Author: Kira Domratchev

16 Jul

Retrospective Capacity Assessments: Yay or Nay?

Kira Domratchev Capacity, Estate & Trust, Estate Litigation Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently made an important ruling on a voir dire in respect of Dr. Kenneth Shulman’s proposed expert testimony.

This ruling will be of particular interest to estate litigators as it addresses the inherent admissibility of retrospective capacity assessments, amongst other things.

The Court in this instance implemented a form of blended voir dire, wherein Dr. Shulman’s evidence would be received in its entirety and submissions would be made on the issue of admissibility of the expert testimony. In the event that the Court ruled that Dr. Shulman’s evidence was admissible, the evidence obtained during the voir dire would be incorporated as part of the trial record.

The Defendant, amongst other objections, took issue with Dr. Shulman’s testimony on the basis that his testimony was based on a retrospective capacity assessment which was problematic for the following reasons:

  • The proposed opinion was based on hearsay evidence and must therefore be excluded; and
  • Expert opinion evidence on retrospective testamentary capacity assessments constitutes novel or contested science and is therefore not reliable.

The Court did not accept that Dr. Shulman’s use of certain evidence that has not been proven, and has not been relied upon him for the truth of its contents, prevents the Court from admitting his expert opinion evidence at the threshold admissibility stage. In other words, any such issues could be addressed in reference to the weight of the proposed evidence.

Most interestingly, however, the Court noted that many of the types of medical and psychiatric opinions offered at trial are retrospective in nature and did not agree that retrospective capacity assessments are novel in Ontario courts. The Court specifically noted that the Defendant was unable to identify a single case, since retrospective testamentary capacity assessments were first considered by the courts, in which psychiatric expert opinion of retrospective testamentary capacity assessment has been ruled inadmissible.

In applying the admissibility test established in R v Abbey 2017 ONCA 640, the Court held that Dr. Shulman’s expert opinion satisfied the threshold requirement in the first step. In weighing the cost versus benefit of admitting Dr. Shulman’s report, the Court found that the evidence favoured the admission of Dr. Shulman’s evidence.

The Court made a ruling admitting Dr. Shulman as an expert geriatric psychiatrist to provide expert opinion evidence in the areas of geriatric psychiatry and retrospective testamentary capacity assessment.

This is an important ruling in the context of estate litigation given that in most instances, the capacity assessments that are usually relied on in the course of litigation are of a retrospective nature, since the subject of the assessment is most often deceased.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

Expert “Hot-tubbing” and Its Use in Will Challenges

Psychological Autopsies and Testamentary Capacity

The Search for Contemporary Values: A Moving Target

 

29 Apr

Estate Information Returns: What’s That All About?

Kira Domratchev Estate & Trust, Executors and Trustees, Trustees Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

Were you recently appointed as Estate Trustee and needed to obtain a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee (otherwise known as “probate”)? In that case, you need to know that an Estate Information Return must be filed with the Ministry of Finance within 90 days of the date of the appointment, setting out the assets in the Estate and their corresponding date of death values.

Typically when an Application for Certificate of Appointment is filed with the Court, a trustee may not have access to every asset of the Estate such that that the value of the Estate may not necessarily be accurate.

As a result, when an Estate Information Return is filed following the Certificate of Appointment being granted, all of the assets of the Estate must be listed. Depending on the values of the assets as confirmed by the trustee following the Certificate of Appointment being granted, a refund may be issued in the event that Estate Administration Tax was overpaid or additional tax may be payable in the event that the value of the assets as listed on the Application is lower than what was listed on the Estate Information Return.

The Estate Information Return may be audited by the Ministry of Finance for up to four years after it is filed. As such, it is important to retain all relevant records in the event of such an eventuality. Another important consideration is that the Ministry of Finance will not typically provide confirmation of receipt of an Estate Information Return so it is prudent to send it via means that would provide you with confirmation of delivery such as fax.

