Category: Support After Death

30 Aug

Dependants and Insolvent Estates

Stuart Clark Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

We have previously blogged at length about the broad discretionary powers of the court to award support for dependants after death under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act. Although support applications are most often commenced in circumstances where the insufficient support was caused directly by the estate planning of the deceased individual (or lack thereof), a support application can also be a useful tool where, as a result of the deceased’s debts and liabilities at the time of death, the deceased’s estate is insolvent such that the bequests in the Will may not be carried out.

Section 2(3) of Ontario’s Creditors’ Relief Act provides:

“A support or maintenance order has the following priority over other judgment debts, other than debts owing to the Crown in right of Canada, regardless of when an enforcement process is issued or served:

  1. If the maintenance or support order requires periodic payments, the order has priority to the extent of all arrears owing under the order at the time of seizure or attachment.
  2. If the support or maintenance order requires the payment of a lump sum, the order has priority to the extent of any portion of the lump sum that has not been paid.”

Simply put, the payment of a support order, including those under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, is paid in priority to all other judgment debts other than those owed to the “Crown in right of Canada” (i.e. taxes).

Generally speaking a deceased’s debts and liabilities are paid in priority to all distributions to beneficiaries, such that where these liabilities are significant there could be little to no funds remaining to pay the beneficiaries after the debts are paid. As a result of the priority of support orders over other judgment debts, it could be advantageous for a surviving spouse or next of kin when faced with an insolvent estate to commence an Application for support as a dependant. If the individual is confirmed as a dependant the payment of their support Order would take priority over any other judgment debts, potentially resulting in a situation where the dependant receives a benefit from the estate where such a benefit otherwise would not materialize had they waited for their bequest under the Will or intestacy.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

03 Aug

Dependant’s support – notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary

Sydney Osmar Estate & Trust, Litigation, Support After Death Tags: , 0 Comments

Last week, Jonathon Kappy and I podcasted on the recent decision out of the Superior Court of Justice, Virey v Virey, 2021 ONSC 2893.

In this decision, The Honourable Madam Justice Dietrich tackled the question of whether an Estate should have an ongoing obligation to support a dependant, even where the dependant had entered into an agreement, which the Estate Trustee argued, released the Estate from any ongoing support obligations.

In Virey v Virey, at the time of the Application, the Applicant was 94 years old. The Applicant had been married to the deceased for 42 years, together having 9 children. However, the Applicant and the Deceased divorced in 1994. The Deceased died with a Will dated December 9, 2018 – neither the Applicant, nor any of their children, were named as beneficiaries of the Will. Instead, the Deceased’s spouse, the Respondent, was named sole beneficiary and Estate Trustee.

At the time of the divorce, the Applicant was 67. The Minutes of Settlement and the Divorce Judgment (based off of the Minutes of Settlement), set out that the Deceased was to pay three lump sum installments, along with monthly child and spousal support. The Minutes of Settlement set out that the monthly spousal support was final and not subject to variation, and, included a release with respect to support pursuant to the Family Law Act, the Divorce Act, pursuant to the common law, or otherwise.

At the time of death, the Deceased was survived by 7 of his 9 children, the Respondent and the Applicant. He had no debts, owned real property valued at approximately $923,000 and liquid assets of approximately $972,000. The Applicant had no significant savings, with her primary income comprised of OAS and CPP benefits.

While the Respondent argued that the Minutes of Settlement fully released the Estate from any ongoing obligation to support the Applicant, the Court reached a different determination.

As a starting point, the Court turned to section 63(4) of the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”), which sets out that the court has the discretion to make an award for support “despite any agreement to the contrary”. Relying on this sub-section, the Court held that the Minutes of Settlement and the Divorce Judgment, while relevant documents to factor into the analysis, were not determinative and did not oust the Court’s jurisdiction.

As part of its analysis, the Court looked to the decision in Butts v Butts Estate, where the court held that “s. 63(4) gives the court a broad judicial discretion to award support to a dependant, as defined in s. 57, notwithstanding the existence of any prior agreement or waiver. The language of s. 63(4) could not be broader or clearer in its purpose and is obviously aimed at achieving justice and equity at the date of the hearing, notwithstanding what the parties have agreed to earlier on”. Therefore, the Court in Virey concluded that even if the Deceased’s legal obligation ended on his death, the Court is not precluded from ordering support payable by the Estate under the SLRA, as support may ultimately be ordered to achieve equity.

