Category: Guardianship

23 Oct

Can a Guardian Settle a Trust?

Noah Weisberg Capacity, Estate Planning, Ethical Issues, Guardianship, Power of Attorney Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Does an attorney, or guardian, have the power to change a grantor’s estate plan?

According to section 31(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, a guardian of property (or attorney for property) has the power to do on the incapable person’s behalf anything in respect of property that the person could do if capable, except make a will.

The statute, however, is deceptively simple.  Can a guardian transfer property into joint tenancy?  Can a guardian sever a joint tenancy?  Can a guardian change a beneficiary designation on a RRSP, RRIF or insurance policy?  Can an inter vivos trust be established or an estate freeze undertaken to save taxes?  There are numerous cases which have tested these issues.

For instance, in Banton v Banton, Justice Cullity found that although the grantor’s attorneys had the authority to create an irrevocable inter vivos trust, they nonetheless breached their fiduciary obligations owing to the grantor, in creating the trust.

The irrevocable trust provided for income and capital at the trustee’s discretion for the grantor’s benefit during his lifetime and a gift over of capital to the grantor’s children, who were also the attorneys.  The scheme of distribution of the irrevocable trust was the same as provided for in the grantor’s will.   However, the court found that the fact that the remainder interest passed automatically to the grantor’s issue defeated the grantor’s power to revoke his will by marriage and would deprive his common law spouse of potential rights under Parts II and V of the Succession Law Reform Act and Part I of the Family Law Act.  The court found that the gift of the remainder of the interest went beyond what was required to protect the grantor’s assets.

Justice Cullity stated:

“I do not share the view that there is an inviolable rule that it is improper for attorneys under a continuing power of attorney to take title to the donor‘s assets either by themselves or jointly with the donor .  This must depend upon whether it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so to protect or advance the interest, or otherwise benefit, the donor.”

Noah Weisberg

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22 Oct

Fiduciary Accounts – Yes, Form Matters

Noah Weisberg Executors and Trustees, Guardianship, Passing of Accounts, Power of Attorney Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

In the Estate of Divina Damm the Court answers the following question – what form of accounts must a guardian of property use when filing an application to pass accounts?

The facts in Re Damm Estate are not remarkable.  A guardian of property commenced an application to pass accounts in accordance with Rule 74.18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking court approval of her accounts.  No objections arose with respect to the accounts, such that the guardian proceeded to file the application ‘over the counter’ as an unopposed application to pass accounts.

Notwithstanding that there were no objections, the Court refused to approve the accounts.  The Court was concerned with the lack of detail and itemization in the entries, as well as the failure to comply with Rule 74.17.  The judge tried to “…link all numbers listed in the draft judgment with information presented in the accounts but [was] unable to do so – because the accounts are not in proper form”.

Interestingly, the judge considered whether smaller estates should be permitted to file accounts in a simple format, but noted that it was for the Legislature and the Rules Committee to consider.

Accordingly, the Court directed the guardian to re-serve and re-file the accounts prepared in compliance with Rule 74.17.

Noah Weisberg

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11 Oct

The Importance of Filing Comprehensive Management Plans

Nick Esterbauer Guardianship Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

A decision released earlier this week highlights the importance of a complete Management Plan supported by evidence when seeking one’s appointment as guardian of property.

Sometimes, the necessity of filing a Management Plan is viewed as a formality without proper attention to the details of the plan.  However, the failure to file an appropriate Management Plan may prevent the appointment of a guardian of property, putting the administration of the incapable’s property in limbo.

In Connolly v Connolly and PGT, 2018 ONSC 5880 (CanLII), Justice Corthorn declined to approve of a Management Plan filed by the applicant and, accordingly, refused to appoint her as guardian of property.  The Management Plan was rejected for the following reasons (among others):

  • it did not address an anticipated increase in expenses over time (including when the applicant was no longer available to serve as the incapable’s caregiver and he may incur alternate housing costs);
  • there was no first-hand evidence from BMO Nesbitt Burns or Henderson Structured Settlement with respect to the net settlement funds in excess of $1.4M and their payout and investment in a portfolio on the incapable’s behalf;
  • the Court was concerned that stock market volatility could threaten to deplete the invested assets;
  • the Public Guardian and Trustee had strongly recommended that the applicant post security, the expense of which was reflected as a deduction from the incapable’s assets (while not suggested that this was unreasonable, Justice Corthorn took issue with the absence of any case law or statutory provision cited by the applicant in support of the payment of the expense by the incapable rather than the applicant herself); and
  • while the applicant had agreed to act as guardian without compensation, the plan did not contemplate how compensation would be funded if claimed by a potential successor guardian.

