Category: TOPICS

12 Dec

Seniors’ homes, trespass orders, and the Residents’ Bill of Rights

Sydney Osmar Elder Law Tags: 0 Comments

Recently, Marketplace has released the results of an investigation into seniors’ homes using trespass orders to ban family members from visiting.  The investigation reviewed over a dozen cases across Canada where family members believe they were banned from visiting their loved ones by retirement homes and long-term care homes as a method of silencing them from advocating on behalf of their loved ones.

In Ontario, one’s entry to a premises can be prohibited through the issuance of a notice under  the Trespass to Property Act.

Marketplace spoke with counsel at the Advocacy Centre for the Elderly (“ACE”) in Toronto, who explained that with regard to retirement homes in Ontario, case law has established that residents who pay to live on the property have a right to receive visitors they choose, without interference.

With regard to long-term care, the Long-Term Care Homes Act (the “Act”) provides residents with statutory protection, setting out that “[e]very resident has the right to communicate in confidence, receive visitors of his or her choice and consult in private with any person without interference.” This particular protection can be located at section 3(14) of the Act, which forms part of the Residents’ Bill of Rights (the “Bill of Rights”). The Act also provides for a reporting and complaints procedure set out from sections 21 to 28.

The Bill of Rights statutorily mandates licensed care homes under the Act (“licensees”) to fulfill certain duties and obligations to their residents, including unhindered visitation and communication with family members and friends, the right to be protected from abuse, the right to exercise the rights of a citizen, and the right to be treated with courtesy, respect and in a manner that fully recognizes the residents’ individuality and respects their dignity.

Importantly, section 3(3) of the Act sets out that a resident may enforce the Bill of Rights against the long-term care home “as though the resident and the licensee had entered into a contract under which the licensee had agreed to fully respect and promote all of the rights set out in the Residents’ Bill of Rights.” While I have been unable to locate a reported decision where a resident (or a litigation guardian of a resident) has attempted to enforce the Bill of Rights vis-a-vis section 3(3), arguably, a resident pursuing such enforcement would have access to relief available in any other breach of contract case, including the specific performance of the contract and monetary damages.

In response to the Marketplace investigation, Ontario MPPs have called for a full investigation into the use of trespass orders against visitors and family members in retirement homes.

To learn more about the Residents’ Bill of Rights, take a listen to Stuart Clark and Doreen So’s recent podcast located here.

Thanks for reading!

Sydney Osmar

11 Dec

Muirhead Estate, Re: A Widowhood Clause from 1919

Suzana Popovic-Montag Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, General Interest, Wills Tags: , , 0 Comments

As we head towards the holiday season, it is a good time to think about the past. The weather is drab and the days are short, too, so we have ample opportunity to curl up in cozy chairs – rum and eggnog in hand, perhaps – to read old books, watch history documentaries, or otherwise reminisce of that which came before us. In line with this, in today’s blog we examine a case from 1919, Muirhead Estate, Re, which includes a decision that is both intriguing and continuously relevant for estate planning.

The deceased had left a widowhood clause in his will, by which he sought to discourage his widow from marrying another. Remarry, however, she did, in the event of which the executors of the Muirhead Estate applied to the court for directions as to the construction of the following clause:

“If my wife shall remarry the share hereby bequeathed to her shall revert to my estate and be divided among my said children.”  

The court had to determine if the clause violated public policy, for even in 1919, conditional gifts “in general restraint of marriage” had long been against public policy. It found that there was a distinction between a restraint of marriage and a restraint of remarriage. The former was clearly grounds for voiding a clause, but the latter was legally valid. In particular, restraining the “second marriage of a woman” was an established exception to the public policy rule. As for the second marriages of men, the court found that these may have still fallen under the umbrella of public policy, but it did not explain or elaborate why.

