Written reasons from a mid-trial motion was recently released in Barker v. Barker, 2019 ONSC 2906. The only issue in this motion was whether a particular video of a deceased plaintiff was admissible at trial. The larger claim at issue surrounds the Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene mental health centre and its treatment of maximum security mental health patients between the 60’s and the 80’s. One of the plaintiffs, James Motherall, died after the action was brought and his claims were continued by the estate trustees of Mr. Motherall’s estate under Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Prior to Mr. Motherall’s death, Mr. Motherall was examined for discovery in the ordinary course but he was not examined under Rule 36 for the purpose of having his video testimony tendered as evidence at trial. Since a de bene esse examination did not occur, the trial judge was literally unable to assess Mr. Motherall’s credibility with his own eyes. In an effort to address this issue, counsel for the plaintiffs sought to introduce video footage of Mr. Motherall from a CBC documentary that featured Mr. Motherall and his experiences at Oak Ridge. The footage was taken a month before Mr. Motherall’s death and counsel for the Plaintiffs proposed to call the filmmaker as a witness to introduce the unedited footage of the filmmaker’s interview with Mr. Motherall.
Without criticizing the filmmaker’s work, the trial judge found that the video interview was not conducted under reliable circumstances for the purposes of a trial because Mr. Motherall was not sworn, he was not cross-examined, and he was simply asked to tell his story without more. The video was presumptively hearsay and it was up to the plaintiffs to meet, on a balance of probabilities, the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach for the admissibility of hearsay evidence (R v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, R. v. Chretien, 2014 ONCA 403).
In addition to the issues of reliability, the trial judge also found that the video was not necessary since there was a transcript of evidence from Mr. Motherall’s examination for discovery and an affidavit from Mr. Motherall in the course of a prior summary judgment motion.
Both the filmmaker’s proposed testimony and the video footage of Mr. Motherall was found to be inadmissible.
Even though Barker v. Barker is at its core a civil matter, the reasoning from this motion is instructive for estate litigators who are also bound by the additional hurdle for material corroboration pursuant to section 13 of the Evidence Act.
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Today, in episode #355 of Hull on Estates, Paul Trudelle and Holly LeValliant discuss the common law of hearsay and section 13 of the Evidence Act in the context of estate litigation in the Court of Appeal decision in Brisco Estate v. Canadian Premiere Life Insurance.
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Click here for more information on Holly LeValliant.
In Modonese v. Delac Estate, 2011 BCSC 82 (CanLII) the deceased left her property to her two children equally in her Will but the bulk of her estate consisted of her house, which was transferred into joint tenancy with her son. The son and his wife and children had always lived with the mother in her home except for a 3-year period after an episode of violence by the son against the deceased. At the end of the day, the son was not a credible witness and the Court accepted evidence that the deceased intended her estate to be shared equally between her son and her daughter.
Mondonese v. Delac Estate contains some useful discussion (below) regarding the “principled approach” to admissibility of hearsay evidence and the factors to be considered in determining whether there was undue influence.
To be admissible, hearsay evidence must be:
a) Necessary – the only available means of putting that evidence before the Court; and
b) Reliable – there is no real concern about the truth of the statement because of the circumstances in which it was made and it can be sufficiently tested by means other than cross examination.
The two instances where the question of undue influence arises are:
a) Where the gift was the result of influence expressly used by the donee for the purpose; and
b) Where the relations between the donor and donee around the time of the gift were such as to raise a presumption that the donee had influence over the donor.
To rebut the presumption of undue influence, the defendant must show that the donor gave the gift as a result of her own "full, free and informed thought" in that:
a) No actual influence was used or there was no opportunity to influence the donor;
b) The donor had independent legal advice or the opportunity to obtain it;
c) The donor had the ability to resist any such influence; and
d) The donor knew and appreciated what she was doing.
Other relevant factors include undue delay in prosecuting the claim, acquiescence or confirmation by the deceased, and the magnitude of the benefit or disadvantage.
Sharon Davis – Click here for more information on Sharon Davis.