As of April 7, Wills can be witnessed by video conference.
As you are aware, two witnesses must be “in the presence of” the testator when a typed Will is signed. This has historically required physical presence.
The new Emergency Order now confirms that the “presence” may be by “audio-visual communication technology”.
Importantly, at least 1 of the 2 witnesses must be a licensee of the Law Society of Ontario.
In light of these changes, we, together with Hull e-State Planner, have created a suggested Video Execution Checklist to use for execution of wills in these circumstances.
Click here to access the Checklist and further information about the Emergency Order.
Feel free to reach out with any questions,
Over the past few blogs, we discussed alternates for having Clients sign Wills when we can’t meet with them in person.
One of the options was to have client sign holograph Wills. While that may work with more straightforward instructions, it won’t be practical where testamentary trusts are necessary.
In today’s blog, we will focus on an alternate option – “incorporation by reference” of an unsigned “Will” into a holograph Will.
The terms of one document (“the Incorporated Document”) can be included in another document without repeating all of it provisions. This is known as “incorporation by reference”. In order to incorporate the terms of the Incorporated Document into a Will, there are four well established requirements:
- The Incorporated Document must be referred to in the Will;
- The reference in the Will to the Incorporated Document must be sufficient to identify the Incorporated Document; and
- The Incorporated Document must be in existence at the time the Will is signed. It cannot come into existence at a future date.
- The Incorporated Document must be “entirely separate and apart” from the Will.
The most common examples of incorporation by reference in a Will are a binding memorandum regarding the disposition of Personal Effects and a trust company’s compensation agreement.
Rather than just a list of personal effects or compensation agreement, can the Client incorporate an entire unsigned Will by reference?
Where a testator in a duly executed will or codicil refers to an unattested written paper (whether of a testamentary form or character or not), as a written paper then in existence in such terms that it may be ascertained, the paper so referred to becomes part of his will, in other words, is incorporated therein; provided always that the paper referred to is actually in existence at the time of the execution of the will or codicil. Probate Practice and Re Warren (1930), 38 O.W.N. 358 (Ont. H.C.),
This concept was not disputed in Re Coate Estate, (1987) 26 E.T.R. 161, although the facts in that case did not lead to a finding of incorporation by reference.
Similarly, in Re Dixon-Marsden Estate (1985), 21 E.T.R. 216 (Ont. Surr. Ct.), the Court found that the particular handwriting did not qualify as a holograph document. Nevertheless, Judge Misener seemed to endorse the use of a holograph document incorporating the terms of a formal, but unexecuted Will. In that case, a typed Will on a single piece of paper was not properly signed with two witnesses. However, at the bottom of the page the testator wrote, in his own hand, “The above-mentioned are in short those to whom my estate is left” and below that he signed his name.
“I have always understood that the doctrine of incorporation by reference contemplates the existence of a testamentary document that qualifies for probate, independent of the document sought to be incorporated. If that is so, the condition precedent to the argument that a typewritten document is incorporated is the tendering of a document wholly in the handwriting of the testator and bearing his signature that can be admitted to probate all by itself. Therefore, on the facts of this case, the handwritten words ‘the above-mentioned are in short those to whom my estate is left’ must be capable of admission to probate.”
In that case, the handwritten portion could not be separated from the typed portion and so did not satisfy the requirement that the two documents be “entirely separate”.
In Re Chamberlain Estate, the deceased enclosed two documents in an envelope:
- A printed Will form, which the deceased signed but was not witnessed.
- A single sheet of paper wholly in the handwriting of the deceased which listed several of the deceased’s assets. The deceased wrote his name at the bottom of the sheet.
The issue before the court was whether the documents could be read together as a valid Will.
Justice Maher emphasized that although documents referred to in a testator’s Will or codicil may not be duly executed in accordance with The Wills Act, they may nonetheless be incorporated in the Will.
Justice Maher found that the document written wholly in the handwriting of the testator was a valid holograph Will and it met the conditions outlined above. Although the documents were not completed at the same time, the incorporation by reference doctrine still applied as they were testamentary in nature and wholly in the handwriting of the deceased.
