Category: Capacity

30 Jun

Changes to Consent and Capacity Board Coverage

Noah Weisberg Capacity, In the News Tags: , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Legal Aid Ontario has published a notice setting out changes to coverage for Consent and Capacity Board appeals.

Effective June 23, 2020, Legal Aid Ontario is making the following changes to its certificate coverage:

    1. an additional 10 hours will be offered to the current 25 hours allocated on the CCB appeal tariff. This increases total coverage to 35 hours
  1. a new 10-hour certificate for motions for emergency/urgent CCB treatment orders held in the Superior Court is being introduced

The full notice can be found here.

If you have applied for CCB appeal coverage from March 13 onward, Legal Aid Ontario will be contacting you regarding the notice.  If you have not heard from Legal Aid Ontario, you should contact them directly.

Any attempt to increase access to justice, is always welcome.

Noah Weisberg

If you find this blog interesting,  please  consider these other related blogs:

29 Jun

Don’t Worry Be Happy

Noah Weisberg Capacity, Health / Medical Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

Yes, you’re reading this blog on a Monday.  As week days go, Monday isn’t nearly as fun as a Thursday, or Friday.  But that doesn’t mean you should be unhappy.  A recent study purports that repetitive negative thinking is linked to cognitive decline.

The authors of the study propose that repetitive negative thinking may be a new risk factor for dementia.  Based on various tests, the study found that when compared to non-pessimists, people who think negatively have a greater buildup of certain proteins in the brain that cause Alzheimer’s disease (the most common type of dementia), a worse memory, and greater cognitive decline.

Based on this correlation, it is believed important to think happy thoughts.  Whether you are a glass half empty or half full kind of person, the brain can be trained to be more optimistic.  This can be done in a number of ways, including:

  • meditating – one study found that only 30 minutes a day over a two week period produced a measurable change in the brain
  • practicing gratefulness – taking a few minutes each day to write down what you are thankful for
  • reframing negative thoughts –changing your perspective on a situation to give more of a positive or beneficial meaning to you

As Bobby McFerrin sings, ‘In every life we have some trouble / But when you worry you make it double / Don’t worry, be happy / Don’t worry, be happy now’.

Happy Monday,

Noah Weisberg

If you find this blog interesting, please consider these other related blogs:

30 Apr

Incapacity Planning Considerations Specific to COVID-19

Nick Esterbauer Capacity, Elder Law, Power of Attorney Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Earlier this week, Ian Hull and I spoke at Osgoode Professional Development’s program on Powers of Attorney and Guardianship: Non-Contentious and Contentious Matters.

During the program, in addition to discussing new execution options for wills and powers of attorney, the panel shared its thoughts on a number of considerations relevant to the preparation of powers of attorney during the pandemic, including some of the following:

  • It may now be impractical to permit for decisions regarding personal care or property to be made only jointly by two or more attorneys acting together where the attorneys selected are not members of the same household.
  • In light of ongoing travel restrictions, it may be increasingly important that the selected attorney(s) for property and/or personal care are local.
  • It may be more difficult to access multiple medical professionals (or a specified medical professional) to confirm incapacity during a healthcare crisis.  The provision regarding the circumstances in which a power of attorney is to become effective should accommodate potentially limited access to a specified physician or more medical professionals than necessary.
  • It may be more important than ever to ensure that the original power of attorney documents (and/or copies) are physically accessible to the named attorney(s).
  • The current circumstances present a unique opportunity to assist clients in updating outdated plans and ensuring that powers of attorney are put into place for those who do not have them already.

Even outside of the context of a pandemic, considering practical issues like those set out above when creating or updating an incapacity plan is a worthwhile exercise and may expose potential problems with the plan before it is finalized.

Thank you for reading.

