Recently, the Advance Care Planning in Canada initiative, led by the Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association, released a new resource to assist with advance care planning and choosing a substitute decision maker.
The “Speak Up” initiative includes two complementary resources.
One resource is the “Living Well, Planning Well” legal toolkit. The development of this toolkit was funded by Health Canada. The legal toolkit was designed to be used by lawyers and their clients, to encourage conversations and reflections about clients’ wishes for advance care planning, and putting appropriate arrangements in place.
The other resource is a public toolkit. It provides plain language information regarding the laws and processes with respect to advance care planning and substitute decision-making throughout Canada. This is helpful as the laws can vary between the provinces and territories.
It is very important to consider advance care planning, and to implement plans as early as possible. In particular, everyone should consider executing a power of attorney, to ensure that they are able to select the person responsible for making decisions on their behalf when they are no longer capable. Without a power of attorney, in Ontario, the ultimate decision as to who will make decisions on an incapable person’s behalf (other than those captured by the Health Care Consent Act, 1996), is left to the court. The court takes such matters very seriously, but most people prefer that the choice of substitute decision maker be their own.
Something else to contemplate is speaking with your family and friends, especially with your named attorney, regarding your wishes. As we enter the holiday season, and plan gatherings with our friends and family, consider taking this opportunity to have a conversation in this regard.
You can review Speak Up’s post about the release of their toolkit here.
Thanks for reading,
You may enjoy these other blog posts:
In Ontario, we are fortunate to have the ability to execute powers of attorney in respect of our property and our health care. I recently learned that Jersey, in the Channel Islands, has only lately gained the ability to execute a “Lasting Power of Attorney” to record their decisions and intentions in respect of their assets and care. On that note, I thought I would take the opportunity to provide a quick reminder of the importance of executing powers of attorney, and the possible consequences of not doing so.
Powers of attorney in Ontario are governed mainly by the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30 (the “SDA”). The SDA sets out, among other things, the requirements for powers of attorney, the requisite capacity to grant a power of attorney, and the powers and duties of attorneys. There are two types of powers of attorney: powers of attorney for personal care (dealing with your health, medical care, and other matters related to your well-being) and powers of attorney for property (dealing with your property and financial matters). Generally, powers of attorney will come into play if you become incapable of managing your property or personal care, respectively, but it is also possible to grant a power of attorney for property that is effective immediately (that is, not conditional upon later incapacity).
What Happens if I Don’t Execute Powers of Attorney?
If you do not execute powers of attorney, and you never lose capacity, you may never realize how important they are. However, as we have blogged about previously, as our population begins to live longer, there has been an increase in dementia and other aging-related conditions associated with cognitive decline, meaning that the use and activation of powers of attorney is increasing.
Taking the step of executing powers of attorney means that you have the chance to make your own decision regarding who will handle your affairs in the event that you are no longer capable. If you become incapable, and have not named an attorney for property or personal care, it is open (and may become necessary, depending on your circumstances) for an individual to bring an application seeking to be appointed as your guardian for property or personal care, thus allowing them to act as your substitute decision-maker. The application process requires that notice be given to certain people (including certain family members), and if someone disagrees with the appointment of the proposed guardian, they may contest the guardianship—but the key detail to remember is that the ability to make the decision is taken away from you.
A guardianship application can also be brought if a person has executed a power of attorney, but the existence of a power of attorney will be an important factor for the court’s consideration: pursuant to the SDA, if the court is satisfied that there is an alternative course of action that is less restrictive of the person’s decision-making rights, the court shall not appoint a guardian.
Naming someone to act on your behalf with respect to your property and personal care is a big decision. It is almost certain that you are in the best position to make a determination as to who you want acting for you in this regard. We should all take the opportunity to exercise our own decision-making rights, to choose the person that we want to play the important role of attorney, and not leave it up to others to make this decision for us.
Thanks for reading,
Other blog posts that you may enjoy:
Does an attorney, or guardian, have the power to change a grantor’s estate plan?
According to section 31(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, a guardian of property (or attorney for property) has the power to do on the incapable person’s behalf anything in respect of property that the person could do if capable, except make a will.