Notwithstanding that neither the incapable nor the Public Guardian and Trustee had opposed the Management Plan or the appointment of the applicant as guardian of property, Justice Corthorn found that the appointment of a guardian to manage over one million dollars in settlement funds was “contentious” and, accordingly, under Rule 39.01(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, direct evidence from a representative of the financial institution was required.  In short, although the applicant was accepted as being a suitable candidate for appointment as guardian of property (and it was anticipated by the Court that she would ultimately be appointed), the Court was not satisfied on the evidence available that the management of the incapable’s property in accordance with the contents of the Management Plan was consistent with the man’s best interests.

While Justice Corthorn declared the individual respondent incapable and in need of assistance by a guardian of property, Her Honour adjourned the balance of the matter, suggesting that the applicant’s appointment as guardian of property could be revisited once additional evidence was filed in support of the contents of the Management Plan and/or the plan was further revised.

Thank you for reading.

Nick Esterbauer

 

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02 Oct

Full Indemnity through Blended Costs: The Estate of Irmgard Burgstaler

Doreen So Elder Law, Guardianship, Passing of Accounts, Trustees, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

The Estate of Irmgard Burgstaler (disability), 2018 ONSC 472, was a costs decision that arose from an application to pass attorney accounts.  Erwin  was named as the attorney for property for his mother, Irmgard.  Erwin was ordered to pass his accounts and his siblings, Barbara and Peter, objected.

A four-day hearing took place.  Erwin was self-represented and his accounts were not in court format pursuant to Rule 74.17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  Extensive written submissions were also filed by both sides.

Erwin was found to have breached his fiduciary duty to Irmgard when $82,000.00 was taken from Irmgard and applied towards the purchase of a home in Erwin’s name.  Erwin also took approximately $44,000.00 from his mother’s accounts to pay his legal fees in the proceeding at issue and the Court found that this expense was not for Irmgard’s benefit.  Certain other expenses were ordered to be repay to Irmgard as well as the repayment of $5,000.00 from the sale of Irmgard’s trailer.

Given their success, the Objectors sought full indemnity on a blended basis from Erwin (15%) and the Estate (85%).  In reviewing the jurisprudence on costs in estate matters, Justice Shaw found that this case fell within the public policy exemption for due administration of estates and allowed the Objectors’ claim for full indemnity.

That said, Justice Shaw disagreed with the Objectors’ proposed 15/85 split on the basis of the “losers pay” principle in general civil costs.  Justice Shaw ordered Erwin to pay the Objectors’ costs on a partial indemnity scale while the Estate was ordered pay the full remaining balance.  In this case, partial indemnity appears to be close to 70% of the total claimed based on the fixed amounts that were ordered.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

28 Sep

Temporary Guardians of Property

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate Planning, Guardianship, Power of Attorney Tags: , , 0 Comments

The court has the authority under the Substitute Decisions Act to appoint a guardian for property. However, does the court have the authority to appoint a temporary guardian for property? According to the decision in Ballinger v. Marshall, 2018 ONSC 3020, the answer is Yes.

In Ballinger, Ms. Marshall’s son applied for a declaration that Ms. Marshall was incapable of managing property and personal care, and for an order appointing himself as her guardian for property and personal care.Capacity Assessment

In an interim order, the court ordered that Ms. Marshall be assessed. The court also ordered that counsel be appointed by the Public Guardian and Trustee to represent Ms. Marshall (“s. 3 counsel”).

Ms. Marshall refused to be assessed. A further motion was brought to compel Ms. Marshall to be assessed, which order was granted. Still, Ms. Marshall still refused to be assessed.

The court considered s. 25 of the Substitute Decisions Act, which sets out what may be contained in an order appointing a guardian. Section 25 provides that an order appointing a guardian for a person must include a finding that the person is incapable of managing property. Further, the court may make the appointment for a limited period as the court considers appropriate, and impose such conditions as the court considers appropriate.

The court held that this gives the court jurisdiction to make a temporary order. Support for this was found in the Divisional Court decision of Bennett v. Gotlibowicz, 2009 CanLII 33031 (ON SCDC).

