Author: Doreen So

04 Oct

The Right to Disclosure from a Trust

Doreen So Estate & Trust, Executors and Trustees, Passing of Accounts, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

A recent decision from the Royal Court of Jersey was recently discussed here with respect to a beneficiary’s right to disclosure from a trust.  This blog by lawyers from Ogier is an insightful read on this particular area of trust law.

According to the authors at Ogier, M v W Limited and Others was a case that considered a beneficiary’s broad request for documents, such as copies of all trust instruments, latest accounts, financial statements for the corporations owned by the trust, and details about all past distributions from the trust.  While Court’s decision was grounded in an interpretation of the relevant Jersey legislation, some of its commentary remains instructive for those of us who practice outside of Jersey.

In M v W Limited and Others, the nature and immediacy of the beneficiary’s interest is salient to the inquiry.  For example, a contingent beneficiary may not be entitled to as much disclosure as a beneficiary who is entitled to the assets of the trust at that point in time.  By extension, it is also relevant to consider whether the disclosure at issue would negatively affect another class of beneficiaries as well as the proportionality of the request.

As for the law in Canada, I have blogged on a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision about a trustee’s duty to disclose the existence of a trust to the beneficiaries.  Justice Brown for the majority in Valard Construction Ltd. v. Bird Construction Co., 2018 SCC 8, has stated the following at paragraph 19,

“In general, wherever “it could be said to be to the unreasonable disadvantage of the beneficiary not to be informed” of the trust’s existence, [17] the trustee’s fiduciary duty includes an obligation to disclose the existence of the trust.”

This notion of whether a beneficiary would be unreasonably disadvantaged by the non-disclosure is important to keep in mind because the right to disclosure is grounded in a beneficiary right to hold trustees accountable and to enforce the terms of the trust.

Practically speaking, issues of disclosure often leads to a request for the trustee to commence an application to pass accounts.  While the trustee will have the benefit of a court order approving his/her administration for that period (if and when Judgment is obtained), an application to pass accounts must be served on all beneficiaries with a contingent or vested interest pursuant to Rule 74.18 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.  In turn, these beneficiaries will have the right to object to the trustee’s accounts and seek relevant disclosure from the trustee in the course of this process.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

02 Oct

Full Indemnity through Blended Costs: The Estate of Irmgard Burgstaler

Doreen So Elder Law, Guardianship, Passing of Accounts, Trustees, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , 0 Comments

The Estate of Irmgard Burgstaler (disability), 2018 ONSC 472, was a costs decision that arose from an application to pass attorney accounts.  Erwin  was named as the attorney for property for his mother, Irmgard.  Erwin was ordered to pass his accounts and his siblings, Barbara and Peter, objected.

A four-day hearing took place.  Erwin was self-represented and his accounts were not in court format pursuant to Rule 74.17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  Extensive written submissions were also filed by both sides.

Erwin was found to have breached his fiduciary duty to Irmgard when $82,000.00 was taken from Irmgard and applied towards the purchase of a home in Erwin’s name.  Erwin also took approximately $44,000.00 from his mother’s accounts to pay his legal fees in the proceeding at issue and the Court found that this expense was not for Irmgard’s benefit.  Certain other expenses were ordered to be repay to Irmgard as well as the repayment of $5,000.00 from the sale of Irmgard’s trailer.

Given their success, the Objectors sought full indemnity on a blended basis from Erwin (15%) and the Estate (85%).  In reviewing the jurisprudence on costs in estate matters, Justice Shaw found that this case fell within the public policy exemption for due administration of estates and allowed the Objectors’ claim for full indemnity.

That said, Justice Shaw disagreed with the Objectors’ proposed 15/85 split on the basis of the “losers pay” principle in general civil costs.  Justice Shaw ordered Erwin to pay the Objectors’ costs on a partial indemnity scale while the Estate was ordered pay the full remaining balance.  In this case, partial indemnity appears to be close to 70% of the total claimed based on the fixed amounts that were ordered.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

01 Oct

Are you still a “spouse” if you are “Living Apart Together”?