The statute, however, is deceptively simple. Can a guardian transfer property into joint tenancy? Can a guardian sever a joint tenancy? Can a guardian change a beneficiary designation on a RRSP, RRIF or insurance policy? Can an inter vivos trust be established or an estate freeze undertaken to save taxes? There are numerous cases which have tested these issues.
For instance, in Banton v Banton, Justice Cullity found that although the grantor’s attorneys had the authority to create an irrevocable inter vivos trust, they nonetheless breached their fiduciary obligations owing to the grantor, in creating the trust.
The irrevocable trust provided for income and capital at the trustee’s discretion for the grantor’s benefit during his lifetime and a gift over of capital to the grantor’s children, who were also the attorneys. The scheme of distribution of the irrevocable trust was the same as provided for in the grantor’s will. However, the court found that the fact that the remainder interest passed automatically to the grantor’s issue defeated the grantor’s power to revoke his will by marriage and would deprive his common law spouse of potential rights under Parts II and V of the Succession Law Reform Act and Part I of the Family Law Act. The court found that the gift of the remainder of the interest went beyond what was required to protect the grantor’s assets.
Justice Cullity stated:
“I do not share the view that there is an inviolable rule that it is improper for attorneys under a continuing power of attorney to take title to the donor‘s assets either by themselves or jointly with the donor . This must depend upon whether it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so to protect or advance the interest, or otherwise benefit, the donor.”
Find this blog interesting, please consider these other related blogs:
In today’s podcast, Stuart Clark and Sayuri Kagami discuss the issue of whether damages can be claimed on a passing of an attorney for property’s accounts in light of the fact that section 49(3) of the Estates Act, RSO 1990, c E21 only refers to the ability of a Judge to award damages against an executor, administrator, or trustee, not an attorney for property, in such proceedings. To read about this issue, see Stuart Clark’s recent blog on this topic.
Should you have any questions, please email us at firstname.lastname@example.org or leave a comment on our blog.
While digital assets constitute “property” in the sense appearing within provincial legislation, the rights of fiduciaries in respect of these assets are less clear than those relating to tangible assets. For example, in Ontario, the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, and Estates Administration Act provide that attorneys or guardians of property and estate trustees, respectively, are authorized to manage the property of an incapable person or estate, but these pieces of legislation do not explicitly refer to digital assets.
As we have previously reported, although the Uniform Law Conference of Canada introduced the Uniform Access to Digital Assets by Fiduciaries Act in August 2016, the uniform legislation has yet to be adopted by the provinces of Canada. However, recent legislative amendment in one of Ontario’s neighbours to the west has recently enhanced the ability of estate trustees to access and administer digital assets.
In Alberta, legislation has been updated to clarify that the authority of an estate trustee extends to digital assets. Alberta’s Estate Administration Act makes specific reference to “online accounts” within the context of an estate trustee’s duty to identify estate assets and liabilities, providing clarification that digital assets are intended to be included within the scope of estate assets that a trustee is authorized to administer.
In other Canadian provinces, fiduciaries continue to face barriers in attempting to access digital assets. Until the law is updated to reflect the prevalence of technology and value, whether financial or sentimental, of information stored electronically, it may be prudent for drafting solicitors whose clients possess such assets to include specific provisions within Powers of Attorney for Property and Wills to clarify the authority of fiduciaries to deal with digital assets.
Thank you for reading.
Other blog posts that may be of interest:
The Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30 (the “SDA”), governs, among other things, the appointment of guardians for incapable persons. There are two types of guardians: a guardian for property and a guardian for personal care.
Sections 22(1) and 55(1) of the SDA provide that the Court may, on any person’s application, appoint a guardian of property or of the person, for a person who is incapable of managing property or personal care if, as a result of the said incapacity, it is necessary for decisions to be made on his or her behalf.
In order to appoint a guardian for someone, the Court will need to make a finding of incapacity for that person. This is an important hurdle, and the Court will generally need to see evidence that the person in question has been assessed as incapable of managing property and/or personal care prior to making a finding that he or she is incapable.