In Bennett, a court-ordered assessment concluded that the person was incapable. In Marshall, there was no such assessment evidence: due to Ms. Marshall’s refusal to undergo an assessment. The court was, however, able to rely on the son’s observations with respect to his mother’s behavior to come to a conclusion that, on a balance of probabilities, Ms. Marshall did not have capacity to manage her property.

The son was appointed as guardian. However, the guardianship was only a temporary one, until:

  • Ms. Marshall participates in a capacity assessment and the capacity assessment is returned to the court for consideration;
  • the matter is returned to the court for further directions; or
  • November 15, 2018.

The court also gave specific direction with respect to what the guardian could do with Ms. Marshall’ property. He was to sell her house, and pay her debts. The proceeds of the sale, after the payment of debts, was to be held in a law firm’s trust account pending the further order of the court. The son had proposed that an affordable condominium be purchased for Ms. Marshal as alternative accommodation. However, the court did not allow for this, stating that “I believe that it is best that this process proceed slowly”.

Have a great weekend.

Paul Trudelle

27 Aug

Predatory Marriages: A Growing Concern in Ontario

Kira Domratchev Capacity, Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, Guardianship, Litigation, Power of Attorney, Wills Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

We sometimes hear about an elderly person marrying a much younger person. What we often do not consider, however, is the possibility that such a marriage is entered into by a “predatory” spouse in order to take advantage of an elderly victim with the ultimate goal of assuming control of his or her finances.

The “predator” is often a caregiver or a family friend or neighbour. In most cases, it is a person who uses a position of trust to cause an elderly victim to change a Will, a power of attorney, an insurance policy designation or other documents. It is also not uncommon for inter vivos transfers to be made while the senior is alive.

According to Ontario law, the act of marriage grants the new spouse certain property rights, specifically with respect to the matrimonial home and spousal support. The most significant effect of a marriage, however, is the fact that the Succession Law Reform Act, revokes any Will executed prior to the marriage. To make matters worse, predatory marriages often occur in private such that the senior’s family members are not aware that he or she has married.

The evidentiary burden imposed upon the elderly victim’s adult family members to prove that a marriage should be declared void as it is a marriage of a “predatory” nature is significant.

Why is it so tough to show that a marriage is void?

Capacity is a fluid concept. It means that a person could have capacity for one task and no capacity for another, as capacity is time and situation specific. Capacity to enter into a marriage, is the lowest threshold of capacity. As such, a person can be entirely capable to enter into a marriage but may be incapable of managing his or her own financial affairs.

In addition, a person likely does not just lose capacity in a day; it is a gradual process such that there is a “grey zone” between having capacity and having no capacity at all. It is in that “grey zone” that a predator will take advantage because a person may start forgetting things but is otherwise capable for all intents and purposes.

Because of that, many are of the opinion that Ontario laws make seniors an easy target for “predatory marriages”. Will there be a change in the law coming our way, in light of the growing phenomenon of such marriages? Only time will tell.

For more information regarding this growing concern and the manner in which this issue has been treated by the courts, please see a paper by Kimberly Whaley of WEL Partners on Predatory Marriages.

Thanks for reading.

Kira Domratchev

26 Jul

Who is the Ontario Children’s Lawyer?

Doreen So Continuing Legal Education, Estate & Trust, General Interest, Guardianship, Litigation Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

The Ontario Court of Appeal recently considered the issue of whether the litigation files of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer are subject to a freedom of information access request in Ontario (Children’s Lawyer) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 ONCA 599.  This appeal arose from a father’s request for the production of the Children’s Lawyers’ records.  The Children’s Lawyer acted for the father’s children in the course of a custody and access dispute.  Accordingly, a portion of the Children’s Lawyer’s records were privileged.

Justice Bennotto, in writing for a unanimous panel, found that the issue turned on whether the records are “in the custody or under the control” of the Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario (“MAG“) for the purposes of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 31.

The answer was no.

 

The Children’s Lawyer’s records are not in the custody or under the control of MAG because she operates separately and distinctly from MAG and,

“[68]     [she] is an independent statutory office holder appointed by Cabinet through the Lieutenant Governor. She derives her independent powers, duties and responsibilities through statute, common law and orders of the court.

