Author: Arielle Di Iulio
On April 30, 2021, the Long-Term Care Covid-19 Commission (the “Commission“) released its Final Report to the Minister of Long-Term Care. This report pulled back the curtain on the dreadful conditions that residents of certain long-term care homes in Ontario have endured during the coronavirus pandemic. It also made recommendations to the Ontario government with respect to improving quality of care for the long-term care resident population. You can read more about the Commission’s report in Ian Hull and Tori Joseph’s recent blog.
It seems that the Ontario government is heeding the Commission’s call to action. On May 31, 2021, Ontario announced that all long-term care homes in the province will be required to put into place certain COVID-19 vaccine policies for staff. The focus of these policies will be on educating long-term care staff about COVID-19 vaccines and promoting full immunization among staff.
The requirements related to the establishment, implementation and reporting on a COVID-19 immunization policy in long-term care homes are set out in the Minister’s Directive: Long-term care home COVID-19 immunization policy (the “Directive“). The objectives of the Directive are to establish a consistent approach to COVID-19 immunization policies in long-term care homes, optimize COVID-19 immunization rates in homes, and ensure that staff make informed decisions about COVID-19 vaccination. To meet these objectives, the Directive provides that every person working in a long-term care home in Ontario will be required to do one of the following:
- Provide proof of vaccination of each dose;
- Provide a documented medical reason for not being vaccinated; or
- Participate in an educational program about the benefits of vaccination and the risks of not being vaccinated.
The Directive is effective as of July 1, 2021, which means that long-term care homes have approximately one month to implement their COVID-19 staff immunization policies.
It is worth noting that Ontario is the first province in Canada to make it mandatory for long-term care homes to have COVID-19 immunization policies for staff and to set out the minimum requirements that need to be included in these policies. Hopefully this will be an effective step towards better protecting the health and well-being of long-term care home residents.
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As in other areas of civil litigation, the general costs principle of “loser pays” applies in estate litigation. The recent costs decision of Toller James Montague Cranston (Estate of), 2021 ONSC 3704, is an interesting example of just how much a loser in estate litigation could have to pay.
In Toller, the Estate Trustee of the estate of Toller Cranston was compelled to bring an application to pass her accounts by the two other beneficiaries of the estate. These beneficiaries (the “Objectors“) raised over 300 objections to various expenses paid by the Estate Trustee personally to administer the estate in Mexico. The Objectors were unsuccessful on all of their objections except for five. They also made allegations of fraud and theft by the Estate Trustee which were ultimately unproven. The Estate Trustee sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale of $390,602.98 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the Objectors personally. The Objectors took the position that the requested amount was not reasonable or proportionate in the circumstances.
In his costs decision, the Honourable Justice Robert Smith relied on the factors set out in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to help determine the appropriate costs award to make. He also relied on the case of Estate of Francoise Poitras v. Canadian Cancer Society, 2021 ONSC 406, for a summary of the legal principles applicable to costs in estate litigation, which include:
- An estate trustee is generally entitled to be indemnified for all reasonably incurred costs in the administration of an estate, including the legal costs of an action reasonably defended, to the extent these costs are not recovered from another person.
- The winning party in estate litigation is usually entitled to reasonable costs from the losing party.
- A court may deny cost recovery by an estate trustee, in whole or in part, if the trustee acted unreasonably or in substance for his or her own benefit, rather than for the benefit of the estate.
- If the estate trustee acted reasonably, the court may require the other party or parties to pay costs or make a blended order requiring the losing party to pay some costs and the estate to pay the balance.
- In fixing costs, the court must determine the fair and reasonable amount that a party should pay in the particular circumstances of the case.
