Author: Doreen So
There was a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on the issue of costs in a contested guardianship proceeding. Rather unusually, the endorsement in Howard Johnson v. Howard, 2019 ONSC 4643, dealt with the issue of costs after the parties have resolved the main dispute on consent.
In this case, there were two competing guardianship applications over Elizabeth. The applicants on the one hand were Elizabeth’s daughter and son, Marjorie and Griffin, and on the other hand, Elizabeth’s other son, Jon. All three of Elizabeth’s children were of the view that their mother was in need of a substitute decision maker for both the management of her property and for personal care.
While the endorsement does not specify who the competing applicants were seeking to appoint as Elizabeth’s guardian, the parties eventually settled on the appointment of CIBC Trust Corporation as Elizabeth’s guardian of property and all three children as Elizabeth’s guardians of personal care. On the issue of costs, Marjorie and Griffin sought full indemnity costs from Jon while Jon sought substantial indemnity costs from Majorie and Griffin or, in any event, that he be indemnified by Elizabeth for any amounts not recovered from his siblings.
Pursuant to section 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, Elizabeth was represented by counsel throughout the proceeding and on the issue of costs. Submissions were made on Elizabeth’s behalf that she should not have to pay costs of the other parties or the outstanding balance of an invoice that was purportedly incurred by Elizabeth in a joint retainer with Jon.
The Court in this instance considered the modern approach to costs in estate litigation as set out in McDougald Estate v. Gooderham, 2005 CanLII 21091 (ON CA), with respect to Jon’s claim that Elizabeth ought to be responsible, at least in part, for his costs. The court relied on D.M. Brown J.’s (as he was then) comments that the discipline imposed by the “loser-pays” approach to estate litigation applies with equal force to matters involving incapable persons citing Fiacco v. Lombardi, 2009 CanLII 46170 (ON SC). Only costs incurred for the best interests of the incapable person could be justified as costs payable from the incapable’s assets.
In this case, the competing applications of the siblings were found to contain a number of ancillary issues beyond that of the appointment of a substitute decision maker for Elizabeth. The Court was ultimately unable to see how Elizabeth would have derived any benefit from her children’s disputes. Therefore, the children were all ordered to bear their own costs. There was also no clear benefit to Elizabeth from the invoice that was issued to her prior to the appointment of section 3 counsel and Jon was ultimately left to pay that balance.
At the end of the day, the only costs borne by Elizabeth, as the incapable person subject to two competing guardianship applications, were the costs of section 3 counsel pursuant to the section 3(2) of the SDA.
Here is a Bon Appetit recipe for a frozen margarita pie that we could all benefit from.
Earlier this year, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the issue of an estate’s entitlement to the residual assets of a partnership upon the death of its sole limited partner.
Canadian Home Publishers Inc. v. Parker, 2019 ONCA 314, is a lawsuit between the general partner and the Estate Trustees of the deceased limited partner, David. Canadian Home Publishers Inc. was incorporated when Lynda and David decided to purchase Canadian House and Home magazine in 1985. Lynda and David were married at the time. The corporation was owned by Lynda as the sole general partner and by David as the sole limited partner. It was their intention that Lynda would run the company as her own business and David would make use of its tax losses.
The couple later divorced in 1991. Litigation ensued and there was a previous decision about the nature of the parties’ oral partnership agreement in the ’90s. David dies in 2012. By the time of his death, David had received over $26 million from his interest as the limited partner. The magazine itself was valued at over $50 million. Lynda, as the general partner, sought a declaration that 1) the limited partnership was dissolved upon David’s death, and 2) that David’s Estate was only entitled to a share of the profits to the date of his death and a repayment of his remaining capital contribution (i.e. that the Estate was not entitled to share in the residual value of Canadian Home Publishers).
The lower court found that 1) the limited partnership was indeed dissolved upon David’s death and 2) that David’s Estate was entitled to an equal share of the residual value of Canadian Home Publishers with Lynda. While the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the limited partnership was dissolved on death, the second finding was overturned and the Estate was limited from any additional benefit over above its share in profits as of the date of death and a return of capital.
