We have previously blogged at length about the broad discretionary powers of the court to award support for dependants after death under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act. Although support applications are most often commenced in circumstances where the insufficient support was caused directly by the estate planning of the deceased individual (or lack thereof), a support application can also be a useful tool where, as a result of the deceased’s debts and liabilities at the time of death, the deceased’s estate is insolvent such that the bequests in the Will may not be carried out.
Section 2(3) of Ontario’s Creditors’ Relief Act provides:
“A support or maintenance order has the following priority over other judgment debts, other than debts owing to the Crown in right of Canada, regardless of when an enforcement process is issued or served:
- If the maintenance or support order requires periodic payments, the order has priority to the extent of all arrears owing under the order at the time of seizure or attachment.
- If the support or maintenance order requires the payment of a lump sum, the order has priority to the extent of any portion of the lump sum that has not been paid.”
Simply put, the payment of a support order, including those under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, is paid in priority to all other judgment debts other than those owed to the “Crown in right of Canada” (i.e. taxes).
Generally speaking a deceased’s debts and liabilities are paid in priority to all distributions to beneficiaries, such that where these liabilities are significant there could be little to no funds remaining to pay the beneficiaries after the debts are paid. As a result of the priority of support orders over other judgment debts, it could be advantageous for a surviving spouse or next of kin when faced with an insolvent estate to commence an Application for support as a dependant. If the individual is confirmed as a dependant the payment of their support Order would take priority over any other judgment debts, potentially resulting in a situation where the dependant receives a benefit from the estate where such a benefit otherwise would not materialize had they waited for their bequest under the Will or intestacy.
Thank you for reading.
This week on Hull on Estates, Stuart Clark and Kira Domratchev discuss a finding of support for an adult dependant child in Deleon v Estate of Raymon DeRanney, 2020 ONSC 19.
Should you have any questions, please email us at firstname.lastname@example.org or leave a comment on our blog.
Yesterday I blogged about the recent Deleon v. Estate of Raymond DeRanney (“Deleon“) decision wherein an individual who was not the Deceased’s biological or adopted child was declared to be a dependant “child” of the Deceased in accordance with Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“) due to the Deceased having shown a “settled intention” to treat the Applicant as their child during their lifetime. Although my blog from yesterday went into some of the detail of what the court considered when determining that the Applicant was in fact a “child” of the Deceased who was entitled to support, it did not get into the quantum of support that the Applicant was entitled to receive as a “dependant child”.
The factors that the court is to consider in determining the quantum of support for a dependant are established by section 62 of the SLRA, and include:
- the dependant’s current assets and means;
- the assets and means that the dependant is likely to have in the future;
- the dependant’s capacity to contribute to his or her support;
- the proximity and duration of the dependant’s relationship with the deceased; and
- the dependant’s needs, in determining which the court shall have regard to the dependant’s accustomed standard of living.
In Deleon the Deceased died intestate with one biological child leaving an estate valued at approximately $1.5 million, which under normal circumstances would be distributed solely to the biological child on an intestacy. Upon being declared a dependant “child” of the Deceased in accordance with Part V of the SLRA, the Applicant attempted to argue that she should equally share the Deceased’s estate with the biological child akin to if she was a biological child of the Deceased on an intestacy, an argument which, if accepted, would result in the Applicant receiving approximately $750,000 from the Deceased’s estate.
In support of her position that she should be entitled to receive 50% of the Deceased’s estate in support, the Applicant cites to Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, in which the court confirms that it can consider “moral” obligations and what is “adequate, just and equitable” under the circumstances when determining the quantum of support, and that the court is not necessarily limited to the factors delineated in section 62 of the SLRA. The Applicant also pointed to the accustomed standard of living which she had enjoyed while previously living with the Deceased.
Upon reviewing the jurisprudence in reference to the Applicant’s circumstances, Madam Justice Dietrich ultimately determines that the appropriate sum of support to be paid to the Applicant is the lump sum of $40,955, with such an amount being justified as being enough to get the Applicant through the remainder of her University degree, with the Applicant being required to be independent thereafter. Such an amount is of course notably less than the approximate $750,000 sought by the Applicant in the Application.
The Deleon case provides an excellent reminder that just because you are a “dependant” of the Deceased it does not necessarily follow that you will receive a significant sum in any support payment, as the court will consider your specific circumstances when setting the quantum of support.
Thank you for reading and stay safe and healthy.