Doreen So Common Law Spouses, Elder Law, General Interest, Support After Death, Wills Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

The Globe and Mail recently published an article on couples that live apart from each other.  This particular article focuses on the story of a couple who has never shared a home in the course of their twenty-year relationship.  This couple is not alone; approximately 1.9 million unmarried adults in Canada were in an intimate relationship with someone who occupies a separate residence in 2011.

This form of intimate relationships are considered to be a historically new family form.  Sociologists have coined this phenomenon as “LAT couples“, i.e. couples that are living apart together.

 

While the article focuses on couples who are deliberately choosing to live apart, there are also external factors that may prevent a couple from living together (such as immigration or capacity issues where one spouse has greater care needs than the other spouse).

LAT couples raise an interesting question with respect to whether such couples would be considered as a “spouse” within the meaning of Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act for the purposes of dependant’s support.  Pursuant to section 57 of the SLRA, the word “spouse” has the same meaning as section 29 of the Family Law Act.

Section 29 of the Family Law Act in turn defines the term spouse as,

  • people who are married to each other;
  • unmarried people who have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years; or
  • unmarried people who are in a relationship of permanence if they have children.

Interestingly, the Ontario Court of Appeal has made the following comment in Stephen v. Stawecki, 2006 CanLii 20225:

“the specific arrangements made for shelter are properly treated as only one of several factors in assessing whether or not the parties are cohabiting”.

Thanks for reading.

Doreen So

26 Jul

Who is the Ontario Children’s Lawyer?

Doreen So Continuing Legal Education, Estate & Trust, General Interest, Guardianship, Litigation Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

The Ontario Court of Appeal recently considered the issue of whether the litigation files of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer are subject to a freedom of information access request in Ontario (Children’s Lawyer) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 ONCA 599.  This appeal arose from a father’s request for the production of the Children’s Lawyers’ records.  The Children’s Lawyer acted for the father’s children in the course of a custody and access dispute.  Accordingly, a portion of the Children’s Lawyer’s records were privileged.

Justice Bennotto, in writing for a unanimous panel, found that the issue turned on whether the records are “in the custody or under the control” of the Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario (“MAG“) for the purposes of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 31.

The answer was no.

 

The Children’s Lawyer’s records are not in the custody or under the control of MAG because she operates separately and distinctly from MAG and,

“[68]     [she] is an independent statutory office holder appointed by Cabinet through the Lieutenant Governor. She derives her independent powers, duties and responsibilities through statute, common law and orders of the court.

[…]

[72]      To allow a disgruntled parent to obtain confidential records belonging to the child would undermine the Children’s Lawyer’s promise of confidentiality, inhibit the information she could obtain and sabotage her in the exercise of her duties. This would, in turn, impact proceedings before the court by depriving it of the child’s voice and cause damage to the child who would no longer be meaningfully represented. Finally, disclosure to a parent could cause further trauma and stress to the child, who may have divided loyalties, exposing the child to retribution and making the child the problem in the litigation.”

For those practising in the estates and trusts context, it is important to note that the role of the Children’s Lawyer is different in family law.

In civil matters that implicate a minor’s financial interest in property, the Children’s Lawyer acts as the minor’s litigation guardian and she is represented by the lawyers of her choice.  In custody and access disputes, the Children’s Lawyer acts, at the request of the court, as the minor’s lawyer.

Bonus answer: the current Children’s Lawyer is Marian Jacko.

Thanks for reading this week!

Doreen So

24 Jul

SLRA Dependant Awarded Entirety of Estate

Doreen So Common Law Spouses, Continuing Legal Education, Estate Planning, Executors and Trustees, Litigation, Support After Death Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

In Michael v. Thomas, 2018 ONSC 3125, Justice Ramsay awarded a dependant support claimant the entirety of the Estate net of all debts and liabilities.  The dependant support claimant in this case was a common law spouse of approximately 20 years.  Ms. Michael was in her late-fifties/early sixties when Mr. Chambers died suddenly from cancer without a will. 