The second document being testamentary in character and wholly in the handwriting of the deceased is a valid holograph will and it has been held that the doctrine of incorporation by reference applies to holograph wills: Re Long Estate,  1 All E.R. 435.
Based on these authorities, it appears that a holograph Will could incorporate the terms of a non-executed formal Will as long as the 4 conditions were properly met.
However, there is an outlier Ontario case that is problematic- Facey v. Smith (1997), 17 E.T.R. (2d) 72 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
In Facey, the court was faced with an unseemly fact scenario. The deceased was murdered by her husband who later, on the same day, committed suicide. The issue was whether certain writings made by the deceased were holograph Wills and if so, did thy properly incorporate the terms of a formal Will by reference.
The court found that a holograph documents did not qualify as a Will because it did “not show a fixed final intention as to disposition on death”. However, in obiter, the Court said the following:
“I have no difficulty with the doctrine of incorporation by reference applying when the Will into which type written words are to be incorporated is itself a witnessed Will. When those type written words are declared incorporated, the statutory requirement of the testator’s signature duly witnessed is wholly satisfied. In the case of a holograph Will, however, incorporation of typewritten words does not meet the statutory requirement. That requirement is that the holograph Will, to be valid, must be “wholly by his own handwriting and signature” and patently the incorporated typewritten words are not in the testator’s handwriting. The doctrine of incorporation by reference was developed to relieve against the harshness of the Wills Act and to give effect to the intentions of a testator. I am not satisfied that the law in Ontario is or should be that typewritten documents can be incorporated into a holograph Will. The purpose of requiring certain formalities in the making of Wills is to prevent fraud and no fraud is here alleged. Although not formally required, my answer to question two is “no”.
If you decide to recommend this strategy, here are a few suggestions:
- Have the formal Will identified as “Schedule A”;
- Ensure that the Holograph document qualifies as a valid Will, both in terms of execution and in terms of testamentary intent.
- Have the Client initial each page of “Schedule A” and sign it.
- Properly incorporate by reference Schedule A in the Holograph Will.
Here is a link to a sample Client Instruction Sheet for your consideration. Use with caution!
Hoping you are safe and healthy,
The Victorians consigned themselves to more subtlety in their works of entertainment than we at present do. To all appearances, theirs was decidedly not an age capable of enjoying rap music and HBO comedies. The spiciest themes in their art, therefore, would include marriage intrigues, duels, financial scandals – or, as we see in George Eliot’s Middlemarch – controversial wills and eccentric testators.
The wills and estates subplot in Middlemarch is comprised of all the ingredients that you may see in a modern legal drama: a rich and erratic miser (Mr. Featherstone) manipulating his relatives with implied promises of future bequests; the idle protégée (Fred Vincy) who accumulates debts with the idea that the testator will bail him out; concern over the testator’s attachment to his young caregiver (Mary Garth); a train of impoverished relatives ill-concealing their greedy expectations; and much discussion on why “blood” was deserving and why “strangers” were not.
It is remarkable how little has changed in a century or so with respect to wills and estates. Then, as now, a Mr. Featherstone who promises a bequest, receives consideration, and then goes back on his word, may be found to have broken a binding contract – as occurred in Legeas v. Trusts & Guarantee Co. Likewise, a ruling of unjust enrichment (Moore v. Sweet) or specific performance (Folsetter v. Yorkshire & Canadian Trust Co.) could be made against him/his estate.
Still relevant today are the challenges of undue influence and incapacity. In the story, the scheming relatives are alarmed at Mr. Featherstone’s connection to Ms. Garth. She, all too aware of an undue influence allegation, refuses her patron’s money and ignores him when he orders her, while on his deathbed, to destroy his wills. In return, he throws his cane at her, which is perhaps evidence of incapacity.
Much as we may laugh at the relatives in Middlemarch who repeatedly visit Mr. Featherstone to remind him of his obligations to his “own flesh and blood”, our own law continues to ascribe significance to bloodlines. The Succession Law Reform Act defines “child” based upon conception, and the statute’s intestacy provisions speak of “issue” and the “nearest degree” of kindred. As many an adopted child and step-child knows, with respect to estates law, blood still matters.
