Author: Ian Hull
Last month, in the case of McKitty v Hayani, 2019 ONCA 805, the Ontario Court of Appeal had to consider a challenge to the medical and common law definition of death on the grounds of freedom of religion. The Court also considered whether someone’s religious beliefs should be a factor when deciding whether they are legally deceased. In the end, the Court unanimously declined to rule on whether religious beliefs should be taken into account, but there were some key takeaways from the decision, and a framework was made that invites future challenges. This issue could have an important application in estates law, as it examines the standard for when someone is considered legally deceased.
Taquisha McKitty was declared dead in September 2017 following a drug overdose. The medical staff attending to her declared her dead due to “neurological criteria”; however her relatives were granted an injunction to keep her on life support, arguing their Christian faith only considers someone deceased upon cessation of cardiovascular, instead of neurological, activity. They made the argument that according to the freedom of religion in section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, they have the right to have their religious views taken into account when it comes to determination of death and removal of life support. The point is now somewhat moot because McKitty has since died from both neurological and cardiovascular criteria; however important groundwork was laid for a potential future challenge.
The Court of Appeal unanimously concluded that it did not have enough information to rule on the matter. To be able to appropriately rule on the Charter issues, the Court held it would need more evidence on the duties and legal obligations of doctors, McKitty’s religious beliefs, and the religious beliefs of her community. The Court did accept the common law definition of death as being cessation of neurological activity, but left this definition open to future challenges based on freedom of religion. While not providing a definitive answer, the Court did craft a legal framework for how this issue should be addressed in future. This framework includes acknowledging that death is not just a medical determination but also an “evaluative” legal concept. The Court also ruled that the Charter still applied to McKitty as a legal “person” even though she was clinically dead, and a lack of neurological activity does not remove her right to challenge the criteria used to declare her death. With this framework in place, it remains very possible that we might see a further challenge within this framework in the near future.
In this case, the current definition of death as cessation of neurological activity was confirmed, but it remains very possible that this could be challenged on freedom of religion grounds. This has very interesting implications for estates law. For example, in families of mixed faiths, some members of the family might consider a relative to be deceased, while other members might consider them to be alive. This would cause a tricky situation when it comes to dividing up the estate. Watch this space!
Thanks for reading,
Ian Hull and Sean Hess
For those who are about to enter, or are in the very midst of, a long and arduous legal dispute, beware the ineffaceable nature of social media activity. The sands of time might erode Rome and the Pyramids, but they will bounce off the public record of your impassioned posts and hyperbolic tweets. Keeping in mind that such evidence lasts forever, and is also readily accessible, devoid of context, and cheap to procure, litigants may be wise to keep their online communication to a minimum – lest they spoon-feed their opponents material that could later prove hamstringing and self-defeating.
In recent years there have been stories about criminals sharing their crimes with the world via Facebook Live. In family law, we have seen a support claimant attain more support by citing a payor’s lavish life on Instagram, and a father’s custody compromised by his errant Youtube video. In estates law, where there is often mystery and ambiguity involved with testamentary intention, and much of the evidence is “he-said-she-said” – in other words, uncorroborated parole evidence tainted by self-interest – parties scramble for whatever concrete material they can find, such as a screenshot of a social media tirade.
In one recent Ontario decision (Lyons v. Todd,  O.N.S.C. 2269), a man not only dragged out litigation against his sister, who was the estate trustee, but engaged in a campaign of harassment, menaces, and defamation – all of which the court was able to scrutinize with ease:
“The transcription of voice messages, copies of emails and other social media posts, establish that Bob threatened to make what he described as Victoria’s ‘perverted’ sex life public. He threatened to expose her to the clients of the Park and bankrupt her with the costs of litigation if she did not settle. With some of the Facebook posts, he posted the location of the Park.”
The court did not accept the man’s argument that the posts were unrelated to the proceedings, finding instead that the “gratuitous humiliation and embarrassment” the estate trustee suffered was a further reason for which she should receive the $60,000 in costs that she requested.
In Nova Scotia (Public Safety) v. Lee,  N.S.S.C. 71, a man came under the fire of CyberSCAN and the Director of Public Safety, which are government bodies mandated with the policing, punishment and prevention of cyberbullying. The man was purportedly vexed with his sister, who was the sole beneficiary of the mother’s will. The rambling posts were addressed to “anybody out there in Facebook land” and the “cowards in my family”, but in fact the speech was tantamount to a naked admission before a stern court.