Mr. Chambers and Ms. Michael were not married at the time of Mr. Chambers’ death.  Accordingly, Ms. Michael was not a beneficiary of Mr. Chambers’ Estate pursuant to the rules of intestacy.  Mr. Chambers did not have any children either so the beneficiaries of his Estate were his surviving siblings and two nephews who were the sons of his predeceased sister.

Justice Ramsay found that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Michael lived modestly during Mr. Chambers’ life.  They were joint owners of their home, which Ms. Michael received by right of survivorship.  The home was subject to a mortgage of about half its market value in the amount of $150,000.00.  Ms. Michael was also the beneficiary of a modest $80,000.00 life insurance policy and her income became supplemented by an additional $3,325 per month through the deceased’s CPP and pension benefits.  Ms. Michael worked part-time and has two adult children of her own.  Interestingly, Justice Ramsay commented that Ms. Michael should not have to seek support from her adult children under the Family Law Act (even though she could, theoretically) before seeking support from Mr. Chambers’ Estate.

In considering the Respondent’s case, Justice Ramsay found that Mr. Chambers did not have any other dependants and that he was estranged from the only party who responded to Ms. Michael’s claims in Court.  Mr. Chambers’ sister argued that Ms. Michael already received $203,965 out of the assets of the Estate, which, including section 72 assets, were worth a total $285,000.   She further argued that Ms. Michael would be able to maintain the same standard of living that she used to enjoy if Ms. Michael supplements the pension income by working full-time at minimum wage.  In his analysis, Justice Ramsay squarely stated as follows:

[19]           I do not agree. It is not reasonable to expect the Applicant to take an entry level job at the age of 62 when she is already past the point of being able to sustain full time physical labour, even light physical labour. Even if it were possible, it would only raise her earnings to the low $40,000 range, which would still not be enough to continue the modest standard to which she was accustomed. I do not think that the intestate made adequate provision for the proper support of the Applicant.

[20]           The estate is not big enough to make periodic payments. In fact it is not big enough to provide the proper support the Applicant needs. I think that a judicious spouse would have left her the entire estate, such as it is. The Applicant is the only dependant and the only person with any moral claim on the estate. Accordingly I order the trustee to convey to the Applicant the entire residue of the estate after payment of taxes, debts of the estate and his own fees and I declare that the amounts already received or already in the Applicant’s possession are hers to keep.

Ms. Michael was also awarded partial indemnity costs from Mr. Chambers’ sister.  Mr. Chambers’ sister was found to have no need for “more found money” from Mr. Chambers’ Estate because of the inheritance that she received from their mother, and that costs from the Estate would have the same effect as awarding costs against Ms. Michael.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

23 Jul

Customs Requirements When Sending Money to the US from Canada

Doreen So Continuing Legal Education, Estate & Trust, Executors and Trustees, General Interest, In the News Tags: , , , , , , , 0 Comments

It is not uncommon for Canadian estate trustees to make distributions to beneficiaries living in the U.S.  In doing so, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (the “US CBP“) could be involved in a myriad of ways.

A recent story from CBC News is an example of what can go wrong if estate trustees are not aware of their US reporting obligations.  An estate trustee in Ottawa mailed a bank draft worth $500,000.00 to a beneficiary in the U.S.  U.S. border officials seized the bank draft because it was mailed without filing the appropriate customs declaration form.  Almost a year later, the bank draft is still held at the border while the unfortunate beneficiary is sick and in need of money for his medical bills.