The Court’s analysis provides a helpful description of the differences between limited partnerships and ordinary partnerships. A limited partner is meant to be a passive investor whose exposure to liability is limited to the extent of his or her capital contribution unless otherwise provided in the Limited Partnerships Act (see paras. 20-21). A limited partner has no broader right to participate in the upside of the limited partnership, just as the limited partner has no broader obligation to suffer or contribute in the downside (para. 25).
Since we are talking about House & Home, here is a recipe from their website for pineapple honey ribs 🙂
Thanks for reading and until next time!
I noticed a rip in a twenty dollar bank note in my wallet the other day. I was struck by the rip because Canadian bank notes are now made with a polymer that is meant to last longer than paper bank notes. The idea that money can be accidentally damaged is a potential issue for estate trustees who are charged with the responsibility of gathering and preserving the assets of an estate until it’s distributed to the beneficiaries.
Luckily enough, The Bank of Canada has a policy on contaminated or mutilated bank notes. Under certain circumstances, The Bank of Canada will redeem bank notes that have become contaminated or mutilated beyond normal wear and tear and issue the claimant with replacement bank notes. The Bank of Canada will carefully scrutinize each note and the circumstances of each claim in order to determine whether the claim is legitimate.
According to The Bank of Canada, a claim will be rejected if it is their opinion that:
- the identity of the claimant cannot be substantiated;
- the notes are counterfeit or there are reasons to believe that the notes were acquired or are connected to money laundering or other criminal acts;
- there has been an attempt to defraud the Bank or there exists contradictory or improbable explanations about significant aspects of the claim, such as how the notes were damaged or how they came into possession of the claimant;
- any of the security features of the notes have been removed or altered or where the notes have otherwise been altered or damaged deliberately or in a systematic fashion, including dyed or chemically washed or treated, by a process that could be reasonably expected to have the effect of altering them.
While this particular problem might seem unlikely to occur, our blog has covered past instances where cash was found to have been destroyed. There is also a very thorough wikiHow on how to replace damaged currency in the U.S. with some practical tips for worldwide application, such as tips on how to package and deliver the damaged currency to the appropriate authorities.
Thanks for reading!
Written reasons from a mid-trial motion was recently released in Barker v. Barker, 2019 ONSC 2906. The only issue in this motion was whether a particular video of a deceased plaintiff was admissible at trial. The larger claim at issue surrounds the Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene mental health centre and its treatment of maximum security mental health patients between the 60’s and the 80’s. One of the plaintiffs, James Motherall, died after the action was brought and his claims were continued by the estate trustees of Mr. Motherall’s estate under Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Prior to Mr. Motherall’s death, Mr. Motherall was examined for discovery in the ordinary course but he was not examined under Rule 36 for the purpose of having his video testimony tendered as evidence at trial. Since a de bene esse examination did not occur, the trial judge was literally unable to assess Mr. Motherall’s credibility with his own eyes. In an effort to address this issue, counsel for the plaintiffs sought to introduce video footage of Mr. Motherall from a CBC documentary that featured Mr. Motherall and his experiences at Oak Ridge. The footage was taken a month before Mr. Motherall’s death and counsel for the Plaintiffs proposed to call the filmmaker as a witness to introduce the unedited footage of the filmmaker’s interview with Mr. Motherall.
Without criticizing the filmmaker’s work, the trial judge found that the video interview was not conducted under reliable circumstances for the purposes of a trial because Mr. Motherall was not sworn, he was not cross-examined, and he was simply asked to tell his story without more. The video was presumptively hearsay and it was up to the plaintiffs to meet, on a balance of probabilities, the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach for the admissibility of hearsay evidence (R v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, R. v. Chretien, 2014 ONCA 403).
In addition to the issues of reliability, the trial judge also found that the video was not necessary since there was a transcript of evidence from Mr. Motherall’s examination for discovery and an affidavit from Mr. Motherall in the course of a prior summary judgment motion.
Both the filmmaker’s proposed testimony and the video footage of Mr. Motherall was found to be inadmissible.
Even though Barker v. Barker is at its core a civil matter, the reasoning from this motion is instructive for estate litigators who are also bound by the additional hurdle for material corroboration pursuant to section 13 of the Evidence Act.
