Category: Estate & Trust

16 Jul

Bequesting What You Don’t Have: Ademption

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, Wills Tags: , , 0 Comments

“Ademption occurs when the property which is the subject of a specific gift, although in existence at the date of the will, is not in the testator’s estate at his death. It may have been sold or given away by the testator, or it may have been lost, stolen or destroyed. In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, if a specific gift has adeemed, the beneficiary gets nothing.”

This explanation of ademption comes from Oosterhoff on Wills, 8th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2016) at 538, as quoted in Best v. Hendry, 2021 NLCA 43 (CanLII).

In Best, the issue of ademption was front and center. The testator left a will that provided that her house was to go to her niece Hendry, and the residue of her estate was to go to her niece Best. Many years after making the will, the testator developed dementia, and was moved from her home to a nursing home. Best applied to be her guardian, and proceeded to sell the home.

Upon the testator’s death, Best claimed that the gift of the house adeemed, and the proceeds of sale fell into the residue. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal agreed.

In Ontario, recourse to ss. 35.1 and 36 of the Substitute Decisions Act may have applied. Section 35.1(1) provides that a guardian shall not dispose of property that the guardian knows is subject to a specific testamentary gift in the incapable person’s will. Section 35.1(3) allows for the disposition of the property if it is necessary to comply with the guardian’s duties. However, s. 36 provides that the doctrine of ademption does not apply to such dispositions by the guardian, and that the beneficiary is entitled to receive from the residue of the estate the proceeds of disposition, without interest.

According to the decision in Best, only Ontario and B.C. have such anti-ademption legislation.

(Best also dealt with issues relating to a release initially signed by Best, the liability of the estate trustee to Best, and the right of the estate trustee to recover funds improperly paid to a beneficiary (Hendry). I will not address those here.)

This brings me to my favourite ademption joke. A testator went to a lawyer to prepare his will. He told the lawyer that he wanted to make a bequest of a house to his loving wife, a cottage to his two loving sons, and a Frisbee collection to his loving dog. When the lawyer reminded the testator that he did not have a house, a cottage or a Frisbee collection, the testator responded: “Well, that’s their problem. I’ll be dead by then.”

Have a great weekend.

Paul Trudelle

29 Jun

Presumptions of Resulting Trust and Beneficiary Designations Revisited

Nick Esterbauer Beneficiary Designations, Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, Joint Accounts, RRSPs/Insurance Policies Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice revisits the issue of whether a presumption of resulting trust should be imposed in the case of a beneficiary designation.

As our readers will know, the leading case on presumptions of resulting trust remains Pecore v Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, in which the Supreme Court summarized the state of the law relating to property that had been gratuitously transferred into joint tenancy with a non-dependent adult child: the asset becomes subject to a presumption that it is impressed with a resulting trust in favour of the parent’s estate.  The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that it was, in fact, the parent’s intention to gift the jointly-held property to the adult child by right of survivorship.

Last year, we saw a couple of decisions apply the principles of Pecore to novel situations, potentially expanding the applicability of presumptions of resulting trust.  For example, in Calmusky v Calmusky, 2020 ONSC 1506, the doctrine of resulting trust was applied to a RIF for which an adult child had been designated as beneficiary.

In Mak Estate v Mak, 2021 ONSC 4415, Justice McKelvey reviewed the issue of whether an asset for which a beneficiary designation was in place should be subject to the presumption of resulting trust.  The plaintiff residuary beneficiaries of their mother’s estate sought an order setting aside the 2007 beneficiary designation for the mother’s RRIF, under which the defendant, their brother and another residuary beneficiary of the estate, was named.  The evidence suggested that the deceased had relied upon the defendant, who lived with her and drove her to appointments after the death of the parties’ father in 2002.