According to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection website, any time money exceeding $10,000.00 is sent to the U.S. from a foreign country, the sender is required to file a “Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instructions” (FinCEN Form 105) with the CBP before the money is sent.  This applies regardless of whether the sender is acting personally or on behalf of another legal entity.  This applies to money in the form of coins, currency notes, travellers checks, money orders, etc.   This also applies to money sent by mail, courier, personal delivery, etc.

However, this particular US reporting requirement does not apply where the method of transfer does not involve physically transporting money over the border, such as wire transfers through banking institutions.  If a wire transfer is used, the bank is responsible for satisfying the necessary reporting requirements.

This a US duty to report and the CBP does not collect duty on currency.  Click here for a copy of the CBP reporting Form 105.

In course of sending money worth $10,000.00 or more from Canada, there are corresponding Canadian customs requirements as well.  If money is sent by mail, be sure to visit a Canada Post location and inquire about the necessary requirements.  The applicable reporting form must be filled out and enclosed within the envelope or package and a copy of the same form must be submitted to the Canada Border Services Agency.  If money is sent by courier, the courier is responsible for filing another reporting form while the individual sender is still responsible for providing the courier with the general reporting form.

Like the US CBP, Canada Border Services Agency has the authority to seize the funds and charge penalties if the Canadian reporting obligations are not satisfied.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

10 May

POA Self-Dealing Transaction was Set Aside: the Reasonably Necessary Test

Doreen So Capacity, Continuing Legal Education, Elder Law, Estate & Trust, Ethical Issues, Executors and Trustees, General Interest, Guardianship, Litigation, Power of Attorney Tags: , , , 0 Comments

Previously on our blog and podcast, we discussed Tarantino v. Galvano, 2017 ONSC 3535 (S.C.J.)  in the context of the counterclaim for quantum meruit and the costs decision of the Hon. Justice Kristjanson.

Tarantino v. Galvano arose from a lawsuit that was commenced by two out of three Estate Trustees against the third Estate Trustee, Nellie, with respect to her actions as attorney for property for the Deceased, Rosa (i.e. Nellie’s actions while the Deceased was still alive but incapable of managing her own property).

Rosa had two daughters, Nellie and Giuseppina.  Giuseppina died before Rosa.  Guiseppina’s daughters were the other two Estate Trustees and they are beneficiaries of the Rosa’s Estate along with Nellie.  For the better part of her life, Nellie lived with Rosa.  She took care of her mother after her father’s death.  Nellie and her son were also Rosa’s caregivers as Rosa’s health declined until Rosa’s death in 2012.

Rosa and Nellie owned the home that they lived in together.  Rosa held an 80.3% interest and Nellie held an 19.62% interest.  Pursuant to Rosa’s 2005 Will, Nellie had a right of first refusal to purchase the home from Rosa’s Estate.  In 2008, on the advice of counsel while Rosa was incapable, Nellie entered into an agreement between herself and Rosa.  The agreement provided for a transfer of Rosa’s interest in the home and 75% of Rosa’s pension income to Nellie in exchange for Nellie’s caregiving services.  The agreement was in writing and it was signed by Nellie.  Nellie signed for herself and for Rosa, in her capacity as Rosa’s attorney for property.

Even though the Court found that Nellie was a good daughter who held up her end of the bargain by caring for Rosa, the agreement was set aside because it was a self-dealing transaction that did not meet the requirements of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992:

“[46]    Under the Substitute Decisions Act, Nellie could only enter into the agreement to transfer the house and pension income if it was “reasonably necessary” to provide for Rosa’s care, which I find it was not. As a fiduciary, an attorney for property is “obliged to act only for the benefit of [the donor], putting her own interests aside”: Richardson Estate v. Mew, 2009 ONCA 403 (CanLII), 96 O.R. (3d) 65, at para. 49. An attorney is prohibited from using the power for their own benefit unless “it is done with the full knowledge and consent of the donor”: Richardson Estate, at paras. 49-50. Rosa lacked capacity at the time of the Agreement, and the transfer of the house and pension income therefore were not done with Rosa’s full knowledge and consent.”

