Author: Doreen So
According to this CNN article, a scientific breakthrough has occurred thanks to research from the Arizona State University and Texas A&M University. These scientists have, for the very first time, identified the structure of telomerase in plants.
Telomerase is an enzyme that creates the DNA of telomeres.
>>Telomeres protects our cells from aging as our cells multiply.
>>>If our cells are protected from aging, then so will our bodies…
This breakthrough will allow scientists to study how telomerase in plants compare to the ones in animals, including humans! For example, there is a pine tree, named Methuselah, that is 4,845 years old in California. It is so inimitable that the location of this particular pine tree is kept secret for protection.
On the flip side, certain cells that have too much telomerase can be deleterious to our health, like cancer cells. The ability to stop a cancer cell from multiplying by shortening its telomeres could be revolutionary!
Fun fact: these components of life are so important that the 2009 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded to Elizabeth H. Blackburn, Carol W. Greider, and Jack W. Szostak for their research on how chromosomes are protected by telomeres and telomerase.
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Competing applications about the ownership of a home were before the Court in Marley v. Salga, 2019 ONSC 3527. On the death, the home was jointly owned between the deceased (Salga) and his wife (Marley). Notwithstanding the registered, legal ownership of the property, Salga’s Will gave Marley a lifetime right to occupy and use Salga’s one-half interest in the property and thereafter directed that the house be sold for the benefit of the residuary beneficiaries.
This led the residuary beneficiaries to commence an Application for a declaration that the Estate is entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the home and for an order requiring the Estate Trustee (Klassen) to sell the home right away (the “Salga Application“). Thereafter, Marley commenced her own Application for a declaration that she was the sole legal and beneficial owner of the property, or, alternatively, that her interest in the property is greater than 50% (the “Marley Application“).
Ultimately, Justice Reid found that ownership of the property was severed by the deceased in the course of his dealings but denied the Salga Applicants’ request that the property be sold before the termination of Marley’s interest under the Will. The Marley Application was also denied. Our blog on this decision can be found here.
The parties were unable to agree to the issue of costs. Justice Reid, 2019 ONSC 6050, followed the traditional approach to costs in estate matters and the costs of both applications, on a partial indemnity scale, were ordered from the Estate. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Reid considered and found the following:
- The Marley Application was in essence a response to the Salga Application and the costs of both proceedings were treated as one;
- Both parties were found to be partially successful: the Salga Applicants were successful in obtaining a declaration that 50% of the home belongs to the Estate and the Marley Applicant was successful in preventing an immediate sale of the home;
- Consideration was given to the fact that an award of costs from the Estate meant that the Salga Applicants (as the residuary beneficiaries) would be effectively bearing their own costs as well as Marley’s costs. However, that was not enough to outweigh the deceased’s responsibility to act unambiguously by severing his interest on title during his lifetime.
- Costs against the Estate in this case “places the responsibility for the litigation squarely on [the deceased] where it belongs“.
This costs decision is also an informative read for the costs of an estate trustee as a respondent in both proceedings and how costs should be paid from an estate where there is no liquidity.
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A recent master motions in the Estate of Robert William Drury Sr., 2019 ONSC 6071, considered the issue of an extension of time to serve a statement of claim.
Robert Sr. owned a property where the defendant Shirley lived with her spouse Hugh Drury. When Hugh Drury died, Robert Sr. sought vacant possession of his home. Robert Sr. died on September 8, 2016. Days later there was a fire on the property on September 24th and Shirley was criminally charged with arson.
Almost two years later, the estate trustee for Robert Sr.’s Estate issued a statement of claim for malicious and intentional arson damage, or gross negligence causing loss of enjoyment of life, or damages for loss of property. That claim was issued on September 19, 2018 while Shirley’s criminal proceedings were underway. Pursuant to Rule 14.08(1), Robert Jr. had 6 months to serve the civil claim on Shirley which expired on March 19, 2019. Shirley was not served until June 14, 2019 when Robert Jr. brought a motion for an extension of time.
In applying the test that was set out by the Court of Appeal in Chiarelli v Wiens, 2000 CanLii 3904, the extension of time was ultimately allowed by Master Sugunasiri.
