Tag: Ethical Issues

27 Apr

Moving the Body

Paul Emile Trudelle Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Funerals, General Interest Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Although rare, disputes over the final resting place of a deceased are not unheard of. Such a dispute was the subject matter of Mason v. Mason, a decision of the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick.

There, the deceased died at the age of 53. He was survived by his mother, and his wife of 13 months. At first, the relationship between the mother and the wife appeared to be harmonious. The mother wanted the son’s cremated remains buried next to his father, and the deceased’s wife agreed. Later, however, the wife had a change of heart, as she came to believe that her husband did not have a good relationship with his father. She asked the cemetery to agree to disinter the remains and have them buried in another cemetery. As the original plot was owned by the mother, the cemetery required the consent of the mother. The mother refused to consent.

The wife then applied for and obtained letters of administration. This would normally cloak her with the authority to dispose of the body. The wife then applied to court to exercise this right. The court refused to assist her.

The applications judge held that the administrator had the right to determine the proper burial or disposal of the remains. However, this right was limited to carrying out those actions. The applications judge concluded that the remains were properly dealt with, with the agreement of the mother and the wife. At the time, there was no administrator, and therefore the next of kin could determine the disposition of the body, which they did.

The wife argued that as administrator, she had an ongoing right to determine the burial place. Support for this proposition was found in the Saskatchewan case of Waldman v. Melville. There, the deceased’s sister wished to disinter the deceased, over the objection of the executor. The court held that “The rights of the executor continue after the burial of the body, otherwise it would be an empty right … and those who oppose the executor could disinter the body as soon as it was buried.”

The applications judge distinguished the Melville decision. The rights of an administrator appointed months after burial did not entitle the administrator to disrupt burial arrangements agreed to by the person in her capacity as spouse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge’s decision. They went on to hold that once the body was properly discharged, it could not be moved, under s. 15 of the Cemetery Corporations Act, without the written consent of the Medical Health Officer or the order of a judge. The Court of Appeal stated that the powers conferred on the court by s. 15 of the Cemetery Companies Act were discretionary in nature. A judge to whom an application is made under that section is required to consider and weigh all the circumstances and make the order he or she considers appropriate. In this case, the court found no valid reason for moving the body.

Thank you for reading.

Paul Trudelle

29 Mar

Predatory Marriages: knowing what it means to say “I do.”

Hull & Hull LLP Capacity, Common Law Spouses, Elder Law, Ethical Issues, General Interest, Health / Medical, In the News, Public Policy Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

The interplay between evolving social norms and the legal foundations that predate or accelerate these changes has seen significant development in the last decade.  Courts of law and of public opinion have made important strides in shaping  social policy in many areas, such as medically-assisted death, gender diversity and inclusion, and marriage rights, to name a few.  A recent case out of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered this last issue, marriage rights, with a particular focus on predatory marriages.

A person has the capacity to enter into a marriage contract only if that person has the capacity to understand the duties and obligations created

In Hunt v Worrod, 2017 ONSC 7397, the Court was tasked with assessing whether an individual who had suffered a catastrophic brain injury possessed the necessary capacity to marry.  In 2011, Kevin Hunt suffered a serious head injury following an ATV accident and spent four months recuperating in hospital.  He was eventually discharged into the care of his two sons, but three days after his release, Mr. Hunt was whisked away by his on-and-off girlfriend, Kathleen Worrod, to be ostensibly married at a secret wedding ceremony.

Mr. Hunt’s children brought an application to the Court on his behalf to void the marriage, partly to preclude Ms. Worrod from accruing spousal rights to share in Mr. Hunt’s property or assets.  Ultimately, the Court concluded that Mr. Hunt did not possess the requisite capacity to enter into the marriage.

In its reasons, the Court relied heavily on the opinions of several expert witnesses and the existing body of legal authority.  The Court began by reviewing section 7 of Ontario’s Marriage Act, which provides that an officiant shall not “solemnize the marriage” of any person that the officiant has reasonable grounds to believe “lacks mental capacity to marry.”

The expert evidence tendered by the parties suggested that Mr. Hunt had significant impairments in his ability to make decisions, to engage in routine problem-solving, and to organize and carry out simple tasks.  He was characterized as “significantly cognitively impaired”, and was assessed as being incapable of managing his property, personal care, or safety and well-being.

The Court subsequently relied on the test for capacity to enter into a marriage contract established by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Ross-Scott v Potvin in 2014.  The Court held that a person has the capacity to enter into a marriage contract only if that person has the capacity to understand the duties and obligations created by marriage and the nature of the commitment more generally.

The Court also identified the tension between balancing Mr. Hunt’s autonomy as against the possibility that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the legal and social consequences of marriage.  Ultimately, the Court was satisfied that Mr. Hunt’s children had met their burden of demonstrating that their father lacked the necessary capacity to marry Ms. Worrod.  The marriage was declared void ab initio, and the attendant spousal property rights that would have otherwise flowed to Ms. Worrod were lost.

Thanks for reading.