In turning to the analysis regarding quantum required by the SLRA, and the factors provided for at section 62(1), the Court considered Cummings v Cummings, finding that while the SLRA provides a remedy akin to spousal support, unlike spousal support which is determined on the payor’s means and the recipient’s needs, with regard to dependant’s support, the Court must consider not only the Applicant’s needs but also the legal, moral and ethical claims.

In conducting this analysis the Court further considered the fact that at the time of the Minutes of Settlement and the Divorce Judgment (i.e. 1994) societal values regarding quantum and term of support were different than those of today – in 1994, the prevailing view was that on the termination of marriage, the dependant spouse was to be maintained, and nothing more. This is in contrast to the prevailing view today, which is that spouses are entitled to not only proper support, but also a share in each other’s estates when the marriage is over.

In light of the above analysis, the Court ultimately ordered the Estate to pay monthly support to the Applicant for the remainder of her life.

For more on this decision, please see here to listen to last week’s podcast.

For more on dependant support, please see the below blogs:

Dependant Support – Quantum of Support

Dependant’s and Their Entitlement to a Deceased’s Estate

Thanks for reading!

Sydney Osmar

13 Jul

British Columbia & Wills Variation: Who is Entitled to Dependant’s Support?

Rebecca Rauws Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

In Ontario, the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 allows a deceased person’s dependants, to whom the deceased has not made adequate provision for his or her proper support, to seek an order for support to be made to the dependant out of the deceased’s estate. In order to qualify as a “dependant”, a person must be a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the deceased “to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death.” There are therefore several conditions for a person to be able to obtain an order for dependant’s support:

  1. they must have one of the required relationships with the deceased (spouse, parent, child, or sibling);
  2. the deceased must have been providing them with support, or have a legal obligation to provide support, immediately before the deceased’s death; and
  3. any provision made for the person in the deceased’s Will (if any) must be inadequate.

British Columbia deals with dependant’s support differently than Ontario. In B.C.’s Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c 13, s. 60 provides that if a testator does not make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of his or her spouse or children in his or her Will, the court may order the provision that it thinks adequate, just, and equitable in the circumstances for the spouse or children out of the testator’s estate. Unlike the Ontario law, it is not a requirement that the testator had been providing support to his or her spouse or children prior to death. This difference is significant because in Ontario, independent adult children are typically not able to obtain dependant’s relief as they do not meet the requirements of a “dependant”. In BC case law, there is also a greater emphasis on a testator’s moral duty to his or her dependant’s than there is in Ontario.

The BC Supreme Court decision in Jung v Poole Estate, 2021 BCSC 623 provides an example of how the difference in the law in Ontario vs. B.C. can result in vastly different outcomes.  In Jung v Poole, the testator was survived by his two twin daughters, Courtney and Chelsea. Courtney and Chelsea’s mother had been dating the testator when she became pregnant. The testator suggested an abortion but the mother chose to keep the twins, and raised them as a single mother without any involvement or financial assistance from the testator. The mother died when the twins were 4 years old, and a custody battle ensued between the testator and the twins’ grandmother on their mother’s side, on the one hand, and a couple who were friends of the mother’s and whom the mother had named in her Will to be the twins’ joint guardians, on the other hand. The testator expressed a desire to be involved in raising the twins at that time.

Ultimately, the court determined that the couple chosen by the mother to be the twins’ guardians would become the twins’ custodial parents. The testator and the grandmother were allowed specific and generous parenting time, access, and consultations regarding major areas of the twins’ lives. However, the testator never exercised any of these rights and, with the exception of one attempt to contact the twins the year after the custody decision, ceased to have any involvement in their lives.

The testator executed two Wills after the custody decision, both of which disinherited the twins. In one Will the testator referred to the twins as his illegitimate children, and in the other he explained that one of his reasons for disinheriting them was that they had not made efforts to contact him.

As stated by the court, if the court concludes that the testator owed a moral obligation to the twins and did not make adequate provision for their proper maintenance and support, the court has the authority to vary the testator’s Will to make the provision for them that, in its view, is adequate, just and equitable in the circumstances.