The delay was only three months and the prejudice to Shirley was minor. Robert Jr. explained that he acted on the advice of counsel when the decision was made to serve Shirley after the conclusion of the criminal proceeding. This decision was not personal or contemptuous. As for Shirley, while memories fade over time, the criminal proceeding was found to be an ameliorating factor that preserved her evidence for the civil proceeding.
In reaching this decision, Master Sugunasiri also considered an instance where an extension of time was denied because the delay was caused by the Plaintiff’s decision not to serve the claim until he had enough money to fund the proceeding. In that case, the Court found that the Plaintiff ought to bear the consequences of the risk that he took under the Rules.
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Thanks to the New York Times, I found out about where most of Bob Ross’s paintings have been kept all these years. Bob Ross was the iconic host of the television show, The Joy of Painting. The PBS show ran from 1983 to 1994 and these old episodes continue to be watched on television, YouTube, and Netflix today.
In each episode, Bob taught his audience how to paint landscapes from his own imagination and memories. According to this NYT video, Bob would paint three versions of the same painting for each episode. Given the amount of episodes, Bob is estimated to have painted over a thousand paintings for the show alone.
Bob’s paintings are owned by a company known as Bob Ross, Inc. Bob Ross, Inc. was originally owned by Bob, his wife, Jane, and Annette and Walt Kowalski. The Kowalskis are credited with discovering Bob and financing his early career. When Bob died in 1995, predeceased by his wife Jane, the Ross’s shares of the company were left to the Kowalskis.
To date, Bob Ross, Inc. does not sell Bob’s paintings. It is a company that sells painting supplies, books and dvds, and other fun items like t-shirts and coffee mugs.
As a privately held corporation, Bob Ross Inc. can continue to hold onto Bob’s paintings for the foreseeable future. Only time will tell if the shareholders of Bob Ross Inc. might change their minds about Bob’s paintings. For now, the company has donated a collection of Bob’s paintings to the Smithsonian and the rest of us will just have to paint our own paintings by learning from Bob.
Just for fun, and to finish off my theme for the week, here is a video for happy little Bob Ross waffles.
Golden Fall Foliage Autumn Yellow Maple Tree Season
There was a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on the issue of costs in a contested guardianship proceeding. Rather unusually, the endorsement in Howard Johnson v. Howard, 2019 ONSC 4643, dealt with the issue of costs after the parties have resolved the main dispute on consent.
In this case, there were two competing guardianship applications over Elizabeth. The applicants on the one hand were Elizabeth’s daughter and son, Marjorie and Griffin, and on the other hand, Elizabeth’s other son, Jon. All three of Elizabeth’s children were of the view that their mother was in need of a substitute decision maker for both the management of her property and for personal care.
While the endorsement does not specify who the competing applicants were seeking to appoint as Elizabeth’s guardian, the parties eventually settled on the appointment of CIBC Trust Corporation as Elizabeth’s guardian of property and all three children as Elizabeth’s guardians of personal care. On the issue of costs, Marjorie and Griffin sought full indemnity costs from Jon while Jon sought substantial indemnity costs from Majorie and Griffin or, in any event, that he be indemnified by Elizabeth for any amounts not recovered from his siblings.
Pursuant to section 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, Elizabeth was represented by counsel throughout the proceeding and on the issue of costs. Submissions were made on Elizabeth’s behalf that she should not have to pay costs of the other parties or the outstanding balance of an invoice that was purportedly incurred by Elizabeth in a joint retainer with Jon.
The Court in this instance considered the modern approach to costs in estate litigation as set out in McDougald Estate v. Gooderham, 2005 CanLII 21091 (ON CA), with respect to Jon’s claim that Elizabeth ought to be responsible, at least in part, for his costs. The court relied on D.M. Brown J.’s (as he was then) comments that the discipline imposed by the “loser-pays” approach to estate litigation applies with equal force to matters involving incapable persons citing Fiacco v. Lombardi, 2009 CanLII 46170 (ON SC). Only costs incurred for the best interests of the incapable person could be justified as costs payable from the incapable’s assets.