[…]

[72]      To allow a disgruntled parent to obtain confidential records belonging to the child would undermine the Children’s Lawyer’s promise of confidentiality, inhibit the information she could obtain and sabotage her in the exercise of her duties. This would, in turn, impact proceedings before the court by depriving it of the child’s voice and cause damage to the child who would no longer be meaningfully represented. Finally, disclosure to a parent could cause further trauma and stress to the child, who may have divided loyalties, exposing the child to retribution and making the child the problem in the litigation.”

For those practising in the estates and trusts context, it is important to note that the role of the Children’s Lawyer is different in family law.

In civil matters that implicate a minor’s financial interest in property, the Children’s Lawyer acts as the minor’s litigation guardian and she is represented by the lawyers of her choice.  In custody and access disputes, the Children’s Lawyer acts, at the request of the court, as the minor’s lawyer.

Bonus answer: the current Children’s Lawyer is Marian Jacko.

Thanks for reading this week!

Doreen So

28 Jun

Contextualizing Capacity: The ‘Who’, ‘What’ and ‘When’ of Decision-Making

Garrett Horrocks Capacity, Estate Planning, Guardianship Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Capacity is a fundamental consideration in many aspects of estate, trust, and attorneyship litigation.  The capacity of an individual to take a particular legal step, for example, to effect a distribution of property or to make a valid testamentary document, will often form the basis of a claim or court application.  However, as set out in today’s blog, capacity is specific as to task, time, and situation.  Context is a key factor in assessing capacity or lack thereof.

Capacity is specific as to task, time, and situation.

Whether an individual will be found to be capable of taking a particular legal step depends on the nature of the step being taken and when this step was taken.  By way of example, the threshold for the capacity required by a testator to execute a valid Last Will and Testament differs from, and is considerably higher than, the threshold of an individual seeking to grant a power of attorney for property or personal care.

The capacity to make a valid will requires an individual to have a clear understanding of the nature and extent of their assets, and to understand the effects of the dispositions being made including any claims that might arise as a result.  The capacity to grant a power of attorney for property, while similar to testamentary capacity, is a lower threshold.  An individual will be capable of granting a power of attorney for property provided that,

  1. they have a general understanding of the nature and value of their property;
  2. are aware of the obligations owed to any of their dependants; and
  3. understand the nature of the rights being given to the attorney as well as the rights that they retain as the grantor of the power of attorney, for example, the right to revoke the power of attorney if capable.

While the capacity to grant a power of attorney for property only requires the grantor to have a general understanding of their property or their obligations, testamentary capacity requires specific knowledge and appreciation of potential legal ramifications.  Accordingly, an assessment of an individual’s capacity in each respect will impart different requirements.

Capacity is also specific as to time, particularly as an individual’s capacity may fluctuate depending on illness or circumstance.  While somewhat uncommon in practice, an individual who was previously assessed as incapable may subsequently regain the capacity to take a particular legal step.  Accordingly, when acting on behalf of an individual challenging the validity of a testamentary document or disposition of property, it is important to consider not only the grantor’s historical capacity or lack thereof, but also whether capacity may have been regained at some point prior to the disposition being challenged.

Thanks for reading.

Garrett Horrocks

10 May

POA Self-Dealing Transaction was Set Aside: the Reasonably Necessary Test

Doreen So Capacity, Continuing Legal Education, Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Ethical Issues, Executors and Trustees, General Interest, Guardianship, Litigation, Power of Attorney Tags: , , , 0 Comments

Previously on our blog and podcast, we discussed Tarantino v. Galvano, 2017 ONSC 3535 (S.C.J.)  in the context of the counterclaim for quantum meruit and the costs decision of the Hon. Justice Kristjanson.

Tarantino v. Galvano arose from a lawsuit that was commenced by two out of three Estate Trustees against the third Estate Trustee, Nellie, with respect to her actions as attorney for property for the Deceased, Rosa (i.e. Nellie’s actions while the Deceased was still alive but incapable of managing her own property).

Rosa had two daughters, Nellie and Giuseppina.  Giuseppina died before Rosa.  Guiseppina’s daughters were the other two Estate Trustees and they are beneficiaries of the Rosa’s Estate along with Nellie.  For the better part of her life, Nellie lived with Rosa.  She took care of her mother after her father’s death.  Nellie and her son were also Rosa’s caregivers as Rosa’s health declined until Rosa’s death in 2012.

