Tag: attorney for property

26 Aug

Judicial discretion to order passings of accounts

Nick Esterbauer Capacity, Estate & Trust, Passing of Accounts Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

We often encounter situations where the administration of an estate is complicated by the fact that the deceased was married multiple times, and there is a clash between children from a prior relationship and a subsequent spouse (and/or his or her children).  Sometimes, a couple will be closer with one set of children, which may lead to disputes following both of their deaths.  Estate of Ronald Alfred Craymer v Hayward et al, 2019 ONSC 4600, was one such case, in which Joan and Ronald had been closer for much of their 32-year marriage with Joan’s children from a prior marriage.  After Joan and Ronald died in 2016 and 2017, respectively, a dispute arose between their adult children.

While Ronald’s will named his own children as beneficiaries of his estate, his Continuing Power of Attorney or Property (like Joan’s), named Joan’s daughter as alternate attorney for property, should his spouse be unable to act.   Joan had acted as Ronald’s attorney for property from 2006, during which he had suffered a stroke, until her death.  In 2011, Joan had transferred the couple’s matrimonial home, previously held jointly, to herself alone.  During this period, however, there had been no request by Ronald’s children for an accounting.  Joan’s daughter had subsequently acted as Ronald’s attorney for property and as estate trustee for Joan’s estate over the period of approximately eight months between the deaths of Joan and Ronald.

Ronald’s children sought a passing of accounts with respect to the management of their father’s property by Jane and her daughter and, specifically, challenged the change in title to the matrimonial home.  The Court referred to Wall v Shaw, 2018 ONCA 929, in stating that there is no limitation period to compel an accounting.  Accordingly, it considered the only bar to this relief to be laches and acquiescence.  Justice C.F. de Sa commented that the there was nothing improper in the manner in which the plaintiff had sought the accounting and, furthermore, that the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances.  The Court permitted the claim regarding the matrimonial home to continue, but nevertheless declined to order a passing of  accounts:

…[O]rdering the passing of accounts is discretionary. And in my view, to require an accounting at this point would result in a clear injustice as between the parties.

[Joan’s daughter,] Linda, as Estate Trustee, is hardly in a position to account for Joan’s spending while she was alive. Yet, to require a passing of accounts at this point would subject every line of Joan’s spending (as Attorney for Property) to the court’s scrutiny.  Moreover, as the Estate Trustee, the Defendant would be liable to account for any unexplained expenditures.

Indeed, it is unclear that the spending was spurious given the nature of the relationship between Joan and Ronald. Joan would have been spending the money as his wife as much as his Attorney for Property.  The failure to keep detailed accounts is hardly suspicious given the circumstances here.

…In the circumstances, I will not order a passing of accounts.

This decision is interesting in that it clearly considers the practicality of a passing of accounts and the inability of the deceased attorney’s estate trustee to properly account in the absence of relevant records in determining that it would be unjust to order a passing of accounts, despite there being no other apparent legal reason not to do so.

Thank you for reading.

Nick Esterbauer

 

Other blog entries that may be of interest:

10 May

A “Good News” Story on Compensation

Paul Emile Trudelle Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Passing of Accounts, Trustees, Uncategorized, Wills Tags: , , , 0 Comments

In Daniel Estate (Re), 2019 ONSC 2790 (CanLII), the applicants applied to have their estate trustee and attorneyship accounts passed. As stated by the judge hearing the application, “Unlike many applications to pass accounts, this is a “good news” story.”

The applicants were the friends and former neighbours of a high net worth, elderly couple, Isabel and Wayne. For over 20 years, the applicants provided extensive personal assistance to the elderly couple. “In many ways, [the applicants] acted like loyal and dutiful family members.” In addition to completing simple neighbourly tasks, the applicants helped the couple in many other ways. They eventually became the attorneys for property and personal care for the couple. When Wayne died, the applicants took on the role of acting as his Estate Trustee.

The application to pass accounts was supported by an affidavit from Isabel, who indicated that she was content with the claim for compensation being made by the applicants. The application materials also included an accounting analysis prepared by a Chartered Accountant, who reviewed the accounts in detail, and also an analysis by a Certified Case Manager  and Certified Canadian Life Care Planner, who assessed the value of the personal services provided by the applicants.

