Tag: Common Law
In Ontario, if a person dies without a will, the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”) dictates how the person’s estate is to be distributed. Part II of the SLRA provides that if the person dies with a married spouse, that spouse receives a share of the estate. If there are no children, the spouse receives the estate outright. If the deceased has children, may be entitled to receive a share of the estate. If there is only one child, the spouse receives the “preferential share”, and half of any estate in excess of the preferential share goes to the spouse and the other half goes to the child (or the child’s issue, if the child has predeceased). If there is more than one child, the spouse gets the preferential share and one-third of the excess and the other children share the remaining two-thirds. Again, if a child has predeceased the deceased, the child’s issue enjoys that child’s share.
Things get a little more complicated where there is a partial intestacy. If the spouse receives assets under the will, the spouse’s preferential share is reduced by the value of the property received under the will.
Note that the intestate provisions pertaining to spouses in Ontario apply to married spouses only. Common-law spouses are not entitled to a share of the estate on an intestacy. However, they may be entitled to dependant support under Part V of the SLRA.
In Ontario, the value of the preferential share is not referred to in the SLRA. The value of the share is set by regulation: O. Reg 54/95. Since 1995, the value of the preferential share has been $200,000.
British Columbia intestacy legislation is somewhat different. The relevant legislation is the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c 13.
Firstly, in B.C., a spouse is defined as including a married spouse AND a person with whom the deceased lived in a marriage-like relationship for at least two years immediately before the death.
Secondly, in B.C., there are different calculations of the “preferential share”. If all of the children are children of BOTH the deceased and the surviving spouse, then the preferential share is $300,000. If all of the children are NOT “common” to the deceased and the surviving spouse, then the preferential share is only $150,000.
Thirdly, in addition to the preferential share, the surviving spouse is entitled to the “household furnishings”, which is defined as being the “personal property usually associated with the enjoyment by the spouses of the spousal home”. In Ontario, the value of the preferential share presumably includes the value of any household furnishings.
Fourthly, the B.C. legislation provides that if the estate is greater than the preferential share, then the surviving spouse gets half, and the deceased’s descendants get the other half, regardless of how many children there are.
Fifthly, the WESA provides for situations where there are more than one “spouse’. In such a case, the surviving spouses are to share the preferential share in the portion to which they agree, or failing agreement, as may be determined by the court. The WESA does not appear to give any guidance as to how that determination is to be made.
If you are short of things to think about this weekend, consider:
- Whether it is time to reconsider the value of the preferential share?
- Whether it makes sense to allow the spouse to have the household furnishings in addition to the preferential share. This personal property usually has nominal resale value, is difficult to evaluate, and often has sentimental or practical value to the surviving spouse.
- Whether Ontario should adopt a definition of “spouse” that includes common-law spouses for intestacy purposes, or whether resort to dependant support provides sufficient protection for common-law spouses?
- Whether the fact that the surviving children of the deceased are also the surviving children of the surviving spouse should impact on the value of the preferential share, as it does in B.C.?
- Whether the percentage of the estate in excess of the preferential share that the surviving spouse gets should vary depending on how many children the deceased had (that is, 50% if only one child, but only 33% if more than one child)?
Thank you for reading. Have a great weekend.
The city of Toronto was abuzz this past weekend as we kicked off summer 2019 with wall-to-wall sunshine. There were so many wonderful things to celebrate this weekend. For some, celebrations continued over the Toronto Raptor’s historic NBA Championship win. Some were tapping their feet to the beat for the first weekend of Toronto’s Jazz festival. Others, like myself, were flooding the streets to celebrate one of the city’s largest, loudest, and most colourful parades of the year – the Toronto Pride Parade.
Pride festivities provide a great opportunity to come together with others to celebrate and promote the equal rights of all persons regardless of gender or sexual orientation. While there, I reflected on some key considerations for LGBTQ+ individuals to consider in the context of estate planning in Ontario.
1. The value of a will
A will is an invaluable tool to assist people in planning for the future. The Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c. 26 (“SLRA”) gives individuals the power to dispose of property post-death.
Provided that your will meets the statutory requirements to be valid (which are prescribed in Part I of the SLRA) testators are free to dispose of their property as they wish. This a right regardless of sexual orientation or gender and includes couples that are in common-law relationships and same-sex marriages.
Importantly, the will provides a testator with a level of control over how children are provided for post-death. This is especially important in scenarios where parents rely on assisted reproduction as a method of conceiving a child. Having a will allows a testator to specifically name children and outline how that child is to take under the will. For more information about this, click here.