Finally, if a trustee finds out any additional information regarding the value of the assets of the Estate that has any bearing on the Estate Administration Tax payable, an amended Estate Information Return must be filed within 30 days of the new information being uncovered.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this post interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

File Your Estate Information Return On Time

The Estate Information Return and Multiple Wills

Hull on Estates #468 – Personal Property, Digital Assets and the Estate Information Return

22 Apr

Ante-Mortem Probate: What’s That All About?

Kira Domratchev Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, General Interest, Litigation, Wills Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Ante-Mortem Probate, or Pre-Death Probate, is a process of probate which validates the Will of a testator during his or her lifetime and may be particularly useful for testators who fear that their Will may be subject to a challenge following their death.

Various models of Ante-Mortem Probate have been explored in the past by American scholars and include the following proposed models:

  • The “Contest Model”, reviewed by Professor Howard Fink, is where each of the beneficiaries are identified, including those that would benefit on an intestacy and the testator essentially becomes the moving party in his or her own suit against all possible beneficiaries of his or her Estate. [Antemortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life After Death? (1976) 37 Ohio St LJ 264]

 

  • The “Conservatorship Model”, explored by Professor John H. Langbein, is where the testator is required to apply to the Court in a manner similar to the “Contest Model”, however, instead of each of the specific beneficiaries being involved, a Guardian Ad Litem (Conservator) represents the interest of all potential beneficiaries, including any unborn or unascertained beneficiaries. [Living Probate: the Conservatorship Model (1980)]

 

  • The “Administrative Model”, set out by Professor Gregory S. Alexander and Albert M. Pearson is neither judicial nor adversarial. There is no requirement of notice to the beneficiaries or in fact “interested parties” as one of the significant concerns with the other models of Ante-Mortem Probate is the confidentiality of the testator. [Alternative Models of Antemortem Probate and Procedural Process Limitations on Succession (1979-1980) 78 Mich L Rev 89]

Only certain American States allow Ante-Mortem Probate, whereas Canada does not have any provinces or territories with a similar arrangement.

Given the number of suits that are commenced following the death of testators across Canada, such an arrangement could be beneficial in that at the very least, a testator who expects that there will be a challenge to his or her Estate plan could take an active part in adjudicating whether his or her Will is indeed, valid.

Considering the complicated familial arrangements that are often present in our society today, perhaps addressing challenges of things like capacity of the testator, undue influence or the presence of suspicious circumstances would make more sense before the testator’s death. This is particularly an issue where a testator’s capacity had been in question for a while and the Will being challenged was executed a decade or more before death.

There are, of course, certain potential negative effects of any Ante-Mortem Probate regime, particularly the possibility that it would encourage litigation that would not otherwise arise, following the death of the testator.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this post interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

Probate and Wills: What About Electronic Wills?

The High Cost of Probate

When is Probate of a Will Required in Ontario?

15 Apr

Legal vs. Beneficial Ownership: British Columbia’s New Registry

Kira Domratchev Estate & Trust, In the News, News & Events Tags: , , 0 Comments

Any estate litigator will tell you that many of the cases that we deal with on a daily bases involve disputes regarding the beneficial ownership of assets, being jointly held assets or assets that are wholly owned by one party and alleged to be beneficially owned by another.

For reference, legal ownership or legal title refers to property held in the name of a person or persons. In contrast, beneficial ownership is what is referred to as “actual” ownership even though the property is registered in someone else’s name.

Without a clear trust agreement, it is often very difficult to argue that beneficial ownership exists and the parties to the dispute will resort to arguments over things like, who is paying taxes for the property, who is collecting rental income and other evidence that relates to the parties’ intention.

The Province of British Columbia appears to have come up with a solution to the question of whether the specific property truly belongs to the person in whose name it is registered.

The Land Owner Transparency Act has been introduced to create a public registry of property owners in the province. Notably, this is the first legislation of its kind in Canada and is aimed towards ending the use of trusts, corporations and partnerships to shield transactions from public view.

The new legislation was positively received at Transparency International Canada whose executive director, James Cohen, noted that Canada has been criticized globally for our apparently lax beneficial ownership legislation.

In accordance with this legislation, corporations, trusts and partnerships that buy land would have to disclose their beneficial owners in the registry. It is interesting to note that failure to do so will result in fines of up to $100,000.00 or 15% of the assessed value of the property, whichever is greater.

The Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (Canada) submitted certain concerns to the province such as questions of how the new framework is to work with other relevant legislation and raised questions of privacy.

Will Ontario follow suit? Stay tuned.

To learn more about this new initiative, check out this Globe and Mail article on the topic.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

Legal vs. Beneficial Ownership – Not so easily distinguished?

The Beneficial Ownership of Shares in a Corporation

House Explosion Leading to Questions or Ownership and Ultimately, Responsibility Under the Law

04 Feb

To Act or Not to Act: When is There a Conflict of Interest for a Lawyer?

Kira Domratchev Ethical Issues Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

As lawyers, we always have to consider whether we can act for someone before we are retained. Often, the question of whether we are in a conflict is a simple one; however, occasionally, it is more difficult to assess whether we can or more importantly, should, act for someone.

In a recent case, a Plaintiff moved to remove counsel for the Defendant due to a perceived conflict of interest (Gloger v Evans 2018 ONSC 4919).

Facts

Otillie and Jochen Gloger, whose children are the parties in this action retained a law firm, to prepare their Wills. Otillie died first and Jochen retained the law firm to prepare a survivorship application with respect to their joint property.

Jochen’s Will named both the Plaintiff and the Defendant in this matter as the Estate Trustees of his Estate and the Estate was divided equally between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

In this action, following Jochen’s death, the Plaintiff sought to have the Defendant removed as Estate Trustee based on various allegations such as misappropriation of assets and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Defendant retained the law firm to represent her in this action. In turn, the Plaintiff alleged that the firm could not represent the Defendant because there were several conflicts of interest and more importantly, such representation would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court considered the test set out in MacDonald Estate v Martin (1990) 3 SCR 1235, which requires that two questions be answered:

  1. Did the lawyer receive confidential information attributable to a solicitor client relationship relevant to the matter at hand?
  2. Is there a risk that it will be used to the prejudice of the client?

Because prejudice is difficult to prove, the “test must be such that the public, represented by the reasonably informed person, would be satisfied that no use of confidential information would occur…”.

Analysis and Decision

The Court held that, at its best, the Plaintiff’s evidence was that he and the Defendant initially retained the law firm but that, three days later, he retained his own lawyer. The Plaintiff never met with a lawyer at the law firm but he apparently had a telephone call with someone at the law firm while the Defendant listened in. However, he could not advise whom he spoke with, nor what that person’s occupation was. Furthermore, the Plaintiff did not sign a retainer agreement nor did he provide a retainer.

Given this evidence, the Court held that the Plaintiff did not retain the law firm and was therefore not a former client. Even if he was a former client, however, the Plaintiff stated at his cross-examination that he did not provide any confidential information to the law firm.

The Court did not believe that any confidential information provided by the Deceased, with respect to the Will which named both the Plaintiff and the Defendant as the beneficiaries and Estate Trustees of the Estate, was relevant to this action regarding trustee misconduct, given that the Will was not ambiguous, nor was there a challenge to the Will.

In making this decision, the Court also commented  on the importance of the right of the client to be represented by counsel of their choice and that a flexible approach must be taken.

In light of the foregoing, the Court did not consider the second step of the test and dismissed the Plaintiff’s motion for the removal of the law firm, as the Defendant’s counsel.

This case reminds us that it is important to consider whether you should act for someone in the circumstances of each individual case. The above-noted test helps one determine whether a potential conflict of interest may arise.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

Solicitor’s Conflicts of Interest in an Estates Practice

Conflicts of Interest and the Bright Line Rule

The Lawyer’s Estate Planning Retainer With A Married Couple

29 Jan

House Explosion Leading to Questions of Ownership and Ultimately, Responsibility Under the Law

Kira Domratchev Litigation, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , , , , 0 Comments

Paul Zigomanis (“Paul”) died on April 20, 2015 as a result of an explosion that destroyed the home he lived in for 24 years (the “Brimley House”). At the time of Paul’s death, title to the Brimley House was in the name of Paul’s parents, John Zigomanis (“John”) and Mary Zigomanis (“Mary”).