The frustrated litigant or potential litigant who needs to vent would be safer, and likely more satisfied, by confiding his or her troubles to a friend in a private setting rather than airing from a veritable rooftop grievances which will echo for the end of time.
Thank you for reading,
Ian Hull and Devin McMurtry
Business Insider recently reported that 2.1 billion people access at least one of the Facebook, Messenger, Whatsapp or Instagram apps every day. That’s a little less than a third of the world’s population.
These platforms allow us to share various aspects of our lives. Some of us use them to document everything. But what happens to these accounts when a user passes away? Do their accounts remain on these platforms forever or can they be removed? Let’s take a look at four of the biggest social network platforms to see what their policies say.
Facebook users have the option of having their account permanently deleted or appointing a legacy contact to look after their “memorialized account.” A legacy contact is someone who is chosen to oversee an account if it is memorialized. The legacy contact must be 19 years or older. They can accept friend requests on the deceased’s behalf, pin tribute posts and change the account’s profile picture and cover photo.
Key features of memorialized accounts include the following:
- The word “Remembering” will appear next to the person’s name on their profile
- No one can log into the account
- The account will not appear in public spaces such as friend suggestions
- Content that was shared on Facebook while the deceased was alive will remain visible to the audience it was initially shared with
- Depending of the deceased’s privacy settings, friends of the deceased can share memories on the account’s timeline
Similarly to Facebook, Instagram accounts can also be permanently deleted or memorialized upon request. To remove the account, the user must provide proof that they are an immediate family member of the deceased. Proof may include the deceased’s birth or death certificate or proof of authority that the individual is the lawful representative of the deceased person or their estate. In order to memorialize an account, proof of death such as a link to an obituary or news article is required. A memorialized Instagram account will not appear differently from an account that has not been memorialized.
Instagram’s memorialized accounts have the following key features:
- No one can log into the account
- Posts shared on the account stay on Instagram and will remain visible to the audience they were initially shared with
- Changes will not be able to be made to any of the account’s existing posts or information
Unlike Facebook, a legacy contact cannot be appointed for a memorialized Instagram account.
A colleague, classmate or loved one can request the removal of the deceased’s profile by filling out this form. The form requires several pieces of information such as the applicant’s relationship to the deceased, the link to the deceased’s obituary and the company the deceased most recently worked at.
A verified immediate family member or someone who is authorized to act on behalf of the estate can request the removal of the deceased’s account. A request requires information about the deceased, a copy of ID from the individual making the request and a copy of the deceased’s death certificate.
Thanks for reading!
Ian M. Hull and Celine Dookie
Recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that even where a gift is not validly executed, the intention of the parties can still be fulfilled through a bare trust.
A father made a profitable investment that was held by his wife in trust for their three children in equal shares. One brother sold his share of the investment, so that the remaining portion of the investment was to be divided 50/50 between his brother and sister. The sister subsequently disclaimed her share of the investment for tax reasons, with the result that her share reverted back to the mother. It was understood and orally communicated that the mother would hold the investment and gift the income from the investment to the sister, with the principal coming back to the sister as part of the mother’s inheritance. When the mother was eventually declared incapable and the brothers became their mother’s Attorneys for Property, they were suspicious of this arrangement between their mother and their sister, and brought an action against the sister and her husband.
The main issue was whether the past and future proceeds of the investment had been validly gifted by the mother to the sister, and whether the sister’s husband, who had assumed responsibility for using the proceeds, was liable as trustee de son tort.
In the initial ruling, the application judge rejected the sister’s claim to the funds and held that the gift from the mother was invalid. Funds had been transferred by the mother to the sister through signed blank cheques. A valid gift requires delivery from the donor to the recipient (Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2014); Teixeira v. Markgraf Estate, 2017 ONCA 819, 137 O.R. (3d) 641, at paras. 38, 40-44), and the gift was not considered delivered until the cheque had been cashed. In this case, by the time the cheques were cashed by the sister, the mother had been declared incapable and lacked the capacity to gift. The judge ruled that the money belonged to the mother, and that the sister and her husband had to account for it, and the husband was liable as trustee de son tort.
