Category: Litigation

22 Apr

Ante-Mortem Probate: What’s That All About?

Kira Domratchev Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, General Interest, Litigation, Wills Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Ante-Mortem Probate, or Pre-Death Probate, is a process of probate which validates the Will of a testator during his or her lifetime and may be particularly useful for testators who fear that their Will may be subject to a challenge following their death.

Various models of Ante-Mortem Probate have been explored in the past by American scholars and include the following proposed models:

  • The “Contest Model”, reviewed by Professor Howard Fink, is where each of the beneficiaries are identified, including those that would benefit on an intestacy and the testator essentially becomes the moving party in his or her own suit against all possible beneficiaries of his or her Estate. [Antemortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life After Death? (1976) 37 Ohio St LJ 264]

 

  • The “Conservatorship Model”, explored by Professor John H. Langbein, is where the testator is required to apply to the Court in a manner similar to the “Contest Model”, however, instead of each of the specific beneficiaries being involved, a Guardian Ad Litem (Conservator) represents the interest of all potential beneficiaries, including any unborn or unascertained beneficiaries. [Living Probate: the Conservatorship Model (1980)]

 

  • The “Administrative Model”, set out by Professor Gregory S. Alexander and Albert M. Pearson is neither judicial nor adversarial. There is no requirement of notice to the beneficiaries or in fact “interested parties” as one of the significant concerns with the other models of Ante-Mortem Probate is the confidentiality of the testator. [Alternative Models of Antemortem Probate and Procedural Process Limitations on Succession (1979-1980) 78 Mich L Rev 89]

Only certain American States allow Ante-Mortem Probate, whereas Canada does not have any provinces or territories with a similar arrangement.

Given the number of suits that are commenced following the death of testators across Canada, such an arrangement could be beneficial in that at the very least, a testator who expects that there will be a challenge to his or her Estate plan could take an active part in adjudicating whether his or her Will is indeed, valid.

Considering the complicated familial arrangements that are often present in our society today, perhaps addressing challenges of things like capacity of the testator, undue influence or the presence of suspicious circumstances would make more sense before the testator’s death. This is particularly an issue where a testator’s capacity had been in question for a while and the Will being challenged was executed a decade or more before death.

There are, of course, certain potential negative effects of any Ante-Mortem Probate regime, particularly the possibility that it would encourage litigation that would not otherwise arise, following the death of the testator.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

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Probate and Wills: What About Electronic Wills?

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18 Apr

A Question of Fact: Will Challenges and Mistaken Belief

Garrett Horrocks Capacity, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, General Interest, Litigation Tags: , 0 Comments

A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered an interesting question of fact and law.  Will challenges in Ontario are ordinarily grounded on the basis that a testator lacked testamentary capacity, did not know and approve of the contents, or that the Will was procured by undue influence.  In Cavanagh et al v Sutherland et al, however, the applicant sought to challenge the validity of her mother’s will on novel grounds; namely, that it was procured as a result of a mistake of fact.

The testator died in July 2016, leaving a Will benefiting 5 of her 6 daughters.  The Will expressly excluded her sixth daughter, Carolynn, from sharing in the Estate.  Carolynn objected to the issuance of a certificate of appointment on the basis that her mother lacked capacity or that the Will was procured by undue influence.

The estate trustees brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order dismissing Carolynn’s objection and a declaration that the Will was their mother’s valid Last Will and Testament.  At the hearing of the motion, Carolynn changed her position and chose instead to focus primarily on her belief that her mother had been operating on a set of mistaken facts.

Carolynn referred to a payment of $65,000 made to her by her parents in or about 2011, prior to the execution of an earlier will that also excluded Carolynn.  She took the position that this payment was made in satisfaction of a loan to her father years earlier that her mother knew nothing about.  Carolynn argued that her mother likely believed this payment was a gift to Carolynn in lieu of her inheritance and, accordingly, left her no benefit under the Will.