After addressing the issue of whether a presumption of undue influence applied to the RRIF beneficiary designation (and finding that it did not because a beneficiary designation is not an inter vivos gift), Justice McKelvey turned to the issue of the principle of resulting trust, writing (at paras 44, 46):

In my view…there is good reason to doubt the conclusion that the doctrine of resulting trust applies to a beneficiary designation. First, the presumption in Pecore applies to inter vivos gifts. This was a significant factor for the Court of Appeal in Seguin, and similarly is a significant difference in the context of a resulting trust. Further, the decision of this Court in Calmusky has been the subject of some critical comment. As noted by Demetre Vasilounis in an article entitled ‘A Presumptive Peril: The Law of Beneficiary Designations is Now in Flux’, the decision in Calmusky is, ‘ruffling some features among banks, financial advisors and estate planning lawyers in Ontario’. In his article, the author comments that there is usually no need to determine ‘intent’ behind this designation, as this kind of beneficiary designation is supported by legislation including in Part III of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA”). Subsection 51(1) of the SLRA states that an individual may designate a beneficiary of a ‘plan’ (including a RIF, pursuant to subsection 54.1(1) of the SLRA.)

It is also important that the presumption of resulting trust with respect to adult children evolved from the formerly recognized presumption of advancement, a sometimes erroneous assumption for a parent that arranges for joint ownership of an asset with their child is merely ‘advancing’ the asset to such adult child as such adult child will eventually be entitled to such asset upon such parent’s death. The whole point of a beneficiary designation, however, is to specifically state what is to happen to an asset upon death.

As a result, the defendant was entitled to retain the proceeds of his mother’s RRIF, as the plaintiffs unable to establish any intention of their mother to benefit her estate with the asset without the benefit of a presumption of resulting trust.

In light of the conflicting applications of Pecore under the Calmusky and Mak Estate decisions, it will be interesting to see how this issue may be further developed in the case law.  For the time being, however, it may be prudent to take care in documenting a client’s wishes to benefit an adult child by way of beneficiary designation in the same manner as we typically would in situations of jointly-held property.

Thank you for reading.

Nick Esterbauer

15 Jun

Hull on Estates #615 – The Role of the Medical Expert in Determining Undue Influence

76admin Estate & Trust, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Podcasts Tags: , , 0 Comments

On today’s podcast, Natalia Angelini and Rebecca Rauws discuss a recent article from The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry entitled “Susceptibility to Undue Influence: The Role of the Medical Expert in Estate Litigation”. The paper can be accessed online here.

Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.

Click here for more information on Natalia Angelini

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10 Jun

Dependants and Their Entitlement to a Deceased’s Estate – A summary of Earl v. McAllister, 2021 ONSC 4050

Sanaya Mistry Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Litigation, Pension Benefits, Support After Death Tags: , , , 0 Comments

In the recent decision of Earl v. McAllister, 2021 ONSC 4050, the Divisional Court ordered 100% of the net estate of the Deceased to be used for the benefit of the minor dependants, to the exclusion of the Deceased’s wife.

Leo McAllister (the “Deceased”) died on May 3, 2017. He is survived by his wife (Barbara McAllister) and his two minor sons (the “Sons”) from a previous relationship with Tammy Earl. When the Deceased learned he was dying, he started to put his affairs in order, including executing a Will and leaving his estate (the “Estate”) to his wife and signing consents required to transfer the designed beneficiaries on one of his pensions from Ms. McAllister to his Sons.

Ms. Earl brought an application on behalf of her Sons, for their support, pursuant to Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act. The Applicant argued that for the purposes of this application, the value of two pensions and a life insurance policy should be included in the value of the Estate of the Deceased, failing which, the Estate would have a shortfall of $12,926.82 due to the Estate’s liabilities. She also argued that the entirety of the Estate should be used for the benefit of her Sons, as they are both dependants of the Deceased.

The Application Judge agreed that one of the pensions and the life insurance proceeds should be included in the value of the Estate, valuing it at $167,062.52. The Application Judge ordered the net value of the Estate to be split in two halves, one to be used for the benefit of the Sons and one to be distributed to Ms. McAllister. The Application Judge also ordered $30,000 of the Sons’ half to be paid into Court, to be paid to the Sons when they turn 18.

Ms. Earl appealed this decision, arguing that both pensions should be included in the value of the Estate, the entirety of the Estate should be used for the benefit of her Sons and that the $30,000 which the Application Judge ordered to be paid into court should now be paid out to the Appellant, for the benefit of the Sons.