One hundred years hence, we see from cases such as Goodwin and Brown Estate that the decision in Muirhead Estate, Re, is still good law – though the distinction of second marriages of men and women is in all likelihood obsolete. According to the public policy rule, you cannot, through conditions in your will, prevent a beneficiary from marrying; nor can you promote marital breakdown through such conditions. If, however, you think that your widow looks best in perpetual black finery, or you have a distaste for suitors characteristic of Odysseus, the law likely allows for you to include a widowhood clause in your last will.

 

Happy planning – and thank you for reading!

Suzana Popovic-Montag and Devin McMurtry

10 Dec

The T3 trust return: change in reporting obligations

Sydney Osmar Estate & Trust Tags: 0 Comments

Pursuant to the 2018 Federal Budget, there will be new trust reporting requirements coming into effect for taxation years ending after December 31, 2021.

Prior to the implementation of the forthcoming changes, a Trustee would only have to file a T3 trust return if the trust generated income or distributions were made to beneficiaries during the year.

In addition to this expanded filing requirement, certain parties to the trust (such as trustees, beneficiaries and settlors) will soon be required to provide personal identification information including: names, addresses, dates of birth, social insurance numbers (or in the case of a business, a business number), as well as their jurisdiction of residence.

These requirements will apply to express trusts resident in Canada. The new proposed provisions of the Income Tax Act (the “ITA”) would extend the application of these new requirements to include express trusts that are deemed to be resident in Canada pursuant to section 94 of the ITA.

Express trusts can be loosely defined as those created “on purpose,” that is, the trust is set in express terms, usually in writing, and can be distinguished from trusts that are implied by conduct.

There are exceptions to the application of these changes, including, among others:

  • Trusts that have been in existence for less than three months at the end of the tax year;
  • Employee life and health trusts;
  • Graduated rate estates;
  • A lawyer’s general trust account (but not specific client accounts);
  • Qualified disability trusts; and
  • Trusts that are governed by registered plans such as RRSPs and RRIFs.

Trustees managing trusts that do not fall within one of the enumerated exceptions, may be reluctant to make the disclosure required by these changes, especially where there is a preference to keep personal matters related to the trust private. In such cases, the changes may encourage Trustees to take early steps to wind-up trusts.

Anyone who is subject to the new reporting requirements who fails to file a T3 trust return can be subjected to a penalty in an amount equal to the greater of $2,500 and 5% of the highest fair market value of the assets of the trusts in the year.

Given the risk of potentially significant penalties, estate practitioners should be careful to remind clients who are acting as Trustees that tax advice needs to be obtained, regardless of whether trust assets are generating income.

Thanks for reading!

Sydney Osmar

09 Dec

A Call for Change in Toronto’s Long-Term Care Facilities

Christina Canestraro Elder Law Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

On December 4, 2019, the Economic and Community Development Committee considered a proposal to improve senior services and long-term care in the city of Toronto, which is set to be considered by City Council on December 17, 2019.

The proposal is based on a Report from the Interim General Manager, Seniors Services and Long-Term Care which recommends ways to improve life for residents in long-term care facilities. The proposal sheds light on certain shortcomings of the current institutional model of long-term care facilities. Under the current system, after tending to basic care needs such as eating, bathing, and safety, and ensuring that they have met government mandated reporting requirements, staff are left with little free time. As a result, residents spend the majority of their days alone, without any form of genuine human interaction or purpose.

The proposal will revamp and hopefully reinvigorate the city’s 10 long term care homes by shifting the model of care to one that is emotion-centred. The key components of an emotion-centred approach to care would see increased staffing (with up to 281 new staff by 2025), more hours of care per resident per day, increased funding from the provincial government, and improved bedding.

More importantly, an emotion-centred approach emphasizes the emotional needs of residents, understanding that human connection leads to enjoyment of life. The new approach is based wholly and substantively on an understanding of ageing, equity, diversity and intersectionality.

If adopted, the city of Toronto will be the first to integrate diversity, inclusion and equity directly and comprehensively into an emotion-centred approach to care framework.