The average “family unit” (if such a thing ever truly existed) is becoming harder to define in 2020. With the rise of concepts such as “co-parenting“, as well as the growing ubiquity of step-parents from second (or third, or fourth) marriages, the expectations and reality associated with the parent/child relationship is evolving. Although such an evolution is almost certainly predominantly for the better, it can create some unique complications should one of the “parents” die unexpectedly, particularly should they die without a Will. Such a scenario is exactly what was recently before the court in Deleon v. Estate of Raymond DeRanney (“Deleon“).
In Deleon, the Deceased died intestate with no married spouse and one biological child, such that the entirety of their estate would under normal circumstances be distributed to their biological child. The Applicant, who was not the Deceased’s biological child but was rather the child of the Deceased’s ex-girlfriend from approximately 20 years prior, commenced an Application for support under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“) alleging that the Deceased had treated her as his “child” and had provided her with support during his lifetime. In support of such a claim, the Applicant cited to the fact that the Deceased had allowed her and her mother to reside with him for several years prior to his death even though the Deceased and her mother were no longer romantically involved, and that, although she was not residing with him at the time of his death, the Deceased was subsidizing her rent to the tune of approximately $500 per month. She also cited to the fact that the Deceased had historically paid for things such as the Applicant’s extra-curricular activities, summer school, groceries and vacations throughout the Applicant’s childhood, and had encouraged her to attend University which she was in the process of attending.
The definition of “child” within Part V of the SLRA includes someone who the deceased individual had a “settled intention” to treat as their child. As a result, if an individual can show that a deceased individual had a “settled intention” to treat them as their child, and the individual otherwise meets the remainder of the factors required to be a “dependant” of the deceased, the individual can receive support as a dependant child notwithstanding that they are not biologically related to or legally adopted by the deceased.
In considering whether the Applicant met such a “settled intention” definition in Deleon, Madam Justice Dietrich considers the factors delineated in Hyatt v. Ralph, which include:
- did the “parents” pool their income into a joint account?
- did the “parents” pay the expenses for all children out of this same account?
- did the child in question refer to the man as “daddy” or the woman as “mommy”?
- did the “parents” refer to themselves as “mommy” and “daddy”?
- did the “parents” share the task of disciplining the child?
- did the child participate in the extended family in the same was as a biological child?
- was there a change in surname?
- did the “parent” express to the child, the family and the world, either implicitly or explicitly, that he or she is responsible as a parent to the child?
Perhaps interestingly in the Deleon decision, although Madam Justice Dietrich found that the relationship between the Deceased and the Applicant did not generally meet any of the factors to be considered from Hyatt v. Ralph (the Applicant referred to the Deceased as “Uncle Raymond” who undoubtedly spoiled her but did not necessarily fulfill the “typical” parental role), Madam Justice Dietrich nonetheless found that the Deceased’s conduct in relation to the Applicant demonstrated a “settled intention” on the part of the Deceased to treat the Applicant as a “child”, and that as the Applicant otherwise would receive nothing from the Deceased’s estate on an intestacy she was entitled to support from the Deceased’s estate as the Deceased’s dependant “child”. In coming to such a conclusion Madam Justice Dietrich states:
“In my view, [the Deceased’s] support of [the Applicant] in these ways rises above affection and generosity. Despite the atypical family relationships between [the Deceased, the Applicant’s mother, the Deceased’s biological child, and the Applicant], [the Deceased’s] support of [the Applicant] demonstrates his settled intention to treat her as a member of his unconventional family. I find that [the Applicant] is therefore a dependant for the purposes of the SLRA.”
Thank you for reading and stay safe and healthy.
This past weekend I had the great pleasure of seeing the movie Knives Out by Rian Johnson. For those of you who have not yet seen it I would highly recommend it, especially for those interested in estate law. Although I will try my best to avoid any significant spoilers for those who have not yet seen it, if you don’t want to know anything about the movie before seeing it you should stop reading this blog now.
The plot of Knives Out offers some interesting considerations for those interested in estate law, as it centers around the possible murder of the patriarch of an affluent family, with the alleged motive for many of those accused being that he was going to cut them off and write them out of his Will. While I was watching the movie I couldn’t help but analyze the cases of some of those accused, and whether there were estate law related options that would have been available to them that would not require them to commit murder (I promise that I am fun at parties and that this job has not ruined me).