The court did ultimately conclude that the testator abandoned the twins from the outset, as well as after the custody battle, and had a strong moral obligation to them, which he failed to meet during his lifetime. As a result, the court varied the testator’s Will to provide 35% to each of Courtney and Chelsea, and 15% to each of the two friends of the testator who had been named as estate trustees and sole beneficiaries of his estate. The court was of the view that the testator had blamed the twins for the decision in the custody battle, even though that was beyond the twins’ control, and also blamed them for the lack of relationship, notwithstanding what the court found were valid and rational reasons given by the twins in this regard (including that they were hurt that the testator had wanted their mother to abort them, and the testator’s actions during their lives made it clear to them that he did not want them in his life).

It is unlikely that the same decision would have been reached had this situation occurred in Ontario. The fact that the twins were independent adults, and that the testator had not been providing them with support, nor under a legal obligation to provide them with support, immediately before his death, would likely have resulted in a decision that the twins were not entitled to support, regardless of the unfortunate circumstances between the twins and the testator.

Thanks for reading,

Rebecca Rauws

 

These other blog posts and podcast episodes may also be of interest:

10 Jun

Dependants and Their Entitlement to a Deceased’s Estate – A summary of Earl v. McAllister, 2021 ONSC 4050

Sanaya Mistry Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Litigation, Pension Benefits, Support After Death Tags: , , , 0 Comments

In the recent decision of Earl v. McAllister, 2021 ONSC 4050, the Divisional Court ordered 100% of the net estate of the Deceased to be used for the benefit of the minor dependants, to the exclusion of the Deceased’s wife.

Leo McAllister (the “Deceased”) died on May 3, 2017. He is survived by his wife (Barbara McAllister) and his two minor sons (the “Sons”) from a previous relationship with Tammy Earl. When the Deceased learned he was dying, he started to put his affairs in order, including executing a Will and leaving his estate (the “Estate”) to his wife and signing consents required to transfer the designed beneficiaries on one of his pensions from Ms. McAllister to his Sons.

Ms. Earl brought an application on behalf of her Sons, for their support, pursuant to Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act. The Applicant argued that for the purposes of this application, the value of two pensions and a life insurance policy should be included in the value of the Estate of the Deceased, failing which, the Estate would have a shortfall of $12,926.82 due to the Estate’s liabilities. She also argued that the entirety of the Estate should be used for the benefit of her Sons, as they are both dependants of the Deceased.

The Application Judge agreed that one of the pensions and the life insurance proceeds should be included in the value of the Estate, valuing it at $167,062.52. The Application Judge ordered the net value of the Estate to be split in two halves, one to be used for the benefit of the Sons and one to be distributed to Ms. McAllister. The Application Judge also ordered $30,000 of the Sons’ half to be paid into Court, to be paid to the Sons when they turn 18.

Ms. Earl appealed this decision, arguing that both pensions should be included in the value of the Estate, the entirety of the Estate should be used for the benefit of her Sons and that the $30,000 which the Application Judge ordered to be paid into court should now be paid out to the Appellant, for the benefit of the Sons.

For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the Divisional Court’s decision in respect of the whether to include both pensions in the value of the Estate and the manner in which the Estate is to be distributed.

Pensions

The Deceased had  two pension plans. The first was from the Union’s Province of Ontario Pension Plan, the value of which was included in the Estate by the Application Judge. The second was the Union’s “Canada” Pension Plan (administered in the US), which provided for a pre-retirement surviving spouse benefit under which the Respondent, as a surviving spouse, was entitled to a lump sum payment of $88,117.40.

The Divisional Court found that it was not open to the Deceased to designate someone other than his spouse to receive the pre-retirement benefit under the second pension and while the Respondent could have waived her entitlement to the receipt of that benefit, she could not be deprived of that benefit without her agreement.

As a result, the second pension was not included in the value of the Estate.

 

Distribution of the Net Value of The Estate

The Divisional Court found that in determining the issues between the parties, the needs of the Sons in the balancing exercise should be paramount. The court weighed the financial circumstances of the Sons against the financial circumstances of the Respondent.