Thanks for reading!
This week on our podcast Stuart Clark and I discussed the statutory Residents’ Bill of Rights that is within the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007.
The importance of this Act should not be overlooked by anyone who is has a loved one in a long-term care home. Section 3 of the Act gives rise to enforceable rights as between the resident and the care home as if they have entered into a contract where the home has agreed to fully respect and promote 27 enumerated residents’ rights.
As an example, the first 4 rights are:
- the right to be treated with courtesy and respect and in a way that fully recognizes the resident’s individuality and respects the resident’s dignity;
- the right to be protected from abuse;
- the right not to be neglected; and
- the right to be properly sheltered, fed, clothed, groomed and cared for in a manner consistent with his or her needs.
While it may be difficult to determine what the Residents’ Bill of Rights means in day-to-day reality, it is a meaningful starting point for any advocate.
An important resource is the government of Ontario’s Guide to the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007 and Regulation 79/10, which is available for download here.
Thanks for reading and listening!
Another will challenge was before the Court of Appeal this month on February 5, 2019. Reasons for the panel, comprised of Pepall, Trotter, and Harvison Young JJ.A., were released in writing on February 13th. Quaggiotto v. Quaggiotto, 2019 ONCA 107, can be found here.
The issue of validity was solely focused on a codicil that was executed by Maria Quaggiotto when she was 87 years old. The codicil left the residue of her estate to one son, Livio, while her will had previously left an equal division of the residue to both of her sons, Livio and Franco.
After a 10 day trial, Justice Rogin found that the codicil was valid.
On appeal, the challenger Franco sought to overturn various findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law.
Ultimately, the panel upheld the decision of Justice Rogin.
The panel reaffirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Orfus Estate with respect to the notion that testators are not required to have “an encyclopedic knowledge” of their assets in order to satisfy the test for testamentary capacity.
Interestingly enough, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was sufficiently alive to corroboration requirements of section 13 of the Ontario Evidence Act even though Justice Rogin’s decision would appear to have erroneously cited section 13 of the Ontario Estates Act for this important statutory requirement. The adage “form over substance” did not hold water in this appeal given that the actual legal requirement was adequately considered by Justice Rogin.
Thanks for reading!
It is that time of the year when media outlets release their “top” or “most popular” lists, like the Time 100.
I came across a rather interesting and topical list the other day called “The Most Obnoxious Celebrity Wills” by Ranker. This particular list features 24 celebrity Wills and I will excerpt some of the notable mentions here:
- Napoleon Bonaparte’s Will was first on the list. Apparently, his Will included a direction for his head to be shaved and for his hair to be divided amongst his friends.
- Harry Houdini asked his wife to hold an annual séance to contact his spirit.
- Philip Seymour Hoffman wanted his son to be raised in three different cities: New York, Chicago, and San Francisco.
- Charles Dickens gave directions for a particular dress code at his funeral.
- Fred Baur, the person who designed the Pringles can, wanted to buried in a Pringles can.
Turns out testamentary freedom is whatever you want to make of it but the enforceability of provisions like these are another matter.
Thanks for reading and Happy Holidays!
Humans are social beings. Some of us enjoy interacting with others, with animals, with virtual reality experiences, or all of the above!
I read a heartwarming story recently from the New York Times which featured a robot caregiver for the elderly named Zora. Zora was introduced to a nursing facility outside of Paris and she was rather well received.
The residents of this particular facility have dementia and other conditions that require twenty-four hour care. Zora can converse with the residents through the assistance of a nurse who types on a laptop for the robot to speak. Many residents formed an attachment to Zora and even treated the robot like a baby.
According to the makers of the Zora robot, it is the first robot in the world that takes care of people.
While a robot may not be able to replace the tender, love, and care of one’s family, it is easy to believe that a robot can make any one’s imagination wander, stimulate play, and even be a friend.
I say that as someone with very fond memories of Toy Story. The first Toy Story came out in 1995 and Toy Story 4 is about to be released in 2019 if you want to check out the trailer here.
Thanks for reading!
