Category: Public Policy

21 Feb

Policy and Estate Planning in Film

Garrett Horrocks Disappointed Beneficiaries, Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, General Interest, Hull on Estate and Succession Planning, In the News, Public Policy 0 Comments

This blog is the second and final blog in my series discussing estates-related topics in the film The Grand Budapest Hotel.  While the first part focused on the application of forfeiture rules in the context of a testator’s murder, this blog specifically discusses the policy considerations that arise as a result of the further Last Will and Testament executed by one of the film’s characters, Madame D.

As a brief refresher, late in the film, a further Last Will and Testament executed by Madame D is discovered, the operation of which is only to be given effect in the event of Madame D’s death by murder.  While the concept makes for an interesting twist in the film, in reality the purported condition precedent that the Will takes effect only upon death by murder likely means nothing in the context of Madame D’s estate planning.

Part I of Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act specifically contemplates that a Will is revoked by, among other actions, the execution of a subsequent Will made in accordance with the provisions of that section.  It is not made clear in the film which of Madame D’s two Wills were executed last.  If the further Will was executed most recently and complied with all of the requirements of due execution, the prior Will would have been revoked and the second Will would likely prevail irrespective of the condition precedent.

Alternatively, a Will may also be revoked by a written direction of the testator to do so.  Failure to expressly revoke a prior Will can potentially create problematic administration scenarios in which a testator may have believed, albeit mistakenly, that a prior Will had been revoked when in fact it had not.

While executing a Will in accordance with the provisions at Part I of the Succession Law Reform Act is sufficient in and of itself to revoke prior Wills, it is nonetheless prudent from an estate planning perspective to include a written intention to revoke prior Wills (provided, of course, the testator intends to do so).

Separately, even if we were to disregard the provisions of the Succession Law Reform Act, there would be a number of practical policy concerns if a Will whose effects were subject to a condition precedent. Notably, a reasonable debate could arise between beneficiaries in scenarios in which the cause of death is ultimately unclear.

The film suggests Madame D’s reason for executing a further Will to take effect on her murder is to ensure her nephew could not benefit from her demise at his hand.  However, as discussed in Tuesday’s blog, that goal is accomplished by the operation of the slayer rule.  Alternatively, Madame D could have relied on a common estate planning technique by making her nephew’s interest in her estate, rather than the Will in its entirety, subject to a condition precedent.

While Ontario prohibits conditions precedent that are deemed to be contrary to public policy, such as restraining marriage or promoting discriminatory behaviour, other conditions precedent are recognized at law.  For example, Madame D could have simply made Dmitri’s interest contingent on his reaching a certain age, or reaching a certain milestone in his life, such as graduating from university.  Instead, the purported condition precedent that the further Will was to take effect on her murder likely has no effect at all, provided the evidence shows it was executed after the initial Will and in compliance with the provisions of Part I of the Succession Law Reform Act.

Thanks for reading.

Garrett Horrocks

18 Feb

Forfeiture in Film: The Slayer Rule in The Grand Budapest Hotel

Garrett Horrocks Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, General Interest, In the News, New Media Observations, Public Policy Tags: 0 Comments

Recently, I experienced a series of coincidences involving American filmmaker Wes Anderson.  In the span of a handful of days, I came across the newly-released trailer of his upcoming film, The French Dispatch, and had the opportunity to revisit his 2014 hit, The Grand Budapest Hotel.

Not having seen the latter in several years, I had entirely forgotten a key plot point involving a handful of curious estate planning decisions.  Although the film was released six years ago, I nonetheless attach a mild spoiler warning.

The plot of the film revolves around a specific bequest of a work of art made by one of the characters in the film, Madame D.  The painting, Boy with Apple, is left to Ralph Fiennes’ character, Gustave H, the proprietor of the film’s namesake hotel, per Madame D’s (purported) Last Will and Testament.

Her decision to leave the painting to Gustave, rather than her nephew, Dmitri, creates a firestorm of controversy, not least of all because Dmitri accuses Gustave of murdering his aunt in order to secure

his entitlement to Boy with Apple.  In reality, it is strongly hinted in the film that Dmitri is responsible for her murder.  As an additional twist, a further Last Will and Testament executed by Madame D is discovered later, which appears to leave the entire residue of her estate, rather than just Boy with Apple, to Gustave.  However, it is stated in the film that this further Last Will is only to be given effect in the event that Madame D is murdered.