Garrett Horrocks

11 Jan

Trust Law in the Atomic Era: Lessons from Fukushima

Hull & Hull LLP Estate & Trust, Executors and Trustees, General Interest, In the News, Trustees, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

Likely to be of a surprise to most readers, Canada has a law on the books governing, among other things, policy and financing with respect to the disposal of nuclear waste.  The purpose of the federal Nuclear Fuel Waste Act (the “NFWA”) is to “provide a framework to enable the Governor in Council to make […] a decision on the management of nuclear fuel waste that is based on a comprehensive, integrated, and economically sound approach for Canada.”

The intersection of trust law with the NFWA occurs with respect to how the purpose and the goals of the act are to be financed. Section 9 of the NFWA provides that every “nuclear energy corporation” must maintain a trust fund with a duly incorporated financial institution, the purposes of which are described in greater detail below.  The following entities are defined as a “nuclear energy corporation” under the NFWA:

  1. Ontario Power Generation;
  2. Hydro-Quebec;
  3. New-Brunswick Power Corporation; and
  4. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.

When the NFWA came into effect, each nuclear energy corporation was required to make a substantial initial deposit into its respective trust fund, and each must make a minimum annual deposit of a prescribed amount to the capital of the trust.  To provide some context, the largest trust fund is that maintained by Ontario Power Generation.  At its inception, OPG was required to make an initial contribution of $500,000,000.00 to its fund, and its minimum annual levy is $100,000,000.00.

The NFWA provides that the corporations may only make withdrawals from their respective funds for the purposes of implementing a plan selected by the Governor in Council to “[avoid or minimize] significant socio-economic effects on a community’s way of life or on its social, cultural or economic aspirations.”  In layman’s terms, the nuclear energy corporations must use the capital of their respective trusts exclusively for the purposes of ensuring the nuclear waste is managed and disposed of in an efficient and comprehensive manner while minimizing the social impact.

Control and management of all aspects of nuclear power generation is top of mind in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011.  We may all hope the capital of the trusts established under the NFWA continue to be used for their intended purpose rather than to fund clean-up efforts in the event of a similar tragedy.  However, consider that the most recent financial statements for all of the aforementioned trust funds list a total combined balance of approximately $4 billion.  Now consider that some have estimated the total cost of cleaning up and containing the waste and fallout from the Fukushima disaster as exceeding $626 billion.  A drop in the proverbial bucket, to be sure.  Indeed, the magnitude of the Fukushima incident likely far surpassed any reasonable expectations, though it gives us pause to consider whether we are giving nuclear power the deference it deserves.

Thanks for reading.

Garrett Horrocks

10 May

Financial Abuse of the Elderly Part 2 – A Case Study

Suzana Popovic-Montag Continuing Legal Education, Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Ethical Issues, General Interest, In the News, News & Events Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

Last week, Ian blogged on the Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority, financial abuse of the elderly, and the competency of elderly individuals to make financial decisions.  As stated last week, it is unclear what the responsibilities are of a retirement home in cases where there have been loans between a resident and the licensee.

The recent Licence Appeal Tribunal decision of 2138658 Ontario Ltd. ola Seeley’s Bay Retirement Home v. Registrar, Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority is the first case to look at financial abuse in the context of  the Retirement Homes Act, 2010, S.O. 2010 Chapter 11 (the “Act”). This case involved the Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority’s revocation of Seeley’s Bay Retirement Home’s licence on the basis of the alleged financial abuse of three residents, and a former resident.

The Tribunal determined  that the former resident offered to grant the licensee a second mortgage, however, the resident had independent legal advice and a proper written mortgage, and as such, no financial abuse was found.

The Tribunal found financial abuse of one out of the three residents. For the first two residents, the Tribunal did not find financial abuse as they were a couple that had a long-term 25-30 year relationship with the licensee. The couple offered a loan to the licensee but he had counted the loan toward the couple’s rent and had paid off the loan at the time of the hearing. The Tribunal found that this was a trade-off, and that people who are competent to manage their own affairs ought to be allowed to make independent financial decisions, and found the loan to be “a matter of friendship and faith”.

The Tribunal found financial abuse of the third resident. Resident three lived in the home for 6 years prior to her death, and was determined to be capable. She managed her own finances and had no close family. The licensee began approaching her for money, which he applied to her rent, yet continued to borrow money beyond the amount paid of rent. There was nothing in writing, no records of the payment, and the resident had no independent legal advice. In 2016, the resident’s health began to deteriorate and she was worried that she would not be able to cover her expenses due to the amount of money she had lent to the licensee. She approached the licensee about repayment and the licensee took no action. The loans were outstanding upon the resident’s death. The Tribunal found this amounted to financial abuse as it was found to be “misappropriation” of resident money under the Act, pursuant to Regulation 166/11 and section 67.

In considering all of the claims against the residence, the Tribunal found that the loans raised concerns about the licensee’s ability to operate the home with honesty and integrity. This was exemplified due to the third resident’s dependency on the home. Moreover, the Tribunal noted that in the third case, there was harm to the resident’s peace of mind along with a risk that she would not be able to pay for her own long-term care.

Thanks for reading,

Suzana Popovic-Montag

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