Not Every Imperfect Testamentary Document is a Will: Liscombe v. Groskopf et al, 2026 ONSC 3646

Since coming into force on January 1, 2022, section 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act (the “SLRA”) has generated a growing body of case law addressing when a court may “save” a testamentary document that does not comply with formal execution requirements.

The recent decision in Liscombe v. Groskopf et al., 2026 ONSC 3646 offers a unique look at the operation of section 21.1 in practice, as it arises from the same estate as the earlier decision in  Groskopf v. Rogers et al., 2023 ONSC 5312. Both cases concerned informal will-kit materials prepared by the same deceased individual. In one case, the documents were validated as a will. In the other, a competing collection of testamentary documents was rejected. Taken together, the decisions demonstrate both the reach and the limits of the “saving” provision under the SLRA.

The SLRA

Section 21.1 permits the court to declare a document fully effective as a will, notwithstanding deficiencies in execution, where the court is satisfied that the document sets out the deceased’s testamentary intentions. The focus is not on technical compliance, but on whether the document reflects the deceased’s fixed and final intentions regarding the disposition of their estate.

Groskopf v. Rogers: The Reach of Section 21.1

One of the early and often-cited decisions applying section 21.1 is Groskopf v Rogers et al.

In Groskopf, the court validated an undated and unwitnessed “fill-in-the-blank” will kit completed in the deceased’s handwriting.

Although the document suffered from significant formal deficiencies, the court found that it represented the deceased’s fixed and final testamentary intentions. The document expressly identified itself as a will, named beneficiaries, established a comprehensive distribution scheme, and appointed an estate trustee. The deficiencies were therefore treated as technical rather than substantive, and the document was validated under section 21.1.

Liscombe v. Groskopf: Drawing the Line

The more recent decision in Liscombe v. Groskopf et al., arises from the same factual matrix as Groskopf, but reaches the opposite conclusion.

Following the successful validation application in Groskopf, a different dispute emerged from the same estate. In Liscombe, the applicant, who had unsuccessfully opposed the validation application in Groskopf, sought an order declaring a separate collection of documents to be the deceased’s true last will and testament. If validated, those documents would have effectively displaced the document previously recognized by the court as the deceased’s will.

In the alternative, shall the documents be found not to constitute a valid will, the applicant sought that the validation finding in Groskopf be reversed and the estate administered as an intestacy.

The documents at issue were a compilation of materials, including:

  • four handwritten and initialed pages (with missing pages), dated October 18, 2005;
  • a signed but undated signature page from a will kit; and
  • various “fill-in-the-blank” will kit worksheets listing assets.

Unlike in Groskopf, the court declined to validate this collection of documents. Critically, the materials did not demonstrate a complete or coherent testamentary plan. In particular, no executor or executrix was identified, and there was no residue clause addressing the balance of the estate.

The court concluded that these omissions were not merely technical defects. Rather, they undermined any finding that the documents reflected a settled and final intention as to the disposition of the deceased’s property. The validation of the document in Groskopf remained.

Takeaways

Read together, the decisions illustrate both the reach and the limits of section 21.1. Courts may be prepared to overlook substantial deficiencies in form where the evidence demonstrates a clear and final expression of testamentary intention. However, section 21.1 is not a license to assemble a will from a grab bag of incomplete notes, worksheets, and disconnected documents. The court may cure defects in execution, but it cannot supply testamentary intentions that are missing from the documents themselves.