Nick Esterbauer

 

Other blog entries that may be of interest:

20 Apr

Volk v. Volk: ONCA Refusals and Stay Motion heard April 14, 2020

Doreen So Capacity, Litigation, Power of Attorney, Recently Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

The motions in Volk v. Volk, 2020 ONCA 256, arose from an appeal of an order to, inter alia, sell a property owned, in part, by Doris Volk, who is incapable of managing her own property, and to pay the net proceeds of sale to Doris’ husband, George.  This case is instructive for how matters are currently proceeding before the Court of Appeal and in general for the scope of examinations under SDA matters.

George is not Doris’ attorney for property.  The attorneys for property are Doris’ daughter, Darlene, and Doris’ sister, Lisa.  George brought an application under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 because he claimed that the property was improperly transferred by the attorneys from Doris, as the sole owner, to Doris and Darlene’s daughter, Felicia, as tenants in common.  At the time of the application, the property was registered with a 1% interest in Doris’ name and the rest was registered in Felicia’s name.  Furthermore, the property was occupied by Darlene but George claimed that the carrying costs of the property were paid from Doris’ money in further breach of trust.

George’s application was granted on January 7, 2020 on the consent of Lisa.  Darlene, Felicia, and the Public Guardian and Trustee did not appear or file opposing materials.  The house was sold with a closing date of May 16, 2020.

Darlene and Felicia appeals the order of January 7th on ground that they were not properly served or provided with adequate notice of the application.  They also brought a stay motion with a supporting affidavit from Felicia.  Felicia was cross-examined on her affidavit and she refused a number of questions on the advice of her counsel.  This led George to bring a refusals motion and an request for an adjournment of the motion for a stay pending appeal.

Both the refusals motion and the stay motion were scheduled to be heard before Justice Paciocco on April 14, 2020.  Justice Paciocco noted that the agreement for purchase and sale gave the stay motion added urgency.  The matter proceed on April 14th with counsel for Darlene and Felicia appearing by phone and counsel for George appearing by videoconference.  George’s refusals motion was allowed in part.   Justice Paciocco clarified that the proper scope of a cross-examination on an affidavit is governed by the issues that are relevant to motion.  It includes questions that are relevant to credibility so long as it within the competence of the motions judge to determine (para. 10).  He then goes on to give reasons for why certain categories of questions ought to be answered and why other categories were found to be irrelevant or unfair.  Of note, questions about Doris’ state of mind were properly refused because it was unfair for Felicia to speak for Doris (para. 19).

Since counsel for George acknowledged that further examinations were not feasible as a result of COVID-19, Justice Paciocco ordered a timetable for answers and follow up questions in writing.  The stay motion was adjourned to May 1st.

Thanks for reading and keep well.

Doreen So

05 Mar

Revocation of a Power of Attorney for Personal Care and its impact on substitute decision making under the Health Care Consent Act

Sydney Osmar Capacity, Elder Law, Health / Medical Tags: 0 Comments

Section 20 of the Health Care Consent Act (“HCCA”) provides for a legislative hierarchy of substitute decision makers for persons who have been found incapable with respect to treatment. The hierarchy is as follows:

  1. The incapable person’s guardian of the person;
  2. The incapable person’s attorney for personal care;
  3. The incapable person’s representative appointed by the Consent and Capacity Board;
  4. The incapable person’s spouse or partner;
  5. A child or parent of the incapable person, or an agency that replaces the parent’s authority;
  6. A parent of the person who only has a right of access;
  7. A brother or sister of the incapable person; and
  8. Any other relative of the incapable person.

Those in the above list may only give or refuse consent on behalf of the incapable person if they are: at least 16 years of age, are not prohibited by court order, are available, and are willing to assume this responsibility. A person from the above hierarchy may only act as the substitute decision maker with regard to treatment, if there is not a person who also meets these requirements who ranks higher within the hierarchy.

Sections 20(5) and 20(6) of the HCCA sets out that if no one in the above list meets the requirements to make treatment decisions, or, if there are two equally ranking parties who both meet requirements but disagree on the treatment decision, the decision will devolve to the Public Guardian and Trustee (“PGT”).