This result was overturned recently in the Court of Appeal. The court found that the applicable legal mechanism here was not a gift, which was invalid, but instead was a valid bare trust. A bare trust is where the trustee has no obligations other than to convey the trust property to the beneficiaries on their demand (Donovan W. M. Waters, Mark R. Gillen & Lionel D. Smith, Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at pp. 33-34).
The decision turned on whether there had been sufficient certainty of intention from the mother to create a bare trust, and the court found that there had been. The trust did not have to be formally evidenced in writing because the trust property was funds in a bank account and not land or an interest in land (Statute of Frauds, R. S. O. 1990, c. S.19, ss. 4, 9-11; see also In the Estate of Jean Elliott (2008), 4 E. T. R. (3d) 84 (Ont. S. C.) at para. 42.). There was sufficient evidence in the conduct of the parties to show an intention for the funds to be held for the sister as well as one of her brothers in equal shares, and the certainty of intention for the mother to hold the money as bare trustee was satisfied. As there was a valid trust, the husband was not liable as trustee de son tort because he had not acted inconsistently with the terms of the trust. While the proceeds that had already come from the investment were held on bare trust by the mother, the future distributions from the investment were not, as future property cannot be the subject matter of a trust (para. 58 and 84 of the judgment).
Moral of the story
This is a great indicator of how, when a gift is invalid, the court will use the legal mechanism of a bare trust to give effect to the intention of the parties, so long as their intention is sufficiently certain.
Thanks for reading,
Ian M. Hull and Sean Hess
In Banks v Goodfellow, the English High Court laid out the benchmark test for assessing testamentary capacity. To this day, it has stood the test of time. Subsequent cases have served to focus and clarify aspects of it. The recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Kay v Kay Sr. is such a case. In Kay v Kay Sr., the court provides a helpful review of the law regarding testamentary capacity, specifically the weight that is to be given to the drafting lawyer’s assessment and a posthumous testamentary capacity assessment.
The deceased, Annie Wotton, died on August 26, 2019, at the age of 95. Mrs. Wotton created a will in 1992 which essentially left everything to her son, John. It also provided that John, along with her husband, Jack, were to be appointed as joint executors.
Medical assessments conducted in November 2009, September 2010 and October 2010 noted that Mrs. Wotton had a mild to moderate form of dementia. The assessments stated that Mrs. Wotton’s memory was moderately impaired and that her cognitive abilities were progressively declining.
In November 2010, another will was prepared by Mrs. Wotton. The drafting lawyer, Mark Ouimet-McPherson, met with Mrs. Wotton and assessed her capacity. Mr. Ouimet-McPherson believed that Mrs. Wotton had testamentary capacity so he took her instructions and prepared and executed the documents. The new will stipulated that the residue of the estate was to be divided equally amongst John and two of Mrs. Wotton’s three grandchildren: Cindy and John Jr. It also named John as estate trustee, with Cindy as the alternate.
At the time of Mrs. Wotton’s death, John had advanced dementia and was incapable of acting as estate trustee. John’s wife, Rosemary, acted as his litigation guardian and filed a Notice of Objection to Cindy’s application for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee. Rosemary’s objection was based on the fact that the November 2010 will should be declared invalid as Mrs. Wotton lacked testamentary capacity at that time.
In 2019, a posthumous testamentary capacity assessment was conducted by Dr. Francine Sarazin. Dr. Sarazin found that “there [was] reasonable evidence in support of a determination of incapacity when Mrs. Wotton gave instructions to draw up a last will and testament.”
The court relied on O’Neil v. Royal Trust Co. and Vout v. Hay to summarize the legal principle regarding the onus of testamentary capacity: A presumption of capacity exists until it is shown that suspicious circumstances existed regarding the preparation of the will. If suspicious circumstances exist, that presumption is no longer in effect and the onus then shifts to the party propounding the will to prove that the testator had testamentary capacity.
Since medical evidence found that Mrs. Wotton suffered with a form of mild to moderate Alzheimer dementia at the time of signing the 2010 will, and due to Mrs. Wotton’s age and the changes between the two wills, the court determined that the onus should shift to the propounder of the November 2010 will to show capacity.
The court accepted the posthumous assessment of Dr. Sarazin, but the assessment was only afforded a modest degree of weight for the following reasons:
- Since it was a retrospective capacity assessment which went back nine years, the court thought that it was not very reliable;
- The assessment was not an exhaustive review of Mrs. Wotton’s life in and around the time she signed the will; and
- Cindy’s material was not provided to or reviewed by the assessor.