In this case, the competing applications of the siblings were found to contain a number of ancillary issues beyond that of the appointment of a substitute decision maker for Elizabeth. The Court was ultimately unable to see how Elizabeth would have derived any benefit from her children’s disputes. Therefore, the children were all ordered to bear their own costs. There was also no clear benefit to Elizabeth from the invoice that was issued to her prior to the appointment of section 3 counsel and Jon was ultimately left to pay that balance.
At the end of the day, the only costs borne by Elizabeth, as the incapable person subject to two competing guardianship applications, were the costs of section 3 counsel pursuant to the section 3(2) of the SDA.
Here is a Bon Appetit recipe for a frozen margarita pie that we could all benefit from.
Earlier this year, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the issue of an estate’s entitlement to the residual assets of a partnership upon the death of its sole limited partner.
Canadian Home Publishers Inc. v. Parker, 2019 ONCA 314, is a lawsuit between the general partner and the Estate Trustees of the deceased limited partner, David. Canadian Home Publishers Inc. was incorporated when Lynda and David decided to purchase Canadian House and Home magazine in 1985. Lynda and David were married at the time. The corporation was owned by Lynda as the sole general partner and by David as the sole limited partner. It was their intention that Lynda would run the company as her own business and David would make use of its tax losses.
The couple later divorced in 1991. Litigation ensued and there was a previous decision about the nature of the parties’ oral partnership agreement in the ’90s. David dies in 2012. By the time of his death, David had received over $26 million from his interest as the limited partner. The magazine itself was valued at over $50 million. Lynda, as the general partner, sought a declaration that 1) the limited partnership was dissolved upon David’s death, and 2) that David’s Estate was only entitled to a share of the profits to the date of his death and a repayment of his remaining capital contribution (i.e. that the Estate was not entitled to share in the residual value of Canadian Home Publishers).
The lower court found that 1) the limited partnership was indeed dissolved upon David’s death and 2) that David’s Estate was entitled to an equal share of the residual value of Canadian Home Publishers with Lynda. While the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the limited partnership was dissolved on death, the second finding was overturned and the Estate was limited from any additional benefit over above its share in profits as of the date of death and a return of capital.
The Court’s analysis provides a helpful description of the differences between limited partnerships and ordinary partnerships. A limited partner is meant to be a passive investor whose exposure to liability is limited to the extent of his or her capital contribution unless otherwise provided in the Limited Partnerships Act (see paras. 20-21). A limited partner has no broader right to participate in the upside of the limited partnership, just as the limited partner has no broader obligation to suffer or contribute in the downside (para. 25).
Since we are talking about House & Home, here is a recipe from their website for pineapple honey ribs 🙂
Thanks for reading and until next time!
I noticed a rip in a twenty dollar bank note in my wallet the other day. I was struck by the rip because Canadian bank notes are now made with a polymer that is meant to last longer than paper bank notes. The idea that money can be accidentally damaged is a potential issue for estate trustees who are charged with the responsibility of gathering and preserving the assets of an estate until it’s distributed to the beneficiaries.
Luckily enough, The Bank of Canada has a policy on contaminated or mutilated bank notes. Under certain circumstances, The Bank of Canada will redeem bank notes that have become contaminated or mutilated beyond normal wear and tear and issue the claimant with replacement bank notes. The Bank of Canada will carefully scrutinize each note and the circumstances of each claim in order to determine whether the claim is legitimate.
According to The Bank of Canada, a claim will be rejected if it is their opinion that:
- the identity of the claimant cannot be substantiated;
- the notes are counterfeit or there are reasons to believe that the notes were acquired or are connected to money laundering or other criminal acts;
- there has been an attempt to defraud the Bank or there exists contradictory or improbable explanations about significant aspects of the claim, such as how the notes were damaged or how they came into possession of the claimant;
- any of the security features of the notes have been removed or altered or where the notes have otherwise been altered or damaged deliberately or in a systematic fashion, including dyed or chemically washed or treated, by a process that could be reasonably expected to have the effect of altering them.
While this particular problem might seem unlikely to occur, our blog has covered past instances where cash was found to have been destroyed. There is also a very thorough wikiHow on how to replace damaged currency in the U.S. with some practical tips for worldwide application, such as tips on how to package and deliver the damaged currency to the appropriate authorities.