If you are interested in learning more, read this article from the Toronto Star. I also recommend reading this 2018 Toronto Star series called “The Fix” about a bold initiative to change care in a dementia unit in a Peel nursing home.

Thanks for reading!

Christina Canestraro

06 Dec

B.C. Court Admits Computer File to Probate

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate Litigation, Wills Tags: , , 0 Comments

In a decision out of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, a computer file prepared by the deceased was accepted as a will and admitted to probate. Applying the curative provisions of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 (“WESA”), which came into force on March 31, 2014, the court was able to conclude that the computer record represented the deceased’s full and final testamentary intentions.

In Hubschi Estate (Re), 2019 BCSC 2040 (CanLII), the deceased died after a short illness. No formal will was found. However, his family was able to locate a Word document on his computer labelled “Budget for 2017”. In that computer file, there was the following statement: “Get a will made out at some point. A 5-way assets split for remaining brother and sisters. Greg and Annette or Trevor as executor.”

By way of family background, the deceased was given up by his birth mother at birth to Children’s Aid. At age 3, the deceased was placed in a foster home with the Stacks. He grew up in the Stack house, and was extremely close to his foster parents and 5 foster siblings. He was treated by the immediate and extended Stack family as a member of the family. Upon his foster mother’s death, her estate was divided into 6 shares, with one share passing to the deceased.

On the other hand, if the document was not found to be a will, the deceased’s estate would pass on an intestacy, and would pass to his birth mother’s sister, with whom the deceased had no contact whatsoever.

The court reviewed a number of decisions applying WESA. The court observed that the purpose of the curative provisions in WESA was to avoid the injustice of a deceased’s testamentary intentions being defeated for no good reason other than strict non-compliance with execution and attestation formalities.

In order to obtain probate of a non-compliant document, the propounder must demonstrate (1) that the testamentary document is authentic, and (2) that the testamentary document contains the full, final and fixed intention of the will-maker. The court found that both of these requirements were met in the Hubschi case.

Previously, I blogged on an Australian case where an unsent text message was admitted to probate under similar legislation. Read about it here. This decision was referred to by the court in Hubschi.

For better or for worse, Ontario legislation does not allow for substantial compliance with the formalities of will execution, and strict compliance is required. While this may lead to greater certainty, it also means that the testamentary intentions of a will-maker are often disregarded where there is not strict compliance with the formal requirements of execution.

 

Have a great weekend.

Paul Trudelle

05 Dec

Interim Support – The Intersection of Spousal Support & Dependant’s Support

Rebecca Rauws Support After Death Tags: , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

In the recent decision of Gabourie v Gabourie, 2019 ONSC 6282, the court considered a motion for (among other things) interim support by the deceased’s separated spouse.

The applicant wife had separated from her spouse (now deceased) approximately two years prior to his death in March 2018. At the time of the deceased’s death, he and the applicant had been in the process of negotiating the terms of their separation and divorce. They had already entered into an interim separation agreement, which dealt with the proceeds from the sale of their matrimonial home. After the deceased’s death, the applicant and the respondent (who was the deceased’s sister, estate trustee, and sole beneficiary)  were able to agree on the issue of equalization of net family property, and a payment was made to the applicant. The issue of spousal/dependant’s support remained outstanding.

The applicant sought a lump sum interim support payment of $50,000.00. Ultimately, the court awarded the applicant interim support of $30,000.00.

Providing Support or Under a Legal Obligation to Provide Support

The fact that the spouses had been separated at the time of the deceased’s death was considered as part of the court’s determination of whether the applicant was a “dependant” (specifically as to whether the deceased was providing support to her, or was under a legal obligation to provide support to her, immediately before his death) and whether the deceased made adequate provision for the applicant’s support.