The court then turned to Mr. Ouimet-McPherson’s evidence. In his meeting with Mrs. Wotton, Mr. Ouimet-McPherson filled out a checklist for her. Based upon Mrs. Wotton’s answers to Mr. Ouimet–McPherson’s questions, her knowledge of her family and her assets, he was satisfied that Mrs. Wotton had testamentary capacity.
The court also took other evidence into consideration, such as the medical assessments conducted in November 2009, September 2010 and October 2010. While the assessments provisionally diagnosed Mrs. Wotton with a mild to moderate form of dementia, they noted that she was able to manage daily living on her own as well as her finances.
The court took this evidence and applied it the Banks v Goodfellow test:
- Understanding the nature of the act of making a will and its consequences: At the meeting with Mr. Ouimet-McPherson, Mrs. Wotton commented that she wanted to be fair and avoid disputes. This demonstrated that she likely understood the consequences of what she was doing.
- Understanding the extent of one’s assets: In general terms, Mrs. Wotton knew the assets she owned. Although she could not recall specific details such as knowing whether her life insurance lapsed or the last statement of her bank account, Mr. Ouimet-McPherson felt that Mrs. Wotton responded appropriately for someone her age.
- Understanding the claims of those who might expect to benefit from the will, both of those to be included and excluded: From Mrs. Wotton’s instructions, it seems as if she knew she was changing her 1992 will to divide her assets three ways as opposed to leaving everything to John.
- Any disorder of the mind or delusions: Mr. Ouimet-McPherson’s evidence seems to suggest that Mrs. Wotton knew what she was doing at the time the will was executed and was not suffering from any delusions or disorders of the mind that impacted her intentions.
After considering all of the above, the court ultimately concluded that, at the time the November 2010 will was executed, it was more likely than not that Mrs. Wotton had testamentary capacity. As such, Cindy was named as the Estate Trustee.
Kay v Kay Sr. provides a helpful review of the test for testamentary capacity as set out in Banks v Goodfellow. It emphasizes that testamentary capacity is to be determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The drafting lawyer’s assessment plays a major role in assessing capacity. A posthumous testamentary capacity assessment may also be given considerable weight if it is conducted around the time the deceased’s capacity was in question and if the assessor’s review of the deceased’s life around the time they signed the will is fairly extensive.
Thanks for reading – Have a great day!
Ian Hull and Celine Dookie
No, we are not referring to the 1979 film featuring Dustin Hoffman and Meryl Streep, but a far more recent (but nonetheless interesting) legal dispute involving an application to pass accounts, suspicious activity on behalf of an Attorney for Property, and the resurgence of the equitable defences of laches and acquiescence.
A complex series of facts is present in the Estate of Ronald Alfred Craymer v. Hayward et al, 2019 ONSC 4600: two Attorneys for Property, six marriages, seven children, thirty years of estrangement between Ronald and his four children, and virtually no financial records for the period during which the first Attorney for Property oversaw the affairs of her incapable husband’s estate.
The cruxes of the dispute are that the first Attorney for Property (Joan, Ronald’s wife) transferred the title of the matrimonial home to herself, she kept scanty financial records, and the value of her assets (over $1 million) dwarfed that of her late husband’s (around $35,000). When Joan died suddenly, John Craymer (Ronald’s son, the plaintiff) applied for a passing of accounts and the second Attorney for Property (Linda, Joan’s daughter) was left in the unenviable position of potentially having to answer for the conduct of her late mother in relation to accounts of which she, Linda, had no knowledge.
Under section 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, the Court may order a passing of accounts. In considering whether to do so, it should examine “the extent of the attorney’s involvement in the grantor’s financial affairs and second whether the applicant has raised a significant concern in respect of the management of the grantor’s affairs” (McAllister Estate v. Hudgin, 42 E.T.R. (3d) 313 (ONSC), at para 13). Since section 42 carries a high threshold, and Linda was not responsible for her mother’s conduct, the Court did not grant the application. In its reasons, moreover, the Court found fault with the transfer of the home, but given the marital relationship between grantor and attorney, it did not attach much weight to the scantiness of detailed accounts.