In the end, the court awarded the applicants compensation for administering Wayne’s estate of $129,775; compensation for acting as attorneys for property of $435,772.36 and compensation for acting as attorneys for personal care, for a total of $757,659.

With respect to costs, the court awarded the applicants their costs of $125,021 for the unopposed passing of accounts. According the judge, “While this amount seems at first blush high, I note the accounting report alone was worth $45,000. In my view of the detailed, thorough and helpful material filed and in view of the hours it took to assemble, digest and present the financial information provided, I find that the fees and disbursements claimed are reasonable.”

The court appears to have been impressed by the extent and quality of the assistance provided by the applicants to Isabel and Wayne. Further, the court appears to have been impressed with the detailed and extensive materials put before the court in order to justify the claims on the passing.

Thanks for reading.

Paul Trudelle

08 Apr

Can an Attorney for Property sever a joint-tenancy in real property?

Stuart Clark Power of Attorney Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

It is often said that an Attorney for Property can do anything on behalf of the grantor’s behalf except make a will. This is on account of section 7(2) of the Substitute Decisions Act (the “SDA“), which provides:

The continuing power of attorney may authorize the person named as attorney to do on the grantor’s behalf anything in respect of property that the grantor could do if capable, except make a will.” [emphasis added]

Although at first glance it would appear that the potential tasks that an Attorney for Property could complete on behalf of a grantor are almost absolute, with the Attorney for Property being able to do anything on behalf of the grantor except sign a new will, in reality the tasks that an Attorney for Property may complete relative to the grantor’s estate planning is more restrictive than this would suggest at first glance. This is because the definition of “will” in the SDA is defined as being the same as that contained in the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“), with the SLRA in turn defining “will” as including not only typical testamentary documents such as a Last Will and Testament or Codicil, but also “any other testamentary disposition“. As a result, the stipulation that an Attorney for Property can do anything on behalf of the grantor “except make a will” would include not only a restriction on the Attorney for Property’s ability to sign a new Last Will and Testament or Codicil on behalf of the grantor, but also a restriction on the Attorney for Property’s ability to make “any other testamentary disposition” on behalf of the grantor.

It is fairly common for individuals such as spouses to own real property as joint-tenants with the right of survivorship. When one joint-owner dies ownership of the property automatically passes to the surviving joint-owner by right of survivorship, with no portion of the property forming part of the deceased joint-owner’s estate. Although such an ownership structure may make sense when the property is originally purchased, it is not uncommon for circumstances to arise after the property was registered (i.e. a divorce or separation) which may make one of the joint-owners no longer want the property to carry the right of survivorship. Should such circumstances arise, one of the joint-owners will often “sever” title to the property so that the property is now held as tenants-in-common without the right of survivorship, making efforts to attempt to ensure that at least 50% of the property would form part of their estate should they predecease the other joint-owner.

Although severing title to a property is fairly straight forward while the owner is still capable, circumstances could become more complicated should the owner become incapable as questions may emerge regarding whether their Attorney for Property has the authority to sever title to the property on behalf of the grantor, or whether such an action is a “testamentary disposition” and therefor barred by section 7(2) of the SDA.

The issue of whether an Attorney for Property severing title to a property is a “testamentary disposition” was in part dealt with by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Champion v. Guibord, 2007 ONCA 161, where the court states:

The appellants argue that the severing of the joint tenancies here constituted a change in testamentary designation or disposition and is therefore prohibited by s. 31(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act because it is the making of a will.

While we are inclined to the view that the severance of a joint tenancy is not a testamentary disposition, we need not decide that question in this case. Even if it were, we see no error in the disposition made by the application judge, because of s. 35.1(3)(a) of the Substitute Decisions Act.” [emphasis added]

Although the Court of Appeal does not conclusively settle the issue in Champion v. Guibord, the court appears to strongly suggest that they are of the position that an Attorney for Property severing a joint-tenancy is not a “testamentary disposition” within the confines of the SDA.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

07 Jun

Resigning as Power of Attorney for Property

Stuart Clark Power of Attorney Tags: , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Being a Power of Attorney for Property can often be a difficult and thankless job. It is not unforeseeable that, after originally accepting the job, circumstances may arise which leads the Attorney for Property to want to resign. But how do you go about actually resigning as Attorney for Property? Is it enough to simply stop acting as Attorney for Property, or to loudly scream “I quit!” to those that have caused you the frustration, or are additional steps required for the resignation to become effective?