This single plot point raises a number of points of discussion and policy concerns as to what would transpire if the film were set in Ontario.  This blog will explore the nature of Dmitri’s and Gustave’s potential entitlements in the Estate.

Prior blogs have explored the concept of common law forfeiture rules in Canada, which preclude an individual from deriving a benefit from their own morally culpable conduct.  Colloquially known as the “slayer rule” in the context of a testator-beneficiary relationship, a beneficiary who is found to have caused the unlawful death of a testator will be deemed at common law to have predeceased the testator, thereby extinguishing any interest in the testator’s estate.

In the film, Dmitri accuses Gustave of the murder of Madame D.  In the ordinary course, a conviction proper is not a necessary precondition to the applicability of the slayer rule.  Rather, common law suggests that the rule applies strictly in the event that the beneficiary’s deliberate act caused the death of the testator.  In theory, Gustave’s interest in the estate of Madame D could be in jeopardy despite the lack of culpability.  In practice, despite his efforts to frame Gustave, the evidence would likely show that Dmitri was the culprit, thereby extinguishing any interest in Madame D’s estate.

Of course, the further Last Will purportedly being given effect only in the event a murder adds a further layer of discussion, and will be explored in greater detail in part 2 of this blog.

Thanks for reading.

Garrett Horrocks

28 Jan

MAID: Upcoming Developments

Nick Esterbauer Elder Law, Ethical Issues, Health / Medical, In the News, Public Policy Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

In many respects the law of Quebec differs from that of other provinces.  In terms of medical assistance in dying (MAID), however, a September 2019 decision of the Quebec Superior Court of Justice has the potential to spark change in legislation throughout the country.

In Truchon c Procureur général du Canada, 2019 QCCS 3792, the Court considered the constitutional validity of the requirement that the natural death of individuals accessing MAID be reasonably foreseeable.  The applicants had been declared ineligible for MAID on the basis that their deaths were not considered to be reasonably foreseeable.  The first applicant suffered from cerebral palsy and his condition had deteriorated significantly in 2012, when he became totally paralyzed, preventing him engaging in activities that he had previously enjoyed.  The second applicant suffered from paralysis and severe scoliosis, with a significant change in her health in 1992 when she was diagnosed with degenerative muscular post-polio syndrome.  Both applicants lived in constant pain with a poor prognosis of continued suffering and deterioration, but had been denied access to MAID on the basis that their natural deaths were not reasonably foreseeable and decided to seek the Court’s assistance.

The Court first reviewed the issue of whether the reasonably foreseeable natural death requirement violated the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person under Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  While the restriction was noted to have the potential effect of prolonging the lives of some individuals who would otherwise request MAID, it was also considered to have the risk of encouraging some patients “to end things prematurely, and often in a degrading or violent manner, before being in mortal agony, or having completely lost their dignity or being in the final stage of life.”  Due to the exposure of some Canadians seeking MAID to (1) a higher risk of death and (2) physical and psychological pain, “depriv[ing] them of the opportunity to make a fundamental decision that respects their personal dignity and integrity”, the reasonably foreseeable death requirement was ruled to infringe the right to life, liberty, and security under Section 7 of the Charter.

Next, the Court considered whether the reasonably foreseeable natural death requirement violated the right to equality under Section 15 of the Charter.  The Court found the applicants were prevented from accessing MAID on the basis of the nature of their disabilities, which notwithstanding being “serious and incurable” did not render death reasonably foreseeable, and that as a result the first applicant in particular was “deprived of the exercise of these choices essential to his dignity as a human being due to his personal characteristics that the challenged provision does not consider. He can neither commit suicide by a method of his own choosing nor legally request this assistance.”

The infringement of the applicants’ fundamental rights under Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter was not considered to be justified by Section 1 and the Court, accordingly, declared these provisions of Quebec and Canadian MAID laws unconstitutional.  The declaration of constitutional invalidity of the reasonably foreseeable natural death requirement for accessing MAID was suspended for six months to provide an opportunity to address amendments to provincial and federal legislation.

Quebec has recently announced that it now intends to eliminate the parts of its MAID legislation that have been declared unconstitutional.  Prime Minister Trudeau has advised that the government will be updating federal legislation to reflect the Truchon decision prior to March 11, 2020, when the judgment will take effect.  Precisely how Canada and Ontario will amend the relevant provisions of MAID legislation has yet to be determined.

As yesterday’s blog mentioned, there has been recent scrutiny regarding the restrictive approach in respect of access to MAID and this decision out of Quebec and corresponding updates to the law may represent an important first step in the right direction in enhancing accessibility.