There are some marked differences between Eliot’s England and modern Canada. Whereas Fred Vincy was loaned money in part because the creditors knew he was favoured by Mr. Featherstone, we now have businesses openly and explicitly offering advances to those who “have an inheritance coming”. Although we still use the Banks v. Goodfellow test for evaluating capacity, there have been some innovations, such as capacity assessments done after death and more nuanced, neuroscientific understandings of capacity. Lastly, if Mr. Featherstone had died in Ontario in 2020, he could not take as much comfort in tantalizing relatives and then crushing their hopes, for we have dependency support laws whereby testators must provide “adequate provision” for their “dependents”. Perhaps the creation of such laws was influenced, in part, by the ghoulish conduct of such Victorian literary characters.
Thank you for reading. Enjoy the rest of your day!
Suzana Popovic-Montag and Devin McMurtry.
Coinbase co-founder and CEO Brian Armstrong recently blogged about the future of cryptocurrency, predicting that it will reach 1 billion users by the year 2030 (up from about 50 million at the start of this decade). With the anticipated increased uptake of cryptocurrency, we can expect that more and more people will hold these types of digital assets on their death. The question then arises: how should cryptocurrencies be dealt with in one’s estate plan?
By way of background, cryptocurrency is virtual currency that uses cryptography to verify financial transactions and control production of currency units in a decentralized, peer-to-peer exchange network. Cryptocurrency runs on Blockchain technology, which allows for blocks of information about transactions to be recorded and stored on a distributed ledger. When a transaction takes place, a block is added to the blockchain and there is a corresponding change in balance in the buyer and seller’s cryptocurrency wallets.
A cryptocurrency wallet or “crypto wallet” contains a person’s public and private keys – the former is used to receive cryptocurrency and the latter is used to spend/send cryptocurrencies to other wallet addresses. The crypto wallet is the only means of accessing one’s digital currency. There are different types of wallets that can be used to store and access digital currency, such as online accounts, mobile apps, external hard drives, or simply paper.
Because cryptocurrency is an intangible asset with little to no paper trail, special estate planning considerations should be made to ensure that the value of these digital assets is not lost on death and can be distributed to the intended beneficiaries.
First, the cryptocurrency owned by a person should be expressly referred to in their will to ensure that their executor is aware that these digital assets exist. A testator should then provide sufficient detail for their executor to be able to locate and access the testator’s crypto wallet. Specifically, the testator should describe what type of crypto wallet they have, where it is stored, and provide any other information that may be needed to access the crypto wallet. Instead of listing this sensitive information in the will itself, which becomes part of the public record through the probate process, a testator should include it in a memorandum to their will.
Thanks for reading!
For a will in Ontario to be valid, it must meet the statutory requirements for due execution as outlined in section 4(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA”). In some cases, however, determining whether these requirements have been met is not always clear-cut. Bayford v. Boese, 2019 ONSC 5663 provides such an example.
In this case, the testator, Bruce Boese (“Bruce”), died in June of 2015. Bruce was the sole owner of a farm he inherited from his parents. He never married and did not have any children. For the past two decades prior to Bruce’s death, his friend, Brenda Bayford (“Brenda”), assisted him with the operation of the farm.
Throughout his lifetime, Bruce executed two wills: one in 1992 and another in 2013. Under the 1992 will, Bruce named his parents as his sole beneficiaries. However, since both of Bruce’s parents had pre-deceased him, his estate would pass on an intestacy to his siblings, with Brian and Rhonda each inheriting 50%. Under the 2013 will, the farm property was to be transferred to Brenda, with the residue being equally divided amongst four children of Bruce’s two siblings. Interestingly, the 2013 will had the word “DRAFT” stamped on every page. Also, there were two versions of the 2013 will: “Version 1” and “Version 2”. Version 1 contained Bruce’s signature but did not contain the signatures of any witnesses. Version 2 contained Bruce’s signatures and the signature of two witnesses, Sophie Gordon (“Sophie”) and Colleen Desarmia (“Colleen”).
After Bruce’s death, Brenda found Version 1 of the will. She brought it to the office of Bruce’s lawyer as she thought that the fully executed version of the will would be there. It was not. Shortly after, Colleen informed Brenda of the existence of Version 2. Upon hearing this, Brenda did a further search and found Version 2.