Knives Out gets into a surprising amount of detail regarding certain estate law concepts, discussing such concepts as “undue influence” in relation to those who would have benefited from the new Will, as well as the “slayer rule” which would result in any individual who was involved in the murder not being entitled to receive a benefit from the estate for public policy reasons. The movie also gets into the concept of “testamentary capacity“, and whether the deceased would have had the capacity to draft the new Will which would have cut the various individuals off.
While watching the movie the one thing that kept running through my mind was that most of the accused family members would appear to have fairly strong arguments that they were dependants of the deceased even if they were cut out of his Will. The movie makes it fairly clear that the deceased was financially supporting a majority of his family members, with his threats to cut them off financially forming the foundation of the motivation for why they may or may not have killed him.
If the deceased had indeed cut these family members out of his Will, and this matter took place in Ontario, there would appear to be a fairly strong argument that those family members that were cut out of the Will were dependants of the deceased under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, insofar as the deceased was providing support to them immediately prior to his death and he did not make adequate provision for them in his Will. If these family members were found to be dependants of the deceased, the court could make an order providing for their support from the deceased’s estate regardless of whether they were left anything in his Will. Although I will concede that a long and drawn out court case where various family members assert they are dependants of the deceased is probably a less interesting film than an Agatha Christie style murder-mystery, if Knives Out were real life it is unlikely that many of the family members would ultimately receive nothing from his estate (assuming, of course, they were not involved in his death).
Thank you for reading.
Yesterday I blogged about the Notice of Contestation of Claim, which is a process that in essence provides the Estate Trustee with the ability to require individuals with a potential claim against the estate to commence such a claim within 30 days of being served with the Notice of Contestation of Claim failing which they are deemed to have abandoned the claim such that they can no longer pursue it before the court.
The power given to an Estate Trustee by the Notice of Contestation of Claim coupled with the relatively short timeframe by which the claimant must respond could appear attractive to an Estate Trustee, potentially enticing the Estate Trustee to use such a process to flush out all potential claims at the early stages of the administration of the estate. This is turn raises questions about the kinds of claims that the Notice of Contestation of Claim can be used for, and whether it can be used for all potential claims against an estate or whether the claims against which it can be used are more limited. Could you, for example, serve a possible dependant with a Notice of Contestation of Claim, and in doing so require the alleged dependant to bring their claim for support forward within 30 days failing which they are deemed to have abandoned their claim?
The issue of whether a Notice of Contestation of Claim can be used against a potential dependant of the estate was dealt with by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Omiciuolo v. Pasco, 2008 ONCA 241, wherein the court confirmed that the Notice of Contestation of Claim could not be used in relation to a potential claim for support by a dependant under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act. In coming to such a decision the Court of Appeal notes that historically the “claim or demand” referenced in sections 44 and 45 of the Estates Act had been interpreted to mean a “claim or demand against the estate by a ‘creditor’ for payment of money on demand“, and that it could not be used for claims such as declaratory relief or a claim for judicial sale or foreclosure.
From the Court of Appeal’s rationale in Omiciuolo v. Pasco it would appear that the “claims” against which a Notice of Contestation of Claim can be used are likely limited to claims of potential creditors of the estate (i.e. claims that the deceased owed an individual money), and that it cannot be used against other more nuanced or equitable claims such as a potential claim from a dependant for support or declaratory relief.
Thank you for reading.
I recently came across an article discussing a court’s decision in respect of what appears to be a claim for dependant’s support in Tasmania. In the decision of Booth v Brooks  TASSC 35, the deceased died with a Will that did not leave anything to his estranged daughter. The deceased was also survived by a long-term partner and two adult sons, who were mentioned in his Will.
The daughter made a claim under a Tasmanian statute, the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (the “TFMA”). Section 3(1) of the TFMA states as follows:
3 (1) If a person dies, whether testate or intestate, and in terms of his will or as a result of his intestacy any person by whom or on whose behalf application for provision out of his estate may be made under this Act is left without adequate provision for his proper maintenance and support thereafter, the Court or a judge may, in its or his discretion, on application made by or on behalf of the last-mentioned person, order that such provision as the Court or judge, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, thinks proper shall be made out of the estate of the deceased person for all or any of the persons by whom or on whose behalf such an application may be made, and may make such other order in the matter, including an order as to costs, as the Court or judge thinks fit.
By comparison, section 58(1) of Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act, (the “SLRA”) seems to have quite similar language. Section 58(1) provides:
58 (1) Where a deceased, whether testate or intestate, has not made adequate provision for the proper support of his dependants or any of them, the court, on application, may order that such provision as it considers adequate be made out of the estate of the deceased for the proper support of the dependants or any of them.