The resignation process for an Attorney for Property is governed by section 11(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, which provides:

An attorney under a continuing power of attorney may resign but, if the attorney has acted under the power of attorney, the resignation is not effective until the attorney delivers a copy of the resignation to,
(a) the grantor;
(b) any other attorneys under the power of attorney;
(c) the person named by the power of attorney as a substitute for the attorney who is resigning, if the power of attorney provides for the substitution of another person; and
(d) unless the power of attorney provides otherwise, the grantor’s spouse or partner and the relatives of the grantor who are known to the attorney and reside in Ontario, if,
(i) the attorney is of the opinion that the grantor is incapable of managing property, and
(ii) the power of attorney does not provide for the substitution of another person or the substitute is not able and willing to act.

As a result of section 11(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, if an Attorney for Property wishes to resign from their position they must put such resignation in writing, which must then be delivered to the certain individuals, including the grantor, any other Attorneys for Property named in the document, as well as the grantor’s spouse and next-of-kin if the grantor is incapable and the Power of Attorney does not provide for a substitute Attorney for Property or the substitute is not willing or able to act. Once the resignation has been received by all of such individuals, the resignation is effective, and the individual is no longer the grantor’s Attorney for Property.

It should of course be noted that resigning as Attorney for Property would not release the individual of any liability for their historic administration of the grantor’s property. To do so, the resigning Attorney for Property would likely have to commence an Application to Pass Accounts regarding their management of the grantor’s property, or seek a release from the grantor if the grantor was still capable. This, however, is a topic for a further blog on a different day.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

04 Jun

Can you pursue damages against an Attorney for Property in an Application to Pass Accounts?

Stuart Clark Passing of Accounts Tags: , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

When concerns are raised about the conduct of an Attorney for Property, those raising the concerns often seek an Order compelling the Attorney for Property to commence an Application to Pass Accounts pursuant to section 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act. Should such an Application to Pass Accounts be commenced, the objecting party will often make allegations against the Attorney for Property that the incapable person and/or estate has suffered damages as a result of the Attorney for Property’s conduct, often seeking monetary damages against the Attorney for Property in relation to such objections.

An interesting question was recently posed to me in the context of such an Application to Pass Accounts for an Attorney for Property. Can the objecting party pursue damages against the Attorney for Property within the actual Application to Pass Accounts itself, or do they need to commence a separate claim against the Attorney for Property for the recovery of such damages?

The ability to pursue damages against an Estate Trustee within the Application to Pass Accounts process is well established by statute, with section 49(3) of the Estates Act providing:

The judge, on passing any accounts under this section, has power to inquire into any complaint or claim by any person interested in the taking of the accounts of misconduct, neglect, or default on the part of the executor, administrator or trustee occasioning financial loss to the estate or trust fund, and the judge, on proof of such claim, may order the executor, administrator or trustee, to pay such sum by way of damages or otherwise as the judge considers proper and just to the estate or trust fund, but any order made under this subsection is subject to appeal.” [emphasis added]

Section 49(3) of the Estates Act makes it clear that a separate claim against an Estate Trustee is not necessary to pursue damages for breach of trust when an Application to Pass Accounts has been commenced, and that the Judge may order damages against the Estate Trustee within the actual Application to Pass Accounts itself. Perhaps importantly however, the Estates Act appears to suggest that section 49 only applies to a passing of accounts for an “executor, administrator or trustee under a will“, making no reference to an Attorney for Property. Sections 42(7) and 42(8) of the Substitute Decisions Act also set out the “powers of the court” in an Application to Pass Accounts for an Attorney for Property, with such provisions notably containing no reference to the ability to order damages against the Attorney for Property for any wrongdoing.

As there appears to be no statutory equivalent to section 49(3) of the Estates Act which specifically contemplates that it applies to Attorneys for Property, and the ability to pursue damages within the Application to Pass Accounts itself in other circumstances appears to be derived from statute, the question of whether there is a “legislative gap” as it relates to the ability to pursue damages against an Attorney for Property within an Application to Pass Accounts can at least appear to be raised. If such a “legislative gap” does exist, would this mean that a separate claim would have to be commenced by the objector to pursue such damages even when an Application to Pass Accounts was currently before the court?