Brian asserted that the 2013 will did not comply with section 4(1) of the SLRA. His theory was that upon finding Version 1 of the will, Brenda colluded with the two witnesses to procure the 2013 will. In the alternative, Brian asserted that Bruce’s signature was forged on the 2013 will which the two witnesses signed.
Although Brian called an expert to give evidence with respect to Bruce’s signature on the wills, Justice Corthorn did not find the expert’s evidence to be helpful to Brian, nor did she find that it made the two witnesses less credible.
At trial, there were discrepancies between the evidence of the two witnesses with respect to the specific mechanics of Bruce signing the will and the witnessing of his signature. For example, Colleen testified that she believed that both she and Sophie remained standing while Bruce was seated at the kitchen table when he signed the 2013 Will. Sophie’s evidence was that she believed she was the only person standing and that both Bruce and Colleen were seated. Justice Corthorn noted, however, that “these inconsistencies [were] in keeping with the frailty of human memory, including […] the passage of time” and that they did not give her a reason to be concerned with the credibility of either witness.
Furthermore, based on the witnesses’ respective education and work experience, Justice Corthorn drew an inference that each of them had sufficient experience in completing paperwork to know that a witness to a document signs after the document is signed by the principal signatory.
Taking this into consideration, Justice Corthorn concluded that Bruce’s 2013 will was executed in accordance with s. 4(1) of the SLRA and that it was therefore valid.
While Bayford v Boese provides many noteworthy take-aways, perhaps the main one is the importance of ensuring that a will is properly executed, and that it is stored in a safe and easily accessible place that the testator’s lawyer and estate trustee(s) are aware of. Had this happened, the case could have been avoided altogether.
Thanks for reading!
Ian Hull and Celine Dookie
In today’s podcast, Paul Trudelle and Kira Domratchev discuss the British Columbia Supreme Court’s decision in Hubschi Estate (Re), 2019 BCSC 2040, and the factors considered by the Court in holding that the document found on the deceased’s computer was a Will in accordance with the curative provisions of the relevant legislation.
Should you have any questions, please email us at firstname.lastname@example.org or leave a comment on our blog.
In its recent decision, Baran v Cranston, the Divisional Court provides a helpful summary of the principles applied by the court when determining if the appointment of an Estate Trustee During Litigation (“ETDL”) is appropriate.
As a starting point, the court outlines the Superior Court of Justice’s statutory authority to appoint an ETDL. Section 28 of the Estates Act provides that an ETDL may be appointed “pending an action touching the validity of the will of a deceased person, or for obtaining, recalling or revoking any probate or grant of administration…” Additionally, Rule 75.06(3)(f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly authorizes the court to appoint an ETDL on an application or motion for directions.
The court then looked to the jurisprudence for further support that an ETDL may be appointed even where the validity of a will is not in issue. In McColl v McColl, an ETDL was appointed, notwithstanding the fact that the validity of the will was not in issue. In McColl, the court ultimately appointed an ETDL “based on the conflict and the trustee’s lack of experience in managing a business.”
In Mayer v Rubin, the court set out that the appointment of an ETDL may be required (even where the validity of the will is not in issue) where the parties’ duties as fiduciaries are inconsistent with their ongoing litigation interests. The appointment of an ETDL will also be necessary where there is a trustee who is in an adversarial position towards a co-trustee or beneficiary, and who therefore, should not be left in charge of trust property.
After having reviewed the relevant statutory provisions and jurisprudence, the Divisional Court went on to note some of the factors that will be considered by the court in determining whether or not it should exercise its discretion to appoint an ETDL:
- whether a trustee may be a witness in the litigation;
- potential for conflict of interest;
- conflict between the interests of the trustees and/or beneficiaries;
- hostility between the trustees and/or beneficiaries;
- lack of communication between the parties; and
- evidence of settlement discussions that exclude some of the parties.
