Tag: Court of Appeal
The recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Dzelme v Dzelme acts as a helpful reminder that even if an attorney has standing to seek a passing of accounts, the Court may still refuse to grant the passing.
John was named as the attorney for personal care for his father, Ritvers, and sought an accounting of Ritver’s financial affairs from his brother Arnis (Ritvers’ other son) who was the attorney for property. Both John and Arnis agreed that John, given that he was an attorney for personal care, could apply under section 42(4)(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act for a passing of accounts without leave. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal identified that even if a person has standing to apply for an accounting, it remains the discretion of the Court to order a passing of accounts.
In deciding whether to order the passing, the superior court judge made the following findings of fact: (i) both the father and mother were capable when they executed written instructions to Arnis not to produce any financial information about his affairs to John; (ii) the mother maintained this position in response to John’s motion; (iii) a capacity assessment found that the mother was capable of making her own decisions; (iv) a third brother corroborated Arnis’ evidence that he was abiding by his parent’s wishes; (v) the application judge did not doubt that Arnis was following his mother’s wishes; and, (vi) there was no reason to suspect that Arnis was acting improperly with respect to certain transactions.
On this basis, the Court of Appeal upheld the application judge’s dismissal of John’s request for an order that Arnis pass his accounts of Ritver’s property.
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In overturning a lower court decision, on May 31, 2019, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that neither contract law nor property law principles govern how to dispose of embryos, where neither party has a biological connection to the genetic material.
Instead, in S.H. v D.H, 2019 ONCA 454 the Court held that the governing legislation and regulations prevail: The Assisted Human Reproduction Act (“AHRA”) and the Assisted Human Reproductions (Section 8 Consent) Regulations (“Consent Regulations”).
In 2011, D.H. and S.H. purchased four embryos (created from anonymous donors) from a lab in the US. Two of the four embryos were viable, one of which resulted in the birth of the couple’s son. The second embryo is stored in an Ontario lab. The couple divorced shortly after the birth of their son, and a dispute arose around the fate of the second embryo.
At the time of purchasing the embryos, the couple entered into two contracts, one with the US based lab, and one with the Ontario based lab. The first contract set out that the frozen embryos would be donated, in the event that the parties are unable to make a decision as to their disposition in the future. The couple also acknowledged that in the event of a divorce, the legal ownership of any remaining stored embryos would be determined in a property settlement.
The Ontario based contract identified D.H. as the “patient” and the S.H. as the “partner”. It set out that in the event of divorce or legal separation, the lab would “respect the patient’s wishes”. When D.H. attempted to proceed with implanting the second embryo, S.H. withdrew his consent.
In the lower court decision, the court looked to the persuasive authority, M. (J.C.) v A. (A.N), 2012 BCSC 584, concluding that the embryos were to be treated as property, governed by the contracts, such that the “patients’ wishes” should be respected.
The Ontario Court of Appeal however, has concluded that Parliament has imposed a consent-based, rather than a contracts-based model through AHRA and the Consent Regulations. Under this legislative format, “donor” is defined to include a couple who are spouses at the time the in vitro embryo is created, even where neither person contributes reproductive material to the embryo. The Court also determined that separation or divorce does not change the donor status of the couple in instances where either both individuals are genetically connected to the embryo, or neither individual is genetically connected to it. Pursuant to s. 10(3) of the Consent Regulations, the donor status is only changed if there is only one genetically contributing former spouse – and it is that individual who will be deemed the sole donor.
The Court went on to consider that the principle of free and informed consent was a fundamental condition to the use of human reproductive technologies. The Consent Regulations reflects that consent is ongoing and is not frozen in time by specifically legislating that the consent of the donor may be withdrawn by either spouse. The Consent Regulations and AHRA criminalizes the use of genetic material without the written consent of the embryo’s donors.
In coming to its conclusion, the Court held that a consent-based model to reproductive technology is “fundamentally at odds with contract law”, and that an individual cannot simply contract out of criminal law, nor the protections that may be afforded to them under that law. Therefore, it was within S.H.’s right to withdraw his consent to the use of the embryo.
In the estate planning context, assisted human reproduction brings with it many considerations which should be taken by the drafting solicitor, such as whether or not the client, or their partner has any stored sperm or ova, whether there is consent to the use of the genetic material post-mortem, if there are any time limitations on its use, and whether or not there is an intention that children conceived with donated sperm/ova posthumously are to be included in the Will, among many others.
To learn more about the impact of assisted human reproduction within the estate planning context, and some practical tips for solicitors, see “Fertility Law Considerations for Estate Lawyers” by Suzana Popovic-Montag.