The “reasonably necessary” test was assessed, as of the time of the transfer, rather than from hindsight and it was determined that the decision to transfer 80.3% of a home and 80% of Rosa’s pension income at the outset of care was “an imprudent agreement which benefitted Nellie beyond that ‘reasonably necessary’ to provide adequately for Rosa’s care” (see paragraphs 34-49 for the Court’s analysis of this issue).

As a set off, Nellie’s quantum meruit claim was successful and you can click here for Ian Hull and Noah Weisberg’s podcast on this particular issue.  While there was blended success to all parties involved, none of the three Estate Trustees were entitled to indemnification.  Our discussion of the denial of costs can be found here and the Endorsement can be found here.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So 

08 May

A Live Broadway Performance before a Jury

Doreen So Executors and Trustees, General Interest, In the News, Litigation, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , 0 Comments

Our blog has covered the unique legal issues that have surrounded Harper Lee, the author of “To Kill a Mockingbird”, and her legacy in the past here and here.

Harper Lee died in 2016.  Prior to her death, Ms. Lee published a second novel, titled “Go Set a Watchman“, and there was much litigation with respect to whether Ms. Lee was coerced into publishing this new work while she was vulnerable and elderly.

According to the New York Times, Ms. Lee also signed an agreement prior to her death which gave Rudinplay the right to adapt “To Kill a Mocking Bird” into a live stage play.  The Estate Trustee of Ms. Lee’s Estate has sued the producers of the play for breach of contract by failing to remain true to the novel.  Even though the Estate Trustee sued in Alabama, the producers have, in turn, counter-sued in New York for damages to the production.

Interestingly enough, there were discussions regarding whether the evidence at trial may include a live performance before the jury in New York.  If this request is granted, the jury will be privy to the first performance (and perhaps also the last performance) of the anticipated Broadway play.  This could be a unique precedent for copyright matters.

The play produced by Aaron Sorkin, which stars Jeff Daniels as Atticus Finch, is scheduled to open in December and tickets may go on sale here.

 

 

 

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

07 May

The Inconvenience of Counsel is Not Grounds for a Change of Venue

Doreen So Continuing Legal Education, Estate & Trust, General Interest, In the News, Litigation, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

 

A motion to transfer an estate matter that was commenced in the Brantford Superior Court of Justice to the Toronto Estates List was recently considered in the Estate of Byung Sun Im, 2018 ONSC 2223.

The procedure to be followed in a Rule 13.1.02 motion to transfer is set out in the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction (at Part III, B) when the request to transfer pertains to a proceeding in the Central East, Central West, Central South and Toronto Regions.  Motions to transfer should be brought, in writing, to the court location which the moving party is seeking to transfer the matter.  Therefore, if you are seeking to transfer a matter to the Toronto Estates List, then the written motion should be filed with the Toronto Estates List.

Given that the plaintiff (or applicant) has a prima facie right to select the venue of a proceeding (subject to any applicable statutory requirements), the onus is on the party that seeks a transfer to satisfy the test set out in Rule 13.1.02(2). 

In this particular case, the action was predominately based on an estate trustee’s dealings with estate assets.  The deceased, the estate trustee, the majority of the beneficiaries, and the main estate assets were located in Toronto.  The one person in Brantford was the plaintiff.

However, various interim orders and smaller issues were dealt with in Brantford.  Prior proceedings related to this Estate were also decided and disposed of in Brantford.  Justice Firestone agreed that the location of the assets had little bearing on how the assets ought to be divided.  He also noted that there was an absence of evidence related to the convenience of the witnesses in addition to the convenience and location of the parties themselves.  The convenience of counsel is not a basis to order the transfer of a proceeding.