The court found that there was no evidence that the Deceased had been actually providing support to the applicant prior to his death. They had been separated for two years; in that time the deceased had several health complications and lost his job. He was not supporting the applicant, nor was the applicant relying on him for support. However, spousal support remained an issue to be resolved as part of the separation between the deceased and the applicant. The court stated that there was no evidence that the applicant had waived her right to spousal support, and that, as a married spouse, the deceased was under a legal obligation to support the applicant.

Amount of Interim Support

In arriving at the amount of interim support awarded to the applicant, the court considered the financial circumstances of the deceased’s estate, and of the applicant. Based on preliminary disclosure from the respondent, the Deceased’s estate had a value of approximately $650,000.00, as well as an insurance benefit of $75,000.00. The applicant’s net worth was around $220,000.00, and she earned only a modest part-time income. The applicant also had a significant amount of debt relative to her assets, which the applicant submitted she was required to incur as she was not receiving spousal support and was unable to meet her expenses.

However, the court was mindful of the amount of support sought relative to the value of the estate. The applicant sought $50,000.00, stating that this amount was sought for legal fees that she had incurred in pursuing her dependant’s support claim.

The court was disinclined to award the applicant the full amount sought given the stage of the proceeding, and that it was not yet known whether the applicant would succeed on her application, stating that it was nearly seven percent of the value of the deceased’s estate.

Thanks for reading,

Rebecca Rauws

 

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04 Dec

Is over-involvement by an adult child in preparing a Will or Power of Attorney “suspicious”?

Ian Hull Estate Litigation, Executors and Trustees, Power of Attorney, Wills Tags: , , 0 Comments

One of the ways a Will can be declared invalid is if the court finds that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation of it. In Graham v. Graham, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that significant involvement from the testator/grantor’s child was indicative of suspicious circumstances regarding the preparation of a Will and Power of Attorney (POA).

The Facts

The testator, Jackie, had four children: Tim, Robert, Christine and Steven.

Jackie suffered from terminal cancer. She was hospitalized from November 22, 2015 to December 7, 2015, and again from December 22, 2015 to December 24, 2015, to receive treatment for severe pain.

In mid-December 2015, Robert’s wife, Tammy, searched for and contacted a lawyer to prepare a Will and POA for Jackie. Tammy obtained a Client Information Sheet (CIS) from the lawyer’s office and completed it herself. The lawyer prepared the documents based on this CIS. At Robert’s request, the lawyer went to the hospital to meet Jackie and have her sign the Will and POA. This was the first time Jackie met the lawyer and saw the Will and POA.

Jackie’s Will named Robert as estate trustee and sole beneficiary of her estate. The POA named Robert as Jackie’s sole attorney for property. Robert’s wife, Tammy, was named as the alternate estate trustee and attorney.

On January 4, 2018, Robert used the POA to transfer Jackie’s house to himself as sole owner. Four days later, Jackie died of cancer.

Tim challenged the validity of Jackie’s Will and POA claiming that they were prepared under suspicious circumstances and that Jackie was subject to undue influence by Robert and Tammy.

The Decision

Applying the tests set out in Vout v. Hay and Orfus Estate v. Samuel & Bessie Orfus Family, Justice L. Sheard found that there were suspicious circumstances based on the following facts:

  • Jackie had been in ill health for a long time prior to her death, so it was reasonable to infer she had chosen to die without a will, until Robert’s involvement.
  • Jackie was treated with heavy painkillers on the night and morning of the day she signed the will and POA.
  • Robert and Tammy “orchestrated virtually every aspect of the Will and the POA”, which included searching for a lawyer, providing instructions, arranging for the lawyer to meet Jackie, remaining in Jackie’s room for part of the meeting, and taking part in the discussions concerning the Will and POA.
  • The drafting lawyer relied entirely on Robert and Tammy to provide him with all of the information concerning the Will and POA.