2. Rules of Intestacy
If you die without leaving a will, your estate will be subject to the rules of intestacy which are governed by Part II of the SLRA. Under these rules, married couples are entitled to take their spouses property absolutely if the deceased is not survived by issue. On July 20, 2005 the Parliament of Canada enacted the Civil Marriage Act, which legalizes same-sex marriage and provides in section 2, that, “Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others”. This definition replaced the former definition which described marriage as the lawful union between a man and a woman. As a result, same-sex spouses are entitled to take from their spouses estate on an intestacy.
In contrast, common-law relationships do not share this privilege, regardless of whether it is a heterosexual or homosexual common-law relationship.
3. Incapacity During Lifetime
An important consideration for LGBTQ+ individuals is also what would happen in the event that they become incapable of making decisions regarding their health care and property. Although laws vary by jurisdiction, legal and biological family, such as spouses (sometimes including common-law partners), children and parents, will generally be favoured over other persons who may have a close but legally unrecognized, relationship with the incapable person. This could have a negative impact on an individual whose non-accepting family members step into a decision-making role for them.
4. Dependant Support Claim
If you fall under the definition of a “dependant” under Part V of the SLRA, which could apply to same-sex common-law relationships and spouses alike, you may be entitled to make a dependant’s support claim against your partner’s estate.
Thank you for reading!
As anyone who has ever watched the show Friends can attest, “breaks” can happen in any relationship. For those attempting to claim common law spousal status however, what impact, if any, do such “breaks” have upon the length of time that the couple has to be together? Do you have to re-set the clock of the relationship after every “break”, or can the “breaks” be ignored?
Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act incorporates the definition of “spouse” from section 29 of the Family Law Act. Section 29 of the Family Law Act in turn defines “spouse” as including “two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years“. This definition is often what is being referred to when someone says that a relationship is “common law”, with significant corresponding legal rights potentially being given to the two individuals if they are found to be “spouses”.
As the word “continuously” is included in the definition, one would be forgiven for thinking that there cannot be any “breaks” in the relationship, and that you must have a continuous three year period of “cohabitation” for two people to be considered spouses. As we will see below however, this may not necessarily be the case.
I have previously blogged about the factors that the court may look to in determining whether two people are “cohabitating”, with the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H. having confirmed that you look to the factors listed in Molodowich v. Penttinen to determine whether to individuals are “cohabitating” to the extent that their relationship becomes spousal. For the purpose of this blog however, the interesting question which follows is whether a couple who otherwise meets enough of the factors from Molodowich to be considered to be “cohabitating”, but had a “break” in their relationship during the three year period, could still be considered “spouses”.
In Boothe v. Gore,  O.J. No. 4376, the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) provides the following commentary regarding the effect of a “break” on a relationship:
“The law in Ontario recognizes that a man and a woman are considered to have continuously cohabitated, despite that while living together, there might have been separations for varying periods of time before reconciling. Cohabitation does not terminate until either party regards it as being at an end, and, demonstrate convincingly that this is the party’s intent. A brief cooling off period does not convincingly show a settled state of mind that cohabitation has terminated…
The effects of temporary separations depends on the intention of the parties. When one party leaves the other and provides an objective basis to believe that they do not intend to resume cohabitation and the separation lasts for a meaningful period of time, the period of cohabitation could well have been interrupted.” [emphasis added]
As Boothe v. Gore suggests, a “break” in a relationship should not necessarily preclude a finding that two persons are common law spouses. Rather, the court is to attempt to ascertain the intentions of the parties at the time of the “break”, with the spousal status only coming to a close if either of the parties regards the relationship as being “at an end“, or the period of separation lasts for a “meaningful period of time“.
Thank you for reading.
In today’s podcast, Natalia Angelini and Doreen So discuss the case of MacDonald v. Estate of James Pouliout, 2017 ONSC 3629, which was an interesting decision on constructive trusts, the limitation period applicable to dependants relief, and vesting pursuant to section 9 of Estate Administration Act.
Should you have any questions, please email us at email@example.com or leave a comment on our blog.
This week on Hull on Estates, Ian M. Hull and Stuart Clark discuss the recent case of Stajduhar v. Wolfe, 2017 ONSC 4954, and whether two individuals need to live together to be considered spouses within the confines of Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.
Should you have any questions, please email us at firstname.lastname@example.org or leave a comment on our blog.
The common law slayer rule makes the law in Canada clear that committing murder will prevent a person from inheriting the estate of the victim. For clarity, the accused must be found guilty and exhaust all of their rights to appeal before the courts will void a testamentary gift or beneficiary designation.