In the case at hand, the Estate Trustee won by a landslide. What is more, given the complexity of the estate and the large number of objections raised, the Estate Trustee was forced to spend a significant amount of time and legal expenses to respond to the 295 meritless objections that had been raised. Justice Smith also found that the Objectors acted unreasonably in refusing to narrow the issues to be decided before the hearing and to then abandon approximately half of their objections at the hearing, after time and expenses had already been incurred on those objections. The Objectors’ unfounded allegations of misconduct by the Estate Trustee also warranted an elevated costs award. For these reasons and more, Justice Smith concluded that the bulk of the Estate Trustee’s legal costs should be paid by the Objectors.
It was ultimately decided that the Objectors would pay costs to the Estate Trustee on a substantial indemnity basis, reduced by an amount to account for the Objectors’ partial success. This resulted in a notably high costs award of $325,000.00, inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable to the Estate Trustee by the Objectors. It was further ordered that the balance of the Estate Trustee’s legal costs be paid to her from the estate.
The Toller decision shows that the court will not shy away from holding a losing party personally liable for significant costs in estate disputes where the court deems such an award to be appropriate in its discretion. To help limit personal liability to costs in the event of a loss, parties should endeavour to act reasonably from the beginning through to the end of the litigation.
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In an effort to modernize the legal system and bring it into the 2020’s, the office of the Attorney General of Ontario introduced Bill 245, also known as the Accelerating Access to Justice Act, 2021, in February 2021. The bill received royal assent on April 19, 2021. Schedule 9 to Bill 245 provides for important changes to the Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S. 26 (the “SLRA”). These changes have previously been discussed in Suzana Popovic-Montag’s blog and this podcast by Jonathon Kappy and Rebecca Rauws.
Schedule 9 to Bill 245 provides for six updates to the SLRA. Section 1 of Schedule 9, which makes changes to section 4 of the SLRA, has already come into force and effect. As a consequence of these amendments, the remote execution and witnessing of Wills in counterpart is now permitted on a permanent basis.
The Lieutenant Governor has recently proclaimed that the remaining changes to the SLRA as set out in sections 2 to 6 of Schedule 9 will officially come into effect on January 1, 2022. These changes are briefly summarized as follows:
- Sections 15(a) and 16 of the SLRA are repealed;
- Section 17 is amended to include separate spouses, such that any testamentary gift made to a spouse will be revoked upon separation;
- A new section 21.1 is added to provide for court-ordered validation of a Will that was not properly executed or made under the SLRA; and
- A new section 43.1 is added to provide that the spousal entitlements under the intestacy provisions do not apply if the person and the spouse are separated at the time of the person’s death.
The above-listed amendments are meant to better reflect the modern day experience of individuals and families in Ontario. These changes to the SLRA will certainly be a positive start to the year 2022.
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Estate litigation can be expensive. Sometimes a court may award costs to be paid personally by a party in an estates matter. Parties should always try to act reasonably throughout the litigation, as anything less may attract such adverse costs consequences. A recent example of this is the case of Dewaele v. Roobroeck, 2021 ONSC 1604.
The underlying application arose from the inability of three siblings to agree on how the estates of their late parents should be administered. The siblings were the sole beneficiaries and co-estate trustees of their parents’ estates. The daughter of the deceased parents brought an application against her two brothers seeking various relief, including an order removing them as co-estate trustees and appointing her as the sole estate trustee. Her application was successful and she sought costs against her brothers. Specifically, the applicant sought an order that her substantial indemnity costs be paid by her brothers and that the balance of her full indemnity costs be paid by the estates.
The decision on the issue of costs was given by the Honourable Justice Sheard, who held in favour of the applicant. In her written reasons, Justice Sheard provides a concise summary of the law governing the determination of cost awards in estates matters. First, she cites s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 as amended, which provides that, subject to the provisions of an Act or rules of court, the court has discretion to determine by whom and to what extent costs should be paid. The factors set out in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 guide the court’s exercise of this discretion. The overriding objective in a cost award is that it be fair and reasonable, which is, in part, determined by the reasonable expectations of the parties concerning the quantum of costs.