Particularly, the court noted that the Sons live in precarious financial circumstances and there is very little income to support them apart from public finances and loans. The Sons live in the home of their mother’s parents. The appellant’s affidavit contained information concerning monthly expenses and the loss of the Deceased’s group health benefits. The Applicant’s evidence was that her yearly expenses exceed her income. Further, the Deceased was active in his Sons’ lives and paid the Appellant $300 per week to support his Sons until his death.

In contrast, the Respondent was not financially dependant on the Deceased, had good income of approximately $100,000 annually, had no extraordinary expenses, owned a home (although with a mortgage) and had made some provisions for her own pension. The Respondent and the Deceased had been married for just over two years at the time of death. The Respondent was also to continue to receive the benefits from the second pension.

The Divisional Court cited  Madore-Ogilvie v Ogilvie Estate (2008), 88 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), noting the following:

“Where there are insufficient assets to adequately provide for any or all of a deceased’s dependants, the circumstances of the case may warrant the exercise of an application judge’s discretion to use the limited assets for the benefit only of the minor dependants, to the exclusion of his wife.”

The Divisional Court concluded that in the present case, the circumstances warranted the use of the limited assets for the benefit of the Sons only, to the exclusion of the Respondent.

Thank you for reading.

Sanaya Mistry

15 Mar

Model Orders for the Estates List in the Toronto Region!  

Sanaya Mistry Capacity, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Guardianship, Litigation, Passing of Accounts, Power of Attorney, Support After Death, Trustees, Wills Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

The Consolidated Practice Direction Concerning the Estates List in the Toronto Region was established for the hearing of certain proceedings involving estate, trust and capacity law, applying to matters on the Estates List in the Toronto Region.

As of March 9, 2021, Part VII (Contested Matters – Estates) of this practice direction was amended to make reference to model orders prepared by the Estate List Users’ Committee.

Generally, parties are expected to take the time and care to prepare proposed orders giving directions for consideration by the court. If the parties are unable to agree upon an order giving directions and a contested motion for directions is required, each party must file a copy of the draft order giving directions it is seeking with its motion materials.

 

In addition to providing requirements for what orders giving directions should address, where applicable, this practice direction now includes the following model orders:

  1. Order Giving Directions – Appointment of Section 3 Counsel
  2. Order Giving Directions – Power of Attorney/Guardianship Disputes
  3. Order Giving Directions – Will Challenge
  4. Order Giving Directions – Dependant’s Support
  5. Order Giving Directions – Passing of Accounts

 

As noted in the practice direction, the preparation of draft orders for consideration by the court will greatly expedite the issuance of orders.  Where the relevant model orders have been approved by the Estate List Users’ Committee, a copy of the draft order showing all variations sought from the model order must be filed.

The addition of model orders can greatly benefit the Estates List in the Toronto Region. Among other things, these model orders provide a baseline for all parties, such that it can significantly reduce drafting time and potential disagreements on wording among parties, which in turn can increase efficiency and reduce costs.

Many thanks to the Estate List Users’ Committee for their time and efforts in preparing these model orders!

Thank you for reading.

 

Sanaya Mistry

08 Mar

Dying with a Double Life and Secret Wife

Arielle Di Iulio Common Law Spouses, Estate Litigation, Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

Living a double life can be complicated. A double life that involves a secret second family can be especially complicated, both during the deceiver’s life and after their death. How is the deceiver’s estate to be divided as between his first family and his secret second family? What rights does the unmarried secret spouse in particular have in the deceased’s estate? The Supreme Court of British Columbia addresses these issues in its recent decision of Boughton v Widner Estate, 2021 BCSC 325.

Boughton concerns the Estate of Michael Gregory Widern. Michael was a known member of the infamous Hells Angels and died on March 9, 2017 by homicide. Michael left behind his married spouse, Sabrina, and their two children. He also left behind Sara – whom he had been seeing for roughly eight years unbeknownst to his wife – and their two children. While Michael was alive he spent time with both of his families, alternating between the two households. Sabrina had no knowledge of Michael’s second family until after he passed away.