In the cases of Helmuth Buxbaum and Peter Demeter, who were found guilty of murdering their wives, the court refused to allow the men to benefit from their crimes by collecting the proceeds of their wives’ insurance policies. Pursuant to the case of Demeter v British Pacific Life Insurance Co.,  OJ No 3363, a criminal conviction will be accepted as proof of criminal activity in civil cases. Therefore, a person who has been convicted of murder cannot argue in civil court proceedings that he or she is innocent and capable of accepting a testamentary gift.
Recently, in Minneapolis, an individual named Michael Gallagher killed his mother, and around a year later, is attempting to obtain her life insurance proceeds. According to an article in the Toronto Star, bedbugs were infesting the apartment of Mr. Gallagher’s mother, and he believed that she would be evicted from her home, and decided to “send her to heaven.” The law in Minnesota is similar to the law in Canada, and their legislation states that an individual who “feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will.”
This case turns, however, on the fact that Mr. Gallagher was not convicted for murdering his mother. In July, a Judge found that he was not guilty due to reasons of mental illness, stating that he “was unable to understand that his actions were wrong.” This finding allows Mr. Gallagher to potentially have a claim to his mother’s life insurance policy.
In Canada, a similar finding is known as NCRMD (Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder). If this case took place in Canada, it is likely that Mr. Gallagher would have been found NCRMD. This raises the important question of whether an individual, who is not convicted of murder, but has killed somebody, is still able to claim the proceeds as a beneficiary a testator’s estate or life insurance.
In the case of Nordstrom v. Baumann,  SCR 147, Justice Ritchie stated, “The real issue before the trial judge was whether or not … the appellant was insane to such an extent as to relieve her of the taint of criminality which both counsel agreed would otherwise have precluded her from sharing in her husband’s estate under the rule of public policy.“ The court held that the public policy slayer rule does not apply if the individual was found NCRMD at the time of the killing. Furthermore, in the case of Dreger (Re),  O.J. No. 2125 (H.C.J.), the court held that “[the] rule of public policy [that a person found not guilty for murder] cannot receive property under the will…the only exception to this rule is that a person of unsound mind is not so disqualified from receiving a benefit under the will of a person he has killed while in law insane.“ Lastly, the recent case of Dhingra v. Dhingra Estate, 2012 ONCA 261, upheld a similar finding and allowed the NCRMD individual to apply for the deceased`s life insurance policy.
The law in Ontario seems to uphold the principle that a mentally ill individual who was unable to understand the consequences of their actions should not be automatically disentitled to life insurance proceeds.
Thanks for reading,
Other Articles You Might be Interested In
This week on Hull on Estates, David Smith and Nick Esterbauer discuss avenues of support for common law spouses, including claims for survivor’s pensions and the related legislation and case law in Ontario.
Should you have any questions, please email us at email@example.com or leave a comment on our blog below.
Common law spouses are not included in Part II of Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act, which governs intestate succession (dying without a valid Will).
In British Columbia, unlike Ontario, intestate laws now provide the same rights to common law spouses as to married spouses, if the couple lived together in a marriage-like relationship for a period of at least two years before the death of one of them. Recent case law out of British Columbia has grappled with the issue of identifying common law spouses in cases of intestacy.
In Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586, the deceased had been separated, but not divorced, from his wife for six years. During the last six years of his life, the deceased lived with another woman, Ms. Goerz, as husband and wife. The deceased died without a Will. On the death of the deceased, the legally married spouse, Mrs. Austin, brought a claim seeking a declaration that Ms. Goerz was not the deceased’s common law spouse. The lower court dismissed Mrs. Austin’s claim, and she appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. On appeal, Mrs. Austin argued that the deceased, while legally married, could not have a common law spouse as he lacked the legal capacity to marry. Mrs. Austin also argued that Ms. Goerz was not a common law spouse as there was no financial dependence between her and the deceased during their relationship. Both arguments were dismissed. The Court of Appeal recognized that common law relationships can exist even though one or both partners lack the capacity to marry. Furthermore, lack of financial dependence is not determinative in identifying common law relationships.
Have a great day!
Bianca La Neve
Listen to The Question of Compensation and Complaints.
This week on Hull on Estates and Succession Planning, Ian and Suzana discuss the question of compensation and complaints regarding compensation.
Listen to Dependant Relief.
This week on Hull on Estates, Natalia Angelini and Craig Vander Zee discuss dependant relief and reference a variety of cases that utilized the Succession Law Reform Act.