As is clear by the placement within the above hierarchy, the act of granting a power of attorney for personal care (“POAPC”) holds great weight when it comes to determining substitute decision makers with regard to treatment decisions. However, the significance of the act of revoking a POAPC in relation to the legislative hierarchy is less clear.

For example, it is quite common for a person to grant a POAPC to their spouse or child, however, in revoking the POAPC, the spouse or child could still remain the legal substitute decision maker under the section 20 hierarchy, should there be no other higher ranking individual willing and able to make treatment decisions, and if the grantor fails to execute a new POAPC.

I have located two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board (the “Board”), which suggests that in such circumstances, the Board will pull language from other sections of the HCCA to circumvent the hierarchy provided under section 20, where it is clear to do so would be in the incapable person’s best interests.

In A(I) Re, Mrs. I.A. had previously appointed her two children as her attorneys for care. However, this POAPC was later revoked, with Mrs. I.A. informing her lawyer she feared her two children would be unable to reach agreements on important health care decisions. Two distant relatives were instead appointed pursuant to a new POAPC. However, when Mrs. I.A. lost capacity, and a treatment decision needed to be made, the distant relatives felt they were not best suited to make such a decision.

Both children applied to act as Mrs. I.A.’s representative under s. 33 of the HCCA. In coming to its decision the Board accepted that Mrs. I.A.’s overt act of revoking the POAPC that appointed her children was a prior expressed relevant value and belief, however, this did not impact the fact that both children still qualified as decision makers under the section 20 hierarchy. The Board ultimately determined that it was not in Mrs. I.A.’s best interests to have her children act as decision makers, and concluded they could not agree, such that the decision devolved to the PGT.

In D(D) Re, this issue again arose, where the incapable person, D.D. (prior to becoming incapable) granted a POAPC to her husband, later revoking the POAPC when she believed that her husband would not act in her best interests. Because a new POAPC was never executed, the husband remained the legal decision maker under section 20. D.D.’s daughter, J.R., brought an application to the Board to act as her representative. In coming to its conclusion, the Board noted that it was clear that D.D. had not understood that by revoking the POAPC, her husband would remain the decision maker under the HCCA hierarchy, and that it was equally clear her intention had been to remove her husband as the legal decision maker. Therefore, to circumvent the hierarchy, the Board turned to a best interests analysis and ultimately appointed D.D.’s daughter as her decision maker.

Thanks for reading!

Sydney Osmar

For a related discussion on consent to treatment and the HCCA, click here.

30 Jan

What Impact Might MAID Have on a Will Challenge?

Nick Esterbauer Capacity, Estate Litigation, Health / Medical, Wills Tags: , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

In preparing my other blogs this week, I spent some time considering the issue of how we might see the increased access to medical assistance in dying (MAID) impact our practice area.  As such, I thought that I would finish off this series of blogs focusing on MAID with a hypothetical question I have not yet encountered in practice, but which is inevitably going to be raised: what impact, if any, does MAID have on a will challenge?

Our regular readers will already be well aware that capacity is task, time, and situation specific.

Presumably, the standard of capacity applying to the decision to access MAID is that required to make other personal care decisions, such as receiving or refusing medical treatment.  Section 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, defines incapacity for personal care as follows:

A person is incapable of personal care if the person is not able to understand information that is relevant to making a decision concerning his or her own health care, nutrition, shelter, clothing, hygiene or safety, or is not able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.

I have been unable to find any literature suggesting whether the standard may be somewhat heightened as a result of the significant impact of the decision to actually receive MAID.

The standard for testamentary capacity typically applied remains that set out in the old English authority of Banks v Goodfellow.  While some have suggested that the standard of testamentary capacity be updated, we are generally concerned with the same, well-established criteria:

It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties—that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.

While, historically, standards of mental capacity were viewed as hierarchical, recent case law and commentary have strayed from this understanding, instead viewing the different standards of mental capacity as just that: different.  Courts will consider whether an individual understood the nature of the decision being made and appreciated the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their decision.