Noteworthy in this case is the Court’s consideration of the equitable doctrines of laches and acquiescence in the context of a motion for a passing of accounts (in which, in Ontario, there is no limitation period). In determining whether these defences apply, the Court looks at the length of the delay and the resulting prejudice. Neither of these components were applicable here, for when John learned of the value of his father’s estate as well as the transfer of the home into Joan’s name, he acted promptly. Instead, his application was dismissed on the Court’s discretion.
Thank you for reading.
Ian Hull & Devin McMurtry
With the enactment of Rule 75.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, those involved in disputes relating to an estate, trust or substitute decision-making matter in Toronto, Ottawa or the County of Essex are referred to mediation unless there is a court order exempting it under Rule 75.1.04.
As lawyers, “mediation” is a term we are familiar with. However it may not be as familiar to clients. Many of them may have never heard of “mediation” before. As such, if you or a client have an upcoming mediation, it is important to prepare early to avoid being caught off guard during the mediation.
What is Mediation?
Mediation is a form of alternative dispute resolution where people can settle their disputes outside of court. It is a voluntary process in which the parties meet with a neutral third-party (referred to as the “mediator”) who provides them with assistance in negotiating a settlement. The mediator does not impose a judgment as the process is led by the parties.
Mediation vs. Litigation
The big “pull factor” to mediation is that it vastly differs from litigation. The major differences include:
- Decision-Making: With mediation, the parties decide the outcome but with litigation, a judge imposes his or her decision upon the parties
- Private vs. Public Process: Mediation is a private and confidential process, whereas litigation is a public process
- Costs: The costs of mediation are typically lower than that of litigation
- Time: The mediation process tends to be faster than litigation
- Adversarial vs. Non-Adversarial: Mediation is viewed as a non-adversarial process, whereas litigation is viewed as an adversarial process
Preparation for Mediation
Preparation for mediation should start well in advance of the mediation date.
Preparing the Client
Start by explaining to the client what mediation is and how the process works. Assure the client that the mediator will be a neutral facilitator and that abusive behaviour by the other party will not be tolerated.
As part of discussing the mediation process with the client, let the client know about the time commitment that mediation entails. The mediation could last the entire day or even multiple days.
Determine the client’s interests and goals for the mediation. Are they looking to settle the case at mediation or are they prepared to go to trial? What types of offers would they be willing to accept?
Preparation for the Lawyer
Know the mediator’s background and approach beforehand. Is the mediator someone who has a background in estates law? Are they a lawyer? Are they a former judge? Knowing the answers to these questions can help the lawyer determine what approach would be the most beneficial to employ during mediation.
Prepare a comprehensive mediation brief and send it to the opposing counsel and mediator well in advance of the hearing date. A comprehensive mediation brief can maximize a lawyer’s presentation at the mediation. It is helpful to include copies of all relevant documents, such as the wills in question, within the brief. Additionally, it might be helpful to include a chronology of events as a schedule to the mediation brief.
If the mediation results in a settlement, ensure that the terms of the settlement are formally documented and that each client has signed the document. In some cases, however, a “cooling-off period” of one or two days from the proposed settlement might be necessary.
At the end of the day, the best approach a lawyer can take in preparing for mediation is to know the mediator, prepare their documents ahead of time and provide the client with as much information about the mediation process as possible. The more prepared the lawyer and the client are, the smoother the mediation will go.
For more information on preparing your client for an estate mediation, visit this link.
Thanks for reading,
Ian Hull & Celine Dookie
The Olympics seemed a lot simpler when Montreal hosted the summer games in 1976. Yes, there were some bizarre sports that seemed better suited to ancient Greece (hammer throw anyone?). But at least these bizarre sports were ones we knew well from previous games – and we were very familiar with most of the other stuff (like cycling, rowing, swimming, and running).
Times have changed
While many sports have been added and dropped from the modern Olympic games over the years, some new additions for 2020 certainly catch the eye – namely sport climbing, surfing, and skateboarding.
All of these sports have been added to the exclusion of a sport – played by 20 million people worldwide – that has been working to be recognized as an Olympic sport for decades: squash.
The most recent pitch by the World Squash Federation was for squash to be included in the 2024 games in Tokyo – and it was confident that it had met all the criteria. But in February, the International Olympic Committee chose another sport to be added instead of squash: breakdancing.
You can read about the reaction of the squash community here. In short, they were stunned. Millions play the game, television coverage has increased, and it’s recognized as one of the most demanding sports to play.