Justice Sheard further explains that in estate litigation, the general rule is that estate trustees are entitled to be indemnified for costs reasonably incurred in the administration of the estate. However, the “loser pays” costs regime applies to estate matters, and a blended cost award – in which a portion of the costs is paid by the litigants and a portion from the estate – is within the court’s discretion.
In this case, the applicant asked for substantial indemnity costs from her respondent brothers. Justice Sheard affirms at paragraph 19 of her decision that such an award may be made “where the losing party has engaged in behaviour worthy of sanction”. Moreover, elevated costs should only be awarded where “there has been reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct on the part of one of the parties”. Here, the respondents failed in their obligations as estate trustees, deliberately interfered with the applicant’s ability to complete the administration of the estates, and failed to comply with previous court orders made. Justice Sheard found that this conduct was worthy of sanction and can be characterized as reprehensible and outrageous. As such, an elevated costs award was appropriate. Justice Sheard ultimately decided that the applicant was entitled to be fully indemnified for the costs she incurred in respect of the application, with the respondents liable to pay the majority of these costs (and the balance to be paid from the assets of the estates).
This costs decision is an excellent reminder of the importance of acting reasonably in estate litigation. If any party, including an estate trustee, chooses to act unreasonably then they may pay for it in the end.
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Plan Well Guide’s Toolkit for Legal Practitioners: Helping You Help Your Clients Plan for Incapacity
Last year, my colleague Nick Esterbauer blogged about the Plan Well Guide – a free online tool to assist individuals with their advance care planning. An advance care plan sets out how a person wishes to be treated during a serious illness or health crisis. The Plan Well Guide helps users to create a ‘Dear Doctor’ Letter explaining their values and preferences with respect to their future medical care, which can then be given to their physician and substitute decision-makers to ensure that their wishes are known. For a more in-depth look at the Plan Well Guide and the process of creating a Dear Doctor letter, you can read Nick’s blog here.
Recently, the Plan Well Guide launched a new toolkit designed for legal practitioners. This free online toolkit is intended to help lawyers help their clients become better prepared for future serious illness and incapacitation. In addition to various educational resources for both lawyers and their clients, the toolkit includes:
- a sample power of attorney for personal care;
- a sample advanced health care directive;
- a sample personal directive;
- a sample ‘Dear Doctor’ letter; and
- a step-by-step guide on how lawyers can incorporate the Plan Well Guide into their practice.
Of course, the sample legal documents contained in the toolkit should be amended to reflect the client’s specific set of circumstances and the laws of the applicable jurisdiction.
What I like most about the Plan Well Guide’s new toolkit is that it highlights the importance of a multidisciplinary approach to advance care planning. An effective advance care plan – that is, a plan which facilitates medical substitute decision-making that is consistent with the incapable person’s actual values and preferences – depends on the collaborative efforts of a person’s lawyers, doctors, and substitute decision-makers. The Plan Well Guide and its new toolkit offer accessible ways for legal professionals, health care professionals, and their clients/patients to coordinate their efforts to make serious illness planning more effective. If a lawyer is interested in improving the quality of future medical decision-making and patient outcomes for their clients, the Plan Well Guide’s toolkit for legal practitioners is certainly worth looking into.
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Living a double life can be complicated. A double life that involves a secret second family can be especially complicated, both during the deceiver’s life and after their death. How is the deceiver’s estate to be divided as between his first family and his secret second family? What rights does the unmarried secret spouse in particular have in the deceased’s estate? The Supreme Court of British Columbia addresses these issues in its recent decision of Boughton v Widner Estate, 2021 BCSC 325.
Boughton concerns the Estate of Michael Gregory Widern. Michael was a known member of the infamous Hells Angels and died on March 9, 2017 by homicide. Michael left behind his married spouse, Sabrina, and their two children. He also left behind Sara – whom he had been seeing for roughly eight years unbeknownst to his wife – and their two children. While Michael was alive he spent time with both of his families, alternating between the two households. Sabrina had no knowledge of Michael’s second family until after he passed away.