A passerby who was driving by the Brimley House at the time of the explosion, and impacted by it, brought an action for negligence and under the Occupiers’ Liability Act as against Paul’s Estate and John’s Estate (Zambri v Cooperman, 2018 ONSC 7679). A motion was brought by the Estate Trustee During Litigation of Paul’s Estate, Jonathan Cooperman, (the “ETDL”) to determine whether the Brimley House was an asset of Paul’s Estate or John’s Estate, as this was an important issue that had to be determined before the litigation could proceed (Zigomanis Estate, 2017 ONSC 6855).

As there were more assets in John’s Estate, than in Paul’s Estate, the interested parties in the litigation would suffer an adverse consequence were it determined that the Brimley House properly belonged in Paul’s Estate.

The primary position of the ETDL was that a trust relationship was established between Paul’s parents and Paul, whereby a resulting trust arose between John and Mary and Paul and that title to the Brimley House “resulted back” to Paul upon John’s death on December 31, 2014.

Facts

On December 31, 1990, John and Mary took title as joint tenants to the property where the Brimley House was eventually built on, for $270,000.00, as joint owners. In May, 1991, Mary and John signed a deed transferring the Brimley House to Paul for “natural love and affection”. The Court found that Paul ultimately paid John and Mary $140,000.00 for the Brimley House. It was further held by the Court that the family understood that John and Mary were always going to help Paul to purchase a home.

After moving into the Brimley House, Paul developed a drug addiction. Thereafter, on August 1, 1996, Paul transferred the Brimley House to Mary and John for $2.00. Mary and John put all the insurance, taxes and utility bills into their names and had the bills sent to their own home, however, Paul would transfer $500.00 per month to them for the payment of these expenses. It was understood by the family that this was done in order to protect the Brimley House from the potential repercussion of Paul’s substance abuse problems.

Mary died on March 23, 2013, leaving her Estate to John, who at the time suffered from dementia. Shortly thereafter, Gail MacDonald (“Gail”) and Violet Cooper (“Violet”), Paul’s sisters, who were managing John’s affairs, realized that Paul stopped making regular payments to their parents towards the Brimley House and offered to have the Brimley House transferred to Paul, immediately. Importantly, this letter was written well before the explosion giving rise to the litigation, took place.

John died on December 31, 2014, leaving his Estate to Gail, Violet and Paul, equally. Gail was named as the Estate Trustee of John’s Estate. Before Paul’s death, Gail, through her counsel, and Paul, through his counsel, were engaged in settlement negotiations with respect to the Brimley House. The draft minutes of settlement exchanged included the following: “AND WHEREAS Mr. Zigomanis asserts that the Brimley Road property was transferred to the Deceased to be held in trust for the benefit of Mr. Zigomanis”. The Court held that this particular piece of evidence was indicative of the fact that it was always understood by the family that Paul was the beneficial owner of the Brimley House.

Paul died intestate and he did not have a spouse or any children. His beneficiaries were Gail and Violet, and the sole beneficiaries of his Estate.

Analysis and Decision

 

The Court was satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, and in considering all of the evidence, John and Mary transferred both legal and beneficial title to the Brimley House to Paul in 1991, for valuable consideration. As such, no presumption of a resulting trust applied to this transaction.

The Court further held that the nominal consideration for which Paul transferred the Brimley House to John and Mary triggered the presumption of a resulting trust, such that the Court had to determine what Paul intended at the time of the 1996 transfer.

Based on the evidence considered, the Court found that the presumption of a resulting trust could not be rebutted, such that Paul was the true owner of the Brimley House, because John and Mary intended to transfer the legal title back to Paul, once they were reassured in his ability to control ownership. As a result, the Brimley House was ordered to be returned to the trustee of Paul’s Estate, effective January 1, 2015, being the following day after the death of John.