But Olympic organizers have stated that their agenda is more youth-focused and more urban, which is why skateboarding and breakdancing are in and squash is out.
On the one hand, I get it. Squash has an elitist history (there was a squash court on the Titanic, available to first class passengers) and it’s mostly played in expensive clubs. Breakdancing and skateboarding are available to all, for next to nothing in cost. And they are fun to watch too.
On the other hand, if the Olympics continues to include even more elitist sports like equestrian, it seems unfair to exclude an individual sport that has a storied history, gender balance, and active youth programs worldwide.
I look forward to watching the skateboarding and breakdancing competitions in coming Olympic games. Don’t get me wrong. But I’ll shed a tear for a sport I think deserves a place on the podium as well.
Now, if we could just get rid of that hammer throw…
Thanks for reading!
Ian M. Hull
I love people who make predictions – especially when it’s in their area of expertise. They aren’t always right of course, but you at least benefit from some “best guesses” by people who work in the area.
The Huffington Post published an article a few months ago by realtor Nathan Dautovich about what’s ahead for the Toronto housing market in 2019. Check it out here.
It contains the usual forecasts for housing and rental prices, which are always useful to learn. But what struck me were a couple of predictions – one for the present, one futuristic – for adding housing stock to a crowded city that’s still growing.
- Laneway housing
Did you hear about this? I hadn’t. Last year, Toronto adopted a new policy allowing laneway housing in what are essentially the old city of Toronto and East York areas. This presentation provides a great overview of the concept.
A laneway house is a detached secondary building that remains under the same ownership as the main house. More like a coach house than a full house, they’re intended for rental housing, such as for family members (adult children or aging parents) or others. The goal is to increase city density and the supply of low-rise neighbourhood-oriented rental stock. Rental income can also help owners of the primary home with mortgage and other costs.
The article suggests that innovative companies may be knocking on the door of homeowners, offering to design, develop, and finance a laneway house. So, get ready for that “knock” if you own a home on a laneway in Toronto.
- Islands off the coast of Toronto
The Huffington Post article notes that most of the land south of Front Street used to be under water – so there is precedent for “adding land” to our shoreline. Today, look no further than the Leslie Street spit, which continues to grow. So how about some housing islands off the eastern or western banks of Toronto? A little imagination could go a long way. We already have island housing on our existing Toronto Island chain. Are we ready for more?
Whether you choose to focus on the present or the future when it comes to real estate in Toronto, you should always be cognizant of the tremendous effect large assets like your real estate property can have on your estate. When contemplating real estate decisions, it is important to think of it as an intergenerational asset, as it will affect the makeup of your estate in a significant way.
Thanks for reading!
Summer is fleeting – and we often put pressure on ourselves to make the most of this 3-month sliver of warmer weather.
But here’s the issue. Day-to-day life doesn’t stop. You still have to work most weeks, kids need tending, dogs need walking, and meals need making. And expenses don’t go away – there’s a limit on what you can spend.
So, instead of focussing on big, time-consuming, or costly things that can make a summer special (trips, hot-air ballooning, cottage rentals), how about some small things that can rock your summer.
Here are five small activities that you can easily work into your summer plans.
- Jump in a fresh water lake: You actually don’t have to jump, but there is no summer experience that can match the feel of a Canadian freshwater lake. Even if you’re a non-swimmer, put on a life vest and wade in. Just once. I guarantee it will be memorable.
- Take in one outdoor concert or event: Shakespeare in the Park, a jazz concert, a baseball game – there are many ways to enjoy some sport or culture in the warmer weather. It’s a chance to sit, relax and let someone else do the entertaining.
- Eat ice cream on a hot night: Your diet is no excuse – there are sugar-free and vegan ice cream options everywhere these days. On a hot day, wait until dark then head out for ice cream. The combination of heat, cold and dark can make for some memorable moments.
- Plant a vegetable, somewhere: It can be in a garden or a pot, or secretly hidden in a park, but plant something that you can harvest later in the summer. You’ll get great satisfaction in eating a home-grown carrot, bean, tomato, or zucchini.
- Have a BBQ or patio dinner: If you have a BBQ, use it – the smell alone will bring back memories of summers past. If you don’t BBQ, make a point of having a patio dinner, at a restaurant or at home. And as you’re sitting there, remember: you can’t do this in January.
Here’s to better weather!
Ian M. Hull