Michael died without a last will and testament, leaving his estate to be distributed in accordance with the intestacy provisions set out in British Columbia’s Wills, Estates and Successions Act (“WESA”). In Boughton, Sara brought a claim against Michael’s estate seeking, amongst other things, a declaration that she is a spouse of Michael for the purposes of the WESA and is consequently entitled to a share of his estate. As such, one of the issues to be dealt with by the court was whether the WESA permits the division of an estate as between two individuals who were in concurrent, subsisting spousal relationships with the deceased at the time of death.
The honourable Justice Jennifer Duncan declared that Sara was a spouse for the purposes of the WESA. Section 2 of the WESA provides that two persons are spouses of each other if immediately before the deceased person’s death they were married to each other or they had lived together in a marriage-like relationship for at least two years. Justice Duncan found that on his death, Michael was still married to Sabrina and was also in a marriage-like relationship with Sara. Section 22 of the WESA states that if two or more persons are entitled to a spousal share of an intestate estate, they share the spousal share in the portions to which they agree or as determined by the court. Justice Duncan reasoned that this section clearly provides for more than one spousal share in the estate of an intestate. She also analyzed the legislative intent of section 22 and found that the intention of the Legislature was to continue to provide for individuals in a marriage-like relationship with an individual who was still married to someone else at the time of death. On this basis, Justice Duncan held that Sara was entitled to a declaration that she is a spouse of Michael as that term is defined in the WESA. It was further ordered that Sara and Sabrina were each entitled to half of Michael’s estate.
If this case were decided under Ontario law we would likely see a different result. Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”) has no provision equivalent to section 22 of the WESA which recognizes a “spousal share” in an intestate estate for someone other than the deceased’s married spouse. For purposes of intestate succession in Ontario, “spouse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Family Law Act (“FLA”), which is in essence a married person. It follows that an unmarried secret spouse would likely have no statutory entitlement to share in their deceased spouse’s estate. However, a secret spouse in Ontario could potentially claim an interest in their spouse’s estate pursuant to the dependent support provisions contained in Part V of the SLRA. In Part V, “spouse” has the same meaning as in section 29 of the FLA, which defines “spouse” more broadly as including persons not married to each other and have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years, or have children together and are in a relationship of some permanence. If a secret spouse meets this definition, they may still have a right to a portion of their deceased spouse’s estate by way of a dependent support claim.
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A party has a prima facie right to test the evidence given by a witness through cross-examination. This is a critical means to building a body of evidence to support one’s case. However, if a party does not make adequate efforts to avail themselves of the opportunity to cross-examine, they may lose this benefit. The Honourable Madam Justice Sylvia Corthorn of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice addresses this issue in her recent decision in Clayton v. Clayton et al., 2020 ONSC 7592.
Clayton involves an application to remove the trustees of two trusts that form part of an estate. The applicant in this case brought a motion for an order striking the affidavit sworn by one of the respondents and trustees, Shirley. Pursuant to a notice of cross-examination, Shirley was to be cross-examined on her affidavit on November 22, 2019. However, prior to the commencement of cross-examinations, Shirley’s counsel advised that she would not be produced for cross-examination due to concerns about her mental capacity. Counsel agreed that an assessment of Shirley’s capacity to be cross-examined was necessary and consequently, she was not cross-examined. The applicant did not obtain a certificate of non-attendance with respect to Shirley’s cross-examination and no notice to cross-examine Shirley on a subsequent date was served.
The geriatric assessment of Shirley was scheduled for May 2020 and then postponed to the fall of 2020 due to COVID-19. There was no evidence before the court as to whether this assessment was ever done. The hearing of the application was likewise delayed as a result of the pandemic. The application is currently scheduled to be heard in January 2021.