The Divisional Court also approved the lower court’s summary of the legal principles factored into its decision to appoint an ETDL, which included, among others:
- the court has broad and inherent powers to supervise the management of estates, and can draw upon its inherent jurisdiction (where appropriate) to protect parties so that justice can be done in the proceeding;
- the court must ensure that there is a level playing field between the parties, and the assets of the estate must be immunized from the tactics employed by litigating parties; and
- the appointment of an ETDL is not an extraordinary measure and the court should refuse the appointment only in the clearest of cases. The appointment of an ETDL will be “favoured by the court in the majority of cases of conflict between the trustee and beneficiaries unless the administration of the estate is particularly simple or straightforward.”
Thanks for reading!
In a recent Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision, the Court considered certain extrinsic circumstances surrounding the making of the Will, as well as the reading of the Will as a whole, in reaching a decision regarding its interpretation.
In Love v Wheeler 2019 ONSC 4427, a spouse of a deceased beneficiary sought a declaration that a beneficiary’s estate was entitled under a testator’s Will to an undivided half-interest in property and that the other beneficiary wrongfully appropriated it.
Frances Irene Wheeler died in 2012. She bequeathed a parcel of land to her two sons, Harold William Wheeler and Martin Douglas Wheeler. Her Will stated that this property was to go to Harold and Martin “jointly or the survivor of them”.
The Court grappled with the question of whether Frances meant to leave the property to Harold and Martin as joint tenants or as tenants in common. Certainly, in a joint tenancy, there would be a significant benefit to the survivor of the two brothers, as the other half interest would pass on a right of survivorship, rather than form a part of the deceased brother’s estate.
This is exactly what happened in this case. Martin died in 2015 and in April, 2017, Harold had the title to the property transferred into his own name, on the argument that it was owned by him and Martin, as joint tenants.
Deborah Love, Martin’s common-law spouse of 16 years, commenced an application before the Court, as against Harold. One of the grounds for Deborah’s position was that the extrinsic evidence surrounding the making of the Will, including a prior Will of February, 2009, supports a finding that Frances intended her sons to inherit the property as tenants in common.
The Court’s Decision
In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized its role in giving effect to the testamentary intention of the testator, as expressed in a Will. Justice Chozik gave consideration to the “armchair” rule, which requires a judge to place him or herself in the position of the testator at the time when the last Will was made, and to consider and weigh the circumstances which then existed and which might reasonably be expected to influence the testator in the disposition of her property.
Justice Chozik found that Frances intended to leave the property in question to her sons, as tenants in common. This intention was held to be clear from the Will when it is read as a whole, taking into account some of the extrinsic circumstances surrounding the making of the Will.
This decision certainly emphasizes how important it is that the Will clearly stipulates the terms of each bequest, particularly when it comes to large assets, such as real property.
Thanks for reading!
Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:
In today’s podcast, Stuart Clark and Doreen So discuss the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Donaldson v. Braybrook, 2020 ONCA 66, and what to consider when the ownership of a family cottage was changed to include the children.
Should you have any questions, please email us at email@example.com or leave a comment on our blog.
Goss Estate (Re), 2020 ABQB 121 (CanLII) is the most recent case to discuss the applicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
As stated in the case, “Cases involving the Rules Against Perpetuities are rare, however the Rule is alive and well in Alberta…”.
The case notes, dramatically, that the common law doctrine limits “the grasp of the dead hand … on the hand of the living.”
Simply put, the Rule provides that “No interest is good unless it must vest; if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”
In Goss Estate, the Rule was applied and the trust created by the testator was found to be invalid. There, the deceased left a will that provided that the residue of the estate was to “be retained in trust for future generations of children and grandchildren”, with only the interest on the capital to be paid out. There was no ultimate residual beneficiary named.
Although Alberta has a “wait and see” rule that provides that if an interest may vest during the period, the trust is not necessarily invalid, such a provision did not apply in Goss as the court found that the interest was incapable of vesting within the perpetuity period.
In conclusion, the court found that the trust was invalid. As there were no named residual beneficiary, the estate passed on an intestacy, to the testator’s two children. With respect to the trust that was intended, “While [the testator] had somewhat noble ideas about how to deal with his estate, perpetual trusts have been unenforceable since 1682”.
For other blogs on the Rule Against Perpetuities, see Stuart Clark’s blog, Rule Against Perpetuities – It’s not so scary, and my blogs, Property Rights and the Rule Against Perpetuities and Hollywood, and the Rule Against Perpetuities.
As always, thank you for reading.