Depending on the circumstances, a person may submit to a capacity assessment voluntarily. However, according to section 78(1) of the SDA, if a person refuses to be assessed, an assessor shall not perform the assessment. Section 79 of the SDA allows the Court to order that a person be assessed, provided that the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the person is incapable. Additionally, to obtain a Court Order for an assessment, there must be a proceeding under the SDA, in which the person’s capacity is in issue. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Neill v Pellolio, 2001 ONCA 6452 held that there is no stand-alone relief available for an Order for a capacity assessment in the absence of an application brought under the SDA. Accordingly, obtaining a finding of incapacity from the Court may not be a simple endeavour.
The SDA also has in place measures to protect an individual’s decision-making rights from undue restriction. Sections 22(3) and 55(2) state that the Court shall not appoint a guardian if it is satisfied that the need for decisions to be made will be met by an alternative course of action that does not require the Court to find the person incapable, and is less restrictive of the person’s decision-making rights than the appointment of a guardian.
Accordingly, for example, if a person has already granted a power of attorney, allowing the named attorney to act would constitute a less restrictive course of action which also does not require the Court to make a finding of incapacity in order for decisions to be made for an incapable person. Furthermore, if a person is incapable of managing their property or personal care, but remains capable of granting a power of attorney, that would likely also constitute a less restrictive course of action, and would allow that person to exercise their decision-making rights.
Thanks for reading.
Other blog posts that may be of interest:
Canada’s model legislation regarding digital assets, the Uniform Access to Digital Assets by Fiduciaries Act (the “Canadian Model Act”), was introduced in August 2016, and borrows heavily from its American predecessor, the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (the “American Model Act”).
The Canadian Model Act defines a “digital asset” as “a record that is created, recorded, transmitted or stored in digital or other intangible form by electronic, magnetic or optical means or by any other similar means.” As with the definition appearing within the American Model Act, this definition does not include title to an underlying asset, such as securities as digital assets. Unlike the American Model Act, the Canadian Model Act does not define the terms “information” or “record.”
In the Canadian Model Act, the term “fiduciary” is also defined similarly as in the American Model Act, restricting the application of both pieces of model legislation to four kinds of fiduciary: personal representatives, guardians, attorneys appointed under a Power of Attorney for Property, and trustees appointed to hold a digital asset in trust.
One challenge that both pieces of model legislation attempt to address is the delicate balance between the competing rights to access and privacy. The American Model Act is somewhat longer in this regard, as it addresses provisions of American privacy legislation to which there is no equivalent in Canada. Canadian law does not treat fiduciary access to digital assets as a “disclosure” of personal information. Accordingly, under Canadian law, the impact on privacy legislation by fiduciary access to digital assets is relatively limited.
The Canadian Model Act provides a more robust right of access to fiduciaries. Unlike the American Model Act, the Canadian Model Act does not authorize custodians of digital assets to choose the fiduciary’s level of access to the digital asset. Section 3 of the Canadian Model Act states that a fiduciary’s right of access is subject instead to the terms of the instrument appointing the fiduciary, being the Power of Attorney for Property, Last Will and Testament, or Court Order.
Unlike the American Model Act, the Canadian equivalent has a “last-in-time” priority system. The most recent instruction concerning the fiduciary’s right to access a digital asset takes priority over any earlier instrument. For example, an account holder with a pre-existing Last Will and Testament, who chooses to appoint a Facebook legacy contact is restricting their executor’s right to access their Facebook account after death pursuant to the Will.
Despite their differences, both pieces of model legislation serve the same purpose of facilitating access by attorneys for or guardians of property and estate trustees to digital assets and information held by individuals who are incapable or deceased and represent steps in the right direction in terms of updating estate and incapacity law to reflect the prevalence of digital assets in the modern world.
Thank you for reading,
This week on Hull on Estates, Paul Trudelle and Noah Weisberg discuss the recent Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision of Keller v. Wilson, 2015 ONSC 6962, pertaining to applications for directions by Attorneys and passing of Attorney accounts pursuant to the Substitute Decisions Act.
Should you have any questions, please email us at email@example.com or leave a comment on our blog.