For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the Divisional Court’s decision in respect of the whether to include both pensions in the value of the Estate and the manner in which the Estate is to be distributed.

Pensions

The Deceased had  two pension plans. The first was from the Union’s Province of Ontario Pension Plan, the value of which was included in the Estate by the Application Judge. The second was the Union’s “Canada” Pension Plan (administered in the US), which provided for a pre-retirement surviving spouse benefit under which the Respondent, as a surviving spouse, was entitled to a lump sum payment of $88,117.40.

The Divisional Court found that it was not open to the Deceased to designate someone other than his spouse to receive the pre-retirement benefit under the second pension and while the Respondent could have waived her entitlement to the receipt of that benefit, she could not be deprived of that benefit without her agreement.

As a result, the second pension was not included in the value of the Estate.

 

Distribution of the Net Value of The Estate

The Divisional Court found that in determining the issues between the parties, the needs of the Sons in the balancing exercise should be paramount. The court weighed the financial circumstances of the Sons against the financial circumstances of the Respondent.

Particularly, the court noted that the Sons live in precarious financial circumstances and there is very little income to support them apart from public finances and loans. The Sons live in the home of their mother’s parents. The appellant’s affidavit contained information concerning monthly expenses and the loss of the Deceased’s group health benefits. The Applicant’s evidence was that her yearly expenses exceed her income. Further, the Deceased was active in his Sons’ lives and paid the Appellant $300 per week to support his Sons until his death.

In contrast, the Respondent was not financially dependant on the Deceased, had good income of approximately $100,000 annually, had no extraordinary expenses, owned a home (although with a mortgage) and had made some provisions for her own pension. The Respondent and the Deceased had been married for just over two years at the time of death. The Respondent was also to continue to receive the benefits from the second pension.

The Divisional Court cited  Madore-Ogilvie v Ogilvie Estate (2008), 88 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), noting the following:

“Where there are insufficient assets to adequately provide for any or all of a deceased’s dependants, the circumstances of the case may warrant the exercise of an application judge’s discretion to use the limited assets for the benefit only of the minor dependants, to the exclusion of his wife.”

The Divisional Court concluded that in the present case, the circumstances warranted the use of the limited assets for the benefit of the Sons only, to the exclusion of the Respondent.

Thank you for reading.

Sanaya Mistry

08 Jun

Applying for Probate for a “Small Estate” in Ontario

Sanaya Mistry Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Wills Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Further to our article “Small Estate” in Ontario now $150,000, as of April 1, 2021, for an estate valued at $150,000 or less, probate can be applied for through the small estate court process.

Applying for probate can be a complicating and overwhelming process, especially considering the fact that the steps that need to be taken or forms that need to be filled out can vary depending on the specific circumstances of the estate.

The Probate of a Small Estate webpage provides helpful information on some of the steps included in applying for probate of a “Small Estate”.

Please see below a brief overview of some of the important things to consider when applying for probate of a “Small Estate”.

Forms

Depending on the specific circumstances of the estate, different court forms may need to be completed and filed with the court.

As noted in Rule 74.1.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, “A person may seek a small estate certificate by filing an application for a small estate certificate (Form 74.1A) together with,

(a) a request to file an application for a small estate certificate or an amended small estate certificate (Form 74.1B);

(b) proof of death;

(c) a draft small estate certificate (Form 74.1C);

(d) if there is a will, the original of the will and of any codicils, together with the following evidence of due execution of the will and each codicil:

(i) if the will or codicil is not in holograph form,

(A) an affidavit of execution (Form 74.8) of the will or codicil,

(B) if the will or codicil contains an alteration, erasure, obliteration or interlineation that has not been attested, an affidavit as to the condition of the will or codicil at the time of execution (Form 74.10), or

(C) if each of the witnesses to the will or codicil has died or cannot be found, such other evidence of due execution as the court may require, or

(ii) if the will or codicil is in holograph form, an affidavit attesting that the handwriting and signature in the will or codicil are those of the deceased (Form 74.9);

(e) any security required by the Estates Act; and

(f) such additional or other material as the court directs.”

