Category: Mutual Wills
This week on Hull on Estates, Stuart Clark and Kira Domratchev discuss the decision of Nelson v Trottier, 2019 ONSC 1657, and the legal obligations of the survivor in circumstances where there is a mutual wills agreement.
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In researching common errors in will drafting, we recently stumbled (as one often does through research) on the following question:
In the case of mutual wills, what happens in the event of remarriage?
Mutual wills operate as a contract. Simply put, the terms of the contract are that absent any revocation during the joint lives of the parties, the survivor will not revoke thereafter. The conundrum then becomes: If a will by its very nature is revocable, and wills are automatically revoked by marriage, what then happens to the agreement in the event of a second or third marriage?
The question at hand is best described with an example:
Jane has two children from a prior marriage, as does John. John and Jane get married and draft wills. The wills of Jane and John are identical except for some names and dates and include an agreement that says in part, that if John dies, all assets will be transferred to Jane absolutely, and when Jane dies all assets shall be divided equally among their four children. When John dies, his assets vest in Jane, and her will is now locked such that changing it would frustrate the terms of her agreement with her now deceased husband. But what if then Jane meets and marries Oscar? If all prior wills are null. . . Now what?
The courts have wrestled with the concept of mutual wills since the death of Lord Horatio Walpole in 1797. In his will of 1756, a nephew of the English author and statesman, George Earl of Walpole, demonstrated intent to enter in to a “compact” with his late uncle for the disposition of his and his uncle’s estates to the benefit of their respective families. The question that arose then, as it still does today, is upon what terms the two parties were transacting, and how should they be bound? Or, to quote a commentary from the turn, “How far in law and equity was each at liberty to repent, and to recall his share of the testamentary exchanges between them?”
204 years later, the question continued to be addressed in a seminal decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. In 2001’s Edell v. Sitzer, Cullity J, was tasked with unpacking a bitter family dispute where an alleged agreement not to depart from equal division of assets was at stake. The question before the court then (in part) was, do the facts give rise to a constructive trust? Justice Cullity set out the test for mutual wills thusly:
- The mutual wills were made pursuant to a definitive agreement or contact not only to make such wills, but that the survivor shall not revoke.
- Such an agreement is found with certainty and preciseness.
- The survivor has taken advantage of the provisions in the mutual will.
If the test is satisfied, the court can impose a constructive trust. Rooted in the law of equity, an implied or constructive trust aims to remedy any unjust enrichment by one party of a contract (a surviving spouse, for example) over another.
But what consistently seems to trouble the conscience of the court, is the idea of “contracting-away” one’s testamentary freedom. There is no restriction for a will made in defiance of such an agreement, but in equity, the court is almost bound to treat mutual wills as a single testamentary instrument. This was the problem in the 2016 ONSC case of Rammage v. Estate of Roussel: Alf and Ruth Roussel had made mutual wills 13 years prior to Alf’s death in February of 2009, agreeing in part to divide their estate equally among their four children (both Ruth and Alf went into the marriage with 2 children each). One year after Alf’s death, Ruth made a new will, disinherited Alf’s children, and left everything to her own two kids. Upon the death of Ruth, the litigation began.
The court in Rammage determined that the wills of the deceased testators amounted to mutual wills, imposed a constructive trust, and divided the assets according to the terms of the first wills of Ruth and Alf. If the court is satisfied that the wills are mutual, any property disposed of in a subsequent testamentary document is subject to a constructive trust in favour of the named legatees, and the subsequent will fails.
Returning to the question of remarriage, one could expect the need for administration and ultimately judicial intervention, should all the beneficiaries not consent to the changes in subsequent wills. Like many decisions that seem like “a good one at the time,” mutual wills should be considered very carefully and with the advice of independent counsel. A decision to enter into a contract that prohibits one from ever changing their last will and testament must be considered from all sides. To quote the late Horatio Walpole, the 4th Earl of Orford: “The wisest prophets make sure of the event first.”
Thanks for reading!
David M. Smith & Daniel Enright (Summer Law Student)
Mutual wills are a common tool used by two (or more) people who wish to preserve a will (or specific provisions thereunder) by entering into an agreement to avoid future changes. This is a particularly useful tool in blended families where partners have children from prior relationships, and both want to ensure that their children are equally provided for post-death.
The requirements for an application of the doctrine of mutual wills are three-fold: (1) there must be an agreement between the individuals who made the wills, which amounts to a contract; (2) the agreement must be proven by clear and satisfactory evidence; and (3) it must include an agreement not to revoke wills.
Once one of the parties to a mutual will agreement dies, the survivor is then bound by that agreement not to revoke his or her will. Typically, we see mutual wills cases arising after the death of both spouses, once it is discovered that the surviving spouse drafted a new will in breach of their mutual will agreement or disposed of assets contrary to their agreement.
The recent case of Nelson v Trottier grappled with a novel issue with respect to mutual wills: whether, in light of the existence of a mutual wills agreement, beneficiaries to a survivor’s estate could claim a constructive trust over her assets while she was still alive.
The applicants in this case were the deceased’s children. They were not beneficiaries under their father Bill’s will, but were beneficiaries under his wife Huguette’s will. After making a donation in Bill’s honour, the applicants sought, among other things, a declaration imposing a constructive trust over Huguette’s assets and preventing her from gifting property without further order of the court or the consent of the applicants.
After establishing that a mutual wills agreement existed between Bill and Huguette, the court then examined when a constructive trust is established. In deciding this issue, Justice Pattillo stated,
“in circumstances where one of the parties to a mutual wills agreement has died, however, and based on the nature of a mutual wills agreement and the purpose of imposing a constructive trust in respect of such agreement, it is my view that a constructive trust does not arise until either the survivor dies or earlier, in the event there has been a breach of the agreement by the survivor”
Since Huguette was still alive, the question became whether she had breached the mutual wills agreement by making the donation in Bill’s honour. Justice Pattillo ultimately found that Huguette had not breached the mutual wills agreement. His reasons included that the agreement provided that both Bill and Huguette would give the survivor all of their property absolutely and that the surviving spouse could deal with the property as absolute owner while alive (which includes the ability to make gifts).
Interestingly, Justice Pattillo acknowledged that the mutual wills agreement stipulated that the survivor could not dispose of “substantial” portions of the property received during his or her lifetime in order to defeat the agreement; however, he did not find that the donation given to be “substantial” in comparison to the size of the estate.
The application seeking, among other things, a declaration that there was a constructive trust over Huguette’s assets, was ultimately dismissed.
Thank you for reading!