After finding that suspicious circumstances existed, the burden then shifted to Robert to prove that Jackie had testamentary capacity and that she knew and approved of the contents of the Will and POA. Using the test for testamentary capacity as outlined in Banks v. Goodfellow (1870), the court found that Robert could not establish that Jackie had testamentary capacity. In coming to this conclusion, the court considered the following:

  • There was no evidence that Jackie was given the Will or the POA to read or that it was read to her.
  • Although Jackie knew where she was living, there was no evidence to indicate that she had any knowledge or understanding of the monetary value of her house.
  • It was unclear whether Jackie could do more than repeat what she was told.
  • Jackie was confused and/or mistaken in certain beliefs about her son, Tim.
  • The medications that Jackie was taking for her pain left her confused and drowsy.

As a result, the Will and the POA were declared invalid.

Conclusion

Graham v. Graham serves as a cautionary tale for adult children who become too involved in the drafting of their parents Wills and POAs. It warns us that the courts view this type of involvement as suspicious. Moreover, Graham v. Graham suggests that physical impairment can impact a testator’s mental state, thus making them vulnerable.

Thanks for reading!

Ian Hull  and Celine Dookie

02 Dec

What are the Costs Consequences of Alleging Undue Influence?

Rebecca Rauws Estate Litigation Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

One way that dispositions such as a gift during one’s lifetime, or a Will, may be challenged is on the basis of undue influence. However, allegations of undue influence are often difficult to prove. Additionally, due to the nature of these types of allegations, which often call into question the character of the alleged influencer, they are taken seriously by the court. As a result, parties should be cautious in alleging undue influence, and should be virtually certain that they will be able to back up their claims.

A recent example of this was in the costs decision of Nimchick v Nimchick, 2019 ONSC 6653. A mother and daughter had claimed that their son/brother (“B”) had devised a plan to financially exploit his mother for the benefit of himself, his spouse, and his son, (“J”). The circumstances leading to this allegation involved the mother adding J’s name to a bank account belonging to the mother, for the purpose of paying for J’s student loans, with any excess going to B. The trial judge dismissed the mother and daughter’s claim, finding that the mother intended to gift the money to B and J, and that B had not exerted undue influence over his mother.

The defendants, who were wholly successful, sought their substantial indemnity costs, in the amount of approximately $147,000.00. The court noted that the defendants’ partial indemnity costs of the action were approximately $100,000.00.

In making its determination as to costs, the court considered the circumstances in which elevated costs are warranted, including where the unsuccessful party has engaged in reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous behaviour that is worthy of sanction. The court found that the mother and daughter’s behaviour had been of this nature. This conclusion seemed to have largely been based on the court’s finding that the mother and daughter advanced baseless allegations of wrongdoing and failed to prove their claims of civil fraud and deceit. Overall, the court preferred B’s evidence to the evidence from the mother and daughter.

The court ultimately awarded costs to the defendants in the amount of $100,000.00. This amounted to the defendants’ partial indemnity costs, according to a note included in the decision. Accordingly, it does not appear that the award against the plaintiffs was necessarily on an elevated scale. The costs awarded were, however, $15,000.00 more than the amount submitted by the plaintiffs as being appropriate.

Thanks for reading,

Rebecca Rauws

 

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29 Nov

When Administering an Estate, Don’t Let Things Drag

Hull & Hull LLP Beneficiary Designations, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Support After Death, Trustees, Uncategorized, Wills 0 Comments

My father used to have a saying: “Whatever drags gets dirty.” He would trot it out whenever one of us waited too long to do something and as a result, doing that thing became messy, complicated or impossible. For example: I was supposed to mail a letter. I didn’t mail the letter. Now I can’t find the letter. “Whatever drags gets dirty!”. Thanks, Dad.

Growing up, I thought that this was a widespread adage. Apparently, it isn’t. I searched it up on the internet and most of the results referred to Rupaul’s “Drag Race”.

The adage may fittingly sum up the lesson contained in the decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Probate in Kelly Estate, 2019 NSPB 1 (CanLII).