Estate Administration Tax

It is important to determine the value of the estate.

Estate Administration Tax is payable on the value of the estate of a deceased person as of the date of their death, for estates valued over $50,000.

For estates valued over $50,000, the Estate Administration Tax will be calculated as $15 for every $1,000 (or part thereof) of the value of the estate. Estate Administration Tax can be calculated using the calculator provided on this Ministry of the Attorney General webpage.

 

Service of Documents

Pursuant to Rule 74.1.03(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, “the applicant shall send or give the following documents to each person entitled to share in the distribution of the estate, including charities and contingent beneficiaries:

  1. A copy of the application for a small estate certificate (Form 74.1A) and of any attachments.
  2. If there is a will, a copy of the will and of any codicils.”

It’s important to note that pursuant to Rule 74.1.03(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, “if a person who is entitled to share in the distribution of the estate is less than 18 years of age, the documents listed in subrule (3) shall not be sent to the person but shall instead be sent or given to a parent or guardian and to the Children’s Lawyer.”

Further, a copy of the application and a copy of the will and codicil (if applicable) may need to be provided to Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee.

 

Detailed information in respect of “Small Estates” and the process of applying for probate of a “Small Estate” can be found in Rule 74 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

 

Please note, the above-noted information has been provided for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. For more information, please reach out to one of our team members who will be happy to assist you.

Thank you for reading.

Sanaya Mistry

 

01 Jun

Hull on Estates #614 – Validity of a Handwritten Will and Appointment of an Estate Trustee in Conflict

76admin Estate & Trust, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Podcasts, Wills Tags: , , , 0 Comments

This week on Hull on Estates, Doreen So and Arielle Di Iulio discuss the recent decision of Langrandeur Estate (Re), 2021 ONSC 3447, where the court addresses the validity of a will containing both typewritten and handwritten instructions, and the appointment of an estate trustee in conflict with the estate’s potential beneficiaries.

Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.

Click here for more information on Doreen So

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18 May

Rule 74.15 Orders for Assistance – when is the relief sought too broad?

Sydney Osmar Estate & Trust, Litigation Tags: , 0 Comments

In Munro v. Thomas, 2021 ONSC 3320, the Court found that the relief sought by the Applicant under rule 74.15 was outside the scope of the rule, and that the Applicant should have more appropriately sought to compel a passing of accounts under the rule. Further, the relief sought by the Applicant was viewed by the court as not only outside the scope of the rule, but more appropriately pursued as objections in a passing of accounts.

In Munro, the Applicant issued a Notice of Application that sought a broad range of disclosure (though, notably, did not seek to compel a passing of accounts) including:

  • that the Respondent Estate Trustee produce full bank records of the deceased, including those from April 1, 2013 to present;
  • that the Respondent produce the Deceased’s full and complete medical records;
  • the Respondent provide a sworn affidavit explaining as to all gifts he claims the deceased made during her lifetime,
  • the Respondent submit to an examination under oath, and
  • the Respondent submit to cross-examination.

At no point during the Deceased’s lifetime, did she require the use of a Power of Attorney for Care or Property. The Deceased at all times made her own medical and financial decisions. However, the Applicant alleged that the Deceased experienced dementia during her latter phase of life, yet provided no evidence to support this claim. Further, the Applicant did not seek to challenge the Will, nor were any formal claims commenced challenging the validity of the gifts described below.

Many years prior to her death, the Deceased disposed of two pieces of real property (a home and a cottage). The Cottage was transferred to two of her children (one being the Respondent), and, an agreement was entered into such that $33,333.33 would be transferred by the two children to the Applicant on the Deceased’s death, representing approximately 1/3 of the value of the cottage. This transfer was completed on the Deceased’s death. The home was sold to a third-party.

The Applicant was provided with a fulsome accounting of all of the assets that fell into the Estate. The Respondent had attempted to bring a formal passing of accounts but had been advised that a Certificate of Appointment would be required to do so, despite the fact that probate was not required for the administration of the Estate.