Michael died without a last will and testament, leaving his estate to be distributed in accordance with the intestacy provisions set out in British Columbia’s Wills, Estates and Successions Act (“WESA”). In Boughton, Sara brought a claim against Michael’s estate seeking, amongst other things, a declaration that she is a spouse of Michael for the purposes of the WESA and is consequently entitled to a share of his estate. As such, one of the issues to be dealt with by the court was whether the WESA permits the division of an estate as between two individuals who were in concurrent, subsisting spousal relationships with the deceased at the time of death.

The honourable Justice Jennifer Duncan declared that Sara was a spouse for the purposes of the WESA. Section 2 of the WESA provides that two persons are spouses of each other if immediately before the deceased person’s death they were married to each other or they had lived together in a marriage-like relationship for at least two years. Justice Duncan found that on his death, Michael was still married to Sabrina and was also in a marriage-like relationship with Sara. Section 22 of the WESA states that if two or more persons are entitled to a spousal share of an intestate estate, they share the spousal share in the portions to which they agree or as determined by the court. Justice Duncan reasoned that this section clearly provides for more than one spousal share in the estate of an intestate. She also analyzed the legislative intent of section 22 and found that the intention of the Legislature was to continue to provide for individuals in a marriage-like relationship with an individual who was still married to someone else at the time of death. On this basis, Justice Duncan held that Sara was entitled to a declaration that she is a spouse of Michael as that term is defined in the WESA. It was further ordered that Sara and Sabrina were each entitled to half of Michael’s estate.

If this case were decided under Ontario law we would likely see a different result. Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”) has no provision equivalent to section 22 of the WESA which recognizes a “spousal share” in an intestate estate for someone other than the deceased’s married spouse. For purposes of intestate succession in Ontario, “spouse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Family Law Act (“FLA”), which is in essence a married person. It follows that an unmarried secret spouse would likely have no statutory entitlement to share in their deceased spouse’s estate. However, a secret spouse in Ontario could potentially claim an interest in their spouse’s estate pursuant to the dependent support provisions contained in Part V of the SLRA. In Part V, “spouse” has the same meaning as in section 29 of the FLA, which defines “spouse” more broadly as including persons not married to each other and have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years, or have children together and are in a relationship of some permanence. If a secret spouse meets this definition, they may still have a right to a portion of their deceased spouse’s estate by way of a dependent support claim.

Thanks for reading!

Arielle Di Iulio

08 Feb

Dependant Support – Automatic stay on distributions from the estate

Stuart Clark Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

The commencement of an Application for support as a dependant under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA”) can be an extremely stressful event for the Applicant. Not only is the Applicant likely commencing court proceedings against fellow family members and/or close friends of the deceased, but there may also be a sense of urgency to the Application to ensure that steps are taken before the estate has otherwise been administered and/or distributed to those who would be entitled to the estate but for the support Application. As a result of these concerns it is not uncommon for the Applicant in the early stages of the Application to seek some form of court intervention to stop and/or stay the administration of the estate until the Application has been adjudicated, thereby ensuring that there are assets remaining in the estate to satisfy any support award should it ultimately be made. But is such court intervention actually necessary?

Under section 67 of the SLRA, once an Estate Trustee has been served with an Application for support under Part V they are automatically required to cease all distributions from the estate unless certain conditions are met. Specifically, section 67(1) provides:

Where an application is made and notice thereof is served on the personal representative of the deceased, he or she shall not, after service of the notice upon him or her, unless all persons entitled to apply consent or the court otherwise orders, proceed with the distribution of the estate until the court has disposed of the application.

Section 67(3) provides that any Estate Trustee that makes a distribution in violation of section 67(1) once they have been served with an Application under Part V of the SLRA is personally liable to pay any shortfall should a support order ultimately be made. As a result, any distribution made by the Estate Trustee once an Application for support has been commenced would be at great potential personal liability, as they could personally be required to pay any support order.

Although section 67 of the SLRA automatically stops any external distributions being made once an Application for support has been commenced, it does not stop the internal administration of the estate itself. As a result, the Estate Trustee would, for example, still be at liberty to collect and/or liquidate any estate assets, including any real estate. They just could not distribute those funds to the beneficiaries once the assets had been liquidated. In the event the Applicant should seek a particular asset as part of their support order, such as the transfer and/or use of particular real property, additional steps would need to be taken by the Applicant to ensure that the Estate Trustee did not dispose of the asset while the Application remained before the court. These additional steps would likely be in the form of an order under section 59 of the SLRA, while allows the court to issue an order “suspending” the administration of the estate either in whole or in relation to a particular asset (i.e. the real estate) for such time as the court may decide.