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Written reasons from a mid-trial motion was recently released in Barker v. Barker, 2019 ONSC 2906. The only issue in this motion was whether a particular video of a deceased plaintiff was admissible at trial. The larger claim at issue surrounds the Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene mental health centre and its treatment of maximum security mental health patients between the 60’s and the 80’s. One of the plaintiffs, James Motherall, died after the action was brought and his claims were continued by the estate trustees of Mr. Motherall’s estate under Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Prior to Mr. Motherall’s death, Mr. Motherall was examined for discovery in the ordinary course but he was not examined under Rule 36 for the purpose of having his video testimony tendered as evidence at trial. Since a de bene esse examination did not occur, the trial judge was literally unable to assess Mr. Motherall’s credibility with his own eyes. In an effort to address this issue, counsel for the plaintiffs sought to introduce video footage of Mr. Motherall from a CBC documentary that featured Mr. Motherall and his experiences at Oak Ridge. The footage was taken a month before Mr. Motherall’s death and counsel for the Plaintiffs proposed to call the filmmaker as a witness to introduce the unedited footage of the filmmaker’s interview with Mr. Motherall.
Without criticizing the filmmaker’s work, the trial judge found that the video interview was not conducted under reliable circumstances for the purposes of a trial because Mr. Motherall was not sworn, he was not cross-examined, and he was simply asked to tell his story without more. The video was presumptively hearsay and it was up to the plaintiffs to meet, on a balance of probabilities, the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach for the admissibility of hearsay evidence (R v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, R. v. Chretien, 2014 ONCA 403).
In addition to the issues of reliability, the trial judge also found that the video was not necessary since there was a transcript of evidence from Mr. Motherall’s examination for discovery and an affidavit from Mr. Motherall in the course of a prior summary judgment motion.
Both the filmmaker’s proposed testimony and the video footage of Mr. Motherall was found to be inadmissible.
Even though Barker v. Barker is at its core a civil matter, the reasoning from this motion is instructive for estate litigators who are also bound by the additional hurdle for material corroboration pursuant to section 13 of the Evidence Act.
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This week on our podcast Stuart Clark and I discussed the statutory Residents’ Bill of Rights that is within the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007.
The importance of this Act should not be overlooked by anyone who is has a loved one in a long-term care home. Section 3 of the Act gives rise to enforceable rights as between the resident and the care home as if they have entered into a contract where the home has agreed to fully respect and promote 27 enumerated residents’ rights.
As an example, the first 4 rights are:
- the right to be treated with courtesy and respect and in a way that fully recognizes the resident’s individuality and respects the resident’s dignity;
- the right to be protected from abuse;
- the right not to be neglected; and
- the right to be properly sheltered, fed, clothed, groomed and cared for in a manner consistent with his or her needs.
While it may be difficult to determine what the Residents’ Bill of Rights means in day-to-day reality, it is a meaningful starting point for any advocate.
An important resource is the government of Ontario’s Guide to the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007 and Regulation 79/10, which is available for download here.
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Another will challenge was before the Court of Appeal this month on February 5, 2019. Reasons for the panel, comprised of Pepall, Trotter, and Harvison Young JJ.A., were released in writing on February 13th. Quaggiotto v. Quaggiotto, 2019 ONCA 107, can be found here.
The issue of validity was solely focused on a codicil that was executed by Maria Quaggiotto when she was 87 years old. The codicil left the residue of her estate to one son, Livio, while her will had previously left an equal division of the residue to both of her sons, Livio and Franco.
After a 10 day trial, Justice Rogin found that the codicil was valid.
On appeal, the challenger Franco sought to overturn various findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law.
Ultimately, the panel upheld the decision of Justice Rogin.
The panel reaffirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Orfus Estate with respect to the notion that testators are not required to have “an encyclopedic knowledge” of their assets in order to satisfy the test for testamentary capacity.
Interestingly enough, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was sufficiently alive to corroboration requirements of section 13 of the Ontario Evidence Act even though Justice Rogin’s decision would appear to have erroneously cited section 13 of the Ontario Estates Act for this important statutory requirement. The adage “form over substance” did not hold water in this appeal given that the actual legal requirement was adequately considered by Justice Rogin.
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