The Respondent sought a dismissal of the Application, submitting that the relief sought by the Applicant and the demands made were not consistent with his obligations to account for his dealings with the estate, as the assets in which the Applicant raised inquiry about either passed outside of the estate, or, were distributed by the Deceased prior to her death. The Respondent further submitted that the issues of capacity and undue influence raised by the Applicant all fell outside the scope of the Application under Rule 74.15. Ultimately, the Respondent submitted that the scope of demands pursued by the Applicant would be more appropriately pursued as objections in a passing of accounts, such that the proper course of relief for the Applicant to have pursued would have been to compel a passing of accounts.

The court ultimately agreed with the Respondent. In noting an Estate Trustee’s duty to account, the court turned to Rule 74.17 which sets out the assets required to be accounted for in a proper estate accounting. The court noted that there is no requirement under the Rules for an Estate Trustee to account for assets falling outside of the estate that were passed inter vivos, for tax planning, estate planning, or other purposes.

The Court concluded that the demands made by the Applicant fell outside of the Respondent’s accounting obligations, and the Applicant’s rights as a beneficiary to the Estate. The court furthered that “there are reasonable limits to the extent of an Order that should be made pursuant to Rule 74.15(1). Such an Order is discretionary. It should not be made an instrument of potential abuse of a party arising from the hostility, suspicion or paranoia of another party.

The Court held that the extent of the relief sought by the Applicant was excessive and not warranted by the facts. In dismissing the Application, and ordering a formal court passing, the Court warned that “where a Trustee has given reasonable explanation to the beneficiaries of the assets falling inside and outside of the Estate, has provided legal explanation for their position, and where there is evidence of the Testator’s intentions, beneficiaries who challenge such a Trustee’s accounting without good reason, or who try to force them to pursue assets that lawfully fall outside of the Estate, can be held liable for the Executor’s costs.”

For more on this decision, see Paul Trudelle’s blog here.

For more on how to avoid a passing of accounts, see Natalia Angelini’s blog here.

Thanks for reading!

Sydney Osmar

17 May

The Armchair Rule and Will interpretation

Sydney Osmar Estate & Trust, Wills Tags: , 0 Comments

Recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal had the opportunity to consider the correct use of the “armchair rule” in will interpretations.

In Ross v Canada Trust Company, 2021 ONCA 161, the Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the motion judge’s use of the armchair rule to interpret provisions in a Will regarding the disposition of a cottage property was correct.

The motion judge interpreted the Will as directing the proceeds to be equally distributed amongst the Deceased’s four grandchildren. However, one grandchild disagreed with the interpretation, and argued that the proper interpretation would require the sale proceeds to be divided into five equal shares, with distribution of two shares to him, such that he would ultimately receive 40% of the sale proceeds, rather than the 25% that would result from the motion judge’s decision.

The respondents on the appeal cross-appealed. While they agreed with the judgment, they disagreed with the manner in which the decision was arrived at. In short, both parties submitted that the motion judged erred by resorting to the “armchair rule”.

In explaining the armchair rule, the Court of Appeal cites Ian Hull and Suzana Popovic-Montag’s description of the armchair rule in Feeney’s Canadian Law of Wills, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2020) at 10.45 and 10.46:

“In the first instance, the court may be convinced that the testator’s intention can be discerned from the will itself. In such a situation, since the testator must be taken to have used the language of the will in view of the surrounding circumstances known to him or her when he or she made his or her will, evidence of such circumstances is necessarily admissible, at least insofar as it corresponds to the facts and circumstances referred to in the will. It seems obvious that a court might conclude that admissible evidence of surrounding circumstances is not helpful in determining meaning…The court puts itself in the position of the testator at the point when he or she made his or her will, and, from that vantage point, reads the will, and construes it, in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances. This approach is commonly referred to as the “armchair rule”. [emphasis added].

The Court of Appeal rejected the arguments raised by the parties, and concluded that the interpretative methodology applied by the motion judge was sound. The Court found that where the motions judge could not discern the plain meaning of the Will’s language, the motions judge correctly took a step back to “consider the bigger picture” of the surrounding circumstances and applied the armchair rule. The court furthered that given the inconsistency that results from the two Will provisions in question, it was necessary to resort to the armchair rule.