Rosa and Nellie owned the home that they lived in together.  Rosa held an 80.3% interest and Nellie held an 19.62% interest.  Pursuant to Rosa’s 2005 Will, Nellie had a right of first refusal to purchase the home from Rosa’s Estate.  In 2008, on the advice of counsel while Rosa was incapable, Nellie entered into an agreement between herself and Rosa.  The agreement provided for a transfer of Rosa’s interest in the home and 75% of Rosa’s pension income to Nellie in exchange for Nellie’s caregiving services.  The agreement was in writing and it was signed by Nellie.  Nellie signed for herself and for Rosa, in her capacity as Rosa’s attorney for property.

Even though the Court found that Nellie was a good daughter who held up her end of the bargain by caring for Rosa, the agreement was set aside because it was a self-dealing transaction that did not meet the requirements of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992:

“[46]    Under the Substitute Decisions Act, Nellie could only enter into the agreement to transfer the house and pension income if it was “reasonably necessary” to provide for Rosa’s care, which I find it was not. As a fiduciary, an attorney for property is “obliged to act only for the benefit of [the donor], putting her own interests aside”: Richardson Estate v. Mew, 2009 ONCA 403 (CanLII), 96 O.R. (3d) 65, at para. 49. An attorney is prohibited from using the power for their own benefit unless “it is done with the full knowledge and consent of the donor”: Richardson Estate, at paras. 49-50. Rosa lacked capacity at the time of the Agreement, and the transfer of the house and pension income therefore were not done with Rosa’s full knowledge and consent.”

The “reasonably necessary” test was assessed, as of the time of the transfer, rather than from hindsight and it was determined that the decision to transfer 80.3% of a home and 80% of Rosa’s pension income at the outset of care was “an imprudent agreement which benefitted Nellie beyond that ‘reasonably necessary’ to provide adequately for Rosa’s care” (see paragraphs 34-49 for the Court’s analysis of this issue).

As a set off, Nellie’s quantum meruit claim was successful and you can click here for Ian Hull and Noah Weisberg’s podcast on this particular issue.  While there was blended success to all parties involved, none of the three Estate Trustees were entitled to indemnification.  Our discussion of the denial of costs can be found here and the Endorsement can be found here.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So 

30 Apr

When Will the Court Appoint a Guardian?

Rebecca Rauws Guardianship Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

The Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30 (the “SDA”), governs,  among other things, the appointment of guardians for incapable persons. There are two types of guardians: a guardian for property and a guardian for personal care.

Sections 22(1) and 55(1) of the SDA provide that the Court may, on any person’s application, appoint a guardian of property or of the person, for a person who is incapable of managing property or personal care if, as a result of the said incapacity, it is necessary for decisions to be made on his or her behalf.

In order to appoint a guardian for someone, the Court will need to make a finding of incapacity for that person. This is an important hurdle, and the Court will generally need to see evidence that the person in question has been assessed as incapable of managing property and/or personal care prior to making a finding that he or she is incapable.

Depending on the circumstances, a person may submit to a capacity assessment voluntarily. However, according to section 78(1) of the SDA, if a person refuses to be assessed, an assessor shall not perform the assessment. Section 79 of the SDA allows the Court to order that a person be assessed, provided that the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the person is incapable. Additionally, to obtain a Court Order for an assessment, there must be a proceeding under the SDA, in which the person’s capacity is in issue. The Ontario Court of Appeal in  Neill v Pellolio, 2001 ONCA 6452 held that there is no stand-alone relief available for an Order for a capacity assessment in the absence of an application brought under the SDA. Accordingly, obtaining a finding of incapacity from the Court may not be a simple endeavour.

The SDA also has in place measures to protect an individual’s decision-making rights from undue restriction. Sections 22(3) and 55(2) state that the Court shall not appoint a guardian if it is satisfied that the need for decisions to be made will be met by an alternative course of action that does not require the Court to find the person incapable, and is less restrictive of the person’s decision-making rights than the appointment of a guardian.

Accordingly, for example, if a person has already granted a power of attorney, allowing the named attorney to act would constitute a less restrictive course of action which also does not require the Court to make a finding of incapacity in order for decisions to be made for an incapable person. Furthermore, if a person is incapable of managing their property or personal care, but remains capable of granting a power of attorney, that would likely also constitute a less restrictive course of action, and would allow that person to exercise their decision-making rights.

Thanks for reading.

Rebecca Rauws

 

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