The court found that the evidence held otherwise.  Notably, the evidence showed that the payment was not made in satisfaction of a loan, but rather as a result of a demand by Carolynn.  In 1996, her parents had agreed to place her on title to a property to assist them in obtaining a mortgage.  The mortgage was subsequently paid off in 2011, at which point Carolynn’s parents asked that she transfer her interest in the property back to them.

The evidence showed that Carolynn refused, instead asserting that there was always an intention that she remain on title to the property as legal owner.  Carolynn’s parents ultimately offered to buy out her interest in the property in exchange for a payment of $65,000.  Her mother later advised the lawyer who prepared the Will that this was to constitute Carolynn’s inheritance.  It was clear to the court that the testator had considered this payment when the Will was drafted.

In the end, the evidence was such the court did not have to consider the effect of a true mistake of fact on the validity of a Will.  However, the question of a mistake of fact would ordinarily tie into knowledge and approval and, specifically, whether the mistake was sufficient to negate the validity of the Will.  In this case, it was apparent that the testator had turned her mind to the payment to Carolynn, and there was no question of a lack of knowledge and approval.

Thanks for reading.

Garrett Horrocks

21 Mar

Admissibility of Medical Records

Nick Esterbauer Capacity, Estate & Trust, Health / Medical, Litigation, Wills Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Medical records are frequently key evidence in estate disputes.  Often, a testamentary document or inter vivos transaction is challenged on the basis that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity or the mental capacity to make a valid gift.

The British Columbia Supreme Court recently reviewed the issue of admissibility of medical records within the context of a will challenge.  The parties propounding the last will asserted that the deceased’s medical records were inadmissible on the basis that (1) the parties challenging the will were attempting to admit the records for the truth of their contents, (2) the records included third party statements from family members, which was suggested to constitute double hearsay evidence, and (3) the records were entirely inadmissible because they were not relevant, none of them being within weeks of the date of execution of the challenged will.

In Re Singh Estate, 2019 BCSC 272, the estate trustees named in the deceased’s will executed in 2013 only learned of the existence of a subsequent will executed in 2016 after they provided notice to the beneficiaries of the estate that they intended to apply for probate in respect of the 2013 will.  The 2016 will disinherited two of the deceased’s eight children (including one of the two adult children named as estate trustee in the 2013 will) on the basis that they had received “their share” in their mother’s estate from the predeceasing husband’s estate.  Between the dates of execution of the 2013 and 2016 wills, the deceased had suffered a bad fall and allegedly experienced delusions and had otherwise become forgetful and confused.

At trial, medical records are typically admitted under the business records exemption of the Evidence Act (in Ontario, section 35).  Justice MacDonald acknowledged this general treatment of medical evidence, citing the Supreme Court of Canada (at para 48):

While clinical records are hearsay, they are admissible under the business records exception both at common law and under s. 42 of the Evidence Act. The requirements for the admission of medical records as business records are set out in Ares[ v Venner, [1970] SCR 608]. The Supreme Court of Canada held at 626:

Hospital records, including nurses’ notes, made contemporaneously by someone having a personal knowledge of the matters then being recorded and under a duty to make the entry or record should be received in evidence as prima facie proof of the facts stated therein.

Subsequent case law cited by the Court addressed the second objection of the parties propounding the will, which provided that the observations that a medical practitioner has a duty to record in the ordinary course of business (including those involving third parties) are generally admissible (Cambie Surgeries Corporation v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 1896).  Lastly, the Court considered the issue of relevance of the medical records and found that evidence relating to the mental health before and after the making of a will can be relevant in supporting an inference of capacity at the actual time of execution of the will (Laszlo v Lawton, 2013 BCSC 305).

After finding the medical records to be admissible as evidence of the deceased’s mental capacity (and in consideration of all of the available evidence), the Court declared the 2016 will to be invalid on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity.

Thank you for reading.