Thank you for reading.

Stuart Clark

24 Nov

A Perceived Gap in Alberta’s Succession Law

Kira Domratchev Estate Litigation, Support After Death Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

I came across an interesting report on Alberta’s succession law and what is perceived as a gap that has affected family maintenance and support in the province. The report was published by the Alberta Law Reform Institute (ALRI) and can be found here.

In accordance with the Family Law Act in Alberta, a child can apply for and may be entitled to support from a person standing in the place of a parent, when a couple separates. Under the Wills and Succession Act, however, which applies when a person dies, there is no provision addressing the distinction of a “person standing in the place of a parent”. What that means is that while a person who is characterized as a “person standing in the place of a parent” is alive, the child can apply for support under the Family Law Act but if this person dies, that same child has no ability to seek support from the Estate of this person “standing in the place of a parent”.

Consequently, the ALRI is of the view that there is a gap in the law that ought to be rectified on the basis of an equality argument, alone. This report was apparently recently sent to the province of Alberta but there has been no response, as of yet.

In comparing the provisions of the Succession Law Reform Act here in Ontario, it appears that the very issue raised by the ALRI is addressed by section 57(1) where the definition of a “child” includes a grandchild and a person whom the deceased has demonstrated a settled intention to treat as a child of his or her family, except under an arrangement where a child is placed for valuable consideration in a foster home by a person having lawful custody.” [emphasis added]

Certainly, it is important that children be able to bring a support claim against the estates of their parents, where not appropriately provided for out of the estate, even where not formally adopted but clearly treated as a child.

It will be interesting to see what happens and what the province of Alberta will do, if anything, in response to this report from the ALRI.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

Perils in the Succession of the Family Cottage

B.C.’s Wills, Estates and Succession Act: Claims May be Pursued by Beneficiaries

Testing the waters of Section 72(1)(d) of the Succession Law Reform Act

07 Jul

Dependant Support – Quantum of Support

Stuart Clark Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Yesterday I blogged about the recent Deleon v. Estate of Raymond DeRanney (“Deleon“) decision wherein an individual who was not the Deceased’s biological or adopted child was declared to be a dependant “child” of the Deceased in accordance with Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“) due to the Deceased having shown a “settled intention” to treat the Applicant as their child during their lifetime. Although my blog from yesterday went into some of the detail of what the court considered when determining that the Applicant was in fact a “child” of the Deceased who was entitled to support, it did not get into the quantum of support that the Applicant was entitled to receive as a “dependant child”.

The factors that the court is to consider in determining the quantum of support for a dependant are established by section 62 of the SLRA, and include:

  • the dependant’s current assets and means;
  • the assets and means that the dependant is likely to have in the future;
  • the dependant’s capacity to contribute to his or her support;
  • the proximity and duration of the dependant’s relationship with the deceased; and
  • the dependant’s needs, in determining which the court shall have regard to the dependant’s accustomed standard of living.

In Deleon the Deceased died intestate with one biological child leaving an estate valued at approximately $1.5 million, which under normal circumstances would be distributed solely to the biological child on an intestacy. Upon being declared a dependant “child” of the Deceased in accordance with Part V of the SLRA, the Applicant attempted to argue that she should equally share the Deceased’s estate with the biological child akin to if she was a biological child of the Deceased on an intestacy, an argument which, if accepted, would result in the Applicant receiving approximately $750,000 from the Deceased’s estate.

In support of her position that she should be entitled to receive 50% of the Deceased’s estate in support, the Applicant cites to Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, in which the court confirms that it can consider “moral” obligations and what is “adequate, just and equitable” under the circumstances when determining the quantum of support, and that the court is not necessarily limited to the factors delineated in section 62 of the SLRA. The Applicant also pointed to the accustomed standard of living which she had enjoyed while previously living with the Deceased.

Upon reviewing the jurisprudence in reference to the Applicant’s circumstances, Madam Justice Dietrich ultimately determines that the appropriate sum of support to be paid to the Applicant is the lump sum of $40,955, with such an amount being justified as being enough to get the Applicant through the remainder of her University degree, with the Applicant being required to be independent thereafter. Such an amount is of course notably less than the approximate $750,000 sought by the Applicant in the Application.