Thank you for reading,

Nick Esterbauer

28 Nov

A Step Toward Equal Inheritance Rights

Nick Esterbauer Estate & Trust, In the News, Public Policy, Wills Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

A recent decision by an Egyptian court saw the reversal of the trend in following Islamic Sharia inheritance law under which female beneficiaries are entitled to half the interest of their male counterparts.

The claimant, a human rights lawyer, applied to obtain the same rights as her brothers on the death of her father.  Her case was previously dismissed by two courts.

In Egypt, Sharia principles are typically applied unless the parties agree that Christian inheritance laws, which do not favour male beneficiaries over females, instead be followed.  In this case, the claimant and her brothers agreed that the administration of their father’s estate would not be subject to Sharia inheritance rules.

Last year, a proposed law in Tunisia designed to promote equality in respect of inheritances sparked discussion regarding unequal inheritances in a number of jurisdictions including Egypt.  A 2017 survey suggests that over half of Tunisia’s population remains opposed to equal inheritance rights.

It is anticipated that this decision may result in significant change in jurisdictions where Sharia law has historically been applied in respect of personal property, regardless of religion.

Canadian courts have also considered the issue of cultures that may support an estate plan favouring sons over daughters simply on the basis of their gender.  In Grewal v Litt, 2019 BCSC 1154, the daughters of the deceased challenged the Wills left by their parents, who both died in 2016, on the basis that they discriminated against them in favour of their brothers on the basis of their sex.  The four daughters applied under Section 60 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c 13 (the “WESA“), for the variation of the Wills that directed the payment of $150,000 to each daughter, while the residue of the estates valued at greater than $9 million was left to the two sons.

Justice Adair noted that there was no dispute that the parents owed a moral obligation to their daughters under BC law, and, as the Wills made inadequate provision for them, they should be varied under the WESA.  The Court attempted to resolve the matter by balancing the adequate, just, and equitable provision for the daughters with their parents’ testamentary autonomy and varied the division of estate assets from approximately 93% in favour of the sons with only a combined 7% for the daughters, to the more equitable division of 15% of the value of the estates for each daughter and 20% for each son.  Notwithstanding the granting of the variation of the Wills, the Court stopped short of finding that the parents’ testamentary intentions were motivated solely by unacceptable discrimination against the daughters.

While many provinces do not recognize a parental obligation to benefit a non-dependant adult child after death, coming years may nevertheless see an increase in the number of challenges to a will on the basis that its terms are discriminatory.

Thank you for reading.

Nick Esterbauer

 

Other blog posts that may be of interest:

23 Jul

Putting Your Best Foot Forward: Evidence on Summary Judgment Motions

Garrett Horrocks Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Litigation, Public Policy Tags: , , 0 Comments

In Drummond v Cadillac Fairview, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the issue of the admissibility of hearsay evidence on a motion for summary judgment.  The facts in Drummond are quite simple.  The plaintiff tripped on a skateboard while shopping at the Fairview Mall in Toronto, owned by the defendant.  The plaintiff brought an action for occupier’s liability, supported by an affidavit sworn by him.  The defendant, Cadillac Fairview, responded by bringing a motion for summary judgment.

At the hearing of the motion, not only did the judge dismiss Cadillac Fairview’s motion for summary judgment, but it granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff (a remedy that the plaintiff was not seeking).  Cadillac Fairview appealed and was successful at the Court of Appeal.

In granting the appeal, the Court identified serious concerns regarding the hearsay evidence relied on by the plaintiff in responding to Cadillac Fairview’s summary judgment motion.  The plaintiff’s responding affidavit relied heavily on statements purportedly made by his fiancée and his daughter, and two unidentified staff members working at the mall.  The trial judge agreed that these statements were hearsay but admitted them nonetheless under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and under Rule 20.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal rejected the admission of the hearsay statements.  While the Court agreed that Rule 20.02 permitted the admission of affidavit evidence “made on information and belief”, the Court also noted that the Rule permits a trier of fact to draw an adverse inference if a party with personal knowledge of contested facts does not give evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the information relayed by the plaintiff from his fiancée and his daughter “went to the heart” of his claim.  The plaintiff’s failure to have his fiancée or daughter swear their own affidavits with respect to the key facts at issue caused the Court to have considerable reservations about admitting their evidence.  The Court of Appeal ultimately held that the finding of liability against Cadillac Fairview was based on an “erroneous admission of hearsay evidence on key, contested issues” and reversed the decision.