In a recent judgment, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered whether joint account holders owe a fiduciary duty with respect to the management and operation of a joint account.
The facts of MacKay Estate v MacKay, 2015 ONSC 7429 are not unusual. Dawn MacKay (“Dawn”) was married to Tom MacKay (“Tom”) one of Annie MacKay’s (“Annie”) three sons. Annie and Dawn had a very close relationship. In early 1999, Annie made a Power of Attorney for Property in favour of Tom. Shortly thereafter, Annie, with Tom’s assistance, named Dawn as joint bank account holder. At trial, Dawn advised that she and Annie had agreed that Dawn would assist Annie with her banking and her care, as well as provide companionship, in exchange for compensation. There were no specific terms agreed to at the time.
Around 2003, Dawn began making transfers from the joint account to herself. She stated that the transfers were in the nature of compensation and were loosely based around payment of $250.00 per week for services provided. After Dawn and Tom separated in 2008, Tom commenced an action as Annie’s litigation guardian seeking an accounting, payment of monies found due, damages for breach of trust, and punitive damages. After Annie died in 2010, in 2012, Tom, as Estate Trustee, continued the action on behalf of Annie’s estate.
The main issues considered by the court were (1) whether Dawn, as a joint account holder, owed a fiduciary duty to Annie in the management and operation of the joint bank account; (2) whether Dawn breached her fiduciary duty by making payments to herself from the account; and (3) whether Dawn was liable to repay the amount of the payments made.
To determine whether there was a fiduciary relationship, the court followed the guide from Frame v Smith,  2 SCR 99, to consider whether:
i. the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power;
ii. the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests; and
iii. the beneficiary is vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.
Based on these indicia, the court found that Dawn did owe a fiduciary duty to Annie and that Dawn had acted as a trustee de son tort. The court also found that in making the payments to herself out of the joint bank account, Dawn had not breached her fiduciary duty and that, in fact, the payments were reasonable in the circumstances.
Although this case seems to establish that it is possible for a joint bank account holder to owe a fiduciary duty, it is not entirely clear from the decision whether this finding will apply only in the context of a non-contributing individual who is added to a pre-existing account in order to assist the account holder, or whether this may apply to all those who hold bank accounts jointly.
Thanks for reading.
A recent decision arising from the British Columbia Court of Appeal addresses the ability of an elderly Alzheimer’s patient to provide consent to personal care decisions without speaking.
Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society involves a petition brought by Margaret Bentley’s daughter and husband to prevent Maplewood, the care facility in which Margaret has been a patient since 2009, to cease providing food and water to Margaret.
At the time of the hearing, Margaret was an 83-year-old woman who had been afflicted with Alzheimer’s Disease since at least 1999. Consequently, Margaret would sit “…slumped over in a chair or in bed most of the time, with eyes closed. She has not spoken since 2010 and does not appear to recognize anyone”.
Margaret’s family relied on evidence from as far back as 1991, including a living will (otherwise referred to as an advance directive), expressing Margaret’s wishes that, amongst other things, if there was no reasonable expectation of recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, she be allowed to die (and not be provided with nourishment or liquids). Interestingly, Margaret was a nurse in earlier years, who had experience with patients in ‘vegetative’ states due to Alzheimer’s Disease. Accordingly, one may think that these decisions were well thought out.
Maplewood argued that Margaret opened her mouth to accept nourishment or liquid. Should Margaret keep her mouth closed, as she did when at the dentist, or keep her teeth clenched, they would respect her decision and not attempt to feed her by means of a feeding tube or any other medical means.
The lower Court Judge considered various evidence from general practitioners, finding it significant that Margaret “…indicates preferences for certain flavours and eats different amounts at different times…”, and that the petitioners (family), had not established that Margaret’s behaviour was a mere reflex.
Importantly, the family did not seek to have Margaret declared incapable. Therefore, the Court found that Margaret consented to being given food and water by holding a spoon or glass to her lips. This did not amount to prodding and prompting. Since Maplewood did not go further when Margaret kept her mouth closed, their actions were within the scope of Margaret’s consent.