John’s Estate’s Liability in the Litigation Related to the Explosion

Following the Court’s finding regarding the ownership of the Brimley House, Gail, as trustee of John’s Estate brought a motion for an order that John’s Estate did not owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff and was not liable under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The Court held that a relationship between the Plaintiff, a passerby, and John’s Estate, a non-owner of property, is not one in which a duty of care had previously been recognized. The Court further held that although John had some involvement with the Brimley House, it would not be a sufficient basis to find a relationship of proximity with the Plaintiff that would give rise to a duty of care.

Based on the above findings, the Court held that John’s Estate did not owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff and there was no other legal or equitable basis to find that John’s Estate had an obligation to manage the Brimley House on behalf of or to supervise Paul’s behaviour, including any liability under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

Legal vs. Beneficial Ownership – Not so easily distinguished?

The Beneficial Ownership of Shares in a Corporation

It All Comes Down to Intent

14 Jan

Probate and Wills: What About Electronic Wills?

Kira Domratchev Estate & Trust, Estate Planning, Wills Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

In Ontario, a Will has to be in writing and typically an original is required for probate to be granted. With the increase of the technological presence in the everyday life of a typical Canadian, the question remains, should electronic Wills be admitted to probate?

Clare E. Burns and Leandra Appugliesi wrote an interesting paper on this topic titled “There’s an App for that: E-Wills in Ontario” that argued for the development of a legislative scheme in Ontario that admits the possibility of electronic Wills.

In discussing this question, the experience of other jurisdictions was considered, including the United States and Australia.

In 2005, the State of Tennessee was the first American state to recognize the validity of a Will executed with an e-signature. In that particular case, the deceased prepared his Will on his computer and asked two of his neighbours to serve as witnesses. A computer-generated signature was affixed to the Will. Almost ten years later, in 2013, the State of Ohio admitted to probate a Will that was written in the deceased’s own handwriting and signed by him, on a tablet computer.

It appears that electronic Wills are most probably valid in Florida, Texas and California and consistent with existing legislation, though the legislation does not specifically contemplate electronic Wills. The State of Nevada, on the other hand, has specifically enacted legislation which expressly allows for the validity of electronic Wills.

Australia, in comparison to the United States, has managed the question of electronic Wills by making use of the “substantial compliance” legislation that exists in each state, which gives the state courts the authority to dispense with the formal requirements for the execution of the Will. In comparison, the legislation in Ontario is one of “strict compliance” such that the formalities of a Will are required before a Certificate of Appointment is granted.

It appears that in Ontario, though a Court could theoretically admit an electronic Will (i.e. not an original copy) to probate, the formalities in accordance with the Succession Law Reform Act must be met, in any event. As a result, an electronic Will that does not meet any one of the formalities will almost certainly not be admitted to probate.

As various electronic gadgets are now being used more and more, Canadians are also using them to make testamentary documents. In keeping with the realities of contemporary life, it may be that legislative reform is needed.

In discussing the possibility of legislative reform, Ms. Burns and Ms. Appugliesi, also addressed the importance of various policy considerations. In doing so, they addressed the John J. Langbein analysis, which set out four main purposes to the formalities requirements in any Wills legislation:

  1. Evidentiary: the writing, signature and attestation requirements serve as evidence of testamentary intent in a reliable and permanent form;
  2. Channeling: the writing, signature and attestation requirements ease the administrative burden on the court system by setting out a uniform checklist of what is required before probate can be granted;
  3. Cautionary: the formalities are designed to impress the seriousness of the testamentary act upon the testator so as to ensure that he or she has fully thought through the result of executing the Will; and
  4. Protective: the formalities are designed to reduce the opportunity for fraud and undue influence by involving witnesses in the process.

As litigators, the “evidentiary” and the “protective” purposes are particularly important, as we often consider questions of testamentary intent, undue influence and fraud (albeit more rarely), amongst other things.

From that perspective, any legislative amendments to be made must address the various policy considerations and the implications of any such amendments on the legal system in Ontario.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

The Introduction of e-Wills

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The Validity of iWills

19 Nov

City of Toronto’s Actions to Care for its Senior Citizens

Kira Domratchev General Interest Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

Some people would be surprised to know that there are now more Torontonians ages 65+ than children aged 15 and below. By 2041, the number of people over the age of 65 is expected to double. Nationally, seniors are projected to constitute one-quarter of the Canadian population by the year of 2036.