Consent to MAID must be confirmed very shortly before it is administered, which restriction has been of considerable controversy.  While possessing the capacity to confirm consent to obtain MAID may not correspond to testamentary capacity, it may nevertheless become evidence suggestive of a degree of mental capacity that is valuable (in conjunction with other evidence) in establishing that a last will and testament executed shortly before death is valid.

Whether the fact that MAID has been achieved will be important evidence on a will challenge in support of testamentary capacity or not remains to be seen, but it will be interesting to see how the laws relating to MAID evolve and how incidents of MAID may impact estate law over time.

Thank you for reading,

Nick Esterbauer

27 Jan

Recent Developments in MAID

Nick Esterbauer Capacity, Elder Law, Ethical Issues, Health / Medical, In the News Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

Our blog has previously covered the developments in medical assistance in dying (MAID) since the prohibition against MAID ended in Canada in 2016.

Almost 230 thousand Canadians responded to a recent government survey on MAID, making it the largest public consultation in Canadian history.  Although the complete survey results have yet to be released, respondents are reported to have shown great support for making it easier for Canadians to access MAID.

As MAID has gained recognition throughout the country, many have fought for increased accessibility and the expansion of eligibility criteria.  Specifically, some believe that the criteria are too restrictive in excluding (1) individuals whose deaths are not imminent, and (2) those who cannot consent to receive MAID at the time at which it is administered.  Because recipients of MAID are required to provide consent personally immediately prior to its administration (rather than in advance), health problems that may also impact mental capacity can render some of them ineligible.

In some parts of the country, MAID is already accessed at significant levels.  In Vancouver Island, with the greatest access in Canada to MAID per capita, MAID accounted for over six percent of all deaths in 2019.

Given the clear engagement of Canadians regarding the issue of enhancing access to MAID, it will be interesting to see how legislation regarding MAID may be updated over time to address the potential introduction of advanced consent and/or the authority of substitute decision-makers to confirm consent.

Thank you for reading,

Nick Esterbauer

 

Other blog posts that may be of interest:

13 Nov

Important Principles from the ONCA Regarding Capacity

Suzana Popovic-Montag Beneficiary Designations, Capacity, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Executors and Trustees, Trustees, Wills Tags: , 0 Comments

Lewis v. Lewis is a recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in which the Appellants challenged the dismissal of their Application from the Superior Court of Justice. At issue was whether the Appellants’ mother, Marie Lewis, had the requisite capacity to execute new powers of attorney for property and personal care. The Appellants sought to invalidate the new powers of attorney and bring back into effect prior powers of attorney which Mrs. Lewis executed in 1995.

The Appellants raised several issues on appeal. In essence, they took issue with the application judge’s assessment of the evidence and exercise of his case management discretion.

In dismissing the appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized the following principles regarding capacity:

  • Since capacity is presumed, those objecting to the document(s) have the onus to rebut that presumption, with clear evidence, on a balance of probabilities.
  • Similarly, those raising the issue of suspicious circumstances and undue influence bear the onus of establishing it, on a balance of probabilities.
  • The fact that someone had various chronic medical conditions throughout their life does not automatically mean that they lacked capacity. It is open to the application judge to consider the evidence. In doing so, the application judge may reject any evidence that they find to be unreliable.
  • Without evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable for an application judge to take “solace” from the fact that the individual executed their new powers of attorney before their solicitor of many years.
  • It is reasonable for an application judge to refer to the statements of section 3 counsel, appointed by the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, concerning an individual’s expressed wishes.

Good things to keep in mind when dealing with capacity issues.

Thanks for reading … Have a great day!

Suzana Popovic-Montag and Celine Dookie

12 Sep

Section 2(4) of the Substitute Decisions Act: Releases and Reverse Onuses

Sydney Osmar Capacity, Guardianship Tags: 0 Comments

Under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 (“SDA”), if a person is eighteen years of age or more, there is a presumption of capacity. However, pursuant to section 2(4) of the SDA, if a gift, or contract is made by a person either while the person’s property is under guardianship, or within one year before the guardianship is established, the onus shifts to the other person to prove that they did not have reasonable grounds to believe the person incapable.