When I have raised the question to other estate practitioners, some have suggested that while there may be no statutory authority to order such damages against the Attorney for Property within the Application to Pass Accounts, the court may have inherent jurisdiction to order such damages by way of a “surcharge order” in the Application to Pass Accounts. Some have also suggested that as section 42(6) of the Substitute Decisions Act contemplates that the procedure to be utilized on passing an Attorney’s accounts is to be the same as that as an executor’s accounts, that this should be read as evidence to show that section 49(3) of the Estates Act would apply to the passing of an Attorney for Property’s accounts. In response to this, I would suggest that it is at least questionable if section 49(3) of the Estates Act is “procedural” in nature, and, even if it is found to be procedural, whether the “powers of the court” provisions of sections 42(7) and 42(8) of the Substitute Decisions Act, which notably does not include the power to award damages against the Attorney for Property for wrongdoing, would trump section 49(3) of the Estates Act in any event.

I am aware of no decision which specifically addresses the issue of whether there is a “legislative gap” when it comes to whether damages can be sought against an Attorney for Property within the Application to Pass Accounts itself. While the issue may simply be academic at this time, it is not unforeseeable that someone could attempt to argue that an objector cannot seek damages against the Attorney for Property within the Application to Pass Accounts itself, and that a separate claim is required. If such an argument is successfully raised, and the length of time between the alleged wrong and the separate claim being commenced was such that the limitation period may have expired, it is not unforeseeable that the Attorney for Property may attempt to argue that the separate claim must now be dismissed as a result of the expiry of the limitation period.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

01 Aug

“Special Parties” and Litigation Guardians in Family Law Proceedings

Umair Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, Guardianship, Litigation, Power of Attorney Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Where an incapable person is named as a party in a legal proceeding, the appointment of a representative is necessary to ensure that the person’s interests are adequately represented in the litigation.

Litigation Guardians in Civil Proceedings

Rule 7.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that, unless the Court orders or a statute provides otherwise, a litigation guardian shall commence, continue or defend a proceeding on behalf of a “party under disability.” The Rules define “disability” to include a person who is mentally incapable within the meaning of sections 6 or 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides additional guidance regarding litigation guardians in civil proceedings, including the powers and duties of a litigation guardian.

But what about parties who are under an incapacity and who are named as parties in a family law proceeding in Ontario?

“Special Parties” Under the Family Law Rules

In Ontario, the Family Law Rules apply to family law cases in the Superior Court of Justice’s Family Court, the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Court of Justice. The Family Law Rules provide guidance on the appointment of representatives for incapable persons in family law matters.

Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules defines a “special party” as a party who is a child or who is or appears to be mentally incapable for the purposes of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 in respect of an issue in the proceeding.

Pursuant to Rule 4(2), the Court may authorize a person to represent a special party if the person is appropriate for the task and willing to act as representative. If there is no appropriate person willing to act, the Court may authorize the Children’s Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee to act as the representative.

Mancino v Killoran – More Than One Potential Representative

A recent decision illustrates the conflicts that may arise when more than one person believes that they are the most appropriate person to act as an incapable person’s representative in a family law proceeding.

In Mancino v Killoran, 2017 ONSC 4515, the Applicant asserted a claim for spousal support and for an interest in a property against the Respondent (“Michael”). Michael had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s, and was a resident at a long-term care home. Michael’s sister (“Colleen”) and his son (“Allan”) both sought to represent Michael’s interests in the litigation, and filed affidavits in support of their positions.

Justice Gareau considered Michael’s power of attorneys and testamentary documents, which were executed at a time when Michael was still capable. Allan was named as Michael’s attorney for property and co-attorney for personal care. Allan was also named as the sole Estate Trustee of Michael’s Estate.

Justice Gareau held that “[t]he fact that Michael…, at a time when he had capacity, placed Allan… in a position of trust over his personal property and the administration of his estate indicates that he had confidence in Allan…to represent his best interests.” Michael’s sister Colleen was not named in any of Michael’s testamentary documents, which Justice Gareau found to be a “powerful and persuasive fact.”