Text messaging is an increasingly popular method of communication.
Even though a text may take less than 30-seconds to write and they are often intended to be causal communications as opposed to letters or e-mails, they are still a record of our written communications with one and other.
In a recent family law matter from Saskatchewan, the court was asked to consider the admissibility of a mother’s text messages with her child’s father in the context of a dispute about their parenting schedule.
The texts were downloaded from the mother’s phone to her computer using a computer application called “Decipher Text”. The computer application then generated a print out of the parties text messages which “appears as many single spaced tightly grouped lines with a code at the beginning of each line and what appears to be text message communications placed at the end of the code” (at para. 7). Since the document is a printout of an electronic record, the court considered whether the electronic record meets the requirements of the Saskatchewan Evidence Act. Ultimately, the printout was found to be inadmissible because the mother failed to introduce affidavit evidence about how the printout accurately and completely depicts the parties’ communications as well as how “Decipher Text” actually works.
The crux of the problem was best described at paragraph 19:
Here the link between the smart phone text message and the form of evidence filed to prove that text message – the Decipher Text printout – is lacking. The intermediary here is a printout that is not a screen shot but is instead a computer rendering of some sort, filtered and formatted through the Decipher Text computer program/application. This intermediary program, or application, is not explained in any of the affidavits nor so commonly understood presently that it is possible to take judicial notice of what happens between the electronic record, here being the text messages, reaching the smart phone and that subsequently being converted into the printout attached. Thus a gap exists regarding authentication here.
In Ontario, section 34.1 of the Evidence Act, RSO 1990, c E. 23 governs the admissibility of electronic records in so far as it relates to the issue of authentication and best evidence rule. Like Saskatchewan, section 34.1(4) provides that the person seeking to introduce an electronic record has the burden of proving its authenticity.
Sylvestre v. Sylvestre, 2018 SKQB 105 (link here), is well worth the read for any litigator in today’s day and age. It is also well worth having in your arsenal of case law regarding how judicial notice may be given to other ways of presenting electronic evidence such as the screenshot.
Thanks for reading!
A recent decision from the Royal Court of Jersey was recently discussed here with respect to a beneficiary’s right to disclosure from a trust. This blog by lawyers from Ogier is an insightful read on this particular area of trust law.
According to the authors at Ogier, M v W Limited and Others was a case that considered a beneficiary’s broad request for documents, such as copies of all trust instruments, latest accounts, financial statements for the corporations owned by the trust, and details about all past distributions from the trust. While Court’s decision was grounded in an interpretation of the relevant Jersey legislation, some of its commentary remains instructive for those of us who practice outside of Jersey.
In M v W Limited and Others, the nature and immediacy of the beneficiary’s interest is salient to the inquiry. For example, a contingent beneficiary may not be entitled to as much disclosure as a beneficiary who is entitled to the assets of the trust at that point in time. By extension, it is also relevant to consider whether the disclosure at issue would negatively affect another class of beneficiaries as well as the proportionality of the request.
As for the law in Canada, I have blogged on a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision about a trustee’s duty to disclose the existence of a trust to the beneficiaries. Justice Brown for the majority in Valard Construction Ltd. v. Bird Construction Co., 2018 SCC 8, has stated the following at paragraph 19,
“In general, wherever “it could be said to be to the unreasonable disadvantage of the beneficiary not to be informed” of the trust’s existence,  the trustee’s fiduciary duty includes an obligation to disclose the existence of the trust.”
This notion of whether a beneficiary would be unreasonably disadvantaged by the non-disclosure is important to keep in mind because the right to disclosure is grounded in a beneficiary right to hold trustees accountable and to enforce the terms of the trust.
Practically speaking, issues of disclosure often leads to a request for the trustee to commence an application to pass accounts. While the trustee will have the benefit of a court order approving his/her administration for that period (if and when Judgment is obtained), an application to pass accounts must be served on all beneficiaries with a contingent or vested interest pursuant to Rule 74.18 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure. In turn, these beneficiaries will have the right to object to the trustee’s accounts and seek relevant disclosure from the trustee in the course of this process.
Thanks for reading!