On motions for summary judgment, courts will expect the parties to put their best foot forward, including the nature and source of relevant evidence.  As can be seen in this case, a party’s failure to do so can have serious consequences.

Thanks for reading.

Garrett Horrocks

19 Mar

Should the law relating to medical assistance in dying be updated?

Nick Esterbauer Capacity, Health / Medical, Public Policy Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) and the subsequent decriminalization of medical assistance in dying (“MAID”) in 2016, there has been considerable debate regarding the accessibility of MAID.

Currently, MAID is available only to individuals able to satisfy the following test (set out in the Criminal Code):

  1. they are eligible — or, but for any applicable minimum period of residence or waiting period, would be eligible — for health services funded by a government in Canada;
  2. they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making decisions with respect to their health;
  3. they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition;
  4. they have made a voluntary request for medical assistance in dying that, in particular, was not made as a result of external pressure; and
  5. they give informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been informed of the means that are available to relieve their suffering, including palliative care.

The criteria do not feature any mechanism for providing advance consent to MAID.  Similarly, an attorney or guardian of personal care cannot consent on behalf of the patient at the time of the procedure, once he or she loses the capacity to consent him or herself.

As it currently stands, an individual who qualifies for MAID must consent at the time of the procedure, before he or she may suffer from diminished mental capacity that compromises the patient’s ability to provide informed consent.  In some cases, this has resulted in individuals accessing MAID before they otherwise may have chosen to do so to ensure that they would not be exposed to prolonged suffering during a subsequent period of incapacity, during which MAID would not longer be accessible.

Some individuals and groups, including Dying with Dignity Canada, argue that the laws regarding MAID should be amended to provide for the option of providing advanced requests for MAID.

According to a recent Toronto Star article (“No rush to change assisted-death law”, published on February 17, 2019), Justice Minister David Lametti has stated that MAID laws will not be updated in advance of a five-year parliamentary review in 2021 of how the current MAID regime is operating.  At that time, it will no doubt be difficult in considering any changes to balance the rights of those with grievous and irremediable medical conditions to die with dignity on one hand, and the protection of individuals who are vulnerable and whose capable wishes can no longer be confirmed on the other.

Thank you for reading.

Nick Esterbauer

 

Other blog entries that may be of interest:

14 Jun

The Eastman Estate: The Original Kodak Moment

Garrett Horrocks Capacity, Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, General Interest, In the News, Litigation, Public Policy, Wills Tags: , , , 0 Comments

On a recent trip to Rochester, New York, my fiancée and I had the pleasure of touring the George Eastman Museum and came across an interesting piece of estates lore.

George Eastman, the founder of Kodak and a pioneer of bringing photography to the mainstream, died leaving a Will drawn in 1925.  As his wife had predeceased him and they had no children, Mr. Eastman devised all of his real property and left a substantial cash legacy to his closest family member, his niece, Ellen Dryden.  Mr. Eastman’s estate held significant assets, and the value of liquid assets alone was estimated as exceeding the equivalent of USD$35 million today.

However, on March 9, 1932, only five days before his death, Mr. Eastman had a change of heart with respect to the distribution of his estate.  Rather than leave the bulk of his estate to an individual, Mr. Eastman wished to ensure that his legacy would be one of service to the community that had fostered his photography empire.  True to form as a philanthropist and benefactor of local enterprise, Mr. Eastman executed a Codicil to his Will, changing the primary beneficiary of his estate from his niece to the University of Rochester.

The testamentary dispositions under the Codicil represented a significant deviation from those under his Will.  Typically, where a testator’s dispositions vary substantially from one instrument to another, concerns may arise with respect to the their testamentary capacity or the presence of undue influence.

A shrewd entrepreneur in his own right, Mr. Eastman recognized the risk that the Codicil might later be the subject of scrutiny or litigation.  On the date the Codicil was to be executed, Mr. Eastman hosted a gathering at his residence and invited many guests and acquaintances.  He devoted time to speaking to each individual guest about topical, personal subjects so that they could attest to Mr. Eastman’s soundness of mind in the event that a certain disgruntled niece chose to commence a Will challenge.

In a way, Mr. Eastman’s goal is not too dissimilar from some of the criteria that are relied on even today to assess a testator’s capacity.  Third-party evidence that a testator appeared to be of sound mind immediately prior to the execution of a testamentary document may help a trier of fact draw a favourable conclusion with respect to capacity.  While the formal criteria to assess capacity primarily consider a testator’s appreciation and understanding of his or her assets, Mr. Eastman’s clever scheme demonstrates that he turned his mind to questions about his own capacity and took steps to mitigate the risks.

Mr. Eastman’s Codicil was not later subject to any litigation, and the University of Rochester received a handsome distribution out of his estate.

Thanks for reading.

Garrett Horrocks

23 Apr

Re Wall Estate: Can A Notice of Objection to Accounts Be Statute-Barred?

Umair Estate & Trust, Executors and Trustees, Litigation, Passing of Accounts, Power of Attorney, Public Policy, Trustees, Wills 0 Comments

Is a notice of objection to accounts, filed by a responding party in the context of an Application to pass accounts by an estate trustee, a “claim” within the meaning of the Limitations Act, 2002?

The answer to this question could have significant consequences for individuals with a financial interest: the general two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 may apply to a “claim,” and objections that fall outside the period may be statute-barred.

The Honourable Justice Mulligan of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed this issue in Re Wall Estate, 2018 ONSC 1735.

A Recent History of Limitation Periods and Passing of Accounts

In Armitage v The Salvation Army, 2016 ONCA 871, the Court of Appeal held that a passing of accounts by an attorney for property under the Substitute Decisions Act was not subject to the general two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Hourigan noted that there was historically no statutory limitation period for the passing of accounts. Justice Hourigan concluded that the enactment of the Limitations Act, 2002 did not establish a two-year limitation period for passing of accounts, because a passing did not fit the definition of a “claim” as defined by the Act. Given the Court’s conclusion, the equitable doctrine of laches and acquiescence were the only defences available.

However, in a footnote to the judgment, Justice Hourigan specifically noted that the judgment did not mean that the Act categorically has no applicability to passings. In particular, Justice Hourgan left open the possibility that the filing of a notice of objection in a passing of accounts is a “claim” within the meaning of the Act.

Wall Estate: Is An Objection A Claim?

In Re Wall Estate, the testator died in 2005. The Estate Trustee had annual meetings with the testator’s two children, who were the beneficiaries of testamentary trusts. However, the beneficiaries did not sign releases and the Estate Trustee did not pass his accounts.

The testator’s daughter subsequently compelled a passing of accounts from the Estate Trustee in 2014, and the Estate Trustee was removed in 2016. The testator’s daughter filed an objection to the Estate Trustee’s accounts in June 2015.

The Estate Trustee brought a motion to strike the objections to his accounts, and argued that he was not required to address objections to his accounts for the period prior to December 31, 2012 due to the Limitations Act, 2002, laches or acquiescence.

After discussing Justice Hourigan’s decision in Armitage, Justice Mulligan concluded that the notice of objection filed by the testator’s daughter was not statute-barred:

In my view, if the passing of accounts does not constitute a claim, I am not satisfied that a Notice of Objection is a claim.  In filing a Notice of Objection, the beneficiary is seeking answers to questions about steps taken by the estate trustee during the currency of an administration of an estate.  Answers to those questions may assist the beneficiary in consenting to the passing of accounts without the necessity of a formal hearing.  An absence of consent will require a formal hearing.  A formal hearing will assist the court in determining if the fees sought and investment steps taken are appropriate under all the circumstances.

The objections taken at their highest may result in a reduction or loss of compensation for the estate trustee or other remedies.  In this case, if the objections are successful to any extent, no additional funds would be payable immediately to Elizabeth as beneficiary of the discretionary trust.  The corpus of the estate would be enlarged, increasing the funds available for the discretionary trust, and ultimately, could increase the amount available to be paid to Elizabeth, but only if she survives to age 60.  On the facts here, I am not satisfied that the Notice of Objection rises to the level of a “claim” as contemplated by the Limitations Act, 2002.

What’s On the Other Side of the Wall Decision?

Given that the question was left open in Armitage, it remains to be seen if Re Wall Estate or another case that raises this limitations defence will be appealed to a higher court.

In addition, Justice Mulligan noted that the objections did not rise to the level of a claim “on the facts here.” Thus, Re Wall Estate leaves open the possibility that the Court may reach the opposite conclusion after making a fact-specific enquiry.

In tomorrow’s blog post, I will discuss the issues of laches and acquiescence, which were also pleaded as defences in Re Wall Estate.

Thank you for reading,

Umair Abdul Qadir

13 Apr

Achieving Medically Assisted Death

Paul Emile Trudelle Elder Law, Ethical Issues, Health / Medical, In the News, Public Policy, Uncategorized Tags: , , , 0 Comments

Section 241.1 of the Criminal Code sets out a detailed procedure for determining when medical assistance in dying can be provided. However, the medical and legal communities are still grappling with the application of the provisions.

In A.B. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 3759 (CanLII), two physicians concluded that AB met the criteria for a medically assisted death. A third doctor, however, did not, as he felt that AB did not meet the Criminal Code requirement that a natural death was reasonably foreseeable. Although only two medical opinions are required, the opinion of the third doctor had a chilling effect on one of the other physicians, who declined to provide assistance to AB for fear of being charged with murder.

AB then applied to court for a determination that she met the requirements of the Criminal Code, and a declaration that she may receive medical assistance in dying.

Justice Perell, who had previously considered the issue of assisted death in another proceeding, heard the application.

Ontario and Canada took the position that a declaration should not issue, as the regime established by the Criminal Code does not require judicial pre-authorization. Further, the civil courts should not issue a declaration as such a declaration would interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of the Crown by predetermining criminal liability.

Justice Perell agreed with the position of Ontario and Canada. However, he felt that their position was “as unhelpful as it is technically correct.” The practical effect of such a position was that AB qualified for medically assisted death, but no physician was prepared to assist.

In his decision, Perell J. thoroughly reviews the legislative history of medical assistance in dying. He agrees that it is the medical practitioner and not the court that is to decide whether the Criminal Code criteria are satisfied. He agrees that the court cannot make the decision for them.

However, Perell J. expresses that some form of declaration would be “useful” and have “utility”.

Perell J. walks a fine line in his decision. He accepts that the court is not to make declarations that the Criminal Code criteria for assisted death are met: that must be done by the medical practitioner or nurse practitioner: s. 241.2(3)(a). What Perell J. does, however, is attempt to clarify what is meant by s. 241.(2)(d): the provision that requires the person to meet the criteria that “their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable”. As a matter of statutory interpretation, he declares that in AB’s case, AB’s natural death is reasonably foreseeable.

Perell J. cautions that in making a declaration, he is not conferring immunity on the physicians from prosecution. He also states that he is not finding that courts could or should grant pre-approvals for persons seeking medical assistance in dying. It is unclear as to whether this will provide much comfort to medical practitioners.

Thank you for reading.

Paul Trudelle

12 Apr

New Model of Care for Those with Dementia Coming to Canada

Sayuri Kagami Elder Law, General Interest, Health / Medical, In the News, Public Policy Tags: , 0 Comments

Canada’s population of seniors continues to rise and with that comes the concerns of attending to the unique needs of an ageing demographic.  In 2016, Canadian census data showed that the number of seniors in Canada was slightly higher than that of children 14 and under. Canada, like the rest of the world, has been undergoing changes to account for the population changes that include a growing number of individuals struggling with dementia. Today, I’ll explore an innovative new project in British Columbia aimed at providing a safe yet independent living environment for seniors with dementia.

The Village is a new residence which will accommodate those with dementia in an environment meant to provide the feel of a small village or community. Residents will live in cottage style residences with nearby amenities such as a grocery store, a salon, a coffee shop and a community garden. While residents will be able to go about their lives in the community, they’ll also have the care they require. The project is modeled after the first “dementia village” that was opened in Amsterdam. The goal behind such communities is to move those with dementia away from an institutional setting so as to improve their quality of life.

With estimates that approximately 940,000 people will have dementia in Canada by 2031, it’s great to see new and innovative options available for those with such an illness. Right now, the project in BC is slated to open in 2019 and is a private endeavour meaning residents (or their family) will be responsible for the full cost.

While the project is still in its infancy, it will be interesting to see how it develops and how it might be implemented in the rest of Canada.

From a legal (and Ontario-centric) perspective, it is interesting to note how the goals of “dementia villages” align with the Residents’ Bill of Rights under Ontario’s Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007. The Residents’ Bill of Rights includes a lengthy list of rights of residents of long-term care facilities designed to promote recognition of the dignity, security, safety, and comfort of residents. Included in the Residents’ Bill of Rights is “the right to receive care and assistance towards independence based on a restorative care philosophy to maximize independence to the greatest extent possible.” The development of dementia villages shows one way in which this right may be furthered.   

Thanks for reading!

Sayuri Kagami

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