Under the SLRA, in order to qualify as a “dependant”, one must be a spouse, parent, child, or brother or sister of the deceased, to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his death. The TFMA, on the other hand, provides in section 3A that the persons who may make an application pursuant to section 3(1) are the:
- parents (if the deceased person dies without a spouse or children); and
- person who had a certain relationship with the deceased, and who was entitled to receive maintenance from the deceased at the time of his or her death.
In Booth v Brooks, the court concluded that the daughter had been left without adequate provision. One of the factors that lead to this conclusion was that the deceased had not had a good relationship with the daughter throughout her life and had not provided her with any direct financial support. In particular, the court stated that the deceased’s “abnegation of parental responsibility during childhood increases the moral obligation of the testator to the child”.
It seems that the key difference in the law in Tasmania versus Ontario that came into play in the Booth v Brooks decision, which would likely have resulted in a different outcome had the scenario arisen in Ontario, is that the TFMA does not require that a spouse, child, or parent be receiving or entitled to support or “maintenance” at the time of the deceased’s death. Interestingly, the Tasmanian law seems to lean the other way—if the deceased has not provided adequate support during his or her lifetime, it may increase the ability of a child or spouse to obtain support from the deceased’s estate.
Thanks for reading,
You may also be interested in these other blog posts:
In Michael v. Thomas, 2018 ONSC 3125, Justice Ramsay awarded a dependant support claimant the entirety of the Estate net of all debts and liabilities. The dependant support claimant in this case was a common law spouse of approximately 20 years. Ms. Michael was in her late-fifties/early sixties when Mr. Chambers died suddenly from cancer without a will.
Mr. Chambers and Ms. Michael were not married at the time of Mr. Chambers’ death. Accordingly, Ms. Michael was not a beneficiary of Mr. Chambers’ Estate pursuant to the rules of intestacy. Mr. Chambers did not have any children either so the beneficiaries of his Estate were his surviving siblings and two nephews who were the sons of his predeceased sister.
Justice Ramsay found that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Michael lived modestly during Mr. Chambers’ life. They were joint owners of their home, which Ms. Michael received by right of survivorship. The home was subject to a mortgage of about half its market value in the amount of $150,000.00. Ms. Michael was also the beneficiary of a modest $80,000.00 life insurance policy and her income became supplemented by an additional $3,325 per month through the deceased’s CPP and pension benefits. Ms. Michael worked part-time and has two adult children of her own. Interestingly, Justice Ramsay commented that Ms. Michael should not have to seek support from her adult children under the Family Law Act (even though she could, theoretically) before seeking support from Mr. Chambers’ Estate.
In considering the Respondent’s case, Justice Ramsay found that Mr. Chambers did not have any other dependants and that he was estranged from the only party who responded to Ms. Michael’s claims in Court. Mr. Chambers’ sister argued that Ms. Michael already received $203,965 out of the assets of the Estate, which, including section 72 assets, were worth a total $285,000. She further argued that Ms. Michael would be able to maintain the same standard of living that she used to enjoy if Ms. Michael supplements the pension income by working full-time at minimum wage. In his analysis, Justice Ramsay squarely stated as follows:
 I do not agree. It is not reasonable to expect the Applicant to take an entry level job at the age of 62 when she is already past the point of being able to sustain full time physical labour, even light physical labour. Even if it were possible, it would only raise her earnings to the low $40,000 range, which would still not be enough to continue the modest standard to which she was accustomed. I do not think that the intestate made adequate provision for the proper support of the Applicant.
 The estate is not big enough to make periodic payments. In fact it is not big enough to provide the proper support the Applicant needs. I think that a judicious spouse would have left her the entire estate, such as it is. The Applicant is the only dependant and the only person with any moral claim on the estate. Accordingly I order the trustee to convey to the Applicant the entire residue of the estate after payment of taxes, debts of the estate and his own fees and I declare that the amounts already received or already in the Applicant’s possession are hers to keep.
Ms. Michael was also awarded partial indemnity costs from Mr. Chambers’ sister. Mr. Chambers’ sister was found to have no need for “more found money” from Mr. Chambers’ Estate because of the inheritance that she received from their mother, and that costs from the Estate would have the same effect as awarding costs against Ms. Michael.
Thanks for reading!