Nick Esterbauer

11 Mar

The Risk of Personal Costs Awards in Estate Litigation

Rebecca Rauws Litigation Tags: , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

In the past, in estate litigation matters, it was often the case that some or all of the litigating parties’ costs would be paid out of estate assets. However, in more recent years, the courts have been moving away from this general practice, and increasingly making costs awards providing for the payment of costs by one of the parties, personally. In particular, if the court views a party, including an estate trustee, to have behaved improperly or unreasonably, it may decide that such a party must pay the other party’s costs, personally. We have blogged about instances of such an outcome before.

A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has reaffirmed this general trend. The decision in Ford v Mazman, 2019 ONSC 542, involved a motion to pass over the named estate trustee, and appoint the two sole beneficiaries of the estate in question, as estate trustees. Although the named estate trustee and the beneficiaries were initially on good terms, within several months of the testator’s passing, the relationships began to break down, with the estate trustee beginning to make accusations towards the beneficiaries, in relation to the testator. The court found that it was “not a case of mere friction—this is a case of outright hostility from [the estate trustee] to the beneficiaries”, also commenting that it was difficult to fathom why the estate trustee acted as she did, and that her accusations were unwarranted. Ultimately, the court made an order passing over the estate trustee.

After the parties were unable to reach an agreement as to costs, the court made an endorsement in this regard in Ford v Mazman, 2019 ONSC 1297. After a discussion of the costs principles applicable to estate litigation, the court stated as follows:

“I am mindful that an estate trustee should be fully compensated for any reasonable costs incurred in the administration of the estate. However, the actions of the [estate trustee] are far from reasonable. I was not provided any rationale as to why her animus became necessary in the administration of her good friend’s estate.”

Ultimately, the court made a costs award in favour of the beneficiaries, payable by the estate trustee, personally.

This costs decision serves as an important reminder that parties entering into estate litigation proceedings should not count on their costs being paid out of the estate. Additionally, even though the estate trustee’s conduct in this case appears to be extreme, litigants should still keep in mind the importance of acting reasonably.

Thanks for reading,

Rebecca Rauws

 

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07 Mar

Solicitor’s Negligence Claims: are Non-Clients Owed a Duty of Care?

Sydney Osmar Disappointed Beneficiaries, Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, Litigation, Wills Tags: 0 Comments

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently released a decision that provides a helpful and comprehensive overview of the case law regarding solicitor’s negligence claims brought by non-clients.

Within the estate litigation context, this issue sometimes arises where a claim is brought by a disappointed beneficiary as against the drafting solicitor of a testator’s will. The generally accepted origin and definition of a “disappointed beneficiary” is White v Jones, [1995] 1 AII E.R. 691, which sets out that those who may bring a claim against a lawyer as a “disappointed beneficiary” are those individuals whom the deceased had intended to include as a beneficiary in their Last Will and Testament, but, as a result of an error or negligence on part of the drafting lawyer, such a bequest was not carried out.

The “disappointed beneficiary” is therefore an exception to the general rule that the only individual a lawyer owes a duty of care to in a retainer is the client.  However, the extension of a duty of care to a “disappointed beneficiary” applies solely as it relates to those beneficiaries that a solicitor can reasonably foresee that as a result of their negligence, the beneficiary may be deprived of his or her intended legacy, and where the testator nor the estate would have a remedy against the solicitor.

The Alberta Court of Appeal has held that a drafting solicitor does not owe a duty of care to beneficiaries named under a prior will, as to do so would create inevitable conflicts of interest for the solicitor. Furthermore, the court held that beneficiaries named under prior wills have other options available to them, such as challenging the validity of the will.

General Principles Applying to Solicitor’s Negligence Claims

In the ONSC’s recent decision, 2116656 Ontario Inc. v Grant and LLF Lawyers LLP, 2016 ONSC 114, the particular claim arose in the context of mortgage fraud, however, the general principles that are confirmed by the court are applicable generally to solicitor’s negligence claims. Some of the salient points discussed by the court are summarized below:

  • In order for a solicitor to be liable to a non-client, the solicitor must know – from placing him or herself in a position of sufficient proximity with the non-client third party – that the particular non-client is relying on his or her skill. Therefore actual knowledge is a prerequisite for a finding of care, such that it is not sufficient that the solicitor “ought to have known” of the reliance;
  • The non-client third party’s reliance must have been reasonable;
  • The existence of “red flags” or “warnings” alone will not be sufficient to give rise to a duty of care on the solicitor’s part, unless a duty of care is first established under the ordinary principles;
  • The imposition of a duty of care on a solicitor to a third party non-client raises numerous concerns, including:
    • it makes a solicitor responsible to someone who has not retained and does not pay him or her;
    • It is illogical to impose such a duty on a solicitor where the solicitor’s client themselves do not owe a duty to the third-party;
    • It is usually not possible to disclaim or limit liability to such a non-client third party; and
    • Making a solicitor assume such a duty to a non-client third party may place the solicitor in a conflict with the interests of the solicitor’s own client;
  • The court held that due to the above concerns, it will “only be under “narrow”, “exceptional”, “very limited” and “well defined circumstances” that a lawyer can be held to owe a duty of care to a non-client third party to protect his, her or its economic interests”; and
  • The court outlined the various indicia of a solicitor-client relationship, including, inter alia, a contract, retainer agreement or letter of engagement, an open file, the giving and taking of instructions, the creation of legal documents, and the rendering of bills.

This decision provides a comprehensive summary of the existing jurisprudence and reiterates the principle that: but for exceptional and rare circumstances, a solicitor will only owe a duty of care to his or her client. This may be “disappointing” news to non-client, third party claimants.

Thanks for reading!

Sydney Osmar

Please feel free to check out the below related blog:

When Might a Solicitor be Negligent in Preparing a Will?

19 Feb

The Latest ONCA Pronouncement on Will Challenges

Doreen So Capacity, Estate & Trust, Litigation, Uncategorized, Wills Tags: , , , 0 Comments

 

Another will challenge was before the Court of Appeal this month on February 5, 2019.  Reasons for the panel, comprised of Pepall, Trotter, and Harvison Young JJ.A., were released in writing on February 13th.  Quaggiotto v. Quaggiotto, 2019 ONCA 107, can be found here.

The issue of validity was solely focused on a codicil that was executed by Maria Quaggiotto when she was 87 years old.  The codicil left the residue of her estate to one son, Livio, while her will had previously left an equal division of the residue to both of her sons, Livio and Franco.

After a 10 day trial, Justice Rogin found that the codicil was valid.

On appeal, the challenger Franco sought to overturn various findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law.

Ultimately, the panel upheld the decision of Justice Rogin.

The panel reaffirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Orfus Estate with respect to the notion that testators are not required to have “an encyclopedic knowledge” of their assets in order to satisfy the test for testamentary capacity.

Interestingly enough, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was sufficiently alive to corroboration requirements of section 13 of the Ontario Evidence Act even though Justice Rogin’s decision would appear to have erroneously cited section 13 of the Ontario Estates Act for this important statutory requirement.  The adage “form over substance” did not hold water in this appeal given that the actual legal requirement was adequately considered by Justice Rogin.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

14 Feb

Elder Law Litigation Needs to Increase?

Natalia R. Angelini Elder Law, Litigation Tags: , , 0 Comments

In the last couple of decades we have seen a rise in estate, capacity and trust litigation due in large part to the aging demographic.  One would think that elder law disputes – disputes involving retirement residences, nursing homes and/or long-term care facilities – would similarly be on the rise.  What was highlighted for the attendees at a recent Personal Injury and Elder Law CLE presentation, however, is that there is limited case law in the elder law area. Although the knee-jerk reaction may be to see few cases litigated through to a final hearing as a positive state of affairs, that is not so. Rather, it seems that there are an insufficient number of claims being made, and an even fewer number that are pursued all the way to trial.

The panel sees ageism as contributing to this set of circumstances. Damage awards are typically lower for the elderly, the rationale seemingly that they have already lived most of their lives and are going to die anyway. The converse “Golden Years Doctrine” was cited as a means to argue for the better protection of elderly plaintiffs, grounded in the argument that the elderly suffer more and are more severely impacted from an injury than their younger counterparts.