At no point after November 2019 did the applicant pursue cross-examination of Shirley. When the application returned to court in September 2020, the applicant took the position that Shirley’s affidavit cannot be used on the application in light of her supposed incapacity and the respondents’ alleged refusal to permit cross-examination. The applicant then brought a motion requesting that the affidavit be struck in its entirety on the grounds that the admission of this evidence would be prejudicial to the fairness of the hearing and constitute an abuse of process.
Justice Corthorn dismissed the applicant’s motion. She found that he did not take any steps, prior to bringing this motion, to seek the assistance of the court in determining the steps required to address concerns with respect to Shirley’s affidavit and whether she could be cross-examined. She also considered that the application had already been adjourned three times and that the applicant had not requested a further adjournment to permit cross-examination of Shirley. Justice Corthorn affirmed that the court has discretion to prevent or limit cross-examination where it is in the interests of justice to do so. She decided that in this case, it is fair to both the process and the parties to admit Shirley’s affidavit and leave the issue of the weight to be given to her evidence to be determined with the benefit of the complete record. The parties would also have the opportunity to make submissions with respect to the weight to be given to Shirley’s evidence, and this will permit the court to control the process and avoid an abuse of it.
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The highly anticipated COVID-19 vaccine is being rolled out in Ontario, with some of the first shots having already been administered yesterday. The University Health Network in Toronto and The Ottawa Hospital will be the first to administer the vaccine. Frontline healthcare workers in hospitals, long-term care homes, and other high-risk settings will be given priority. Vaccinations are expected to expand to residents in long-term care homes, home care patients with chronic conditions, and First Nation communities and urban Indigenous populations later in the winter of 2021. The province has not said when vaccines will become available for every Ontarian who wishes to be immunized. However, once available, the province confirms that vaccines will not be mandated but strongly encouraged.
The mass administration of the COVID-19 vaccine could be a real game changer in the battle against coronavirus. However, a recent public opinion poll conducted by Maru Blue shows that only one-third of Canadians would take the vaccine immediately, about half of Canadians would bide their time to assess its safety or use, and the rest have no intention of getting the shot at all. So it appears that Canadians are somewhat divided on the question of whether and when to get vaccinated.
Given the difference of opinion regarding this new vaccine, it is not inconceivable that multiple substitute-decision makers (SDMs) could disagree on whether to give or refuse consent to the shot on behalf of an incapable person. How would such a disagreement be resolved?
First, it is important to note that Ontario’s capacity legislation sets out a hierarchy of SDMs. Pursuant to section 20 of the Health Care Consent Act (HCCA), the guardian of the person is at the top of this hierarchy, followed by an attorney for personal care, representative appointed by the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB), spouse or partner, parent or children, siblings, any other relatives, and lastly the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT). The decision of the highest ranking SDM will prevail over dissenting opinions from those who are lower on the hierarchy.
If there are multiple equally ranked SDMs acting with respect to a particular decision, they all have to be in agreement – the majority does not rule. If the SDMs fail to reach a consensus, any of the SDMs could apply to the CCB to try and be appointed the sole representative to make the decision. However, this option is not available where the incapable person already has a guardian of person or attorney for personal care. Another option is for the SDMs to attend mediation to try to come to an agreement. If mediation is not successful, the health practitioner must turn to the PGT for a decision. Section 20(6) of the HCCA states that the PGT is required to act and cannot decline to act in this situation.
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On November 25, 2020, the beautiful game lost one of its greatest legends, Diego Maradona. The famous Argentine footballer passed away at the young age of 60 years old, leaving behind millions of admirers around the world to mourn his death.
Maradona also left behind many children. In addition to his eight recognized children, there are supposedly at least two others claiming to be his offspring. The net worth of Maradona’s estate remains to be determined, as does the question of whether he made a Will. Nevertheless, should any opportunistic long-lost children succeed in proving paternity, they may have a claim to a share of Maradona’s estate.