Occasionally, a person finds themselves in a situation in which, following their spouse’s death, they were either not adequately provided for under their spouse’s Will or were not provided for at all.
Especially in situations where the deceased fully supported his or her spouse, one viable option is for the surviving spouse to assert a claim for support under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c. S. 26 (the “SLRA”).
A surviving spouse, either married or common-law as defined in the SLRA fits into the definition of a “dependant” and is thus entitled to support from the deceased spouse’s estate. The question for the Court is whether the deceased made adequate provision for his/her surviving spouse and, if not, what ought to be the quantum of support.
Under the SLRA, a “dependant” includes not just married spouses, but also either of two persons who,
- were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated or declared a nullity; or
- are not married to each other and have cohabited,
- continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
- in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child.
It is important to keep in mind that such a claim under the SLRA must be brought within six months of obtaining probate, unless the Court allows for an extension of time. Probate is another term for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will that is usually obtained by the Estate Trustee for proper administration of the Estate.
The Court may consider various factors in assessing the nature, amount and duration of support, including the eighteen factors listed under section 62(1) of the SLRA some of which are:
- The Dependant’s current assets and means;
- The Dependant’s capacity to contribute to their own support;
- The Dependant’s age and physical and mental health;
- The Dependant’s needs – with regard to accustomed standard of living;
- Any agreement between the Dependant and the deceased spouse; and
- The proximity and the duration of the Dependant’s relationship with the deceased spouse.
If a claim for dependant’s relief is successful, the Court has broad discretion and can make a variety of orders for support, including but not limited to:
- A monthly or annual payment, for an indefinite or limited period of time or until the occurrence of a specific event;
- A lump sum payment;
- The transfer of specified property, either absolutely, for life, or a specified number of years; or
- The possession or use of any specified property for life or for such period as the Court considers appropriate.
In any event, if a person believes that they may have a good case for a Dependant’s Support Claim under the SLRA, it is important to consult with a lawyer as soon as possible so as to file the claim within the allotted limitation period and discuss any other options.
Thanks for reading.
Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:
Back in February 2017 I blogged about how, as a result of a recent change in the definition of “spouse” within the confines of Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA”), divorced spouses could arguably no longer qualify as a “spouse” of the deceased individual for the purposes of dependant’s support. As a divorced spouse would be unlikely to be included amongst any other class of individual who could qualify as a “dependant” of the deceased, the effect of such a change was to potentially deprive divorced spouses from the ability to seek support from their deceased ex-spouse’s estate following death.
The issue centered on the removal of language from the definition of “spouse” within Part V of the SLRA. The definition of spouse previously included language which provided that a “spouse” included two people who “were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated or declared a nullity”. The revised definition provided that “spouse” under Part V of the SLRA had the same meaning as section 29 of the Family Law Act. As section 29 of the Family Law Act did not include similar language to the definition of spouse including two people who “were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated or declared a nullity”, but rather simply provided that “spouse” was defined as including two people who were married to each other or who are not married to each other but cohabitated continuously for a period of not less than three years (i.e. common law spouses), the argument was that divorced spouses could no longer be “spouses” for the purposes of Part V of the SLRA.
Much debate ensued in the profession following such a change in definition about what impact, if any, it would have upon a divorced spouse’s ability to seek support after death. Such debate now appears to be moot, as the Ontario legislature appears to have acknowledged the confusion caused by the change in definition, and has again changed the definition of “spouse” within the confines of Part V of the SLRA with the passage of the Stronger, Healthier Ontario Act (Budget Measures), 2017, S.O. 2017, C.8 (the “Stronger, Healthier Ontario Act”).
In accordance with “Schedule 29” of the Stronger, Healthier Ontario Act, the definition of “spouse” as contained in Part V of the SLRA now reads as follows:
“Spouse” has the same meaning as in section 29 of the Family Law Act and in addition includes either of two persons who were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated by divorce.” [emphasis added]
The revised definition of “spouse” leaves no doubt that divorced spouses can qualify as a dependant of their deceased ex-spouse within the meaning of Part V of the SLRA. Interestingly, while the revised definition of “spouse” clearly includes divorced spouses, it does not contain a reference to those individuals whose marriage was “declared a nullity” as the previous definition of spouse contained. As a result, it is still questionable whether those individuals whose marriage was declared a nullity could be considered a “spouse” within the confines of Part V of the SLRA, and whether they could bring an Application for support as a dependant of their ex-spouse’s estate following death.
Thank you for reading.
Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related topics: