Author: Paul Emile Trudelle

23 Aug

Ipse Dixit: Saying It Doesn’t Make It So

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Uncategorized Tags: , , 0 Comments

I recently came across a case out  of the Court of Appeals of Texas (Royce  Homes, L.P. v. Neel, 2005 Tex.App.LEXIS 1514) where the Court of Appeal overturned a jury’s determination of damages that was based on weak evidence from a construction defect expert. Although apparently well qualified, the expert simply estimated the costs of repairs based on his experience: he did not take any notes or measurements.

The court rejected the evidence as “ipse dixit” (sometimes spelled “ipse dexit”). The term is latin for “he said it himself”. The fallacy of logic is that by baldly asserting a state of affairs without evidence to support it sidesteps the argument. It is an assertion without proof. The fallacy is similar to an argument from authority.

My kids used to call me out on the use of ipse dixit all the time. When I made an assertion, they would ask “Why?” My usual, lazy, response was “Because I said so.”

Ipse dixit has been recognized as a problem in litigation, particularly in the area of expert evidence. In General Electric Co. et al. v. Joiner et ux, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the problem of “opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of an expert.”

The term has been used in several Canadian cases. For example, in Young v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2017 BCSC 2306 (CanLII), an expert gave evidence that damages in a motor vehicle accident were not caused by a sideswipe-type collision. At trial, the plaintiff objected to the evidence, with counsel asking “where is the science”. The court agreed, and rejected the evidence. The expert did not refer to his own assessment of sideswipe-type collisions. He did not refer to any studies or tests involving sideswipe-type collisions. As stated by the trial judge, “Instead, what we are left with is an exercise in ipse dixitism: it is so because I say it is so.”

In Lord’s Day Alliance fo Canada v. Regional Municipality of Peel et al., the issue was whether an exemption from Sunday closing by-laws was “essential for the maintenance or development of a tourist industry”. Town council said the exemption was essential, without citing any evidence. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that something more was required beyond council merely saying so. The legislation required proof that the exemption was essential, not just council deeming it to be essential.

In Lewis v. The King, 1949 CanLII 376 (QC CA), the Quebec Court of Appeal overturned a conviction for keeping a common betting house. In a concurring judgment, the appeal judge states that “there is no evidence, except the ipse dixit of the police officer, that the accused was the keeper of the place in which the search was made”.

In Ontario, Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure require that an expert report shall contain, inter alia, “The expert’s reasons for his or her opinion”.

As we head into elections, both here and in the US, keep your eyes open for ipse dixit.

Further, in litigation, be wary of ipse dixit evidence. Simply saying something is so does not make it so.

 

Make it a great weekend ahead. No ipse dixit. Provide proof.
Paul Trudelle

16 Aug

One Expensive Tree!

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Uncategorized Tags: , , 0 Comments

“What could be more Canadian than Toronto neighbours arguing about building an addition on a house? Home owners arguing about a maple tree, of course.”

And so begins the saga of Allen v. MacDougall, 2019 ONSC 1939, a decision of Justice Morgan.

There, the Allens wanted to build an extension to their Moore Park home. To do so, they wanted to remove a tree that was on the property line between their property and their neighbours, the MacDougalls.

The Allens had obtained municipal permits to cut down the tree. However, as the court noted, the permits were necessary as a matter of regulatory compliance: they did not reflect any adjudication of property rights.

The MacDougalls argued that as the tree was on the boundary line between the properties, it was the common property of both adjoining owners. This was confirmed by The Forestry Act.

The Allens countered with an assertion that the tree constituted a “nuisance”, and therefore should be removed. “The law of nuisance seeks to balance the competing rights of owners – one neighbour to do what he wants and the right of the other neighbour not to be interfered with”.

The court held that although the tree was interfering with the proposed addition, it was not interfering with the Allens’ current use and enjoyment of the property. Further, the court found that no reasonable alternative to destroying the tree was explored. The application for an order authorizing the destruction of the tree was dismissed.

On the issue of costs, reported here, the Allens were ordered to pay the MacDougalls $77,000 in costs. This was based on partial indemnity costs up to the time of an offer to settle by the MacDougalls, and substantial indemnity costs from the time of the offer.

So, it appears, the tree still stands. However, I expect that the neighbourly relations between the parties have been clear-cut.

To read about one expensive dock, see my blog, here.

Have a great weekend.
Paul Trudelle

02 Aug

Costs Against Attorney and Her Lawyer

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Passing of Accounts, Trustees, Uncategorized, Wills Tags: , , , 0 Comments

In Baca v. Tiberi, the court awarded substantial costs as against an attorney for property/estate trustee for maladministration of her mother’s property while she was alive, and of her estate following her death.

The litigation was settled prior to a court determination. However, under the settlement, the parties submitted the question of costs to the court.

(With respect to problems that can arise from such a settlement, see my blogs, here and here.)

In Baca, the court found that there was serious misappropriation by the attorney and estate trustee. The attorney added her name to her mother’s bank accounts and took out money for her own expenses. She caused her mother to incur tens of thousands of dollars of debt for the benefit of the attorney, her husband and sister. She moved into her mother’s home with her family and did not pay rent. She transferred title to the home to herself and her mother jointly. After the mother’s death, she transferred the home to herself and her husband. She mortgaged the home to pay her own debts.

At the costs hearing, the court asked the parties whether the attorney’s lawyer might have personal liability for costs. The attorney waived solicitor-client privilege and the lawyer was subjected to examination and made submissions.

The court awarded costs against the attorney and the lawyer on a “full indemnity” basis, after a reduction of $50,000 for excessive time spent, in the amount of $301,941.41, plus HST and disbursements. (The estate had a total value of approximately $1m.) The attorney and the lawyer were jointly and severally liable for costs. As between themselves, the attorney was to be liable for 75% of the costs, and the lawyer was liable for 25%.

In its ruling, the court was critical of the lawyer’s conduct. The court found that the lawyer pursued a goal that was unattainable. Further, the lawyer misrepresented facts to the court. In pleadings, the lawyer (not the client, per the court) denied assertions that were, to her knowledge, true. Further, the pleadings contained assertions that were known to be false. The lawyer allowed a misleading affidavit to be sworn by her client. The lawyer also failed to ensure that certain funds were held in trust in accordance with a court order. At a later hearing, the lawyer advised the court that the funds were held in trust when they were not.

The court found the lawyer liable, partially, on the basis that she knew of her client’s misconduct yet advised or acted on instructions to take untenable legal positions. She also took legal steps that costed her client and the other side hundreds of thousands of dollars, yet the steps did nothing to avoid “the only inevitable conclusion possible”: that her  client would have to make the estate whole. There was no evidence that the client was ever advised of the situation.

Thanks for reading.
Paul Trudelle

19 Jul

Quitting As Estate Trustee: Not Always Easy

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Trustees, Wills 0 Comments

Often, estate trustees no longer want the job, and want to be removed. This is particularly the case when they are required to deal with difficult beneficiaries. In most cases, where a Certificate of Appointment has been issued or where they have acted as estate trustee in any way, a court order is required. However, as illustrated in Pierce v. Zock, 2019 ONSC 4156, getting an order removing oneself as estate trustee is not always straightforward.

There, the deceased appointed two of his children, Gary and Norma, as estate trustees. The wills, primary and secondary, established a trust for the benefit of another child, Stephen. The relationship between Gary and Norma on the one part, and Stephen on the other broke down. Gary and Norma brought an application to remove themselves as estate trustees.

Under the trusts established by the wills, Stephen was entitled to remain in the deceased’s real property as long as he was capable of maintaining the property and managing his personal care. If these conditions were not met, the property was to be sold and the proceeds divided amongst the deceased’s four children, with Stephen’s share being held in a trust administered by the estate trustees. The estate trustees also sought directions from the court as to whether these conditions were being met, and if not, whether the real property could be sold.

The court noted that a trustee cannot be forced to continue to serve as a trustee if he or she is  no longer willing or able to continue. However, in this case, the estate trustees were not able to suggest an alternate to act as estate trustee. No institutional trustee or individual was willing to act. Further , the Public Guardian and Trustee was not willing to act.

During oral argument, Gary indicated a willingness to continue to act on a short term basis, if the court allowed the sale of the real property. The court seized upon this reluctant willingness, and ordered that Norma be removed, but that Gary stay on as estate trustee. The court imposed conditions, which included that Stephen shall have no contact with Gary except through legal counsel.

On the question of the sale of the property, the court refused to allow the sale. The court found that there was insufficient evidence that Stephen was not maintaining the property or was incapable of managing his personal care.

In conclusion, Gary was kept on as estate trustee and was not permitted to resign. The property was not to be sold.

Such a possible outcome should be kept in mind when accepting an appointment as estate trustee. Further, testators should consider naming alternate estate trustees in event that the appointed estate trustees are not able or willing to continue in the role.

Have a great weekend.
Paul Trudelle

12 Jul

Intervention: Trying to Get In The Game

Paul Emile Trudelle Beneficiary Designations, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Sometimes, you are added as a party to a proceeding when you don’t really want to be. In other cases, a proceeding is started, and you are not a party, but want to be. What can be done about this? Intervention.

Under Rule 13.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a person who is not a party to a proceeding may move for leave to intervene as an added party if the person claims:

  1. an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding;
  2. that the person may be adversely affected by a judgment in the proceeding, or
  3. that there exists between the proposed intervenor and one or more of the parties a question of law or fact in common with one or more of the questions in issue in the proceeding.

Rule 13.01(2) adds another consideration. The court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the determination of the rights of the parties to the proceeding.

Intervention was considered in the decision of Arnold v. Arnold, 2019 ONSC 3679. There, the proceeding involved a Power of Attorney dispute between 3 of the incapable person’s children. The issue was whether a 2011 Power of Attorney, which appointed children 1, 2 and 3 as attorneys, governed or whether a 2019 Power of Attorney, which only appointed children 2 and 3 as attorneys governed.

The proposed intervenor was child 4. He was not named as attorney in any of the Powers of Attorney, and was not a party to the proceeding. Child 4 was diagnosed with schizophrenia and lived in his mother’s, the incapable person’s, house. He was receiving support from her. He sought to intervene to ensure that his needs were protected.

The court considered the criteria for intervening, and refused to allow child 4 to intervene.

As to the first criteria, the court found that essence of the application was who was to be responsible for the management of mother’s property, not how it was to be managed. While child 4 may have an interest in how the property was being managed, he had not genuine interest in who.

Regarding the second criteria, child 4 acknowledged that he was not adversely affected by the management of mother’s property, as long as the responsible person fulfills that role properly. The court added that child 4 would benefit from the determination of the question raised in the proceeding, as he would then know with whom he is dealing.

With respect to the third criteria, child 4 argued that he had potential claims as against his father’s estate and his mother for child support. The court found that the questions raised in those potential proceedings were not the same as the questions raised in the existing proceeding regarding who was to care for mother. Further, child 4’s lack of intervenor status would not prejudice his claims.

The court also found that allowing child 4 to intervene would result in undue delay and prejudice. The proceeding was already being expedited, and was scheduled to be heard two weeks after child 4’s motion to intervene. Allowing child 4 to intervene would likely delay the proceeding. Had child 4 moved to intervene sooner, this might not have been the case.

Costs were awarded against child 4. However, due to his being on ODSP, costs were awarded against child 4 in the amount of $4,000 to each of the other groups of litigants. Payment was deferred until child 4 received his share, if any, of his mother’s estate.

Thanks for reading.
Paul Trudelle

05 Jul

Estate Planning With Drake: Money in the Grave

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Trustees, Wills Tags: , , 0 Comments

In a recent recording, “Money in the Grave”, Drake asks that he be buried with his money. He sings:

In the next life, I’m tryna stay paid
When I die, put my money in the grave.

Several issues come to mind.

First, Drake’s wish to be buried with his money is not binding on his estate trustee unless it is in a properly executed testamentary instrument.

Second, even if the money is buried with Drake, his estate trustee may have to pay Estate Administration Tax on the buried money if the will is to be probated. Drake may want to consider multiple wills. (Well-considered primary and secondary wills might also avoid the payment of Estate Administration Tax on the value of all of his chains, and other bling.)

Third, the act of destroying money is illegal in many jurisdictions. In Canada, under the Currency Act, it is illegal to “melt down, break up or use otherwise than as currency any coin that is legal tender in Canada”. The Criminal Code creates an offence for defacing a current coin. There is no similar prohibition on defacing or destroying paper money. However, in the US, burning money or any other act that renders a note “unfit to be reissued” is illegal. Arguably, the act of burying money is not the same as destroying money.

(Read Stuart Clark’s blog, here, about a woman who cut up the equivalent of $1.4m CDN to disinherit her heirs.)

Fourth, Drake’s estate trustee might be accused of waste. He or she may want to seek the opinion, advice or direction of the court before they “Bury my [expletive] Chase Bank.”

More on point, in the US decision of Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.w.2d 210 (1975), the testator directed that her house be burned down, the lot sold, and the proceeds added to the residue of her estate. A neighbour wasn’t too crazy about the idea, and applied for an injunction.  The injunction was, at first, denied. On appeal, the court held that the direction in the will was against public policy.

The court in Eyerman cited the decision of In re Scott’s Will, 88 Minn. 386 (1903). There, the testator directed his estate trustee to destroy money belonging to the estate. The court there found that the clause was void. The court also quoted from Restatement, Second, Trusts, 124, at 267.

“Although a person may deal capriciously with his own property, his self interest ordinarily will restrain him from doing so. Where an attempt is made to confer such a power upon a person who is given no other interest in the property, there is no such restraint and it is against public policy to allow him to exercise the power if the purpose is merely capricious.”

In Restatement, an example is given of a bequest from A’s estate to B in trust to throw the money into the sea. (Query: more lyrical or less lyrical than Drake’s direction?) “B holds the money upon a resulting trust for the estate of A and is liable to the estate of A if he throws the money into the sea.”

In another, earlier Drake ditty, “Crew Love”, Drake boasted about spending $50K on a vacation, and needing restaurant reservations for twenty. “I never really been one for the preservation of money. Much rather spend it all while I’m breathing.” It seems that he now has so much money that he may not be able to spend it all while living, and he is turning his thoughts to succession planning. He may want to get some professional estate planning advice.

Thank you for reading.

Paul Trudelle

28 Jun

Court Gestures: Dying Declarations

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Uncategorized Tags: , , 0 Comments

In the Ontario Court of Appeal decision of R. v. Nurse, 2019 ONCA 260, the gestures of a dying man were relied upon to support a murder conviction.

In that case, N owed rent money to his landlord, K. Rather than pay, N lured K to his home, where K was repeatedly and viciously stabbed.

N denied that he was involved in the stabbing, and claimed that another unknown person had stabbed K.

While K was being treated by police on the scene, N approached K and the police. K, who was in obvious and extreme distress, pointed to his stomach stab wounds, and then pointed to N.

The trial judge found that the gesture fell within the “dying declaration” exception to the hearsay rule. The Court of Appeal agreed. They also agreed that evidence of the gesture was admissible under the principled approach to hearsay.

A dying declaration is usually a verbal statement or utterance. However, a gesture can also convey meaning, and may be considered to be a statement or utterance to which the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies.

With respect to the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, the Court of Appeal said that the exception could be traced back to the 1789 decision of The King v. Woodcock. There, the court stated:

Now the general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is, that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone: when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn, and so awful, is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of Justice.

The trial judge was therefore correct in instructing the jury to consider the evidence of whether K was pointing to N, and if he was, what he meant by this.

Another ground of appeal was with respect to incriminating messages retrieved from N’s cell phone. When N was first arrested, his phone was seized. An analysis of the data on the phone revealed only limited interaction between N and his co-accused. However, about a year later, the analysis software was updated, and a further analysis of the phone revealed the plan to kill K. N argued that the second analysis was a fresh search that was not authorized by the first search warrant. This argument was rejected.

Have a great weekend.

Paul Trudelle

21 Jun

Dying to Golf

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Uncategorized Tags: , , , 0 Comments

Ian’s questions and answers from Wednesday’s blog on various topics, including death and golfing, led me to consider another issue: people dying on a golf course.

One of my favourite scenes from my favourite movie, Caddy Shack, involves a Bishop playing the best round of golf of his life in a raging rainstorm. When asked if play should continue, greens keeper Carl Spackler (Bill Murray) advises: “I’d keep playing. I don’t think, the heavy stuff’s going to come down for quite a while.” The Bishop plays on, misses his final putt, and turns to curse the sky, whereupon he is struck by lightning. See the clip, here.

Although the Bishop lived (but renounced God), many others have not been as lucky.

According to Golfsupport.com, golfing (with 1.8 injuries per 1,000 people) is more dangerous than rugby (only 1.5 injuries per 1,000). In the U.S., golf carts are responsible for 15,000 injuries per year. 40,000 golfers seek treatment each year for injuries caused by errant golf balls and flying club heads.

Golf Digest has published a list of “The 10 Worst Ways To Die On a Golf Course”. These include:

  • A man who was fatally kicked in the chest when a group of golfers lost patience with the man while he was searching for a lost ball.
  • A man in Ireland who died after a rat ran up his leg, urinated and bit him while the man was searching for his ball in a ditch. The rat carried the fatal Weil’s disease.
  • A man who died after slamming his club against a bench after a poor shot. The club shattered, and a piece of the club pierced his chest.

Fore!

Paul Trudelle

14 Jun

Getting Whited-Out of A Will

Paul Emile Trudelle Beneficiary Designations, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Trustees, Uncategorized, Wills 0 Comments

After making her will, the deceased “whited-out” the name of a beneficiary using white-out or liquid paper. Was this an effective amendment to the will?

This question was answered in Levesque Estate (Re), 2019 BCSC 927 (CanLII). There, the deceased made a formal will which left the residue of her estate to 7 beneficiaries. However, at some point between the making the will and her death, the deceased obscured the name of one of her beneficiaries using white-out. The estate trustees applied to the court for the opinion of the court with respect to whether this “alteration” was effective.

Applying B.C. law, the court determined that the alteration would be effective if either the alteration made the word or provision illegible, or if the alteration was deemed by the court to represent the intention of the deceased to alter the will.

With respect to the first test, the court found that the whited out provision did NOT render the name beneath to be “impossible to read by ordinary inspection … without chemical or other analysis”. Therefore, the alteration was not valid on this basis.

(In another case out of Newfoundland, the court held that provisions were “whited out” to the extent that “no part of the previous text [was] apparent”. Apparently, the testator used a heavier hand when whiting out. In that case, the whiting out of the text was found to be an effective revocation.)

In Levesque, however, the court went on to apply the second test of substantial compliance, and found that the alteration was a “deliberate or fixed and final expression of the Deceased’s intention” to remove the beneficiary from her will. “Carefully dabbing white-out over the provision in question was undoubtedly a considered and deliberate act on the part of the Deceased. She was applying the white-out to the original Will. It was not a casual act. The only reasonable inference is that her intention was to remove the provision from the Will.” The court was able to use its curative powers to give effect to the alteration.

In giving effect to the alteration, the court applied s. 58 of B.C.’s Wills, Estates and Succession Act, which gives the court authority to give effect to the alteration of a will even if there is not strict compliance with the formal requirements of the Act. In Ontario, there is no similar “substantial compliance” provision. It is not clear that the whited-out changes would have been effective in Ontario.

For another blog on white-out and wills, see “Revocation of Wills: White Out of this World”.

Have a great weekend.

Paul Trudelle

07 Jun

Wills, Divorce and Tying Up Loose Ends

Paul Emile Trudelle Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation, Estate Planning, Uncategorized Tags: , , 0 Comments

In Ontario, by reason of s. 17(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act, if a testator’s marriage is terminated by a judgment absolute of divorce or is declared a nullity, any devise or bequest to his or her former spouse, any appointment of his or her former spouse as estate trustee, or any grant of a power of appointment to his or her former spouse is revoked, and the will is to be construed as if the former spouse had predeceased the testator.

This is subject to a contrary intention appearing in the will.

This provision was enacted in 1974. Prior to that, bequests to a former spouse remained valid until the testator made a new will, revoked the will, or remarried. (S. 16 of the SLRA provides that a will is revoked by marriage, subject to certain exceptions.)

In Page Estate v. Sachs (H.C.J.), 1990 CanLII 6903, the court had to grapple with the question of the retrospective application of this section. There, the testator made a will in 1968. The will gave the estate to the testator’s spouse. The testator and his spouse were divorced in 1974. The testator died in 1986. The question for the court was whether s. 17(2) would apply in those circumstances.

The court found that s. 17(2) has retrospective application. The gift to the spouse was revoked. The testator’s estate was distributed as if the former spouse had predeceased.

In the decision, the judge quoted from the “Report On The Impact of Divorce on Existing Wills” by the Ontario Law Reform Commission. It was said that s. 17(2) “represents remedial reform legislation in aid of those former spouses who neglect to alter their wills following a divorce and thereby bestowed upon their former spouse unintended windfall benefits.” The judge went on to observe that the section “simply asserts the finality which a decree absolute renders to the relationship and status of the former spouses and ties up any inadvertent loose ends which could resurrect the spousal status.”

Note that the provision only comes into play where there is a divorce or the marriage is declared a nullity. Separated spouses should “tie up any loose ends” and ensure that they consider revising their will upon separation. My first exposure to estates law involved a matter where a wife moved to divorce her husband. The husband was so irate that he vowed that she would not get anything from him in the divorce, and committed suicide. He did not revise his will. As a divorce had not yet been granted, his entire estate passed to his wife, which was clearly contrary to his intentions.

Don’t leave your ends loose.

Paul Trudelle

SUBSCRIBE TO OUR BLOG

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.
 

CONNECT WITH US

CATEGORIES

ARCHIVES

TWITTER WIDGET