The City of Toronto found that a plan and an appropriate strategy were needed to be put in place, in order to ensure that the needs of the growing population of seniors are being met.

The City first addressed this question on April 12, 2011, when Council directed the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for seniors in consultation with other levels of government, school boards, relevant community organizations and individuals, businesses and academia that is adequately funded, financially feasible and able to be implemented. A particularly important aspect of Council’s direction was the request that the strategy include helping seniors remain in their own homes longer.

On May 7, 2013, Council unanimously approved the Toronto Seniors Strategy: Towards an Age-Friendly City. Between 2013 and 2017, various progress reports were generated and on July 4, 2017, City Council adopted the Tenants First Phase 1 Implementation Plan. A particular area of interest in this plan was that the City Council approved the strategic integration of City programs and services for seniors and responsibility for management of the 83 seniors-designated buildings within the Toronto Community Housing Corporation portfolio under a new Seniors Housing and Services entity that is separate from Toronto Community Housing and is more directly accountable to City Council.

Most recently, a report for action was generated on April 30, 2018 indicating that the manner in which the City currently organizes its housing and services for seniors does not meet their needs and this problem will be exacerbated as the population continues to grow over the next 10-15 years.

The following recommendations were made:

  1. City Council to approve Version 2.0 of the Toronto Seniors Strategy and direct City Divisions and Agencies to implement the 27 high-impact recommendations contained in the report;
  2. City Council to direct the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to work with the Executive Director of Financial Planning to report back on the financial impact of fully implementing the 27 high-impact recommendations once the service delivery plans have been fully developed for the medium-term initiatives.

It is encouraging to see that the City of Toronto is taking initiatives such as these to care for its aging population, moving forward. To learn more about this important endeavour check out the Toronto Seniors Strategy Version 2.0 report here.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

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12 Nov

Mediation or Arbitration – What’s the Difference?

Kira Domratchev Estate & Trust, Litigation Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

In the estates regime, mediations occur regularly, particularly in Toronto, where mediations are a mandatory part of the litigation, in accordance with Rule 75.1.02(1)(a)(i) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

A mediation is always an opportunity to attempt to settle a matter without resorting to costly and time consuming litigation. At mediation, the parties will each stay in separate rooms and the mediator (that is usually chosen by the parties to the litigation), will shuttle between the rooms seeking a more in-depth understanding of the parties’ positions as well as probing opportunities for settlement. Sometimes, before the mediation begins, the mediator will do an introduction to all the parties before they break off into separate rooms, explaining how the day will go.

An important aspect of mediation is the fact that a mediator has no decision-making power. He or she cannot force the parties to settle but can provide his or her opinion on the issues. As such, settlement at mediation can only be reached upon the agreement of the parties themselves.

Another means of dispute resolution (other than litigation) that is not often resorted to in estate litigation, is arbitration. Before agreeing to attend an arbitration, however, it is important to consider whether this form of dispute resolution would be helpful in the particular circumstances of the matter.

Arbitration, unlike mediation, is an adversarial dispute resolution process (similar to litigation) determined and controlled by a neutral third party. The arbitrator can make a final decision, called an “award”, contrary to a mediator, who cannot. The most significant aspect of arbitration, however, is that the courts generally do not interfere in a dispute that is subject to an arbitration agreement. As such, there is a risk that should a decision be made by an arbitrator, the court would then refuse to hear the matter further, leaving arbitration as the ultimate medium of resolving the particular matter.

Why is that so important?

In a situation where the parties have already engaged in settlement negotiations and there appears to be a gap between their respective positions, an arbitration may be worthwhile to pursue, particularly should litigation be untenable to the parties given the cost involved and/or if the matter in dispute does not involve a lot of money. In such a situation, a final arbitral award may bring finality and allow the parties to move on, particularly if the gap between the parties’ positions is not significant.