In the recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court), Foisey v Green, the Court provides clarification on the correct test to be applied under section 2(4).

In Foisey v Green, Ms. Foisey and Ms. Green were the co-beneficiaries of their brother’s estate, who had died intestate. Ms. Foisey and Ms. Green had been estranged for many years, however, through the use of a private investigator, Ms. Green was able to locate her sister at a retirement residence in Ontario. Ms. Green then met with her sister and arranged for legal representation. Ms. Foisey ultimately renounced her right to act as estate trustee of her brother’s estate and when the time came to distribute the assets of the estate, Ms. Foisey provided Ms. Green with a release.

Shortly after having provided the release, Ms. Foisey was found to be incapable of managing her own property, and the Public Guardian and Trustee (“PGT”) was appointed as her guardian of property. The PGT became concerned that Ms. Foisey had received significantly less than what was supposed to be a 50% share in the estate. The PGT made repeated inquiries for more information from Ms. Green and her counsel, but received little to no response. In result, the PGT brought an application seeking to compel Ms. Green to pass her accounts.

In applying section 2(4) of the SDA, the application judge concluded that because of the existence of red flags, Ms. Green had not satisfied that she did not have reasonable grounds to believe Ms. Foisey was incapable when she signed the release. The red flags identified by the application judge included the fact that Ms. Foisey had a long-standing mental illness, that Ms. Foisey lived in a retirement residence, that Ms. Foisey was part of a trusteeship program and that Ms. Green and her lawyer had failed to provide the PGT with any information to satisfy their concerns. For these reasons, the application judge ordered Ms. Foisey to pass her accounts.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the “red flags” test applied by the application judge was the incorrect test to apply, because in doing so, the judge failed to consider the extent to which each red flag was known by Ms. Green, and whether Ms. Green had reasonable grounds to believe that Ms. Foisey was incapable of providing the release.

The Divisional Court examined the meaning of “reasonable grounds to believe” looking to jurisprudence and dictionary definitions, concluding that it means a reasonable probability, or that there be an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information.

The Divisional Court went on to hold that when assessing whether a person has capacity to enter into a contract, at the time of entering into the contract, they must understand the information relevant to deciding whether or not to enter into the contract. If they can do this, you must further ask if the person can appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of entering into the contract.

After laying out the framework of section 2(4), the Divisional Court went on to consider the red flags identified by the application judge, holding that:

  • there was no evidence to suggest Ms. Green knew of her sister’s mental illness,
  • no one from the retirement residence suggested that Ms. Foisey was incapable,
  • Green had spoken with the case manager of the trusteeship program and had not been told that Ms. Foisey had severe mental health difficulties,
  • There was evidence from Ms. Green’s lawyer that Ms. Foisey had legal representation, and appeared to be lucid and understood the release that was properly explained to her by counsel. The Court further acknowledged that a person who suffers from a cognitive impairment is competent with respect to a specific act as long as the act in question takes pace during a lucid interval.

On balance, the Divisional Court concluded that the application judge erred in pointing to “red flags” without addressing what was actually known by Ms. Green, and whether or not that knowledge would lead to reasonable grounds to believe that Ms. Foisey lacked capacity to enter into the release. The Court noted that the most alarming of red flags was the failure of Ms. Green and her lawyer to provide the PGT with information to address his concerns. However, the Court found that the lack of cooperation of Ms. Green and her counsel was not relevant to whether or not Ms. Green had reasonable grounds to believe Ms. Foisey incapable, and, it occurred many months after the execution of the release.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that there is nothing inherently unusual or sinister about an estate trustee requesting a release from a beneficiary – such releases have been commonly used by estate trustees for decades.

Thanks for reading!

