In Wong v. Lui, 2023 ONCA 272, the Ontario Court of Appeal provided clarification on the interpretation of section 15(4)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002, which allows for the suspension of the 15-year ultimate limitation period for minors without a litigation guardian. The key issue before the Court of Appeal was whether this suspension applies only when the claim arises during the claimant’s minority, or whether it also applies if the claimant was a minor at any point during the 15-year period.
Background
This issue arose in the context of a negligence claim filed in 2021 by Wong and Tan, who had purchased a property in 2019 and later discovered latent construction defects. The defects were allegedly tied to building permits issued as far back as 1987.
Wong and Tan filed a claim against the City of Toronto and others, alleging negligence relating to building permits issued in both 1987 and 2017. The City sought to dismiss the claims related to the 1987 permits, arguing that they were statute-barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period, which had expired on January 1, 2019.
Motion Judge’s Decision
The motion judge rejected the City’s position. She held that the limitation period had been suspended between 2004 (when the Limitations Act, 2002 came into force) and 2006 (when Wong turned 18), even though the cause of action did not arise until 2019. Based on this interpretation, the claim was not barred.
Court of Appeal Decision
Justice E.E. Gillese, writing for a unanimous panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal, overturned the decision of the motion judge. The Court held that section 15(4)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002 suspends the 15-year ultimate limitation period only if the claim arises while the claimant is a minor without a litigation guardian. Since Wong’s claim arose in 2019—when she was already an adult—the tolling provision in section 15(4)(b) did not apply, and the limitation period was not suspended.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the policy objectives underlying limitation statutes. These laws are designed to promote legal certainty, finality, and repose, ensuring that defendants are not exposed to potential liability indefinitely. While exceptions to limitation periods exist to protect vulnerable parties, such as minors or individuals under legal disability, the Court made clear that these exceptions are to be interpreted narrowly. They are intended to shield individuals who are genuinely incapable of pursuing legal claims—not to indefinitely extend limitation periods simply because a claimant was a minor at some point during the 15-year window.
The Court also relied on a contextual and purposive interpretation of the statute, aligning section 15(4)(b) with the historical approach under section 47 of the former Limitations Act. Under that provision, tolling applied only where the claim arose during a period of legal disability. The Court found no reason to depart from that reasoning. It pointed to the present-tense wording in section 15(4)(b)—specifically, the phrase “the person is a minor”—as evidence that the suspension applies solely to claims that arise during the claimant’s minority.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that Wong did not have a cause of action while she was a minor. The right to sue in relation to the 1987 building permits arose in 2019, when she discovered the latent defects—well after the 15-year ultimate limitation period had expired on January 1, 2019. As a result, her claim regarding the 1987 permits was statute-barred.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the motion judge’s order, and declared that the respondents’ claims related to the 1987 building permits were statute-barred. The Court also awarded costs of both the appeal and the motion below to the City of Toronto.
Conclusion
Section 15(4)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002 only suspends the running of the 15-year ultimate limitation period if the claim arises while the claimant is a minor without a litigation guardian.
Individuals who become aware of or acquire a cause of action after reaching adulthood—regardless of whether they were minors at any time during the 15-year period—cannot benefit from this exception.
As a result, legal practitioners must exercise diligence in determining the precise point at which the cause of action arose and whether the claimant had the legal capacity to bring the claim at that time. This is especially important in cases involving long-past events, where the passage of time may complicate limitation period analysis.
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