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Another will challenge was before the Court of Appeal this month on February 5, 2019. Reasons for the panel, comprised of Pepall, Trotter, and Harvison Young JJ.A., were released in writing on February 13th. Quaggiotto v. Quaggiotto, 2019 ONCA 107, can be found here.
The issue of validity was solely focused on a codicil that was executed by Maria Quaggiotto when she was 87 years old. The codicil left the residue of her estate to one son, Livio, while her will had previously left an equal division of the residue to both of her sons, Livio and Franco.
After a 10 day trial, Justice Rogin found that the codicil was valid.
On appeal, the challenger Franco sought to overturn various findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law.
Ultimately, the panel upheld the decision of Justice Rogin.
The panel reaffirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Orfus Estate with respect to the notion that testators are not required to have “an encyclopedic knowledge” of their assets in order to satisfy the test for testamentary capacity.
Interestingly enough, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was sufficiently alive to corroboration requirements of section 13 of the Ontario Evidence Act even though Justice Rogin’s decision would appear to have erroneously cited section 13 of the Ontario Estates Act for this important statutory requirement. The adage “form over substance” did not hold water in this appeal given that the actual legal requirement was adequately considered by Justice Rogin.
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In today’s podcast, Jonathon Kappy and Sayuri Kagami discuss the recent Court of Appeal decision in Styres v Martin, 2018 ONCA 956, where the Court ordered a new trial of the issues. The Appellant had suffered catastrophic brain injuries after a motorcycle accident and subsequently entered into a long-term relationship with the Respondent to whom he eventually transferred his home. On Appeal, the Court of Appeal examined some of the important issues that need to be examined in such a matter.
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An Ontario Court of Appeal decision released yesterday provides clarity regarding the situations in which beneficiaries of legacies will be entitled to interest on the sum payable to them under a Last Will and Testament.
In Rivard v Morris, the testator had held farmland of significant value. A prior Will left a farm of comparable value to each of his daughters (as the testator had previously gifted a farm property to his son), and divided the residue of the estate equally between the three children. In the months preceding his death, however, the deceased amended his estate plan to provide for a greater benefit to his son, leaving him the residue of his estate (inclusive of the farm properties) after distributions to each daughter in the amount of $530,000.00.
After the testator died, the daughters challenged his Last Will on the basis of alleged undue influence. The will challenge was unsuccessful. The daughters subsequently commenced another proceeding after their brother (the sole remaining estate trustee after their previous resignations) refused to pay to the sisters interest with respect to the legacies of $530,000.00. They argued that they were entitled to interest commencing one year after the date of their father’s death, notwithstanding that the payment had been delayed in part because of the will challenge initiated by the daughters. Any interest would have been payable out of the assets to which their brother was otherwise entitled as sole residuary beneficiary of the estate.
The daughters were unsuccessful at the hearing of their application and appealed. The Court of Appeal found in their favour. Justice Paciocco ordered the payment to each daughter interest in the amount of $53,000.00 out of the residue of the estate. In doing so, Justice Paciocco relied upon the “executor’s year” and the “rule of convenience”. In describing the rule of convenience, Justice Paciocco stated as follows (at paragraphs 24, 25):
The “rule of convenience” can be easily explained, in my view. One of the maxims of equity is that it presumes as being done that which ought to be done. Since the beneficiaries should be enjoying the earning power of their legacies by at least the anniversary date of the testator’s death, where that enjoyment is postponed and the testator has not provided an alternative date for payment of the legacy, interest is to be paid…This general rule has been adopted in Ontario.
The rule of convenience was considered by the Court of Appeal to promote certainty and predictability, and the lower court’s decision to deny the daughters’ interest on the basis that they had commenced litigation against the estate was said to be contrary to principle, as this would have the impact of discouraging “even meritorious litigation”. While the Court of Appeal did neither confirmed nor denied whether judges are able to exercise discretion to deny interest to beneficiaries of legacies, it found that it had been inappropriate for the application judge to do so in this case.
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Today on Hull on Estates, Paul Trudelle and Doreen So discuss expert witnesses and the gatekeeper role of the trial judge in the Court of Appeal decision in Bruff-Murphy v. Gunawardena, 2017 ONCA 502.
The Court of Appeal recently released a decision on the role of expert witnesses and the role of the trial judge as gatekeepers of such evidence.
In Bruff-Murphy v. Gunawardena, 2017 ONCA 502, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from a car accident case. Bruff-Murphy, the appellant, claimed that she suffered physical and mental injuries as a result of a car accident caused by Gunawardena. Gunawardena admitted liability and a 23-day jury trial occurred to determine Bruff-Murphy’s damages. At trial, the jury awarded Bruff-Murphy $23,500.00 in general damages. On appeal, Justices Lauwers, Hourigan, and Benotto overturned the trial decision and ordered a new trial because “the defence proffered the evidence of a wholly unsuitable expert witness” (para. 72).