Sydney Osmar

 

11 Sep

The Appointment of Section 3 Counsel: Kwok v Kwok

Suzana Popovic-Montag Beneficiary Designations, Capacity, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Uncategorized Tags: , 0 Comments

The Substitute Decisions Act (the “SDA”) was passed in 1992. It governs what happens when a person becomes incapable of managing their own property or personal care. Under section 3 of the SDA, if the capacity of a person in a legal proceeding is in issue, the Public Guardian and Trustee (the “PGT”) may arrange for the legal representation of that person. Section 3 also provides that the person shall be deemed to have the capacity to retain and instruct counsel.

Although section 3 seems to be fairly straightforward, the details surrounding the appointment and position of section 3 counsel are somewhat obscure. Cases such as Sylvester v Britton and Banton v Banton have added some clarity to the role of section 3 counsel. The recent case of Kwok v Kwok provides a further illustration as to when section 3 counsel is to be appointed.

In Kwok v Kwok, Jiefu Kwok was involved in two motor vehicle accidents in 2011. He suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result and commenced two legal actions in relation to the accidents. A capacity assessment was conducted in 2014, which revealed that Jiefu was incapable of taking care of himself and managing his own property. In 2015, Jiefu’s son, Derek, was appointed as his guardian for property and personal care. Derek later filed an application to be released from these roles as he stated that it was putting a strain on his relationship with his father. Derek’s mother, Ellie, brought an application to take Derek’s place and be appointed as Jiefu’s guardian of property and personal care.

The PGT took the position that section 3 counsel should be appointed to represent Jiefu and obtain his wishes before Ellie was appointed as Jiefu’s guardian of property and personal care. The PGT was of the view that Jiefu’s capacity assessment conducted in 2014 was outdated and that a more limited guardianship might be appropriate for him.

Counsel for Derek and Ellie (the “Applicants”) argued that section 3 counsel is to be used in cases where a capacity assessment has not already been conducted. They added that, since a capacity assessment was already conducted in this case, the appointment of section 3 counsel was inappropriate. Moreover, a primary concern for the Applicants was the high costs associated with the appointment of section 3 counsel.

The Court considered the arguments of the PGT and the Applicants and noted the following about the role of section 3 counsel:

  • The appointment of section 3 counsel is a safeguard that protects the dignity, privacy and legal rights of a person who is alleged to be incapable
  • Section 3 of the SDA does not make the appointment of legal representation mandatory
  • In deciding whether to appoint section 3 counsel, the Court must consider the specific facts and issues in each case
  • The Court can appoint section 3 counsel even in cases where a capacity assessment has already been conducted or where there is an existing Court order declaring that a person is incapable

The Court concluded that the appointment of section 3 counsel would not be in Jiefu’s best interests and would be a waste of resources. The Court made this finding based on the following reasons:

  • There were no completing claims amongst Jiefu’s closest relatives as to who should be his legal representative. Both Derek and Ellie supported the appointment of Ellie as Jiefu’s guardian of property and personal care
  • There was no evidentiary basis to question the validity of the 2014 capacity assessment
  • A letter from Jiefu’s primary care physician regarding his current condition did not suggest that Jiefu’s condition had improved
  • Jiefu attended Court and expressed that he supported the appointment of Ellie as his guardian of property and personal care

As a result, Derek was released from his role as Jiefu’s guardian for property and of the person and Ellie was appointed in his place.

Kwok v Kwok adds to a growing body of cases examining the role of section 3 counsel. It provides that the Court can appoint section 3 counsel even in cases where a capacity assessment has already been conducted or where there is an existing Court order declaring that a person is incapable. Furthermore, it indicates that the wishes of the incapable person are to be given a considerable amount of weight in assessing whether section 3 counsel is appropriate.

 

For further reading on section 3 counsel, check out these other blogs:

Section 3 Counsel: Duties to the Client and the Court in Sylvester v Britton

SECTION 3 COUNSEL: A CATCH-22

Thanks for reading – have a great day!

Suzana Popovic-Montag and Celine Dookie

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