If, however, the parties had not yet engaged in negotiations and no offers to settle were made, pursuing arbitration may be a serious gamble. That is so because the issues to be arbitrated are set out by the parties and though the arbitration process is similar to traditional litigation, the arbitrator will not have an opportunity to hear all the relevant evidence. As a result, agreeing to arbitrate in a situation like that may cause prejudice to a client who may then not be able to appeal the “award” made by an arbitrator, outside of the regime put in place by the Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 17.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

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05 Nov

When Will a Rule 49 Settlement Be Enforced?

Kira Domratchev Litigation Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

According to Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may bring a motion for judgment in accordance with the terms of an accepted offer and the judge may grant judgment with respect to same or continue the proceeding as if there had been no accepted offer to settle.

In a recent Court of Appeal decision (Hashemi-Sabet Estate v Oak Ridges Pharmasave Inc. 2018 ONCA 839) the Court had to determine whether the motion judge erred in giving judgment in accordance with a Rule 49 offer to settle because said offer was revoked before it was accepted.

Background

The Respondent (the Estate), sued the Appellant for damages for breach of contract, oppression and various other causes of action relating to the opening and operation of a pharmacy.

On June 8, 2015, the Appellant served the Respondent with a written Rule 49 offer to settle the action. In accordance with Rule 49, the offer provided that it would be open until the trial of the action.

In April, 2016, the Appellant retained new counsel, and a Notice of Change of Lawyer was served in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

On September 20, 2016, the parties attended a pre-trial conference. The Appellant maintains that the June 8, 2015 offer to settle was rescinded orally at the pre-trial conference and that the offer to settle served on September 19, 2016 revoked the June 8, 2015 offer, in any event.

The Respondent on the other hand, maintained that when counsel returned to their office following the pre-trial conference, a written acceptance of the June 8, 2015 offer to settle was sent by fax at 1:27 p.m. on the same day. According to further evidence tendered by the Respondent, opposing counsel’s office called and requested a copy of the June 8, 2015 offer to settle following the pre-trial conference on September 20, 2016 and that a copy was sent to opposing counsel via email at 2:34 p.m. that day (arguably after acceptance of same was sent via fax).

The Respondent acknowledged receipt of the second offer to settle but maintained that it was not served until 5:23 p.m. on September 20, 2016 (hours after the June 8, 2015 offer was accepted).

The Respondent brought a motion for judgment in accordance with the June 8, 2015 offer to settle and the motion judge granted same. The Appellant appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal.

Court of Appeal Decision

The Court agreed with the motion judge. The Court found that the revocation of the June 8, 2015 offer to settle did not comply with Rule 49.02(1) which requires that the revocation be made in writing. As such, the timing of service of the second offer to settle would be determinative of the motion.

The Court held that in determining whether to enforce a Rule 49 offer to settle, a two-step approach is to be undertaken, similar to the pre-Hryniak v Mauldin 2014 Supreme Court of Canada decision Rule 20 summary judgment analysis.

As such, the Court agreed with the motion judge’s analysis in accordance with the above-noted framework was appropriate as follows:

  1. Whether an agreement to settle had been reached;
  2. Whether, on all the evidence, the agreement should be enforced.

The Court agreed that the motion judge had to make credibility findings and held that the Respondent’s position was more credible such that the June 8, 2015 was accepted and that judgment in accordance with the said offer should be enforced. In particular, the Court had trouble with the fact that the Appellant had known for over a year that the Respondent took the position that their counsel was not served with the second offer to settle until 5:23 p.m. on September 20, 2016, but did not submit an Affidavit of Service from the process server.

In light of this decision, it is particularly important to be mindful of the particular rules related to Rule 49 offers to settle, both in making an offer to settle and considering to revoke same. Particularly in relation to service of an offer to settle, it may a good idea to serve it in such a manner as to be able to confirm receipt of same by the other side, such as via facsimile. It is important to remember that service via email will not qualify as proper service, particularly if the opposing side maintains the email was never received.

Thanks for reading!

Kira Domratchev

Find this blog interesting? Please consider these other related posts:

What is a Rule 49 Offer to Settle?

Revoking a Rule 49 Offer to Settle

Cost Awards and Offers to Settle

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