Taking such cases to trial and increasing awareness (e.g. media coverage) is a way to create progress and change in this area of the law. The panel advocated for this approach, as well as stressed the importance of electing to have such cases heard in front of a jury, who may be more willing to award larger sums to litigants.

If this advice is followed, we can hope to see more decisions that can build upon the few noted cases in the area (this article references some of them), and more just outcomes for the elderly, their families and/or their estates.

Thanks for reading and have a great day,

Natalia R. Angelini

12 Feb

Can Typography Expose a Sham Trust?

Natalia R. Angelini Estate & Trust, Litigation, Uncategorized Tags: , , 0 Comments

In estate litigation it is not uncommon to have reason to engage handwriting experts to attest to the authenticity of a signature on a testamentary document. However, the need to engage a typography expert to speak to the font used on such a document is a much rarer occasion. In McGoey (Re) such an expert was used to expose a sham trust.

In this case, upon Mr. McGoey’s assignment into bankruptcy, the trustee in bankruptcy sought to realize on the assets, seeking a declaration that Mr. McGoey’s interest in two properties held jointly with his wife were assets of the estate and subject to creditor claims. Mr. McGoey and his wife argued that they held title to the properties in trust for their children and, thus, outside the reach of creditors. They asserted that the trust documentation was executed in 1995 for one property and in 2004 for the other.

Upon examination by a typography expert, it was revealed that the dates of execution of the documents were not accurate, as neither Cambria (the typeface on the 1995 document), nor Calibri (the typeface on the 2004 document), were available for use by the general public until 2007. The court accepted the expert’s evidence. However, the issue was not fully resolved, since Mr. McGoey’s financial predicament was not apparent until 2010. He and his wife may have lawfully created trusts for their children between 2007 and 2010.

The court turned its scrutiny to the other circumstances of the case. Although several red flags or “badges of fraud” were found and are cited in the decision, most notable was the fact that nothing distinguished the McGoey’s use of the properties from that of an owner – they used the properties as they desired, encumbered them when they wanted and described themselves as the owners in legal papers. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trusts were shams.

Although both the expert testimony and the surrounding circumstances contributed to the court’s ruling, it seems the evidence of the typography expert would have been definitive on the question had the factual timeline been different. I expect with the ongoing creation of new fonts that we can expect to see increased use of such expert testimony in estate litigation.

Thanks for reading and have a great day,

Natalia R. Angelini

05 Feb

Hull on Estates #565 – The Supreme Court of Canada on Henson Trusts

76admin Estate & Trust, Litigation, Podcasts Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

This week on Hull on Estates, Natalia Angelini and Nick Esterbauer discuss S.A. v Metro Vancouver Housing Corp., in which the Supreme Court of Canada addresses Henson trusts for the very first time.

Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.

Click here for more information on Natalia Angelini.

Click here for more information on Nick Esterbauer.

29 Jan

House Explosion Leading to Questions of Ownership and Ultimately, Responsibility Under the Law

Kira Domratchev Litigation, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Paul Zigomanis (“Paul”) died on April 20, 2015 as a result of an explosion that destroyed the home he lived in for 24 years (the “Brimley House”). At the time of Paul’s death, title to the Brimley House was in the name of Paul’s parents, John Zigomanis (“John”) and Mary Zigomanis (“Mary”).

A passerby who was driving by the Brimley House at the time of the explosion, and impacted by it, brought an action for negligence and under the Occupiers’ Liability Act as against Paul’s Estate and John’s Estate (Zambri v Cooperman, 2018 ONSC 7679). A motion was brought by the Estate Trustee During Litigation of Paul’s Estate, Jonathan Cooperman, (the “ETDL”) to determine whether the Brimley House was an asset of Paul’s Estate or John’s Estate, as this was an important issue that had to be determined before the litigation could proceed (Zigomanis Estate, 2017 ONSC 6855).