The expert at issue was a psychiatrist and he was the last witness in the defence’s case. In particular, his expert opinion was that the plaintiff did not develop any psychiatric disorders or limitations as a result of the accident. However, the methodology of his process and the tone of his expert report were found by the Court of Appeal to be more prejudicial than probative. The Court of Appeal was highly critical of how unfair it was for this expert to focus on the inconsistencies between the information that he received from the plaintiff though an interview and the information that he later discovered from reviewing the plaintiff’s medical records without putting these inconsistencies to the plaintiff and giving her the opportunity to explain. The overall tone of the expert report, where the expert went out of his way to make damaging comments to the plaintiff’s case, was also found to be reliable indicator of the expert’s testimony.
While the Court of Appeal appreciated that the trial judge correctly turned his mind to the four traditional criteria for the admissibility of expert evidence as established in R. v. Mohan, the trial judge was found to have erred for failing to weigh the prejudicial effect of this expert’s evidence against it’s probative value as the final step during the qualification stage.
To quote Justice Hourigan at paragraphs 35 and 36 of this decision, the test during the qualification stage is as follows,
 The first component requires the court to consider the four traditional “threshold requirements” for the admissibility of the evidence established in R. v. Mohan, 1994 CanLII 80 (SCC),  2 SCR 9: (i) relevance; (ii) necessity in assisting the trier of fact; (iii) absence of an exclusionary rule; and (iv) the need for the expert to be properly qualified.
 The second component is a “discretionary gatekeeping step” where “the judge balances the potential risks and benefits of admitting the evidence in order to decide whether the potential benefits justify the risks”: para. 24. It is a cost-benefit analysis under which the court must determine whether the expert evidence should be admitted because its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
For those who are interested in the topic of admissibility of expert evidence, click here for the Supreme Court of Canada decision in White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23.
Thanks for reading and stayed tuned for my blog later this week on the trial judge’s gatekeeper role after the qualification stage.
Today on Hull on Estates, Ian M. Hull and Doreen So discuss the recent Court of Appeal decision in Levesque v. Crampton Estate, 2017 ONCA 455, and the two-year, from death, limitation in section 38 of the Trustee Act.
This week on Hull on Estates, Jonathon Kappy and Umair Abdul Qadir discuss the Court of Appeal’s recent comments on independent legal advice in Donis v Georgopoulos, 2016 ONCA 194 (http://bit.ly/1qLCSqL), where an inter vivos transfer was challenged on the basis of undue influence. Read more about the Court’s decision on our blog. (http://bit.ly/1RYCGi3)
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Earlier this week, I blogged about the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Neuberger v. York, 2016 ONCA 191, and the first lesson from this case. The second lesson from this case is that the doctrine of estoppel is not permitted to bar challenges to the validity of wills.
As a short recap of the facts from my prior blog, the late Chaim Neuberger was Edie’s father. Edie and, her sister, Myra, were the named Estate Trustees of the 2010 Wills. Between the death of Edie’s father on September 25, 2012, and the commencement of Edie’s challenge of the validity of the 2010 Wills on December 19, 2013, Edie was found by the lower court to have taken steps as an Estate Trustee. Such steps were, for example, the payment of taxes and the redemption of preference shares. This led the lower court to apply the doctrine of estoppel by representation to stop Edie from challenging the 2010 Wills (see Neuberger v. York, 2014 ONSC 6706).
On this point, the Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court of Appeal unanimously took the view that estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention do not lie to bar a challenge to the validity of a will (at paragraph 103).
The Hon. Justice Gillese found that the test for estoppel, as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. v. Paddon-Hughes Development Co.,  S.C.R. 932, is not applicable in probate matters. Canadian Superior Oil was found to deal with promissory estoppel in the context of a private lease agreement between two individuals, which is “fundamentally different than is the question of the validity of a will” (at paragraphs 104 to 108).
As a matter of public policy, the Hon. Justice Gillese stated as follows (at paragraph 118):
“estoppel is animated by the goal of creating transactional certainty between private parties in civil disputes. A will, however, is more than a private document. As explained above, a dispute about a will’s validity engages interests that go beyond those of the parties to the dispute and extend to the testator and the public. Once a testamentary instrument is probated, it speaks to society at large. Probate is an in rem pronouncement that the instrument represents the testator’s true testamentary intentions and that the estate trustee has lawful authority to administer the estate. Because of this, the court has a responsibility to ensure that only wills that meet the hallmarks of validity are probated. It owes that duty to the testators, whose deaths preclude them from protecting their own interests, to those with a legitimate interest in the estate, and to the public at large. If the doctrine of estoppel were available to bar a party from having the validity of a will determined, the court’s ability to discharge that responsibility would be in jeopardy.”
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