The Court concluded that there was nothing in the evidence that would persuade the Court to depart from Michael’s express wishes regarding the management of his property. In the result, Allan was appointed to represent Michael as a special party in the family law litigation.

Thank you for reading,

Umair Abdul Qadir

27 Jun

Attorneys for Property, Conflicts, and Divorce

David M Smith Uncategorized Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

It is commonly understood that an Attorney for Property can do anything that the grantor of the Power of Attorney could do other than make a Will.  Indeed, s. 7(2) of the Substitute Decisions Act provides: “The continuing power of attorney may authorize the person named as attorney to do on the grantor’s behalf anything in respect of the property that the grantor could do if capable, except make a will.

In practice, “will” has been expanded to mean testamentary dispositions.  Accordingly, as an example, beneficiary designations under RRSPs and life insurance policies cannot be changed by an attorney on behalf of the incapable grantor.

The unpredictable onset of incapacity can make for some unintended consequences.  And the choice of attorney can create situations of inevitable conflict of interest that challenge the limitations of the statute.

An example would be a situation in which a separated but not divorced spouse is appointed under a Power of Attorney for Property.  What if an application for divorce was jointly initiated by the grantor and his spouse and the grantor then becomes incapable before the divorce is finalized and before the Power of Attorney is revoked?

In such a situation, the Attorney for Property/separated spouse is in a curious predicament: on the one hand, the grantor would presumably (but not as a certainty) have wanted to complete the steps required to conclude the divorce.  On the other hand, the separated spouse clearly has a competing interest:  he or she would presumably financially benefit from the divorce not being finalized.  To complicate matters further, if the grantor/incapable spouse chose to maintain his separated spouse as his attorney for property, he or she may been seen as wanting to trust that person to act in his or her best interests despite the conflict.

The reality is that there can be no certainty that the grantor would have as a matter of indisputable fact performed the additional steps required to conclude a divorce.  While the surviving spouse in this scenario would have a conflict of interest which raises a question of whether there would be a motive to avoid concluding the divorce, it would seen that, in addition to not being able to make a Will, an Attorney for Property, could not necessarily conclude a divorce on behalf of an incapable Grantor.

There are surprisingly few cases on point.  One such case is O.(M.K.) (Litigation Guardian of) v. C.(M.E.) in which the British Columbia Supreme Court decided against allowing a Divorce to proceed at the behest of a Committee for an incapable husband where the Court found, on a balance of probabilities, that no intention to divorce had been demonstrated before the incapacity.

Of course, it is a nice question as to whether intent to separate is the same as intent to divorce….

Thanks for reading,

David Morgan Smith

 

 

 

 

 

22 Jun

Who Can Compel a Passing of Accounts From an Attorney for Property?

Umair Capacity, Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Executors and Trustees, Litigation, Passing of Accounts, Power of Attorney, Trustees Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

 

As is often the case, a person who is concerned about a fiduciary’s management of property may wish to compel an accounting. However, it is important to remember that a person’s ability to compel such an accounting may vary depending on whether an accounting is being sought from an estate trustee of a deceased’s estate or, in the alternative, from an attorney for property during the lifetime of an incapable grantor.

The legal framework in Ontario

In Ontario, pursuant to section 50 of the Estates Act, an executor or administrator shall not be required to account by the Court “…unless at the instance or on behalf of some person interested in such property or of a creditor of the deceased….” Further, Rule 74.15(1)(h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides for any person who appears to have a financial interest in an estate to move for an order for assistance requiring an estate trustee to pass his or her accounts.

Conversely, the right to compel an accounting from an attorney for property or guardian of property is set out under section 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act. Pursuant to section 42, in addition to the attorney, the guardian and the incapable person, the following persons may apply for the fiduciary’s accounts to be passed:

  1. The grantor’s or incapable persons’ guardian of the person or attorney for personal care;
  2. A dependant of the grantor or incapable person;
  3. The Public Guardian and Trustee;
  4. The Children’s Lawyer;
  5. A judgment creditor of the grantor or incapable person; and
  6. Any other person, with leave of the Court.