As there were more assets in John’s Estate, than in Paul’s Estate, the interested parties in the litigation would suffer an adverse consequence were it determined that the Brimley House properly belonged in Paul’s Estate.

The primary position of the ETDL was that a trust relationship was established between Paul’s parents and Paul, whereby a resulting trust arose between John and Mary and Paul and that title to the Brimley House “resulted back” to Paul upon John’s death on December 31, 2014.

Facts

On December 31, 1990, John and Mary took title as joint tenants to the property where the Brimley House was eventually built on, for $270,000.00, as joint owners. In May, 1991, Mary and John signed a deed transferring the Brimley House to Paul for “natural love and affection”. The Court found that Paul ultimately paid John and Mary $140,000.00 for the Brimley House. It was further held by the Court that the family understood that John and Mary were always going to help Paul to purchase a home.

After moving into the Brimley House, Paul developed a drug addiction. Thereafter, on August 1, 1996, Paul transferred the Brimley House to Mary and John for $2.00. Mary and John put all the insurance, taxes and utility bills into their names and had the bills sent to their own home, however, Paul would transfer $500.00 per month to them for the payment of these expenses. It was understood by the family that this was done in order to protect the Brimley House from the potential repercussion of Paul’s substance abuse problems.

Mary died on March 23, 2013, leaving her Estate to John, who at the time suffered from dementia. Shortly thereafter, Gail MacDonald (“Gail”) and Violet Cooper (“Violet”), Paul’s sisters, who were managing John’s affairs, realized that Paul stopped making regular payments to their parents towards the Brimley House and offered to have the Brimley House transferred to Paul, immediately. Importantly, this letter was written well before the explosion giving rise to the litigation, took place.

John died on December 31, 2014, leaving his Estate to Gail, Violet and Paul, equally. Gail was named as the Estate Trustee of John’s Estate. Before Paul’s death, Gail, through her counsel, and Paul, through his counsel, were engaged in settlement negotiations with respect to the Brimley House. The draft minutes of settlement exchanged included the following: “AND WHEREAS Mr. Zigomanis asserts that the Brimley Road property was transferred to the Deceased to be held in trust for the benefit of Mr. Zigomanis”. The Court held that this particular piece of evidence was indicative of the fact that it was always understood by the family that Paul was the beneficial owner of the Brimley House.

Paul died intestate and he did not have a spouse or any children. His beneficiaries were Gail and Violet, and the sole beneficiaries of his Estate.

Analysis and Decision

 

The Court was satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, and in considering all of the evidence, John and Mary transferred both legal and beneficial title to the Brimley House to Paul in 1991, for valuable consideration. As such, no presumption of a resulting trust applied to this transaction.

The Court further held that the nominal consideration for which Paul transferred the Brimley House to John and Mary triggered the presumption of a resulting trust, such that the Court had to determine what Paul intended at the time of the 1996 transfer.

Based on the evidence considered, the Court found that the presumption of a resulting trust could not be rebutted, such that Paul was the true owner of the Brimley House, because John and Mary intended to transfer the legal title back to Paul, once they were reassured in his ability to control ownership. As a result, the Brimley House was ordered to be returned to the trustee of Paul’s Estate, effective January 1, 2015, being the following day after the death of John.

John’s Estate’s Liability in the Litigation Related to the Explosion

Following the Court’s finding regarding the ownership of the Brimley House, Gail, as trustee of John’s Estate brought a motion for an order that John’s Estate did not owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff and was not liable under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The Court held that a relationship between the Plaintiff, a passerby, and John’s Estate, a non-owner of property, is not one in which a duty of care had previously been recognized. The Court further held that although John had some involvement with the Brimley House, it would not be a sufficient basis to find a relationship of proximity with the Plaintiff that would give rise to a duty of care.

Based on the above findings, the Court held that John’s Estate did not owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff and there was no other legal or equitable basis to find that John’s Estate had an obligation to manage the Brimley House on behalf of or to supervise Paul’s behaviour, including any liability under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

Legal vs. Beneficial Ownership – Not so easily distinguished?

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