGT counsel which explained the time consuming investigations involved when the PGT becomes a statutory guardian of property because of the lack of first-hand information from the incapable individual. Justice McNamara determined that a guardian of property shall act as litigation guardian when he/she has determined that there is a basis for exercising their authority in that role, and that imposing a limitation period from the date in which the PGT becomes statutory guardian is contrary to the Limitations Act and it would create impossible timelines and potential injustice for this vulnerable group. Furthermore, Justice McNamara was also persuaded by the fact that the Estate Trustee in this case will not be prejudiced by the delay, given that he is also the sole beneficiary, and that he was aware all along that the PGT was considering a claim against the Estate.
This case is also an example of the latitude that Courts may accord to large-scale claimants as seen in 407 ETR Concession Company Limited v. Day, 2016 ONCA 709.
Please do not hesitate to contact our firm for a copy of Justice McNamara’s reasons in Shaw v. Barber and click here for comments from Russel Molot, counsel for the PGT in this matter, as reported in the Law Times.
“Disability” is defined in Rule 1.03(1) to mean a person who is (a) a minor, (b) mentally incapable within the meaning of section 6 or section 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, whether that person has a guardian or not, or (c) an Absentee within the meaning of the Absentee Act.
The procedure and requirements for the appointment of a Litigation Guardian are different for plaintiffs/applicants and defendants/respondents.
The initial appointment of a Litigation Guardian for a plaintiff or applicant occurs without a court order upon the filing of an affidavit with the court setting out the information outlined in Rule 7.02(2).
Where the party under a disability is a defendant or respondent to a proceeding, Rule 7.03(1) states that a Litigation Guardian must be appointed by motion to the court unless the exceptions set out in Rule 7.03 (2), (2.1) or (3) apply. These exceptions include the prior appointment of a Guardian or a valid Attorney for Property with express powers to act as Litigation Guardian, or where the Office of the Children’s Lawyer is representing a minor’s interest in an estate or trust. Where there is no appointed guardian or attorney under a power of attorney, any person not under a disability may act as a Litigation Guardian. Where there is no person willing to act as Litigation Guardian, the Public Guardian and Trustee may be appointed.
Litigation Guardians are necessary to protect parties under disability, but also to protect opposing parties and court procedures.
A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Huang v. Braga, 2016 ONSC 6306, considers the appointment of a litigation guardian for a defendant or respondent in circumstances of mental incapacity.
In that case, the defendant had retained five different counsel over 13 years. She had fired her counsel, rejected a large settlement and insisted on proceeding to trial. A capacity assessment was ordered and she was found to be incapable of acting for herself in the action, but capable of managing her property. On review of the totality of the circumstances, Archibald J. found the defendant to be a party under a disability and issued Judgment appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee to act as litigation guardian.
Archibald J. refers to the decision in C.C. v. Children’s Aids Society of Toronto,  OJ No. 5613, which establishes the following test for whether a Litigation Guardian is required:
- The person must appear to be mentally incapable with respect to an issue in the case; and
- As a result of being mentally incapable, the person requires legal representation to be appointed by the Court.
In addition, Archibald J. states that the cause of incapacity must stem from a source of mental incapacity such as mental illness, dementia, developmental delay or physical injury and not from some other reason such as lack of sophistication, education or cultural differences.
Archibald J. states that in determining whether a person “appears to be mentally incapable” the following factors should be considered:
(a) The person’s ability to know or understand the minimum choices or decisions required and to make them;
(b) An appreciation of the consequences and effects of his or her choices or decisions;
(c) An appreciation of the nature of the proceedings;
(d) The person’s inability to choose and keep counsel;
(e) The person’s inability to represent him or herself;
(f) The person’s inability to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant issues; and,
(g) The person’s mistaken beliefs regarding the law or court procedures.
Traditionally the Court has accepted the following types of evidence in support of same:
- medical or psychological evidence as to capacity (including, a capacity assessment, report or doctors certificate);
- evidence from persons who know the litigant well;
- appearance and demeanour of the litigant;
- testimony of the litigant; and,
- opinion of the litigant’s own counsel.
Thank you for reading.
I recently read an article by Gregory Wilcox and Rachel Koff, which was published in the fall 2015 edition of the Journal for the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, that explores the use of genetic testing and counselling within the context of elder law.
The article describes the three uses of genetic testing as disease diagnosis, determining carrier status, and predictive testing. Historically, genetic counsellors were required to rely upon basic Mendelian genetics that did not often reveal whether someone would eventually suffer from a certain delayed-onset disease. Because of recent developments, however, science now allows accuracy in determining whether a person will suffer (or be more likely to suffer) from a variety of medical conditions. For example, the development of breast and ovarian cancer has been linked to the BRCA1 gene mutation, which can be tested for and discovered in time for adjuvant medical intervention.
Genetic testing is now capable of revealing whether a person may be especially susceptible to conditions that are often associated with aging, including Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, diabetes, and cancer. However, to date, there is limited data confirming that individuals who are determined to be at a higher risk of developing a disease like Alzheimer’s actually do receive an eventual diagnosis at higher rates than the general population. As a result of learning that one is at a higher-than-average risk of developing such a condition, lifestyle changes may be made in an effort to reduce the chances that an increased genetic risk is eventually expressed through the onset of the disease.
Perceived risk of developing a disease that may compromise mental capacity or shorten life expectancy may serve as motivation to obtain assistance in creating comprehensive incapacity and estate plans at an earlier life stage than these considerations might otherwise be made. As the year ends, no matter current health status or perceived risk of developing certain diseases in the future, it is important to take the time to ensure that incapacity and estate plans are put into place and to keep those plans updated following any material change in family situation.
Happy New Year!