The Deleon case provides an excellent reminder that just because you are a “dependant” of the Deceased it does not necessarily follow that you will receive a significant sum in any support payment, as the court will consider your specific circumstances when setting the quantum of support.

Thank you for reading and stay safe and healthy.

Stuart Clark

06 Jul

Dependant Support – Can someone who is not your biological/adopted child be a dependant child?

Stuart Clark Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

The average “family unit” (if such a thing ever truly existed) is becoming harder to define in 2020. With the rise of concepts such as “co-parenting“, as well as the growing ubiquity of step-parents from second (or third, or fourth) marriages, the expectations and reality associated with the parent/child relationship is evolving. Although such an evolution is almost certainly predominantly for the better, it can create some unique complications should one of the “parents” die unexpectedly, particularly should they die without a Will. Such a scenario is exactly what was recently before the court in Deleon v. Estate of Raymond DeRanney (“Deleon“).

In Deleon, the Deceased died intestate with no married spouse and one biological child, such that the entirety of their estate would under normal circumstances be distributed to their biological child. The Applicant, who was not the Deceased’s biological child but was rather the child of the Deceased’s ex-girlfriend from approximately 20 years prior, commenced an Application for support under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA“) alleging that the Deceased had treated her as his “child” and had provided her with support during his lifetime. In support of such a claim, the Applicant cited to the fact that the Deceased had allowed her and her mother to reside with him for several years prior to his death even though the Deceased and her mother were no longer romantically involved, and that, although she was not residing with him at the time of his death, the Deceased was subsidizing her rent to the tune of approximately $500 per month. She also cited to the fact that the Deceased had historically paid for things such as the Applicant’s extra-curricular activities, summer school, groceries and vacations throughout the Applicant’s childhood, and had encouraged her to attend University which she was in the process of attending.

The definition of “child” within Part V of the SLRA includes someone who the deceased individual had a “settled intention” to treat as their child. As a result, if an individual can show that a deceased individual had a “settled intention” to treat them as their child, and the individual otherwise meets the remainder of the factors required to be a “dependant” of the deceased, the individual can receive support as a dependant child notwithstanding that they are not biologically related to or legally adopted by the deceased.

In considering whether the Applicant met such a “settled intention” definition in Deleon, Madam Justice Dietrich considers the factors delineated in Hyatt v. Ralph, which include:

  • did the “parents” pool their income into a joint account?
  • did the “parents” pay the expenses for all children out of this same account?
  • did the child in question refer to the man as “daddy” or the woman as “mommy”?
  • did the “parents” refer to themselves as “mommy” and “daddy”?
  • did the “parents” share the task of disciplining the child?
  • did the child participate in the extended family in the same was as a biological child?
  • was there a change in surname?
  • did the “parent” express to the child, the family and the world, either implicitly or explicitly, that he or she is responsible as a parent to the child?

Perhaps interestingly in the Deleon decision, although Madam Justice Dietrich found that the relationship between the Deceased and the Applicant did not generally meet any of the factors to be considered from Hyatt v. Ralph (the Applicant referred to the Deceased as “Uncle Raymond” who undoubtedly spoiled her but did not necessarily fulfill the “typical” parental role), Madam Justice Dietrich nonetheless found that the Deceased’s conduct in relation to the Applicant demonstrated a “settled intention” on the part of the Deceased to treat the Applicant as a “child”, and that as the Applicant otherwise would receive nothing from the Deceased’s estate on an intestacy she was entitled to support from the Deceased’s estate as the Deceased’s dependant “child”. In coming to such a conclusion Madam Justice Dietrich states:

In my view, [the Deceased’s] support of [the Applicant] in these ways rises above affection and generosity. Despite the atypical family relationships between [the Deceased, the Applicant’s mother, the Deceased’s biological child, and the Applicant], [the Deceased’s] support of [the Applicant] demonstrates his settled intention to treat her as a member of his unconventional family. I find that [the Applicant] is therefore a dependant for the purposes of the SLRA.”

Thank you for reading and stay safe and healthy.

Stuart Clark

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