In Ontario, a long-lost child could likewise benefit from their parent’s estate. A child has a statutory entitlement to a share of their parent’s estate where the parent dies without a Will. Pursuant to Part II of the Succession law Reform Act, those who have a right to inherit on an intestacy include the surviving spouse and the “issue”, or descendants, of the deceased.  The courts have confirmed that for the purposes of intestate succession, descendants are restricted to blood relatives (with the exception of adopted children, who have the same rights as a biological child). Thus, any purported child seeking an interest in an intestate estate must prove that they are the biological child of the deceased. If an illegitimate child can establish parentage, then they are entitled to share equally in an intestate estate with those born inside of marriage.
In the case of a testate estate, an alleged child of a deceased person may have a right to any bequest made in the deceased’s Will that is based on parentage. For example, a Will may provide for a gift to the testator’s “issue” or “children”. Unless a contrary intention is included in the Will, any person born outside of marriage who successfully proves parentage could be considered a part of the class of “children” or “issue” entitled to the gift.
Those purporting to be a child of the deceased can prove their familial relationship by presenting documentation like an Ontario Birth Certificate from a Vital Statistics Agency. If this documentation is not available or further evidence of kinship is requested by the estate trustee, DNA testing can also be used. Courts have recognized DNA testing as a reliable, efficient, and effective method of establishing parenthood in probate matters. Section 17.2 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and section 105(2) of the Courts of Justice Act grant Ontario courts the jurisdiction to order DNA testing to assist in determining a person’s parentage.
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 Joshua Nevett. Maradona: Why the football icon’s inheritance could be messy (December 6, 2020), online: BBC News <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-55173630>
 Peters Estate (Re), 2015 ABQB 168 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/ggmgg>; Child, Youth and Family Services Act 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, s. 217 <https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/17c14#BK297>
 Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 17.2 <https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90c12#BK23>; Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s.105(2) <https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90c43#BK146>
The looming threat of COVID-19 has caused some people to see their own mortality in a new and clearer light. In addition to the existential and/or religious contemplation that may arise from this reality, individuals are also turning their minds to more practical end of life planning.
An end of life plan, also referred to as an advance care plan (“ACP”), sets out how an individual would like to be cared for in the final months of their life. In Ontario, an ACP will usually include a Power of Attorney for Personal Care designating a trusted person(s) to make healthcare decisions on behalf of an individual in the event of their incapacity.
An ACP may also include an advance directive, or “living will”, which is a written statement of wishes about future care. Unlike a Power of Attorney, advance directives are not referenced in Ontario’s health care legislation and are not a legal document. However, Ontario law does recognize that wishes and preferences regarding future care choices that are expressed when mentally capable ought to be respected and followed, if possible. Thus, a Power of Attorney or other substitute decision maker is expected to abide by an advance directive to the extent possible. This makes advance directives a useful tool for anyone seeking greater control over the medical treatment they receive while incapable.
Interestingly, a COVID-19-specific advance directive has emerged in the United States. Dr. Andrea Kittrell, a head and neck surgeon practicing in Virginia, established an organization called Save Other Souls (“SOS”) whose objective is to assist individuals with their advance care planning as it pertains to COVID-19-related medical treatment. Specifically, SOS provides guidance on preparing a document that has been coined the “COVID-19 SOS Directive”. This document is a type of altruistic advance directive wherein a person expresses their wish to defer lifesaving critical care hospital placement, medication, and/or equipment to another patient in need during a declared emergency and where there are insufficient health care resources to go around.
Since the COVID-19 SOS Directive was developed for use in jurisdictions outside of Ontario, I will not opine on the effectiveness of this particular document. However, the document is a reminder of the importance of considering one’s own ACP in light of the global pandemic. For information on COVID-19-related advance care planning for Canadians, you can check out Dying With Dignity Canada’s COVID-19 ACP Toolkit. Another helpful resource is the Plan Well Guide which is discussed in Nick Esterbauer’s blog here.
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