The Court of Appeal ultimately held that the motion judge did not err in applying the armchair rule, the conclusion did not reveal any palpable or overriding error, and, the decision was well supported by the evidence.

Thanks for reading!

Sydney Osmar

08 Apr

Incapacity to Sue under section 7 of the Limitations Act, 2002

Doreen So Capacity, Continuing Legal Education, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Ethical Issues, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

The basic limitation period under section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002 provides that a proceeding shall not be commenced in respect of a claim after the second anniversary of the day on which the claim was discovered.  However, pursuant to section 7(1) of the Act,  the “clock” does not run when the person with the claim,

(a)  is incapable of commencing a proceeding in respect of the claim because of his or her physical, mental or psychological condition; and

(b)  is not represented by a litigation guardian in relation to the claim.

A person is also presumed to be capable of commencing a proceeding in respect of a claim at all time unless the contrary is proved (section 7(2)), although minors are dealt with separately under section 6 of the Act.

The issue of the plaintiff’s capacity to commence a proceeding in respect of his claim was considered at length by the Court of Appeal in Carmichael v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc., 2020 ONCA 447Carmichael is a tragic case involving the murder of the plaintiff’s 11 year old son.  The plaintiff strangled his son to death in 2004 when he was suffering from mental illness and psychotic delusions.  During this time, the plaintiff was also taking an anti-depressant that was manufactured by the defendant drug company.  The plaintiff was charged with murder and he was found to be not criminally responsible as a result of his mental disorder.  He later received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board on December 2, 2009.  Nearly two years after that, the plaintiff commenced his claims against the drug company on October 5, 2011.

The defendant drug company brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim as statute barred.  The motions judge dismissed the motion because he found that the plaintiff was incapable of commencing a proceeding because of his psychological condition until the day of his absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board.  The Court of Appeal disagreed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the use of the Huang/Hengeveld indicators as a list of non-exhaustive, objectively verifiable indicators of incapacity under section 7(1)(a) of the Act (see paras. 94-96):

  • a person’s ability to know or understand the minimum choices or decisions required to make them;
  • an appreciation of the consequences and effects of his or her choices or decisions;
  • an appreciation of the nature of the proceedings;
  • a person’s ability to choose and keep counsel;
  • a person’s ability to represent him or herself;
  • a person’s ability to distinguish between the relevant and irrelevant issues; and,
  • a person’s mistaken beliefs regarding the law or court procedures.

Moreover, the plaintiff’s physical, mental, or psychological condition must be the cause for the incapacity in order to meet section 7(1)(a).  The incapacity cannot arise from other sources, such as lack of sophistication, education, or cultural differences (para. 101).

The Court of Appeal ultimately found that the plaintiff had the capacity to sue the defendant drug company prior to his absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board.  The Court disagreed with the motions judge’s view of the plaintiff’s expert evidence.  The plaintiff’s expert witness was criticized for never having prepared a capacity assessment before and for making conclusions that were unsupported by the evidence.  Rather,

“The evidence shows that Mr. Carmichael had several reasons for not suing GSK before December 2, 2009: he did not believe he had the necessary expert evidence until he received the genetic test from Dr. Lucire in October 2009; he was worried about repercussions if the Hospital decided that he was not taking responsibility for his actions; and he was concerned for his own and his family’s well-being. These are understandable reasons for not commencing a lawsuit. But in my view, none of these reasons, alone or together, prove that Mr. Carmichael was incapable of suing GSK until December 2, 2009 because of his psychological condition.” (para. 163)

Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied last week.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

06 Apr

Hull on Estates #610 – Inherent Jurisdiction and Standing in Trust Litigation

76admin Estate & Trust, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, Hull on Estates, Litigation, Podcasts Tags: , , 0 Comments

 This week on Hull on Estates, Natalia Angelini and Garrett Horrocks discuss the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Carroll v Toronto Dominion Bank, 2021 ONCA 38, pertaining to the issue of standing in trust litigation.

 

Should you have any questions, please email us at webmaster@hullandhull.com or leave a comment on our blog.

Click here for more information on Natalia Angelini

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