There, the deceased’s daughter and estate trustee, Carrie, brought an application for the possession of an urn containing the cremated remains of the deceased. The deceased died 13½ years before the application. Probate was granted 8 years before the application.

In the deceased’s will, cremation was requested, and Carrie was expressly given “the powers to decide what will happen with the said ashes.” This was consistent with the court’s observation that “Disposition of the deceased is one of the most fundamental tasks an executor/rix can undertake on behalf of the deceased.”

However, after the deceased’s death, the ashes were taken by Carrie’s sister, Cheryl. They remained at Cheryl’s home, apparently with the acquiescence of Carrie. The court noted that there was no evidence to suggest that there were prior attempts by Carrie to regain custody and control of the ashes over the 13½ years since death.

The court cited the BC decision of Re Popp Estate, 2001 BCSC 183 (CanLII) where the deceased’s husband, as estate trustee, was said to be entitled to control the disposition of the deceased’s remains, provided he did not act capriciously. As the husband was acting capriciously, he lost the right to deal with his spouse’s remains.

The court went on to find that by allowing the urn to remain in Cheryl’s possession for 13½ years, Carrie as estate trustee had in fact determined the disposition and final resting place of the urn: with Cheryl. A change of Carrie’s decision this late in the game “seems capricious at best or malicious at worst”, and the court was not prepared to order a transfer of the urn from Cheryl to Carrie.

When administering an estate, as in life in general, don’t let things drag.

Thanks for reading.

Paul Trudelle

28 Nov

A Step Toward Equal Inheritance Rights

Nick Esterbauer Estate & Trust, In the News, Public Policy, Wills Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

A recent decision by an Egyptian court saw the reversal of the trend in following Islamic Sharia inheritance law under which female beneficiaries are entitled to half the interest of their male counterparts.

The claimant, a human rights lawyer, applied to obtain the same rights as her brothers on the death of her father.  Her case was previously dismissed by two courts.

In Egypt, Sharia principles are typically applied unless the parties agree that Christian inheritance laws, which do not favour male beneficiaries over females, instead be followed.  In this case, the claimant and her brothers agreed that the administration of their father’s estate would not be subject to Sharia inheritance rules.

Last year, a proposed law in Tunisia designed to promote equality in respect of inheritances sparked discussion regarding unequal inheritances in a number of jurisdictions including Egypt.  A 2017 survey suggests that over half of Tunisia’s population remains opposed to equal inheritance rights.

It is anticipated that this decision may result in significant change in jurisdictions where Sharia law has historically been applied in respect of personal property, regardless of religion.

Canadian courts have also considered the issue of cultures that may support an estate plan favouring sons over daughters simply on the basis of their gender.  In Grewal v Litt, 2019 BCSC 1154, the daughters of the deceased challenged the Wills left by their parents, who both died in 2016, on the basis that they discriminated against them in favour of their brothers on the basis of their sex.  The four daughters applied under Section 60 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c 13 (the “WESA“), for the variation of the Wills that directed the payment of $150,000 to each daughter, while the residue of the estates valued at greater than $9 million was left to the two sons.

Justice Adair noted that there was no dispute that the parents owed a moral obligation to their daughters under BC law, and, as the Wills made inadequate provision for them, they should be varied under the WESA.  The Court attempted to resolve the matter by balancing the adequate, just, and equitable provision for the daughters with their parents’ testamentary autonomy and varied the division of estate assets from approximately 93% in favour of the sons with only a combined 7% for the daughters, to the more equitable division of 15% of the value of the estates for each daughter and 20% for each son.  Notwithstanding the granting of the variation of the Wills, the Court stopped short of finding that the parents’ testamentary intentions were motivated solely by unacceptable discrimination against the daughters.

While many provinces do not recognize a parental obligation to benefit a non-dependant adult child after death, coming years may nevertheless see an increase in the number of challenges to a will on the basis that its terms are discriminatory.

Thank you for reading.

Nick Esterbauer

 

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