This is an important distinction to keep in mind: although a person with a financial interest in the estate may be able to compel an accounting from an estate trustee, such a financial interest on the death of an incapable grantor may not in and of itself be sufficient to compel an accounting from an attorney for property during the lifetime of the incapable.

What is the criteria for obtaining the leave of the Court?

The recent decision of the Honourable Justice LeMay in Groh v Steele, 2017 ONSC 3625, is an important reminder of the high threshold for obtaining the leave of the Court to compel an accounting from an attorney for property under section 42.

In Groh, the Applicant, Ernest, sought a capacity assessment of his mother Gabriella under the Substitute Decisions Act. Ernest also sought an order for the suspension of Gabriella’s attorneys for property ability to act and an order for the attorneys for property to pass their accounts. Ernest’s Application was opposed by Gabriella and her attorneys for property.

On the issue of Ernest’s request that the attorneys pass their accounts, Justice LeMay reviewed section 42 of the SDA and concluded that “it is clear that the only circumstances in which Ernest could ask for a passing of accounts is if he can obtain leave of the Court.”

Justice LeMay went on to make the following statement regarding the circumstances in which leave should be granted by the Court:

In my view, such leave should be granted sparingly. The passing of accounts is a detailed review of the financial affairs of the grantor. As such, it is something that is intrusive, and will reveal private financial information about the grantor. In order to obtain leave, the party applying would have to establish both that he or she had some interest (at least indirectly) in the affairs of the grantor, and that there was at least some evidence that the Attorneys were not properly conducting the affairs of the donor. The Court should also consider the role that the Attorneys are playing in the Grantor’s affairs.

After reviewing the facts before the Court, Justice LeMay concluded that a formal passing of accounts should not be ordered, and Ernest’s Application was dismissed.

Thank you for reading,

Umair Abdul Qadir

09 Mar

Hull on Estates #509 – Role of Powers of Attorney for Property

76admin Archived BLOG POSTS - Hull on Estates, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Podcasts, Power of Attorney, Show Notes, Show Notes, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

This week on Hull on Estates, Jonathon Kappy and Stuart Clark discuss the powers entrusted to a Power of Attorney for Property, including whether they may give gifts on behalf of an incapable person.

 Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.
14 Apr

Power of Attorney for Property Compensation

Stuart Clark Power of Attorney Tags: , , , 0 Comments

Being an Attorney for Property can be a difficult and thankless job. As a result of the long hours which are often involved in managing an incapable person’s property, many AttorE5RETXVN7Rneys for Property will begin to ask themselves whether they are entitled to be paid compensation for their work. The answer to such a question is not straightforward, and will depend on each specific circumstance.

The first place to look to in determining whether an Attorney for Property is entitled to be paid compensation is the Power of Attorney document itself, and whether the document sets a specific framework regarding compensation. If the Power of Attorney document sets out a specific framework for compensation, the Attorney for Property may be paid compensation in accordance with what is provided in the document. If the Power of Attorney document specifically bars the Attorney for Property from being paid compensation, the Attorney for Property will be unable to charge compensation for their work.

Presuming that the Power of Attorney document is silent with re
spect to the issue of compensation, the compensation which the Attorney for Property may be entitled to be paid is set by the Substitute Decisions Act (the “SDA“). Section 40(1) of the SDA provides:

“A guardian of property or attorney under a continuing power of attorney may take annual compensation from the property in accordance with the prescribed fee scale.”

The “fee scale” contemplated by section 40(1) of the SDA is set out in Ontario Regulation 26/95, section 1 of which provides that an Attorney for Property shall be paid in accordance with the following guidelines:

  • 3% on capital and income receipts;
  • 3% on capital and income disbursements; and
  • 3/5 of 1% (i.e. 0.6%) of the annual average value of the assets under administration as a “care and management fee”.

The amounts contemplated above are subject to reduction on a subsequent Application to Pass Accounts. To this effect, while the SDA does not require that an Application to Pass Accounts be commenced prior to the Attorney for Property being entitled to pay themselves compensation, the Attorney for Property should be prepared to later justify any amount taken in compensation on a later Application to Pass Accounts. In the event that on such a subsequent Application to Pass Accounts it is determined that the Attorney for Property has been overpaid for their work, they may be required to return any overpayment.

Stuart Clark

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