 

Ultimately, the moving party failed to satisfy the test set out in Rule 13.1.02(2):

“… the court may, on any party’s motion, make an order to transfer the proceeding to a county other than the one where it was commenced, if the court is satisfied,

(a) that it is likely that a fair hearing cannot be held in the county where the proceeding was commenced; or

(b) that a transfer is desirable in the interest of justice, having regard to,

(i) where a substantial part of the events or omissions that gave rise to the claim occurred,

(ii) where a substantial part of the damages were sustained,

(iii) where the subject-matter of the proceeding is or was located,

(iv) any local community’s interest in the subject-matter of the proceeding,

(v) the convenience of the parties, the witnesses and the court,

(vi) whether there are counterclaims, crossclaims, or third or subsequent party claims,

(vii) any advantages or disadvantages of a particular place with respect to securing the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of the proceeding on its merits,

(viii) whether judges and court facilities are available at the other county, and

(ix) any other relevant matter.  O. Reg. 14/04, s. 10.”

Thanks for reading!  For those of you who are also interested in the Practice Directions for the Toronto Estates List, you may access them here.

Doreen So

 

22 Feb

Was there a breach of duty? The Q&A from the New SCC Decision

Doreen So Estate & Trust, Executors and Trustees, General Interest, In the News, Passing of Accounts, Trustees Tags: , , , , , , 0 Comments

The facts in the new Supreme Court of Canada decision on trustee duties were previously set out in last Tuesday’s edition of this blog.

Valard Construction Ltd. v. Bird Construction Co. arose from a commercial matter in which Valard was a subcontractor in a construction oilsands project where Bird was the general contractor.  Bird was the trustee of a labour and material payment bond that could have been available for Valard’s claim for unpaid invoices if notice of claim was given to the surety within a fixed time limit.  Valard claimed against Bird when Bird failed to disclose the existence of the bond to Valard within the relevant time period.

Justice Brown, for the majority, found that Bird had a fiduciary duty to disclose the bond to Valard even though Valard did not explicitly ask about the existence of the bond until it was too late.  In order to determine whether a breach of trust occurred, Justice Brown went on to consider what was required of Bird in order to discharge its duties to Valard because “the question is not what Bird could have done in this case, but what Bird should reasonably have done in the circumstances of this case to notify beneficiaries such as Valard of the existence of the bond” (paragraph 29).  In concluding that the duty was breached in this instance, paragraph 26 is particularly instructive for the analysis:

Like all duties imposed upon trustees, the standard to be met in respect of this particular duty is not perfection, but rather that of honesty, and reasonable skill and prudence.[31] And the specific demands of that standard, so far as they arise from the duty to disclose the existence of a trust, are informed by the facts and circumstances of which the trustee ought reasonably to have known at the material time.[32] In considering what was required in a given case, therefore, a reviewing court should be careful not to ask, in hindsight, what could ideally have been done to inform potential beneficiaries of the trust.  Rather, the proper inquiry is into what steps, in the particular circumstances of the case — including the trust terms, the identity of the trustee and of the beneficiaries, the size of the class of potential beneficiaries and pertinent industrial practices — an honest and reasonably skillful and prudent trustee would have taken in order to notify potential beneficiaries of the existence of the trust. But, where a trustee can reasonably assume that the beneficiaries knew of the trust’s existence, or where practical exigencies would make notification entirely impractical,[33] few, if any, steps may be required by a trustee.

In this case, Justice Brown found that Bird could have reasonably discharged its duties by posting notice of the bond on its information board and that some method of notice was required of the company to notify beneficiaries like Valard with a caveat.  The caveat being that, in some circumstances, nothing could be required to discharge this duty where industry practice and knowledge would render notice unnecessary.

Interestingly, what was or was not industry practice in this case was the question that divided the Court.  For Justice Karakatsanis‘ dissenting opinion, she would have dismissed the appeal because Bird was not under an obligation to inform Valard beyond responding accurately when asked because this type of bond was common in this industry in her view.

Thanks for reading!

Doreen So

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